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
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SOCIOLOGY



KARL MARX'S
200TH ANNIVERSARY



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AS A SCIENCE



MIGRATION

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Объективная, точная, регулярная и свежая информация «Мониторинга» полезна всем, кто принимает управленческие решения, занимается прогнозированием и анализом развития общества. Наш журнал пригодится сотрудникам научных и аналитических центров, работникам органов управления, ученым, преподавателям, молодым исследователям, студентам и аспирантам, журналистам.

Тематика материалов охватывает широкий круг социальных, экономических, политических вопросов, основные рубрики посвящены теории, методам и методологии социологических исследований, вопросам взаимодействия государства и общества, социальной диагностике. Каждый номер журнала содержит двухмесячный дайджест основных результатов еженедельных общероссийских опросов ВЦИОМ.

Мы публикуем статьи специалистов, представляющих ведущие научные социологические центры, институты, организации, а также ВУЗы России и зарубежных стран. Широкая тематика журнала представляет возможность выступить на его страницах представителям смежных специальностей (политологам, историкам, экономистам и т.д.), опирающимся в своих исследованиях на эмпирические социологические данные.

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GUEST EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

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A. V. Rezaev

WHAT ARE SOCIOLOGISTS DOING IN THE 21ST CENTURY: LOOKING AT THE ISA CONGRESS IN TORONTO AND BEYOND

WHAT ARE SOCIOLOGISTS DOING IN THE 21ST CENTURY: LOOKING AT THE ISA CONGRESS IN TORONTO AND BEYOND

ЧЕМ ЗАНИМАЮТСЯ СОЦИОЛОГИ В XXI ВЕКЕ: ВЗГЛЯД НА ВСЕМИРНЫЙ КОНГРЕСС МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЙ СОЦИОЛОГИЧЕСКОЙ АССОЦИАЦИИ В ТОРОНТО И НЕ ТОЛЬКО

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Sociology is too serious a matter to be left to the sociologists. This is a paraphrase of the famous saying that is ascribed to Georges Clemenceau, Prime Minister of France in the early 20th century¹. I want to begin the Editor's Introduction in keeping with this thought by talking briefly about the rationale and the contents of the Issue that you, esteemed reader, are about to open.

The idea of this volume was conceived after long discussions we had at the USA-Russia Research Laboratory «TANDEM» that Peter Kivisto (Augustana College) and I have had the pleasure to establish at St Petersburg State University in 2015.

TANDEM means simply «Transnationalism and Migration Processes: Comparative and Institutional Analysis». In fact we thought to establish a professional research unit *not only* to do transnational migration studies but rather to organize an intellectual space and institutional framework for young scholars who are interested in doing social analytics about the reality of contemporary societies.

In April 2018 when we came up to the situation of another resource cutting and we had to decide where and how to go further with our research activities there arrived a proposition from the *Monitoring of Public Opinion* Journal in Moscow to prepare its first issue in English. It was a real challenge both in terms of timing — the on-line version of the 300 pages volume has to appear in half a year, in October 2018, and in terms of the conceptual content. The difficulties were real, yet by no means insuperable.

Taking into account that the XIX ISA Congress was scheduled for July 2018 where in the framework of RC-20, Comparative Sociology, Peter Kivisto and myself were to chair two regular sessions: 'Comparative Capitalism/s: Socio-economic and political developments in the former communist countries of Europe and Asia after 1989' and 'Comparative Research in Migration and Citizenship Studies: Transformative Change or Status Quo Dynamics?' it was quite obvious that we'll be oriented in our efforts to this professional sociological forum.

Indeed, the ISA World Congress presents an appropriate opportunity to examine recent developments in the discipline of sociology. A substantial part of this examination quite properly should be devoted to what happened at the Congress. I thought though that it would be interesting and provocative to look also and to make a comparison with what has been discussed four years earlier at the XVIII ISA Congress in Yokohama, 2014, and to ring up a curtain a little bit for the next ISA Forum in Brazil in 2020. In order to meet these aims I decided to publish Interviews with the former ISA Presidents and to invite authors from Japan and Brazil to prepare their papers for the volume.

I am very happy to have professional bonds with the University of South Florida Institute on Russia. It consists of people who in time of such political turmoil without ruffle and on an even keel very professionally are doing their job of research and teaching. I asked, Golfo Alexopoulos, Director of the Institute to join the Project and to help me prepare this volume for publication. She kindly agreed. So, the University of South Florida's Institute on Russia provided assistance with the copyediting of this issue. Working together on projects like this one helps to establish real partnership between the Universities located overseas. One of the campuses of USF is in St. Petersburg, Florida — a city co-founded by Russian immigrant Peter Demens — and the sister city

¹ La guerre! C'est une chose trop grave pour la confier à des militaires — War is too serious a matter to entrust to military men.

of St. Petersburg, Russia. I hope that we can build a «Two St. Petersburgs» program that will promote academic and cultural exchanges between the USA and Russia.

To return to the paraphrased maxim of Georges Clemenceau I've started this Introduction with. Basically his idea was to let the politicians but not military men to take care of the wars. In our case, with sociologists, I believe the opposite is true. Those sociologists who are taking care of the future of sociology as an institutionalized discipline somehow are getting very close to politicians and ideologically oriented organizations. And if such a tendency exists, it's definitely not a productive one.

In fact, I believe the impression that the future of sociologists have to be only in the hands of sociologists common though it be, is false to the core, because normally sociologists are wo/men of the system — it might be unorthodox and exuberant system, but the system nonetheless. That is they will do their work having in mind primarily the goals of the system but not necessarily the goals of a science.

Societies continue to be divided; back in the 20th century there was a division between West (capitalism) and East (communism), now it is division between North and South, the framework within which classes, gender, race, and the digital-divide need to be analyzed. Sociologists are obtaining more and more specific data about economic, social, political processes, structures, and institutions. Yet there are grounds to argue that we do not know a society we are living in. And this is not only about the political parties and leaders who win elections today.

Immanuel Wallerstein, at the session organized for the former ISA Presidents at the Yokohama Congress, told an anecdote. He remembered the discussion between Soviet and Western sociologists at one of the earlier ISA Congress. The delegate from the USSR was very satisfied with a Soviet society but critical about sociology, Robert Merton was satisfied with the status of sociology yet very critical about society. Raymond Aron criticized both society and sociology. A quick glance at the papers presented at the ISA Congresses in Yokohama and Toronto allows us to affirm that today sociologists are with Raymond Aron on this one.

People conduct their lives on the basis of many realities. And generally, realities are a mixture of both extremes — of certainty and uncertainty, of myth and fact. The context of sociological development is no exception.

Sociology has lost its unquestioned claim to disciplinary legitimacy. Most of its critics continue to demand radical reform. Controversy between partisans of disciplinary disestablishment and partisans of institutional arrangement consolidation is marching on.

As attention focuses on departmentalization of sociology, we can be easily distracted from a much deeper concern: the manner in which results of sociological inquiry are to be viewed by sociologists themselves. Will they continue to treat it as a science oriented toward research and understanding social phenomena or a commodity that could be more efficiently produced and consumed by a greater number of people?

The study of sociology's prospects has never lacked for polemicists, but it is still little in the way of respectable analytical research about potentials of the sociological profession, especially in the time when new artificial algorithmic reality evident.

As society takes advantage of 'artificial intelligence' appearing in everyday life particularly in the era of on-line sociality there is a risk that sociologists will study what is easy to study rather than what is important for sociology to comprehend. People

in general and scholars in particular occasionally like to search only where the light currently shines and when they are familiar with a location. We have launched a longitudinal project at the ISA Congress in Toronto as an effort to develop an antidote to such searching. It is oriented to step back for a moment and to reflect about the nature of artificial intelligence and on-line phenomena, and the environment in which they occur that are worth studying by sociologists. You'll see some preliminary outcomes published in this issue.

The volume has two main themes. The first theme concerns the opportunity to have a look at the current state of affairs in the domain of sociology as it was presented at the ISA Congress in Toronto and elsewhere. The second is the need for more interaction and communication between sociologists in the West and scholars who study societies in the rest of the world. These two groups have been and continue to be estranged from each other, and I believe, to the detriment of both.

The whole enterprise may seem peculiarly ambitious and intangible and may appear to result in something that can only divert attention from the real problems that sociologists have to take care of today. Some readers might argue that it would have been better to stress the specification of the rules of the game for sociology of tomorrow.

However, the purpose of this special issue is not to establish samples and not to provide specific guidance about how to do sociology, but rather to examine in broad strokes the issues that will shape the ongoing debate among professional sociologists around the world about the essence, scope, prospective emphases, and priorities in research programs of the sociological sciences today and in the years ahead.

Two questions were kept constantly in the fore: What should sociology have to do with a society today: to study it, to intervene into societal issues and problems, or to do both? Where is sociology likely to go as a result of where it is now?

The authors of the articles contained in this volume have approached their themes thoughtfully, candidly, and with a rare sharing of their considered wisdom. I recommend the reading of all the essays and materials published herein. They differ in style and in the number of citations; they vary in mood and some of them clearly reflect distinct angles of vision. But they are all highly informative in terms of questions, data, and the mood of the sociological sciences in the world in the first quarter of the 21st century.

The Structure and the Contents of the Volume

I am really proud to say that after the thorough selection process we are publishing here materials by the authors who represent 11 countries: Brazil, France, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, India, Italy, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, and the USA.

The contributions in the volume are organized into eight sections. It doesn't need to argue much to prove that grouping papers is an arbitrary exercise. A paper may fit into two groups equally well, yet sometimes it may fit neither one well enough. The current allocation of the articles and other materials in the volume is just a convenient way of presentation to highlight research that shares certain ideas and properties.

The first section of the volume is the Interviews section. Here you will meet with outstanding contemporary sociologists who attended and presented their papers at the ISA Congress in Toronto. The Interviews with the past ISA Presidents Margaret Archer,

Alberto Martinelli, and Michael Burawoy are accompanied by a talk with Karim Murji and Sara Neal, current editors of *Current Sociology*, a leading ISA Journal.

It is curiosity that runs throughout Margaret Archer's interview on «doing sociology with interest,» but the same is no less visible in the accounts provided by Alberto Martinelli and Michael Burawoy that stress respectively sociology's usefulness and necessity for the contemporary capitalist world, as well as call out for its continuing public engagement. Indeed, one is tempted to think about the three contributions as comprising a seamless whole — perhaps even in a Hegelian manner with its taste for triadic structures. Such a three-step sequence lends itself visible in these talks and could perhaps be a model for a sociologist's career development: one starts with an interest, a spark of curiosity, only to discover that sociology can also be useful for somebody else, and, in a further step of progression, can contribute to the advancement of the good of the many. Interview with Karim Murji and Sara Neal shed some light on how editors of ISA journals — by definition journals international in scope and globe in content — help sociologists to encounter their readers and sociology to find their paths into the 21st century.

As the talks with these prominent figures in sociology amply illustrate, successful development of International Sociological Association cannot be decreed. It depends on an imaginative and pragmatic long-range effort of devoted sociologists in individual countries. There is little that can be done by professional international organizations to substitute for domestic effort in nurturing skilled sociologists and building up professional institutions, though proper incentives are likely to be a necessary condition.

The second section of this volume comprises five papers. It opens with Celi Scalón's account on the sociological development since the Yokohama Congress. She reviews sociology's position beyond center-periphery dichotomy and provides a discussion of what it means for sociology to be global in the 21st century. The essay calls for a comparative perspective and for reflexivity in contemporary sociology. The author depicts historical paths of social science from 'the West' to 'the Rest' of the world and shows current troubles and challenges to it. She brings up her own experience as a scholar from Brazil considering issues of sociology in and of Latin America. She also discusses the influence of BRICS countries on the development of social science and the promotion collaboration between scholars.

In «The Iron Bars get Closer: Anormative Social Regulation» Margaret Archer presents a theoretical discussion of the fundamental transformation in social regulations in contemporary capitalism. The author takes her concept of 'anormative regulation' to reflect on multiple changes in governmental, business, educational, and other rules proliferating in contemporary societies. The paper elaborates on classical sociological questions and challenges the Durkheimian (functionalist) tradition; it has clear structure and its argumentation is supported by empirical cases. The paper provides deep insights into current social processes combining theoretical sociology and moral philosophy discussing consequences of anormative regulations for social solidarity. It also provides conceptual frames for comparative studies of different countries, regions, communities and organizations in relation to the development of anormative regulation and its effects.

The paper «Preventing and exiting violence: a domain for sociology?» by Michel Wieviorka gives an insightful review of the current state in social science research

on violence and its prevention. The issue at stake — violence prevention — is both theoretically challenging and practically demanded. The author discusses important conceptual distinctions between theories of violence and juxtaposes them to approaches to study violence prevention. He argues that preventing and exiting violence should become a special topic of study for sociologists and anthropologists, as well as activists, and provides recommendations for the organization of such a field. The author gives empirical illustrations of various violent conflicts to support theoretical argument. I believe this article would be of a high interest to scholars in Russia where violence is under-researched and an under-discussed topic in the literature.

Walter Allen's paper deals with the unresolved problems of racial inequality in the USA. The author argues that higher education in the USA is a site of struggle where black progress can best be characterized as «two steps forward, one step back.» Allen discusses status and trends in black higher education in terms of lived experience and W. E. B. Dubois' theories. He examines the persistence of racial discrimination and inequality in different areas of contemporary American life.

In the last paper of the section Andrey V. Rezaev and Natalia Tregubova attempt to outline a positive agenda for the development of sociology in the immediate future, delving into the issue of the Artificial Intelligence (AI) and its implications for the social sciences. Being as it is a vibrant research field, they argue that AI should be seen as both a challenge and an opportunity for research growth in sociology. The latter aspect turns out to be especially salient in the authors' analysis, since the disciplinary borders are permeable and in flux within the social studies of AI. While Rezaev and Tregubova concede that this blurriness of different disciplines engaging with the issue of AI might be just a temporary state of affairs, to be followed by consolidation of this «anti-disciplinary» field, they do see signs of hope for sociologists in the possibilities to refine their methodologies and move beyond elements of the old agenda.

Two papers are included in the third section. It's a Trump Phenomenon section. The authors here address the issue of 'Trump and Trumpism'. Whether their words make us feel better is not clear. That we are better informed about the social effects of the Trump phenomenon cannot be denied. This latter condition is surely one of the main missions of publications in scholarly journals.

Peter Kivisto develops and expands upon a theme introduced in his 2017 book, *The Trump Phenomenon: How the Politics of Populism Won in 2016*. Specifically, he offers a thick descriptive account of Trump as businessman that were presented in short form in the book. In his paper «Investigative Journalism's Collective Narrative of Trump in Business» he explores the business careers of three generations of the Trump family based on the material amassed by business journalists who have been reporting on Trump for decades. He examines these accounts from the perspective of civil sphere theory. The article combines various journalistic assessments into a single, comprehensive narrative that depicts the tortured business trajectories of Donald Trump and his ancestors as well as offering a wider background about business development in the USA since the end of XIX century. Special attention is drawn to the disconnect between Trump's self-presentation and his conduct in business, including his numerous economic failures, norm violations, and illegal activities. The paper

provides links to the sources of information about Donald Trump that are probably not known very well to a sociology reader around the world.

Lauren Langman in «Donald Trump: Morbid Symptom of the Interregnum Trump as Trope» employs critical theory, particularly its linkages to Freudian theory, to offer an account of the authoritarian character of Trump and the authoritarianism of his most devoted followers — the so-called «base». He addresses the burning issue of Donald Trump's controversial policies and no less controversial public discourses that surround it, focusing on what the three primary categories of supporters found in his candidacy. Langman examines wealthy supporters in the GOP, right-wing Christians, and racist white nationalists. Whereas the first group is largely driven by acquisitive motives and sees in Trump a vehicle for making the one-percent richer, the latter two are fighting the cultural wars — motivated by fear and *ressentiment*.

The section on Migration in this volume consist of five papers. Migration is one of the hottest topics in sociology today. Sociology has to continue its efforts to find new theoretical and methodological frameworks to study migration, introducing new data and materials, and developing new visions and insights about how to use research results for the good of society.

Thomas Faist in the article «Immigration into European Welfare States: How Conflicts and Inequalities are (Re)Produced» analyses current migration policies in European countries. He inquires into contradictions between actions and interests of nation states, on the one hand, and the trans-state structure of the EU, on the other hand, concerning labor and forced migration. The author reflects on conflicts and inequalities that arise/might arise because of these policies. The paper provides a deep, theoretically grounded analysis of 'hot' issues concerning the integration of migrants and refugees in contemporary Europe. Special attention is drawn to cultural inequalities and boundaries that are crystallized in the processes of transnational migration. The article's conclusions might be used to formulate hypotheses for comparative migration studies, both in Europe and in other regions.

Tetsuo Mizukami introduces a discussion of the development of migration and ethnic studies in Japan. In his «The Rise and Progression of Migration and Ethnicity Studies in Japan's Sociology» you'll find a thorough review of the research on migration done by Japanese sociologists, authoritative accounts on the formation of ethnic communities in Japan, an examination of change in immigration directions. The author discusses how migration and ethnic studies in Japan have changed after mid-1980s in response to the growth of migration to the country. He argues that although Japan was a 'nation of emigrants' in the late 19th — early 20th century, now it needs to be recognized as a 'nation of immigrants'.

The problem of human trafficking in the last several years has generated a tremendous amount of public attention throughout the world. It has received growing coverage in the media, and we are witnessing a lot of anti-trafficking activism, while new policies and enforcement mechanisms have been created in the Western countries to attack the problem. However, policymaking and enforcement people still lack an evidence-based approach to the problem because so little high-quality research has been done on the topic, especially on the situation in the former communist countries.

Sergey Ryazantsev and Svetlana Sivoplyasova in «Russian women at the international marriage market: ways of migration and adaptation in host societies» consider the inter-marriage market as a problem. The authors chart the infrastructure of this peculiar market along with its unfortunate byproducts like the shadow marriage market and human trafficking. The authors seek to overcome disciplinary boundaries by combining the perspectives of the behavioral economy, traditional demography, and cultural studies. Based on the analysis of media and of migration statistics, the paper characterized the behavioral patterns of Russian women in the international marriage market, as well as marital migration of Russian women to four regions: United States of America, Europe, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. The authors find that, even in the presence of an elaborate infrastructure, substantial risks remain as expectations don't match realities; however, Russian women who migrated for the purposes of marriage rarely return home.

Elizabeth Aranda and Elizabeth Vaquera's paper «Immigrant Family Separation, Fear, and the U. S. Deportation Regime» is based on 50 in-depth interviews with undocumented young adults in the state of Florida. It discusses the US Deportation Regime. The authors found that the practice of family separation in US immigration policy is not a new phenomenon. They scrupulously show how the fear of separation is overwhelming young adults and their parents.

The last paper of the section, «Transnationalism Online: Exploring Migration Processes with Large Data Sets» by Valentin Starikov, Anastasia Ivanova and Maxim Nee, suggests a novel agenda for migration research, bridging Rezaev and Tregubova's paper on artificial intelligence in the second section of this volume. The authors outline a research program on «transnationalism online», making a compelling case for the salience of its digital dimensions and tracing transnational practices, as well as its call for novel methods to study them.

The next section of the volume embraces papers that reflect on interconnected changes in institutionalized policies and cultural practices in different spheres of social life.

While social scientists have studied the effects of social entrepreneurship on social cohesion and inclusivity, and its role in mitigating social exclusion and poverty in the developed world, little has been done in the countries that joined market economies after the collapse of the communist system. Tea Golob and Matej Makarovič in «Work Integration Social Entrepreneurship in East-Central Europe through Structural and Semiotic Transformations» explore this issue drawing upon secondary data from four post-communist society of East-Central Europe — Croatia, Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Poland. They examine the contemporary situation of social entrepreneurship with a focus on the integration of the disadvantaged social groups in the labor market (WISEs: work integration social enterprises). The authors approach the problem from the perspective of cultural political economy. They specify and discuss both the communist and post-communist transformations as mostly unfavorable for WISEs.

Anna Dlużewska and Jolanta Rodzos' paper «Sustainable Tourism Supranational Policies and the Wellbeing — Gaps and Challenges from the Hosts' and the Guests' Perspective» focuses on the patterns of participation of local communities in cultural ecosystem management. Borrowing from «large N», statistical research design, the authors engage into the analysis of 33 case studies based on data from different

regions. In their attempt to enlarge the established classification of participation — spontaneous, induced and coercive— Dluzewska and Rodzos find that social capital plays a crucial role in linking communities to cultural ecosystem management, and thus it should be taken into account by policy-makers.

The paper «Sport practices in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh: The Making of Sport Sociology in India» by Sanjay Tewari and Sanjana Tewari discusses issues of social development in India through the lens of the sociology of sports. Based on data from a survey and expert interviews, the authors assess the actual condition and prospects for sport activities in two states, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. They conclude that sport has great potential for promoting community networks and social inclusion, and further sociological research is needed in this area.

David Weakliem's paper «Thirty Years of Change in the Publication Process» in the sixth section brings us to the world of these top professionals who edit sociological research and prepare it for publication. His essay provides insightful reflections about changes in publishing sociological research. Based on his experience as editor of *Comparative Sociology* (Brill), as an author and as a reader of scholarly articles, Weakliem characterizes noticeable transformations in the publication process (longer period of review, more reviewers, changes in articles' structure and genre, etc.) and provides technological and social causes of these transformations. The author also discusses positive and negative consequences for scholarly discussion and the quality of scholarly production, putting on the table several suggestions for possible improvements. The paper contains focused and insightful remarks about the development of sociology. The essay will be an invaluable companion to those who seek to publish their papers in high-ranked sociological journals.

The next paper introduces a new book. It is Tom Dwyer's remarks as the General Editor of the *Handbook on the Sociology of Youth in BRICS Countries*, Singapore, World Scientific, 2018. The author discusses broader context of BRICS countries through the lens of sociology and comments on diverse issues that are presented in the Handbook: youth and social action, intergenerational dependency, youth and information technologies, etc. He also comments on some limitations of the reviewed handbook and outlines perspectives for further research in sociology of youth.

The seventh section is about Karl Marx. To prepare a general review of how sociologists commemorated the 200th anniversary of the founding father of their subject I invited a contribution from Dmitrii Zhikharevich and Natalia Tregubova, the authors who presented a paper on Marx at the Congress in Toronto. Their paper is an extended review of selected conferences and other academic events devoted to Marx's 200th anniversary held in 2018. They review some of the papers presented and reflect on the current position of Marxist and Marxiological scholarship on contemporary campuses in the era of «academic capitalism».

In the last section of the volume we are pleased to hand over the transcripts, prepared for publication, of the presentations that were delivered at the special session organized by Alberto Martinelli in the framework of the ISA Congress in Toronto. It was a session commemorating the life and scholarly contributions of Neil Smelser².

² Unfortunately, due to some technical and other issues, we cannot publish here all the addresses that were presented at this session.

In spite of the presentational styles and particular wording some authors chose that may not be typical of a scientific journal, the purpose of this Section is to provide a forum for scholars who had the experience of working together with Neil Smelser. By publishing their commentaries, we hope that readers will be able to evaluate or reevaluate the merits and great input to sociology that Neil Smelser has made as well as to know more about this outstanding sociologist as a person. To members of my generation, he was not only among the most influential figures in sociology but also the person who due to his generosity of spirit helped a lot to sociologists at various stages of their careers.

Neil's cohorts of sociologists have carried his passion for science forward and have preserved a culture of being a real gentleman and scholar in the social sciences. It is with a sense of great respect that we remember and talk about this giant of sociology in whose shadow we stand.

A final word of acknowledgement is in order.

Although I was not able to include in this volume every manuscript I received, I wish to thank all those who submitted articles for our consideration as well those who reviewed them or otherwise assisted with the review process. Reviewers are the essence of academic journals. They are anonymous for most of the process however, their job is just invaluable. To each author I am particularly in debt for this assignment was an addition to a very busy schedule of research, writing, and teaching.

I am in substantial debt to TANDEM, the USA-Russia Research Laboratory at St Petersburg State University, where this volume was conceived and developed. I want to express my gratitude to Peter Kivisto — he is the person without whom the TANDEM simply could not have been appeared. I am always struck by Peter's decency, intelligence, and unbelievable amount of knowledge in all fields of sociology but what strikes me more is his openness and willingness to share his knowledge with everybody. We are really lucky to have him at TANDEM.

I want to thank personally all the Laboratory personnel: Pavel Lisitsyn, Natalia Tregubova, Valentin Starikov, Alexander Stepanov, Dmitrii (Mitya) Zhikharevich, Maxim Nee, Anastasia Ivanova. They have stayed close to this volume from its inception to its completion, helping me greatly at every stage. I am grateful for their willingness to involve themselves so generously in thinking with me and working hard on this project collectively. Valentin Starikov deserves particular acknowledgment: [video](#) that opens this Issue is entirely his job.

My special thanks and deep appreciation go to Golfo Alexopoulos, Director, Institute on Russia and Chair, Department of History University of South Florida. Sincere words of thanks also due to Nana Tuntiya of USF; she worked exceptionally hard and professionally making some of the papers in this issue to sound really good in English.

I am deeply grateful to the Board and the editors of the *Monitoring of Public Opinion* Journal who invited me to be the Guest Editor of the Journal's first Issue in English. They have cooperated splendidly in every stage of the planning and production of this volume. In addition, I wish to thank the MPO General managing editor, Anna Kuleshova, for her encouragement, highly consistent and reliable support, for her enthusiasm in performing the various kinds of necessary editorial assistance on the way to prepare

this volume to production. Victoria Silaeva, scientific editor, worked really hard to make this issue happen. I am so impressed by her professional, meticulous and accurately done job. I render her my affectionate homage as well as my sincere thanks. Also I would like to extend my appreciation to Yuliya Baskakova of WCIOM for her assistance in organizing and conducting interviews in Toronto. My appreciation and thank you go to Madeleine Smith, a bright student from Monash University, Australia. Her comments about the materials in this volume at the latest stage of the project were important and very helpful. I wish her all the best in all her academic endeavors.

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These and many other people have contributed in various ways to the volume. All of them deserve credit and a share in any accomplishments, though I am the only one who deserves to be blamed for any shortcomings that might be noticed by the readers.

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It is my earnest hope that this volume of papers and materials will contribute in perceptible fashion to the informed discussion and determination which must precede and accompany the making of a better world of sociology in the World.

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INTERVIEWS

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M. S. Archer

DO SOCIOLOGY WITH INTEREST

DO SOCIOLOGY WITH INTEREST

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СОЦИОЛОГИЕЙ ДОЛЖНЫ ЗАНИМАТЬСЯ ЗАИНТЕРЕСОВАННЫЕ ЛЮДИ

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Professor Archer, first of all let us congratulate you on such a wonderful and inspirational presentation that you just had at the Session of the Former ISA Presidents here in Toronto. We were all impressed by your speech. You addressed the subject with openness, honesty, and high professionalism. We also want to thank you so very much for a conversation that you agreed to have with us. It will be published in the special issue of the *Public Opinion Monitor* Journal.

— Today you are a world-known distinguished sociologist. I doubt that there are professional sociologists who don't know your work. But if I may start our talk with a question about your past, can you tell in a few words what led you to study sociology?

— Well, imagine, I was fifteen, a school girl obviously, and I joined the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Many professors, who became rather famous, were very happy to talk to a fifteen year old, it was great. So, we walked and we talked, because I was organizing it from one coast of England to the other coast, it is not so very far. So, I asked all the questions that I wanted to ask because we were not taught sociology, social theory, anthropology, none of that at school. And they were great, they had time, well, they had nothing else to do, it's true, maybe it was just another tutorial to them. I asked about Weber, I asked about Marx, I asked about Durkheim, those few people that I'd heard about at that age. These conversations changed my life. I had been prepared by my school to do English literature, go to Cambridge and spend rest of my days deconstructing «La Chanson de Roland». So that was the beginning. And it never stopped. I had to have a very big row with the school because they expected me to go to Cambridge; and I said, 'No, I'm going to LSE, London School of Economics, and I'm going to study sociology'. — 'Oh, our girls do not do things like that'. — 'This one does' was my response. I knew I'd made the right choice after a week at LSE and I never changed my mind.

— Is current sociology the same science as sociology at the time when you decided to dedicate your life and to be engaged in sociological theory?

— I hope, it's different because, I hope, other people have made it different, helped to make it different. Then it was very boring, particularly in England, it was like the bad old days in Russia. It was empiricist, you just counted things, observed things, treated your observations with the objective of correlating them and running regressions. The only thing, to tell you the truth, which I have never published is my PhD thesis, which is a model of empiricism. So, empiricism had to go. In terms of social ontology, we had to replace something better than sense data. I'm not saying sense data tells you nothing. It tells you, at least, that there are four people sitting around this table right now. But even the empirical statement that there are four people sitting around the table is not as self-evident as it appears. Two of you could be pregnant, in which case some people would argue there are six people sitting around the table. Or maybe one of you is having twins—seven people, both are having twins—eight people. So, a lot comes down to how we define things including what might look obvious things like who is here. I know it's an absolutely basic reply to make, but it is not self-evident. I know many laws in many different countries that treat a pregnant woman differently from a non-pregnant woman, even if both of them are guilty of the same offense under legal consideration, they would go to prison in different ways. It's a very simple example, but I've always loved simple examples because if you tell them to your students, they remember. Give them a formal definition, such as everything hinges upon the definition of personhood in this case, they would hold on to that for five minutes, and then it would just vanish.

— What do you think about professional sociological congresses? Say, if we look at the headings of professional sociological meetings organized by ISA and ASA in the last decade that we have prepared for you, do you believe these headings reflect actual developments in sociology or that real sociology goes in one direction and conferences in another one?

— Well, you can't give a 'yes' or 'no' answer. Take this one on your list. Part of its theme is 'Sociology on the move'. Well, I hope it has always been on the move, other-

wise it would be dead! Take this one too from 2014, 'Facing an Unequal World': we are always facing an unequal world for different reasons and confronting different kinds of inequalities. Then again, 'Sociological Research and Public Debate', has always been relevant. You could say in England there wouldn't have been such public debate unless there had been sociological research starting at the end of the nineteenth century on poverty, unemployment, unnecessary diseases people had... As for the American sociological association: the same goes for its theme in 2017; 'Culture, Inequalities and Social Inclusion across the Globe', there always have been concerns about this in Eastern Europe, including Stalin's 'nationalities policies'. 2015 is quite interesting because they actually put sexualities in the title. Is this some kind of recognition that it is something sociological to talk about? It wouldn't be apparent in the previous generation. Well, 2013, 'Interrogating Inequality: Linking Micro and Macro', you could have that at any time. Then there is an intriguing one, I don't know what it means — 'The New Politics of Community'. 'Worlds of Work' could have been done at any time...

I think I know what's behind your question. We sociologists are commentators on current changes in the world, in the social environment: always some wanted to be more than that but always to some extent we are just that. We are a part of the world, and we are moving too, so we have to be refining and developing theories the whole time. And there is a big difference between many theories and critical realism... Critical Realism is not a finished work that one person, Roy Bhaskar, gave us. He was a philosopher, and a very modest philosopher, who said «My job is to be a philosophical under-laborer for the social sciences». Effectively he was saying «Yes, I will conceptualize ontology, epistemology, and metaphysics for you, but it is you people, who need to go and do the research and put forward the specific theories about these particular social phenomena». Realism should always be developing because the nature of the open social order is by definition changeable. This is what social morphogenesis is for — it is neither philosophy nor grand theory but an analytical framework useful in the explanation of any new social problem or issue. If we ever treated C.R.'s origins as received wisdom, incapable of refinement and extension it would be dead. This was the fate of Marxism when coercively imposed in the former Soviet bloc, it became sclerotic and incapable of meeting social change. That problem now is demographic, namely the old guard, the old party members, still hang on to their orthodoxy and to their posts in universities, and they still teach their old orthodoxy. What do we do? Wait for them to die? Maybe. Sometimes it feels like that.

— **One particular question to you as a former President of the ISA: how are these titles are formulated? Who is responsible for a decision?**

— Usually it's the executive committee. Sometimes we agree and sometimes we fight when two themes seem very attractive, and we can't do both. Another question is why do we have such thematic titles when much of the time people ignore them... We expect the international social science council of the United Nations to support our conferences, but we know that we would not have financial support if we didn't give them a title.

— **You mentioned Marx, and this year is his 200 anniversary. What do you think about Marx and Marxists in contemporary sociology?**

— We will always be indebted to Marx in sociology, and we should admit it, I think, instead of regarding it as a 'dirty secret'. Bringing to the fore the forces and relations

of production, even though they change over time, still tells us a lot. If you really want to understand a given time, place and circumstances, have a look at these two things, don't forget them. And some of the many good ideas he gave us are now neglected... Ideology, for example. I think it's a wonderful concept but very few people are using 'ideology' these days, I still do, because I think he was absolutely right that culture and structure are two ontologically distinct things, distinguishable because of their different causal contributions. Why would you theorize about ideology if it merely reflected the material forces of production? As its mirror image it would add nothing to explanation. No, it's much more complicated in its role of linking material interests, material structures to ideas and vice versa in a manner which strengthens both. There is always a nexus between interests and ideas. And when groups of people are looking around for an idea to legitimate their vested material interests they 'raid the cultural cupboard' and from it they pull compatible ideas and link these ideas to others that suit them in their current context. So, the connection between interests and ideas is very, very important. Because genuinely few groups with vested material interests will adopt a set of ideas that are not congruent with them — otherwise they cut their own throats. Collectively — as political parties, unions, or voluntary associations and pressure groups we don't tend to do that, which does not mean that as activists we necessarily pick the best of ideas and certainly not that we use them to the best ends.

— If we can come back to sociology in general. Do you believe that we need it as a distinct kind of research — not social sciences, not migration studies but sociology as a specific discipline?

— We need it. And I believe the Morphogenetic Approach that you will have encountered in my books — which is not a theory but much closer to methodology — supplements the ontology of Critical Realism for sociologists. Both are essential, as is the third element, Practical Social Theorizing that offers specific explanations in the problem fields you have just mentioned. First, every social agent and actor has a social ontology. This is not optional, but it may be implicit or explicit. However, there is a damaging tendency in the West to reduce social ontology to social epistemology. The way things are can never be confounded with how we take them to be, believe them to be or want them to be. Take a recent example from the world football competition. Many said «Oh, wonderful! Britain, as it worked out, is going to play Croatia in the next round and that will be a walk-over». That was a belief. Well, you know how it ended. Croatia won. How we take things to be cannot be substituted for how they are. Nevertheless, we all have hopes, expectations and even wish-fulfillments about how things will be in everyday life but reality has the last word. If a young couple believes it has the income to service a heavy mortgage and even convinces the bank about this, it does not protect them from defaulting on their payments, the apartment being repossessed, and the couple becoming objectively less likely to be granted another one. We all have a social ontology, whether we like to say so or not. It does not explain very much. Of course, we would not be sitting here unless we believed that this terrace would carry our weight. Unless we had a certain set of beliefs, we could not get out of bed and go to work without assuming that the floor will carry us, the water will wash us, the coffee will wake us up and the food will get us going. But then in sociology we need an explanatory framework or approach to go further.

This is what the Morphogenetic Approach aims to do, it does not provide a basic ontology, but it says if you want to understand law, say, the law of property, which changes over time, or the rights of women that also change over time, any problem that you want to address, how do you go about it? Well, yes, people have written five hundred books on it, and you might get some ideas that way, but this does not move you very far along the track. So, my contribution in the morphogenetic approach is to break it down into three temporal phases: Structural/Cultural Conditioning — Social Interaction — Structural/Cultural Elaboration. We are always acting in a structural context. We couldn't be sitting here, at this nice hotel: probably the majority of the world does not have hotels like this. Now, I call it the conditioning context, you can call it the situation, it doesn't matter, but it is very important because it influences what we can do. I'll give you an example from today. I met an old friend, we had very little time, and we had a cup of coffee outdoors. That was not the ideal context, because of buses and traffic, and we could not hear one another. So, we grasped one or two things about what she had been doing, where she had been: you could catch one word, two or three, but not more. It happened in this example I'm giving you, that she had many things to do, official things to do this afternoon, and we only had half an hour. So, what did we spend this time doing? A little bit of diagnosing how bad the situation was for that conversation; then an attempt to fix the situation by yelling, and concluding this was all our interpersonal social interaction could be there. That was structural conditioning in this conversation's case. In the end we agreed it was hopeless, and we fixed a date tomorrow, when we could meet in quieter circumstances. And so, we get to structural elaboration. Well, structural elaboration, to start with is all about time. The structural elaboration will be tomorrow, not today, and we will meet in a place tomorrow, that will not be affected by conditions that existed today. Yet even that does not explain enough. You need practical social theory, it can be theories about conversation, or about conference themes, or about how we get married, or anything you like. This is the task of Practical Social Theory. Perhaps the decision for tomorrow was fallible because far too many of our mutual friends will be gathered there, so again the conversation will have to be postponed. But now we were dwelling not on having our conversation but on detecting a nearby place where we could have it. Practical Social Theorising is much the same; fallibility and revision until a new version seems to work.

— **Practical social theory? What do you mean by that?**

— Specific social theory, it does not have any heavy meaning to it, so it could be about health, education.

— **How would you characterize the main problem for sociology today? You mentioned empiricism at the time when you started your career, and now it's not in the mainstream, it exists but...**

— It's not dead yet.

— **Yes. But what is the main theme for sociology today?**

— There are many. One is all about structural conditioning that underlies it in academia. I'm very sorry for young people who are under pressures that we were never under. Pressures to publish very early, too early. While at the same time you are getting some teaching experience, and you're going to conferences. And it's just too much. A second year PhD student would be asked: «What is the impact of your research?»

It's crazy because the poor student has not done his research yet! How can it have an impact? That was one. The other is that people are not creators, they just hang on. You can see it very well at this conference and it's disappointing to me. People hang on to the theorists of the past, they won't let them die, they try to revive them, to reestablish them instead of looking at a problem straight in its face and asking 'what do we do about this?' What was good about the session of former ISA Presidents, was almost everybody was saying: 'What's wrong? What needs doing?', which is surprising because we come from different places, have different theoretical backgrounds, but I think we can see that we are all humanists. And yet nobody has written a humanistic sociology. Which is tragic.

— **To continue this line, would you recommend your young relatives to get major in sociology?**

— No.

— **Why?**

— Because as people they are not suited to it. One of my sons is a professional mountaineer, and the other is a professional engineer. They have no interest in abstract ideas of a sociological kind. Now, the different answer, if you raised the question 'Would you encourage young people to do sociology' — yes! If it really interests you. Without that flame don't do it, do something else.

— **If you were today a young researcher at the very beginning of your career what would you study, what would you look at as a researcher?**

— I couldn't have chosen a better one than I chose in France as a post-doc, namely why are the French and the British systems of education structured so differently, why do these differences remain (morphostasis) and with what causal consequences. So, I did two PhDs. This was a real research question and through trying to answer it. I began to conceptualize the Morphogenetic Approach. Sometimes they are not. Quite often I have students who ask me: 'Can I do PhD with you?' — 'Yes, on what?' — 'I want to work on gender' — or health, or the family, or whatever. And I say 'No, that's a field, it's not a research question'. What do you want to know about family or gender, or health?

— **Our last question: what are you working on now?**

— Oh, something fascinating. Artificial intelligence. One of the books will investigate «Can we be friends with an artificially intelligent robot?». It will involve philosophy, psychology and relational sociology. Technically, we are all enhanced human beings now and seem likely to become more so. Does this have to result in a 'war of the worlds' between biologically based and silicon based beings — as so many Hollywood movies presume? Instead I want to explore the possibility of a social order made up of humane beings, whatever their physical constitution.

— **Thank you very much indeed for the interview!**

INTERVIEWS

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A. Martinelli

SOCIOLOGY CONTINUES TO BE USEFUL AND EVEN NECESSARY

SOCIOLOGY CONTINUES TO BE USEFUL
AND EVEN NECESSARY

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СОЦИОЛОГИЯ ПО-ПРЕЖНЕМУ ПОЛЕЗНА
И ДАЖЕ НЕОБХОДИМА

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— Professor Martinelli, thank you very much for agreeing to have a talk with us that will be published in a Special Issue of the Public Opinion Monitor Journal. I want to ask you just a little about your own past. How did you get involved in sociology? Why it was sociology? Who were your heroes in sociology?

— I had my first degree in economics in Italy, then I studied sociology at the University of California, Berkeley, where I received my PhD. The reason of my interest in sociology was that studying economics I felt the need to frame economic analysis

into a broader cultural perspective for the study of social phenomena. I started working on the border between the two disciplines, because I published the Italian edition of Talcott Parson and Neil Smelser 'Economy and Society' and I wrote a long introduction which was useful in order to define my own approach. I then continued to teach and make research in economic sociology, a field that can be considered, to some extent at least, interdisciplinary, since is very close to what is political economy in political science and the institutionalist approach in economics. In spite of academic partitions, these disciplines have actually a lot in common in terms of concepts and research methods. Later on, I published books and essays also in other areas of sociological research and of other social sciences.

— **Now you have been in this profession for many decades. How would you characterized current sociology?**

— I think that sociology continues to be useful and even necessary because the complexity of social action and social structure is always there. There are new issues, new questions which require the sociological perspective. Major changes took place. For instance, we used to study problems within a well-defined context: the nation state; but in the last decades the many processes that we define with the catch-all word globalization can no longer be studied in the perspective of the nation state as the only context where social action takes place. Moreover, in some countries sociology risked to disappear, substituted by and fragmented into subjects like cultural studies, gender studies, ethnic studies. This risk of disappearing is over, but the risk of fragmentation remains

— **What is your assessment of the state of affairs in sociology? What are the main problems this field is facing at the moment?**

— I think it's a rather favorable moment for sociology. I will talk of the problems later. There has been a coming back of interest: some of the key problems of the contemporary world like multiethnic societies, migrations, the digital revolution and the change in the way of working, new types of professions, just to make a few examples, are all topics where good sociological research is made and should continue to be improved. Another example of good sociological research is the study of new modernizing countries that face similar problems to those of the now developed ones, but give to some extent different responses. I co-chair with professor He Chuanqi of the Chinese Academy of Science the World Modernization Forum, that will held its third conference in May 2019 in Beijing.

— **A question with regard to a jubilee of Karl Marx in this year. In the Soviet Union Marx was the only patriarch for the social sciences and students were oriented to study mostly his works. He was also popular in the West. How do you perceive Marx's legacy for contemporary social sciences?**

— Well, it was a mistake to study only Marx, of course, but an opposite mistake would be to ignore Marx. He has been one of the greatest social thinkers of modernity. For the bicentennial of Marx's birth there have been new books and seminars in several countries including Italy, I contributed to some of them. When I was asked the question 'What is dead and what is alive in Marx's theory to-day?', my synthetic answer was that his greatest contribution has been to show the inherent contradictory nature of capitalism. He underestimated the ability of capitalism to renew itself and to survive through change and his forecasts of the collapse of capitalism and mass

proletarianisation were falsified, but the link between economic growth and social inequalities (that are growing almost in all parts of the world), the analysis of labour market and the role of the industrial reserve army, still hold. Marx's theory suffered mostly from being transformed into the ideology of an authoritarian political regime. But as a social thinker Marx is one of the greatest and will last.

— **Well, if we can look for a moment at the current political scene in the world. Can you make a comment on the elections of Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, on Trump phenomenon, on Putin phenomenon? What would be a sociological perspective on these events that media all over the world is obsessed with?**

— A few years ago I started researching on a phenomenon which is now well-known and much discussed and studied: populism, more specifically national populism, which is the combination of nationalist ideology and populist rhetoric, a very effective combination for getting a political consensus. Populism is a rhetoric, or an ideology with a thin but very strong core: the belief that a society is divided into two opposed components: the people, which is undifferentiated whole (which is sociologically wrong since it is actually composed of many groups with different interests, values, identities) and the corrupted and selfish elites. Populism is not necessarily anti-democratic, but is against liberal democracy, against pluralism and what in the sociological tradition are called intermediate bodies (political parties, unions, business and professional organizations, NGOs). But it is even more powerful, when its thin ideological core can be easily coupled with a more structured ideology like nationalism, that is the source of strong identities. National populism divides society in us (the people of the national community) and them (elites, foreigners, minorities, immigrants, which become scapegoats for all types of problems).

— **And what is the role of sociology here?**

— Sociology can try to throw light on this phenomenon, try to explain, first, that any society is a complicated system with different levels, with a variety of groups, with conflict, with complex patterns of conflict and cooperation, diversity and commonality. And it can also explain that aggressive nationalism is the major threat to peace. I'm studying national populism and, as a sociologist, I put this phenomenon in the context of the European Union. I prefer to speak of what I have studied and think to know better. But I add a few words on like Trump. Trump's national populism is different from traditional American patriotism in his continuous stressing on 'America first'. He does not seem to realize that the national interest is important, but cannot be pursued at any cost; that in a globalized world international cooperation is crucial and we have to cope with global problems through multilateral strategies. For a country which competes for world hegemony, it's important to persuade other countries with facts that its national interests is compatible with some common global goods like peace, economic growth and wellbeing. Otherwise it can be dominant, not hegemonic (in Gramsci's sense). But Trump seems blind on that.

— **Some scholars believe that sociology should be activist. Do you agree with this?**

— This will be the first ISA Congress in years in which I don't have my usual debate with Michael Burawoy on this question. I disagree with Michael's idea of public sociology. Sociology cannot be confused with political activism. Some sociologists can be

skillful politicians like the former president of Brasil Fernando Enrique Cardoso. But when they do this they are not playing the role of the sociologist, but of the political activist. If you make a confusion between these two roles, you are likely doing neither serious sociology, nor effective political activity.

— **So, what's its role, if not activism?**

— A social scientist should have a notion of what a good society should be and what are the political objectives to achieve it. But in doing research one you should have a necessary detachment from the social problems he or she is analyzing. It's not easy, but it's necessary. We all have our own value premises, preferences, prejudices, it's a fact. But a good scholar must verify his or her hypotheses with a rigorous methodology and keep an open mind to consider alternative views, different findings..

— **And when these views came to fore?**

— I don't believe in an entirely neutral and objective social science, I know it's not possible. But this attitude is miles away from thinking that a sociologist should be a political activist. These are two different roles. A person can play different roles if he's able to distinguish between the two. She or he may start as a researcher, then become an activist, then come back to scholarly work, this was not unusual in the 1960s and '70s. But in doing serious sociological work, one must keep in mind that we need, as I say, some critical detachment. Otherwise, one may try to manipulate data in order to pursue a political objective goals, to ignore contrary evidence Let's take an example about sustainability and climate change. I think to all those who on the basis of serious work try to convince public opinion that climate change is an emergency were badly harmed by a group of scientists, who manipulated data in order to show prove the threat was much greater. Their manipulation was exposed, and this created the risk of scientists losing their credibility.

— **May be another 'political' question. As a former President of the International Sociological Association how would you characterize the role of international associations in contemporary world? Do they unite or divide scientific community?**

— Good question. I think that what I call epistemic communities, as international scientific organizations are, can play a major role in global governance. first of all, they defend science and this is particularly important nowadays, at the time of post-truth, fake data and fake news. Science must be defended because science is our best hope to cope with common problems. Second, international scientific organizations bring people together and foster mutual understanding. Third, they fight against discrimination and prejudice since a person is evaluated in terms of her or his own personal achievements, not in terms of gender, ethnicity, religion or other characteristic. I am convinced that these associations play an important role and I actually dedicated a significant part of my professional life first, to the International Sociological Association (ISA) and, second, to the International Social Science Council (ISSC). The latter is the council which organizes the various international associations of the social sciences (sociology, economics, political science, psychology, demography, etc.) and social science research councils (or social science branches in national academies of science) of many countries in the world. When I was elected president of ISSC, I pledged to merge it with the other council (ICSU) that was the council of the natural sciences (biology,

astronomy, physics, mathematics, medical sciences, etc.). And we succeeded. Last week in Paris we were able to complete this long journey and now we have one single world organization of science, the International Science Council (ISC) that is a global voice for science in the world, an important step at a time when most governments are cutting funds for scientific research and many people on the net believe that they are experts of everything. It's enough to have one hundred likes to say very stupid things about questions you don't know like vaccines or asylum seekers. There is a risk of a crisis of knowledge-based ideas and evaluations. A single world organization of science can help.

— **And what are, in your opinion, the main challenges for promoting scientific knowledge?**

— There is a risk of fragmentation. That is why in ISSC I encouraged interdisciplinary dialogues not only within the social sciences, but also between social sciences and natural sciences, between social sciences and the academies of medicine and engineering, between social sciences and the humanities. And I fostered common research programs. I'll just mention one: «Future Earth», a research program on sustainability, where sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists are working together with biologists, climate experts, physicists, chemists. When they work together they understand the importance of knowing other perspectives on the same problem. Similar instances are provided by other joint research programs like that on disaster risk, which was originally confined to geologists, experts on earthquakes; but when these researchers realized that there were more casualties due to collective panic than to the natural event itself, they asked the cooperation of sociologists and social psychologists. Science councils like ISSC and ICSU-now ISC- can also counteract the tendency to disciplinary fragmentation the world of knowledge, that international scientific associations in a sense and to a certain extent certify.

— **Professor Martinelli can you predict, what will be with sociology in ten years, in thirty years from now?**

— You should then predict what the world will be in ten, thirty years. But, as I said, I believe sociology will still be there.

— **Maybe you have your own perception of the direction which the society is developing?**

— There will be the key problem of the modernization of vast regions of the world, China, India, Africa which is very fast and troublesome. There is here a very interesting ground for good sociological work.

— **So you would encourage young professionals to go to these countries, to study them?**

— Why not? Actually I expect that there will be many more interesting scholars coming from those regions of the world, rebalancing a situation where the West as such has played a major role. So, this is time that sociology, as any other science, becomes truly universal, with increased exchanges of scholars, between the world North and South, and within the South, whereas now most cooperation still takes place within the North

— **And what would be your advice to these scholars?**

— I have a great consideration for the classical thinkers of social science-Marx included- not because we have to replicate their theories, since they worked in a world

which was completely different, but because they provide theoretical and methodological examples. Sociological imagination is also very important, that often comes from fieldwork, not only theoretical work. Theory building and fieldwork. And then, I urge to travel, see the world, broaden your horizons; and also learn to work in team with people from other countries.

— May be the last question. You've actively participated at the last ISA Congress in Japan. If you were to make a comparison of the ISA Congresses in Yokohama and current Congress in Toronto what would you say?

— One thing I remark-and it's good-more women. In the opening ceremony, women- having key institutional positions (President of the ISA, the President of the Canadian Sociological Association, the ongoing President of the Canadian Sociological Association, the President of the Local Organizing Committee) outnumbered men. On the whole, as usual in congresses like these, some topics are too present and some other are not enough; sSome sessions are innovative and some dull or just repeating what was said in the previous congress. But on the whole, the ISA congress, as those of other international scientific associations, is a useful occasion to watch and assess the state of art of the field and subfields of sociology, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of sociological research in the various parts of the world. And a congress like this also fulfills the latent function of creating or renovating friendship ties, launching cooperative projects, fostering exchanges of knowledge and experience.

— Thank you very much for this wonderful conversation!

INTERVIEWS

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M. Burawoy

WE ARE LIVING IN A CAPITALIST WORLD

WE ARE LIVING IN A CAPITALIST WORLD

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МЫ ЖИВЕМ В МИРЕ КАПИТАЛИЗМА

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— **Michael, first of all I want to thank you for the opportunity to talk to you. I can see how busy you are here in Toronto. It is really nice that you agreed to have a conversation not only with yours truly but with young scholars Pavel Lisitsyn and Valentin Starikov. We will publish this interview in the Special Issue of the Public Opinion Monitor Journal. The basic idea of the Issue would be to have a look at the development of sociology from Yokohama to Toronto. So, if we can ring up the curtain, here is a prelude question. How many interviews have you had in your professional life? Does it make any sense for academia people? Does it make any interesting input to sociological business?**

— I'm always flattered to be asked for an interview and it would be impolite to turn them down but I'm not convinced my knowledge warrants them. At the same time,

interviews can force one to take positions that one might not otherwise; it leads one to think about things in novel ways. And, of course, interviews can be more exciting to read than long exegeses, after all they are dialogues! It gives a more dynamic dimension to a person's thinking.

— **Do you really believe it's a good activity for academia, or specifically for those who will read that after?**

— When I edited *Global Dialogue*, every issue had one or two interviews, and sometimes I would even turn a boring article into a lively interview.

— **Well, let me ask you about optimistic-pessimistic issue with regard to sociology that you discussed in your presentation at the ISA past Presidents Session. So, what makes you believe that the next stage of sociology development would be optimistic rather than pessimistic, as you have argued today in your presentation?**

— Not as simple as that. When we were in Yokohama there were already black clouds moving in from the horizons. We had arrived in Yokohama riding on an unexpected wave of largely positive, progressive social movements — Occupy, Arab Spring, Indignados — over the previous 4 years. They were receding and even disappearing and have been replaced by more «reactionary» movements, but that does not preclude another reversal in the future. What exists is not natural and inevitable, but the result of forces at work — we have to study those forces that might give rise to different future scenarios. My claim, today, was, in fact, that you can't do that without theoretical framework.

— **Just to make a link with the previous question: how would you assess, or rather characterize the papers presented tonight by the past ISA presidents? I will be more specific. In Yokohama, and this is my personal take, all the past ISA presidents were sort of criticizing your way of understanding what sociology is. Today I would say that only Michael Burawoy himself sort of criticized the sociology he defended back in Yokohama.**

— I think that the difference between myself and all the others is how I talk about the contemporary world as a form capitalism. It was very interesting how Alberto Martinelli, with whom I share many views, rooted the turning of the tide as a failure of democracy, the failure of globalization, but he didn't bring up the concept of capitalism. It's a quite deliberate omission — glossing over what I believe are the fundamental contradictions we face in contemporary society — contradictions that are not going to simply evaporate, contradictions that have been with us for the last three centuries or longer. In Yokohama, I was making an argument that we have to rethink the link between capitalism and social movements. And Polanyi obviously gives us a very interesting way of doing just that. Neither Michel Wieviorka nor Piotr Sztompka talked about capitalism. And it was interesting, Margaret Archer spoke of new powers of regulation, I could have made a point about how that, too, is linked to capitalism. She definitely did not make that move. As soon as we talk about capitalism, at least in the way that I do, or the way Polanyi does, one thinks of socialism — something dismissed by my colleagues for whom the concept is very problematic. Even though it is gaining ever great credence in the US and elsewhere.

— **Following up the line about capitalism, can we come to the name Karl Marx. The year 2018 is the year of his 200th Anniversary. How would you characterize the development of Marxist oriented sociology from Yokohama to Toronto?**

— Well, four years is a very short time! But, I might mention two ideas. The first, as I said to day, is an old idea, closely associated with Rosa Luxemburg, but most recently developed by David Harvey. It is the idea of accumulation through dispossession — an idea closely linked to our conference theme. It refers to the accumulation of private wealth through dispossession of people's access to work, dispossession of our control over nature, land, and air, and dispossession over the production and circulation of money. The idea of dispossession is a powerful one present, in this ISA meeting, but also within Marxism. So, that's one issue; the other is the importance of conceiving of alternatives to capitalism. I'm thinking here, in particular, of the real utopian projects of Erik Olin Wright. He is calling for a normative sociology that discovers challenges to the existing order of capitalism. He includes the conditions of existence and expansion of such experiments as participatory budgeting, cooperatives, new modes of organizing and delivering care, and above all the idea of a universal incomes grant which has become a popular project in the last few years, both from the right and from the left. Exploring the ways in which capitalism is not just compatible with but actually generates alternatives to itself is another line of development.

I suppose my own interest lies in thinking about changing modes of knowledge production and, as I said at the end of my talk, the transition from universities in capitalist societies to capitalist universities. We have to see how this process takes place in different parts of the world. In fact, you might say that Russia has been one of pioneers in the privatization of higher education — one of the advantages or should I say disadvantages of late capitalist development. But it's happening all over the world. I think this transition makes higher education ever more problematic, serving those who have money and power rather than the public interest.

— **Why do young social scientists, or sociologists, have to read Marx, more generally, to read someone who was born two hundred years ago?**

— Good question. There are many reasons. Along with Durkheim and Weber, Marx provides a model or even an aesthetic of how to go about theoretically informed research. They are a fund of important ideas and concepts that continue to inspire sociology. They are founders of disparate research programs. For myself I'd emphasize their importance at a time when sociology has become a specialized field, and is split up into disparate sub-specialties. So, the broader vision of what we are up to gets lost. When Marx, Durkheim and Weber were writing the discipline of sociology was only beginning. They were not hampered by narrow professional concerns and could be more expansive, could develop a broad imagination of the world we inhabit. We are steadily losing that imagination as the best minds are expected to tackle narrower questions. The classics give us a sense of important issues — still important because we are still living under capitalism — the ones we face now and the ones we are likely to face in the future. These theorists create magnificent architectures around such concepts as alienation and exploitation (Marx), rationalization and domination (Weber), solidarity and division of labor (Durkheim). Each of them thought seriously and imaginatively about where society was heading. We lack that today. There's almost a refusal to think seriously about the future in favor of the development of technical expertise.

— **Yes, but you're comparing them. Could you, please, talk specifically about Karl Marx who was earlier than Durkheim and who said he is not a sociologist.**

— Karl Marx generated a theory of the world in which we live now. Actually his theory applies better now than probably it ever has. We are living in a capitalist world, and capitalism actually shapes lived experience in a more profound and deep way. Marx gives us the basis of a theory of capitalism, but, of course, various elements are problematic. To be a Marxist, among other things, is to work toward the reconstruction of Marxism. There is, of course a history of that — from German Marxism, to Russian Marxism, Western Marxism, Third World Marxism, and so forth. Each branch of Marxism has made original contributions to the Marxist intellectual tradition by dwelling on specific anomalies as posed by the history of different countries. Thus, today I would stress three issues that need rethinking within Marx's oeuvre.

First, embedded in his theory of capitalism was a theory of class struggle. It was a flawed theory. He thought that struggle would beget more struggle. But he was wrong, capitalism is more resilient than he anticipated — struggle leads to concessions and reforms, absorbing, refracting, and atomizing struggle. We have to modify that theory of class struggle.

Second, he had an undeveloped theory of the state. He thought that the state was an instrument of the capitalist class but he couldn't see how autonomous it was and how it could recreate capitalism in new forms — organized capitalism.

And, third, he didn't have a theory of transition from capitalism and socialism. Different branches of Marxism have contributed to the solution these problems — although some like Soviet Marxism was a degenerate pseudo-science that created obstacles rather than challenges!

Despite the shortcomings — and after all he was living in the 19th century when the world was a different place — he established the foundations of a theory of the world which we still inhabit. The problem with sociology is that in criticizing Marx, it too often thinks it is burying Marxism.

— **Exactly, that was also my question: how has it come that after 1991, after the Soviet Union collapse Marx withered away?**

— Well, did he wither away?

— **No, it didn't.**

— Indeed, you could argue that 1991 marked the liberation of marxism, from the stranglehold of Soviet Marxism whose degeneracy was proven by the collapse of the Soviet Union. When Marxism becomes a ruling ideology its usefulness as a scientific research program is lost. Still, as Marxists, we should not simply dismiss the Soviet Union as a form of «statism». It was the most important and tragic social experiment of the twentieth century — like it or not, it was one form of socialism — state socialism. So we must examine its origins, its history, its collapse. We must also recognize how the different expressions of state socialism — in different countries and at different times — inspired diverse real utopias that attempted to create a more democratic socialism.

— **If we can change our lenses a little bit. The word 'artificial intelligence' here at the ISA Congress in Toronto is not of a much use. I was really impressed in a positive sense when Margaret Archer said to us that she is working on the book about artificially intelligent robot. So, what do you think does sociology have to**

do something with artificial intelligence? Do sociologists have to look at their work in the era of Big Data, online technologies, artificial intelligence differently?

— There are two things I would say. And it's not a direct answer. You mentioned Big Data that has become a fad — as if collecting more data allows us to approach the truth more closely. Big Data does not deliver imagination, in fact, Big Data just confuses everything. So, I think it becomes even more important, as I was emphasizing, that we have social theory to organize our thinking, so that we can actually use the Big Data in a useful way. It's not a solution by itself. And it all too easily becomes a problem.

The second thing is about AI. I think there has been a lot of interest, re-interest, in the area that I used to spend all my time studying, namely the future of work. People, of course, are arguing that actually artificial intelligence is going to replace work. I have PhD students who study how digital platforms operate and with what consequences. It turns out — as in previous technological revolutions that predicted the end of work — these digital platforms depend on a massive input of deskilled computational and emotional labor. Why? Precisely because these platforms turn out to be very dynamic organizations so that there is the continual production of lags that can only be filled with mental labor. In addition to the labor involved in producing the ever-changing algorithm, Uber, for example, relies on and mobilizes masses of drivers. So, these are my two kopeks. In summary, artificial intelligence has to be seen in its institutional context, in an organizational context, and also in the context of — yes! — capitalism.

— What is the hottest theme, topic, question in sociology today?

— Probably 'What is sociology?'

— Still the same thing that was there two hundred years ago, right? And what do you think, should sociology be an activist or not? Or should it just be a science?

— You've got to have both. We need to have both a sociology as a professional discipline that engages in research and that should inform the way we engage with public. And that engagement with publics, in turn inspires new direction for research.

— Having today the ISA Congress in North America and looking at all the developments of sociological business how would you assess the situation with sociology in the United States, in North America more generally?

— It is surprisingly strong. If I look at my own university, sociology becomes stronger and stronger. We have more undergraduates than ever, who major in sociology, specializing in sociology, while the number of graduate students has fallen only slightly over the last 20 years. Undergraduates are interested in sociology because sociology actually speaks to their precarious existence. Student fees have shot up, they work longer hours at wage labor, they take out loans that later become an albatross around their neck and, at the same time, they face an ever more uncertain labor market. Sociology speaks to the frightening world they face.

— But how is sociology faring elsewhere?

— I'm at a public university. At places like Harvard, Princeton, and Yale, there are few sociology majors — what parents will pay \$50,000 a year in fees and tuition for their children to study «useless» sociology. With growing inequality, sociology speaks to ever greater numbers of students, even if it does not lead directly to a career. It's one of those ironies that sociology becomes intellectually richer with the polarization

of inequality, the concentration of poverty and insecurity. We are past-masters at studying distress and suffering.

Sociology may be faring well in the US, but not necessarily in other countries. Whereas in the US it is the postgraduate degree that counts, in most countries it is the undergraduate degree. More is at stake economically when the destiny of a student depends on their undergraduate degree. But I should add students don't become sociologists to become rich, but to create a more just world. The best sociology — as we see in Marx, Weber and Durkheim — is impelled by moral commitments. That's why public sociology is so important — sociology should speak to the lived experience of broad populations.

— **In this case, would you recommend not just abstract young people but your relatives or people who you see every day to major in sociology?**

— Yes, sure! Why not? But I would do no more than explain why I love it I love to teach — to have a dialogue with students about their lives. You can't do that with mathematics, chemistry, physics. History — possibly. Political science — problematic. Economics — no. So, you can actually enrich people's self-understanding and how they fit into the world — that's what sociology offers.

— **If you were a young researcher what field or topic would you choose within sociology?**

— What would I choose... That's interesting — perhaps I'd study China. That extraordinary complex and dynamic world. Perhaps I'd study the rise and fall of Soviet communism, and its key turning points. Closer to home, I think I would be interested in the university. The sociology of the university is poorly developed. Perhaps that's because it's difficult to study one's own world but, as I said before, very important. I'd probably have difficulties finding a job with that specialty because young professional sociologists are not supposed to question the institutional foundations of their own discipline.

What else? Sociology of work has become a new exciting field once again if only because of the impact of AI and digitalization. Social movements continue to support interesting research. As I said today we should devote more time to the study of right-wing movements, reactionary movements, movements with which sociologists don't sympathize. Slowly but surely young researchers are recognizing that. I was just in Poland and discovered a number of young sociologists studying the distinctive brand of populism that has grown up there and, one might add, all over the former Soviet Union and its satellites. What is the popular appeal of populism? Why do so many of my Russian friends adore Putin?

— **And a young PhD, what should he or she do to become a good sociologist?**

— There is no one way. The advantage or from some points of view the disadvantage of the US PhD is that it takes forever, as many as nine years, to finish. There are few, at least those who work with me, who do it in the normative time of six years. It is a major chunk of their lives. The first thing they have to do is to learn the field, learn what others have discovered. They are not starting from scratch, but stand on the shoulders of their forebears. Few countries can afford to have their doctoral students master the existing literature and so science doesn't develop so rapidly or it does so only by accident. By spending three or four years learning the field, what others have

accomplished, allows you to focus your research, which of course makes it more rather than less challenging. I think one shouldn't be in a hurry, but for so many that's a luxury they cannot afford. It means you have to be funded somehow or other — to pay the fees as well as keep yourself together, body and soul. One of the best ways of surviving is to teach — indeed, that's where one often learns the most — and after all if you don't like teaching then you have to think twice about becoming a sociologist. Research positions are few and far between, and they can be quite sterile.

But to return to research — for it to give satisfaction, a sense of accomplishment one not only has to build on the work of one's forebears, one has to submit oneself to the critical gaze of one's colleagues. One has to try to publish in the best journals that have a strong refereeing system, where you will receive constructive feedback from experts in the field. One has to get used to rejections! It's important to acknowledge that one is part of a community of researchers and it can be very important to work in a team with a dedicated leader like yourself, Andrey.

What I'm saying to you is very much shaped by my own experience in the United States, which has its pluses and minuses. Many countries can't afford such training. But, wherever one is, one should turn sociology into a vocation — to live for as well as off sociology. You know, I often joke, there are three types of sociologists: 8-hour, 12-hour and 24-hour sociologists and they develop corresponding types of sociology.

— If you remember back in 2010, after Goteborg ISA Congress where you were elected as the ISA President you came to St Petersburg to the Summer School that Piotr Sztomka and myself have organized for sociologists from the former Soviet Union. We had the session «University in crisis». Is University continue to be in crisis? Is it in ruins as I insisted at the time? May be you detect today something else?

— Well, I don't remember what I said then but today I do think the university is in crisis or, at least in transition. As I said before we are seeing a move from a university in capitalism — a university with some autonomy producing knowledge for publics — to a capitalist university run as a profit-making machine.

I think we can identify four crises. First, there is a fiscal crisis. And I think that affects universities everywhere. In the past the university was regarded as a public institution, essential to the very meaning of the nation and thus amply funded with public money. When I was in Zambia after independence, the university was among the first institutions to be created. The public university, educating its best and brightest, is no longer viewed as a symbol of nationhood. Today states are telling universities to garner their own funds. So each university develops a machinery for revenue seeking and cost cutting — student fees, charitable donations, subsidized research for corporations, etc.

This reshapes the structure of the university, which leads to the second crisis — a governance crisis. Now that the university becomes a profit center with hard budget constraints, its administrators are imported from the private sector. They often know nothing about the university and its traditions, regard academics and their ways as obstructionist, so they expropriate control from or coopt those who used to run the university. From a cooperative, decentralized self-regulating entity, it becomes centralized into the hands of an administrative class with its pet projects and luxurious living. I call them spiralists — spiraling in from outside, they use the university to build up their reputations, so they can spiral on and the university spirals down.

Trying to turn the university into a private corporation leads to a third crisis — an identity crisis. Who are the staff, students, and faculty? Whom do we serve? Are we servants of power, generators of money for the new class of administrators or are we still in the business of innovative research? Are we in the business of orchestrating new money-making degrees through on-line education; are we training students for lucrative jobs or instilling ideas for the development of a humane society. Which brings me to the fourth crisis — legitimization crisis. The university is no longer a public institution with unquestioned legitimacy. The more it seeks revenues from outside, the less likely states will fund it — it has become a private good rather than a public good.

The solution to the degradation of higher education — if there is one — is for the university to rethink itself, to make itself accessible to broader sections of the population but also to recover its public mandate by being accountable to publics. It has to shed its «ivory tower» quality and engage the broader society. That will require a lot of rethinking, but it could give sociology a privileged place in the university. Sociologists will become the architects of bridges between the university and the wider community.

— **How would you assess the university today with regard to junior scholars: does it like them or does it just use them?**

— They are exploited. Whether as PhD students providing cheap labor, subsidizing research for corporations, whether as teachers paid miserable wages and suffer blocked opportunities. In some ways we are still a feudal institution. When I teach my large classes I have a bevy of «teaching assistants» who do the face-to-face instruction and the grading of papers. This can only be justified if those young scholars are also apprentices who will become fully-fledged professors in due course. If, however, their mobility is blocked and they remain in lowly, exploited positions, then we are in trouble. In many European countries — such as the UK, Spain, Italy, Germany and Poland — upward mobility is indeed blocked, and young scholars are employed on a short term contract basis, often cobbling together a series of part time employments or moving out of higher education altogether. Not surprisingly unionization is spreading across the field of higher education affecting the character of the university.

That's the negative side. But on the other hand, the university still depends upon the originality and inspiration of the next generation. The next generation challenges and supplants the senior generation. That's how science and scholarship progresses. Of course, the senior generation resists those challenges from below, but in the end they have to give way — gracefully or reluctantly. Over time, if the university works well, knowledge production gets transformed. So, universities are dependent upon both the exploitation and the stimulation of young scientists. The university still offers a space for creativity — something important to and treasured by young people of today.

— **So, exploitation is necessary here?**

— It seems so. In the old feudal order exploitation was more hidden, but, as I've been saying, in the capitalist university it becomes ever more transparent. We have to learn to fight to retain our autonomy with a view to contributing to justice and prosperity for all.

— **Professor Burawoy, thank you so much for the interview!**

INTERVIEWS

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HOW DO SOCIOLOGISTS KEEP UP WITH A SOCIAL WORLD?

HOW DO SOCIOLOGISTS KEEP UP WITH
A SOCIAL WORLD?

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ИДУТ ЛИ СОЦИОЛОГИ В НОГУ СО
ВРЕМЕНЕМ?

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Q: Thank you, dear colleagues, for agreeing to participate in this interview. It will be published in the special issue of the Public Opinion Monitor journal. Its focus will be the development of sociology between two ISA Congresses: Yokohama, 2014 and Toronto, 2018. So, if we can start with the questions about the ISA Congresses. Do you observe differences between this year ISA Congress in Toronto and the ISA Congress in Yokohama in 2014? And what are your expectations with regard to the next ISA Congress?

Karim Murji: The ISA Congress theme seems to be decided by the President of the ISA and the executive committee. In 2014 the President was Michael Burawoy and the theme was very much around global sociology which reflects his interests around things like ‘Global Dialogue’ an ISA e-journal he started, and making sociology not just more international but more public and global. By 2018 the President was Margaret Abraham, and her interests are more to do with things like violence and power. So, that was the main theme of the Congress. And the President gets to have some presidential panels and to invite some speakers, so, her topic around power and violence was more evident in 2018 than it was in 2014. And in 2022 we don’t actually know what the theme will be, because the new President from the Middle East, Sari Hanafi, will decide upon it, with the executive committee.

Q: And how about expectations for the next ISA Congress?

KM: Well, it’s going to be in Australia. In Canada it was a bit of a focus on indigeneity because of the history of Canada I think this will also be evident in Australia, on indigenous communities.

Q: Some sociologists believe that such Congresses in spite of uniting professionals make research communities in a way more divided? What is your assessment?

Q: Not only conferences, but international academic organizations in general.

Sarah Neal: I think your question answers itself. Because conferences do have this potential, they can do some of that work about bringing a dialogue and sociologists together, but on the other hand we see kind of entrenchments in terms of who is writing, who’s getting published, who’s submitting to the general. And that’s one of our concerns as editors, to globalize the content more and it follows Burawoy’s concerns. So, I think, the ISA in some ways is successful being an international organization, but on the other hand we see the replication of some older divisions between global North academics and global South academics being much more marginal in getting published and leading conference panels. So, I think there is still a lot of work to be done in terms of being truly international.

Q: Let’s try to reflect on how sociology has been changing through the years... Both of you have been working in this field for many years, so probably you might identify the key current challenges for the sociologists?

SN: Big questions! Well, from our position as editors — we were the editors of the British Sociological Association’s, key journal, «Sociology» before — and then moving to edit one of the ISA’s the key journals, and one of the things we like, I think, is being at the heart of what sociological work is being done, and we are excited and feel privileged about that. But it’s also a vantage point that’s supposed to see what sociologists are actually working on. So, taking a look at, say, a couple of volumes of *Current Sociology* recently, what would be really striking is the diversity in what sociologists are writing about. But in terms of big patterns I suppose migration, mobility is something you would

see a lot of work on, feminism, gender, a lot of material gets written and submitted to us around those themes. Globalization, of course, and the rise of new populism and nationalisms... There is definitely a kind of shifts towards things like intimacy and emotion, perhaps the non-human and environmental sociology, sociology of science and medicine, some of those kinds of frontier sociologies are really beginning to come through. So, for me there's also still preoccupations with the classic sociological areas. We continue to see submissions on social divisions, stratifications, class identities. But I think, on the other hand, we are definitely seeing work around new areas: around intimacy, emotions, materiality, objects, non-humans; they are all coming through too.

KM: Yes, and I agree with what Sarah is saying. I was just going to answer the question in a slightly different way because I heard it slightly differently: in terms of relationships between sociological organizations and what is going on in sociology. I think that what is being going on in the international, global sociology for a while is a big interest in the Global South; and particularly what relationship between the South as a not just a geographical place but as the way of thinking about relationships within the world, and the way in which relates to what is called the Global North in sociology. What is interesting about talking to you, based in Russia, is the way it made me think about the way in which whatever is called the North is itself not undivided, not unproblematic. For example, with the ways in which Europe and Eastern Europe in particular has changed in last twenty years and so on... I think, there is an interest in how these kinds of sociologies do not get represented in what we think of is being an international sociology. So, for example, while Sarah was talking, I was thinking: it is interesting how the sociology of the state which I think was quite prominent when I was a student and for some time... I am not sure we see as much of that we might expect to see, and I am interested in thinking about changes, about how the state is changed particularly in Eastern Europe but also how governance has changed in other parts of the world as well. I am thinking about India and China — it is about the relationship between new forms of capitalism, new forms of state and the ways in which those are governed. And then I think the other thing that is intriguing talking to you from being based in Russia is what are the dimensions of stratification and inequality, and the ways in which very rapid social change in what we think of as being a kind of Eastern European beyond that, some referring all the way to Asia? And it is kind of created new patterns, new sort of cleavages, new differences and new inequalities. And I am not sure that we as sociologists (when I says 'we', I mean people based in Western Europe of the Anglo-American tradition) have a proper understanding, a proper sense of that. And I think in terms of being editors of *Current Sociology*, I think that we might want to say that, as an international association. Sociology should be reflecting those changes, getting an understanding more what do those changes mean, not necessarily in terms of particular nations but in terms of nations and regions. So, that is how I heard your question and how I would comment on it.

Q: Let me turn for a moment to great figures in sociology. This year is the 200 anniversary of Karl Marx. How would you estimate the importance and relevance of his legacy for social research in the XXI century?

SN: It's a really interesting question. Yes, it's a nice provocation asking how relevant are Marxist approaches in the world that we're seeing. I think in some ways it's about

what Karim said, the decline of work on the state. We see in terms of the way we move away from foundationalist thinking, definitely. So, a lot of the work that we see is filtered through Bourdieu, Lefebvre, Adorno, perhaps — these developments of Marx. I would say we don't get, as editors, we don't really see people working through the classic Marxist traditions or approaches so much. I think we see a lot of Bourdieu, definitely, I would say he is one of the most widely and well used social theorists currently.

Q: The presupposition was that Marxist views are becoming sort of a fashion these days. But as editors Current Sociology, if I understood it correctly, you don't feel that Marx is really coming into fashion and you don't observe more attention to Marx than usual?

KM: No, we don't. I think it's interesting that you have this perception. But there are journals like *Capital and Class* and *Critical Sociology* which would do more Marxist sociology. That's not to say that we wouldn't be happy to get that. I think it's because of what Sarah is saying that it's so much of background: classes are understood through Bourdieu now rather than through Marx. But that's what we see. One colleague of ours did a count of the abstracts of the British Sociological Association conference last year trying to find out who was the most represented theorist, and it was Bourdieu. But the point you are raising is very interesting because there is class and inequality, there is a lot of stuff that scholars like Piketty and Boltanski are discussing. I think, in terms of what we thought of foundations of sociology, which is kind of tricky: Marx, Durkheim, Weber, may be Simmel, that is kind of background, it's still taught to students. But it's not clear how much of those thinkers are present in contemporary sociology in general. So, there is a general issue about what is called 'founding fathers', I'm not fond of using this term, also because it's been a Eurocentric way of thinking about sociology.

Q: May be we can move forward and to talk about your experience as the editors of sociological journals. Could you describe how demands for scholarly papers in the field of sociology changed from Yokohama to Toronto? Has there been a change at all, and if yes, what kind of change?

KM: That's quite a hard question to answer. There are from five to six thousand people at these conferences. On the ISA website¹ we have a table that shows how many people attend it from each country and how many of them were female and how many were students. That is just in rough number terms.

Q: And what about papers that have being submitted not to the ISA Congresses but to professional sociological journals you've been engaged with?

KM: Well, it's a good question. We have been editors of *Current Sociology* for one year but we've been editors of another journal... So, we moved from the British journal to the international journal. And what do you think Sarah?

SN: In terms of, as I said before we do have this commitment as editors to increase the reach of who is submitting to the journal, and working in a much more internationally inflected way. We try to challenge methodological nationalism, and the national limits in the focus of papers. I think in terms of a broader commitment, we definitely have that, but as editors we are reliant on all kinds of submissions that we receive. There is that dependency we have as editors, to work with the material that are submitted to us. Again, we are trying to make inflections, one of the things, initiatives Karim and

¹ Here is a table for 2018: <https://www.isa-sociology.org/en/conferences/world-congress/toronto-2018/statistics-18/>.

I would like to develop, is to strengthen the links of the journal with the conferences and the research committees. So, that's something that we have been working on and try to develop as editors, so that there is a more coherent connection between the conferences and the journal.

Q: Does it provide geographical diversity, is it enough? Or does it require any specific efforts to maintain it?

SN: I think I was articulating the commitment to doing that as editors. It's our attention and our ambition. And to work to support authors from a range of countries rather than just Anglo-US, Northern European sociology community.

KM: I think the other thing that the ISA could do which the British Association couldn't is to work with national associations. And our previous editor, Eloisa Martin, was very active in going out and trying to work particularly with sociologists in Africa trying to make the journal representative in ways which Sarah is talking about. And I think, because the ISA has always affiliated with national associations, it's partly about what work we can do, what Sarah is talking about at conferences and at other times to work with sociologists in the countries or the regions as well. We need to look at how to make those links. We also have to have more people who are active in terms of editorial board of the journal or reviewing for the journal, so, that requirements become clear to people as they know what to publish in the journal. I also would like you, Sarah, to explain a bit more about how this complexity gets into the journal.

SN: Yes, I suppose there's always a need for that attention in the journal editing, to the journal's identity, and what it stands for, and what shifts are made and who develops or what drives those. And, certainly, in the journal which has 'Current' in the title it is the concern to reflect the idea of what is current. So, we are looking after the journal, that responsibility is what, as editors, you take on. And diversification and internationalization of the journal, again, there's commitment to that. Then, a responsibility to sociologists in terms of delivering the best quality of sociology writing and making sure we publish what people would read and find it useful for their own work. So, there's those issues as well as the whole thing about impact factor, journal rankings, listings and the journal's place within those. It's what any editor of a journal is going to worry about really, worrying about representing, developing and keeping the identity of the journal, as well as wanting it be dynamic and creative, as well as relying on the work of which sociologists are doing. As editors you are in an ambivalent and sometimes contradictory position when you are worrying or trying to be attentive to completing ambitions. We want *Current Sociology* to have a really strong impact factor so it gets the most interesting, highest quality work being submitted to it. But we also want to be open and creative, and new and fresh, and diverse. So, its how to maintain a balance between those ambitions.

KM: I can just add. I think in terms what we want to say about scientific requirements for a paper, we want people who are submitting from anywhere in the world understand that an international journal is situated in relation not so much to national debates in your country but to whatever international ramifications there are. How are the same or similar issues addressed in sociology in other countries, or better yet, internationally? So, sometimes we get papers and they could be from the USA, just as they could be from China, which are just all about what is going on in that country. And that's

probably very interesting for these countries, but it is not what our journal is about. And, of course, we want papers to be methodologically robust and strong, explaining what your methodology is, and we want good data and a conclusion that hold all things together. That's what makes sociological or scientific paper good. Most sociologists kind of know that but sometimes people get it wrong in terms of what kind of journal they are thinking about. So, a paper which might fit well in a British journal or an American journal would not necessarily fit into an international journal.

Q: Have you noticed any national or regional specifics of submitted texts?

SN: Not specifics, I think it's more the ability for an author to scale up from what can be nationally located study or a very localized study in a particular national context to what are the broader sociological learnings from these data that go beyond the national boundaries. What we are always asking the authors to do is to think how this particular project or empirical dataset is related with the discipline and disciplinary thinking and, I guess, how it is going to be useful from, say, sociologists in South Africa to sociologists in North America or sociologists working in the UK.

Q: Maybe there are some typical issues which are associated with papers coming from some countries? You get papers from all over the world, so maybe you can identify some tendencies like «we usually have this kind of problems when we are editing papers from people from this country»?

KM: There are a couple of examples. One is that we sometimes get papers... just for an example, I was looking through some papers which are really about education and they are fine in themselves but from our point of view we often wonder why it has been sent to us rather than to a journal which is more about education. The other side of that, which I think sometimes happen to papers, I don't know whether it's a specific of Russia or not, for example, we might get a paper which is about ethnicity or ethnic groups in some country or some region of the world, and again, there is nothing necessary wrong with the paper in its own terms but from where we are sitting the debates on ethnicity are so huge that if those papers tend to have any recognition in an international context, ethnicity mean all these other things, it makes it quite hard to take that paper further. That's kind of what we mean by methodological nationalism — it's actually very narrowly in focus.

SN: I think there are inflections of this too in which you see how people have been trained around social science methods in particular ways. How some authors tend to write about data, how they are using hypotheses, and make arguments. We can see differences, perhaps, in methods training and how data get used. We sometimes see papers that just rely on data itself, and usually these papers are more reports than an analytical engagement with wider sociological debates. That's a kind of challenge we all face as sociologists who are doing empirical work. The need to move beyond the empirical and to go beyond reviewing what already exists, so to have balance between the empirical, the theoretical, the evaluation of the arguments already made but then have more. That's something we would want to be encouraging in the journal, those steers that we do try to give as editors along with the referee reports to authors — to ask them to push on the contribution being made.

Q: I would like to ask you one more question about your editing practices. Have you noticed any changes in ethical norms and editing practices throughout your careers?

Have there been any shifts in terms of ethical norms to conduct research and to publish research outcomes?

SN: I think papers written twenty years ago would not have as much methodological detail as we would expect now. Look at the sociological papers written then, it is so unusual to see methods written in the footnotes or endnotes. Now you don't tend to see research methods summarized in that way. I think methodological rigour and accountability reflects a greater and widespread engagement with ethics of fieldwork, research practice and the ways we work as sociologists. So, there has been definitely a shift in ethics in wider social life too and the attention being paid to ethical issues in social media and the questions raised in those kinds of environments, too, around privacy and confidentiality, anonymity. There has been an intensification of ethics, of being ethical.

KM: Sociologists are working within universities but also within national associations. There is now much more emphasis put on ethical protocols than probably was the case when I was a student. That's partly because universities but also individuals are worried about issues about privacy, anonymity, etc. But there are also the cases where sociologists disclose the information which shouldn't be closed or do other kind of harm. And all that stuff about the internet and social media has made it much more risky. I think ethics has been intensified as a kind of way which sociological research is governed, but not necessary governed only by sociological associations, like the British association, but also by employers, universities and so on. I would expect papers that reflect on this.

SN: I think it is partly about abilities of sociologists to be reflexive about what we do, the questions like: what does it mean to do sociological research? What kinds of relationships do have researchers with research subjects? There are also concerns about the power dynamics of such relationships and the representations we make as sociologists, and what and who we research, what questions we are asking. And I think as a discipline sociologists have become increasingly reflexive but there's room for more! There are questions about intrusion, the extractive nature of data and using these to drive papers and explore methodology. But I think ethical questions and methodological transparency are more apparent in the sociological work these days. So, there has been a change.

KM: Just another comment. Another thing is that now we often automatically electronically search against databases to make sure that authors are not submitting more less the same paper as they've submitting to someone else. That was not possible ten years ago. And that's a kind of internal ethical thing. It doesn't happen very often but it is sometimes the case that during monitoring we see that paper looks very similar to something that was published somewhere else.

Q: Yes, we get our share from world mainstream, and all three trends you have identified are definitely came to Russia: technology, intensification of ethics, and methods. But what is coming next to all these trends? Some people, some editors claim that it's going to be sort of shift back because it's almost impossible to work in current conditions. What do you think?

SN: I think that there will be no shift back. I think there is always a balance between the need to avoid harm, the need to be responsible researchers and what we doing as

sociologists, the outcomes of sociological labor but also about how ethics requirements might make some areas of research difficult to do. But I don't think there will be a retreat from where we are now. The question is more: how much further we will go? And that is difficult to predict: it intersects with wider questions of public life, personal data, privacy, surveillance, regulation. I think the question we are dealing with as sociologists exists beyond sociology as well. So, where it is going? It's difficult for us to predict. Do you have any ideas, Karim?

KM: I agree with you. I think the question is whether existing models of journals, how they can carry on. Because some journals are quite expensive but also there is this huge demand to get published in them. And there are people experimenting with different models of publication which isn't quite the same as issue about ethics. For example, more open access journals are coming on, some open-access journals charge a fee; there are internet only journals also. And I think technology may drive all those changes further. I think good sociology and good social science need to be underpinned by ethical protocols we've talked about. But there may be change in way which publishing itself happens in the future which I think is hard to predict in next five years, not to say of beyond that.

Q: Thank you for your time, for your open and sincere answers to the questions. If you want to touch upon any topic to add to our conversation, you are welcome to do so.

SN: So, what I was thinking about — developing from your question about Marxism — is how does sociology keep up with the social world? And that is kind of intrigue for me because when we think about... For example, what happened when we've been editors of *Current Sociology* whether it is Brexit, or Trump, or European elections and the successes of far right politics in Hungary or Sweden or Brazil... All these things have happened during the fourteen months we've been editors of *Current Sociology*. So, for me the puzzle is: how do sociologists, but also journal editors, keep up with a social world? Social research and writing works to a different time. Look at the last two *Current Sociology* issues, looking at the articles, these were first published in 2016, but they're only now appearing in the journal, in the hard copy of the journal, although they have been available online. The publication process is really slow, the research process is really slow, our thinking is slow. That's not bad but the social world is fast running. Just as ethics is intensifying and I think social is intensifying as well. And for us, as editors of the journal which has 'current' in its title, it is a particularly important question about how do we keep up; what questions and concerns are always topical and timely and we are encouraging papers that are thinking about the most pressing sociological questions.

Q: And when, do you think, academic journals will catch up with current sociology? So, you would be able to publish not may be immediately but within a couple of months or so.

SN: There are things that do not change. Sociological writing does just takes time.

Q: But you are the editors, you are the people who change things!

SN: Yes, and I think we have to try to speed up. I guess in terms of what Karim was saying about online technologies enabling journals to be quicker that they are used to... I think most journals now have much quicker response rate. Its something we advertise on the journal's webpage! But still, most papers that are strong take at least

a year to be generated, revised, submitted, reviewed, revised, resubmitted. I would be surprised if the best, most rigorous papers that we've published were written in anything less than a year. So, writing times don't tend to change, and good sociological work takes time. We can speed up as editors, try to turn decisions around faster and encourage reviewers to get their reports to us more quickly and so on — all things we are doing, but takes sociologists need time to write good sociology.

KM: I have just a couple of lines, again. I think, your point is a good one, but as Sarah says, social research takes a bit of time, and writing it up also takes time, which is why any journal can't be as quick as your question implies. But I want to bring up the difference between commentary and research. For example, if you want to publish commentary — I've been at other journals in the past that had a commentary section which was a bit like extended journalism based in sociology when you took an issue whether it's Brexit or populism or whatever it might be, and you write about a few thousand words on it. That wouldn't be the same thing as ordinary journal article which would require data and theoretical context to be actually publishable. I think we can't fundamentally change the nature of the journal but we are thinking about how to have things in the journal that make it a little bit more dynamic, in the margins, not in a whole journal.

SN: The question is, as with this interview, how do we get dialogue, circulating between us, as sociologists as well. Conferences are one way. I think technology clearly, internet and social media, has been really instructive in expanding how we can talk to each other, and how quickly we can talk to each other and respond to each other in 'real time'. So, I suppose what is valuable and useful is a diversification of places in which we can publish but also the formats in which we write and the ways in which we talk to each other. And for us, the things that we have in *Current Sociology* — the special sub-sections, the monographs, the review issue, the Sociologist of the Month feature, making the content on the journal website engaging — all facilitate different types of interactions and support forums for dialogue and ways of talking together — and good publications.

Yu. B. Thank you once again!

SOCIOLOGY AS A SCIENCE: NEW CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY

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BEYOND CENTER-PERIPHERY DICHOTOMY: SOCIOLOGY IN THE GLOBAL ERA

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ЗА ПРЕДЕЛАМИ ДИХОТОМИИ «ЦЕНТР-
ПЕРИФЕРИЯ»: СОЦИОЛОГИЯ В ГЛО-
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Abstract. This article presents an overview of the paths of sociology in times of change in a globalized world. Looking at the four-year period from the XVIII ISA World Congress of Sociology, in Yokohama, to the XIX ISA World Congress of Sociology, in Toronto, it is possible to argue that sociology is going global and

Аннотация. Представлен обзор развития социологии в эпоху перемен глобализирующегося мира. Четыре года, прошедшие с момента XVIII конгресса Международной социологической организации (ISA) в Йокогаме до недавнего XIX конгресса в Торонто, показали, что социология становится все

growing stronger each day. The paper stresses the importance of comparative analysis, the integration of theory and method, and the defense of Sociology as a scientific and academic field. The major question is how to keep on the move during times of profound geopolitical and geo-economic transformations and what is the place of Sociology in the global era. Hereupon we address the debate about sociological research in the 21st century considering the challenges and possibilities open to our academic field. We also analyze the contribution to sociological analysis of Latin-American and the BRICS sociologies who bring in perspectives that can go beyond the theories developed by early industrialized countries or, as they are called here, central countries.

Keywords: social change, globalization, knowledge production, comparative research

Acknowledgment. I want to thank my colleagues Soraya Cortes, Richard Miskolci and Andre Salata for the privilege to have debated this theme, sharing ideas and concepts that were organized in the different article. I am also grateful to Tom Dwyer, who has inspired us to engage in international comparative research, especially with the BRICS countries.

более масштабной и весомой. В статье подчеркивается важность сравнительного анализа, интеграции теории и методологии, а также реабилитации социологии как научного и академического знания. Главным остается вопрос, как «оставаться на плаву» в эпоху глобальных геополитических и геоэкономических трансформаций и какова роль социологии в эту эпоху. В связи с этим мы обращаемся к дискуссиям о социологических исследованиях XXI века, анализируя проблемы и возможности, открывающиеся в нашем научном поле. Мы также анализируем роль латиноамериканских социологов и социологов стран БРИКС в становлении социологического анализа, которые привносят вклад, выходящий за рамки теорий, разработанных их коллегами из промышленно развитых, или, как мы называем их здесь, центральных стран.

Ключевые слова: социальные перемены, глобализация, производство знания, сравнительные исследования

Благодарность. Я хочу выразить благодарность своим коллегам Сорайе Кортес, Ричарду Мискольчи и Андре Салату за возможность обсуждения, обмен идеями и взглядами, представленными в более ранней публикации. Я также хочу поблагодарить Тома Двайера, который вдохновил нас на участие в международных сравнительных исследованиях, особенно в странах БРИКС.

Sociology is a historical product of complex and differentiated societies which create specific opportunities to observe, describe, interpret and understand themselves. One of these opportunities is self-reflexive sociology, which developed specifically as a discipline specialized in this reflexivity. That is its specificity, its vocation and its

challenge. And that is why sociology is often confused with the diagnosis of the present. From this comes its interest in the debate on contemporary issues, particularly those that refer to political, cultural, economic, scientific, artistic, educational, technological, and social change.

The 21st century brought a lot of novelties and, with them, a huge challenge to sociology. It is not like we woke up one day and the world was completely transformed. From my perspective the so called “post-modernity” was not exactly a rupture that gave origin to an entire new era, but the result of the ongoing processes and social dynamics. Nevertheless, there is no doubt the world experienced a clear and profound shift in social, economic and political power, bringing innovation to our traditional understanding about societies and demanding from the world a political compromise in order to build a new balance among nations.

Many factors contributed to this change. Emerging countries came to the international scenario as influential players; mobility around the world became more frequent, in such intensity that borders seem to be blurring, improving diversity and increasing cultural contact; new media and technologies intensified and accelerated communication and information exchange; the global consumption market created standardized products, engendering tastes and converging styles.

We became more connected and aware about the differences as well as the similarities among our societies. But, unfortunately, not all effects of this connection are positive. In many cases, the outcome was less tolerance, more discrimination and growing segregation. Cultural contact often turned into cultural clash, followed by escalating xenophobia when many believe we can still trust the nation-state limits to keep away the strange, the unknown, the other. Recent events showed people are skeptical and seem not ready to adopt supra-national models of organizing economics, politics, and social life. However, it is quite clear no country is isolated, and changes in the environment, economic models or political ambience in one country can have global consequences, reflecting on and involving many other regions far beyond its borders. This unavoidable connection among diverse societies puts a lot of pressure on global strategy and keeps pushing the countries to redesign their frontiers in new regional blocks and free trade zones.

These are challenges for sociology today and I trust it can only be addressed by a comprehensive agenda of transnational research. It does not mean there is no room for studies based on specificities, localities or national states. Yet, it is important to emphasize the idea that analysis at the local or national level becomes more complex and complete when we can see the local through the lens of the global.

The experiences of international comparative analyses, diffusion of open access publications and data, as well as, international meetings are ways for establishing and strengthening the transnational connections among sociologists. As we call for international cooperation in so many spheres — such as environment, human rights, finances, among others — it is our responsibility to promote international cooperation also in knowledge production. Even so, the conditions for that are still to be discussed and analyzed. Redefine the geopolitics of knowledge in the field of sociology, even in the face of deep transformations that have been taking place recently, it is not an easy task. In sociology, as in life, borders still play an important role in keeping asymmetries.

In a very concise way, we could divide sociological production in three phases. First, initiated at the end of the nineteenth century, is characterized by the formation of social science in Europe. The second period can be distinguished by the disciplinary character of sociology, evolved in the United States between the two World Wars. The third can be noted by the emergence of sociology on a global scale by the end of the 20th century.

But despite sociology going global, there still remains a highly asymmetrical structure of the production and circulation of knowledge. Along with the concentration of research in developed countries — or, as some sociologists call it, the Global North — we can also argue that there is an implicit division of intellectual work: European and US scholars produce ‘legitimate’ theory and research methods, while sociologists from the ‘rest of the world’ dedicate their efforts to gather data, analyze case studies or carry on applied research.

Many sociologists have been developing studies on this theme and the criticisms of this context were brought about by different currents of thought. Regardless of the diverse perspectives of analysis, there is a common understanding that the production and circulation of sociological knowledge should be placed in a global perspective. There are many ways to think about strategies to reach this goal, mainly by opening new axis of dialogue among sociologists from less developed countries, also called Global South, or by creating more regular and balanced exchanges between sociologies of North and South. In either case, it is quite clear that the production of knowledge should be more symmetrical between center and the periphery. Both developed countries and the less developed countries shall come as equals in sociological debate since we can all contribute to a better understanding of our world and, consequently, have an impact on building a better future for our societies.

As a first step in this direction, it is essential to recognize the existence of a diverse set of sociological traditions and currents of thought. We must acknowledge the existence of a thriving sociological practice not only in the “West”, as we are used to think throughout the history of sociology, but also in the “Rest”.

Borrowing Hall’s analysis about the cleavage between “the West” and “the Others” helps to understand that, despite the advances in our discipline, there is still a narrative that defines the European and the North-American sociology as reference points for thinking about sociology in general. According to him, this idea survives over time: “So, far from being a “formation” of the past, and of only historical interest, the discourse of “the West and the Rest” is alive and well in the modern world. And one of the surprising places where its effects can still be seen is in the language, theoretical models, and hidden assumptions of modern sociology itself.” [Hall, 1993]

We can all agree that in many ways scholars in the developed countries have better conditions to carry out their work and, of course, Europe and the US are ahead in the process of institutionalizing scientific knowledge. But this cannot prevent us from pursuing the aim of improving dialogues between center-periphery as well as among different kinds of periphery. It is the core issue to promote a more equal exchange among scholars all over the world, and to connect sociological traditions that historically have not been in direct contact. To achieve this goal the circulation of knowledge has to be reorganized, breaking the old and highly unequal pattern of academic distribution of power.

At this point, it is interesting to call attention to the constraints and promises of sociology in Latin America, it is possible to begin making a point in order to differentiate sociology in Latin America and sociology of Latin America.

In this sense, the latter, the sociology of Latin America, is the project that must be pursued and it is probably the most important task for Latin-American researchers. Sociological theory or methodology cannot be restricted to a country or a continent. In fact, theory and methodology in any science is global and knows no borders; it must be universal. But it is clear Latin America shares common social issues, and that Latin American sociology has a lot to contribute to the interpretation of them, especially in regard to such issues as inequality, violence, and poverty among others.

But what we already have is certainly a sociology in Latin America. There is a lot of effort from Latin American sociologists to build a common space for dialogue. One example of this kind of initiative is the creation of UNILA (Federal University of Latin American Integration)¹, which is set in the Triple Border or Tríplice Fronteira (the border of Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay), located in the city of Foz do Iguaçu (Brazil).

There is a long history of collaboration among researchers working together on important issues that affect Latin America. There had been many articles and books published by Latin-American sociologists from various countries, analyzing the development process during the 1970s. We can point out FLACSO (founded in 1957)² and CEPAL (1948)³ as institutions that always engaged many Latin-American social scientists.

All things considered, there is not only interest but the need for joint efforts in comprehending social problems that have been afflicting Latin America countries. In addition, it is worth remembering there is a history of work contributions and links among Latin-American sociologists which had been strengthened in recent years.

We can mention as relevant the topics of sociological analysis in the Global South, and consequently, Latin America, the overcoming of problems related to violence, ecological issues (environmental degradation and bio-diverse heritage), poverty, vulnerable populations, urban segregation, metropolitan governance, urban-rural inequalities, as well as analysis and evaluation of public policies.

It is also relevant to consider that Brazilian sociologists are not only connected to Latin America, or even to the US and Europe, which had been so influential to our social science tradition; Brazilian sociologists had played the leading role in building cooperation among BRICS countries. Joined together, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa scholars had been developing comparative studies for more than twelve years. The connection among sociologies in these five countries makes sense as they are emerging economies that appear in the global scenario as new players in economic,

¹ The mission of the University is to train researchers and professionals who think about the present and the future of integrated Latin America in the areas of sciences, engineering, humanities, letters, arts, social sciences and applied sciences.

² Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO) is an international, intergovernmental, autonomous body, founded in 1957 by Latin American states, based on a proposal from UNESCO.

³ The Economic Commission for Latin America was established by Economic and Social Council resolution 106 (VI) of 25 February 1948 and began to function that same year. The scope of the Commission's work was later broadened to include the countries of the Caribbean, and by resolution 1984/67 of 27 July 1984, the Economic Council decided to change its name to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC); the Spanish acronym, CEPAL, remains unchanged.

political, and social sphere. Apart from having large territories, these five countries cover 40% of the world's population, but that is not the core reason for joining efforts in sociological analysis. BRICS societies face common issues of inequality, poverty, class formation, and labor market structure, all of which are challenges for social stability and development.

Focusing on Brazilian sociology, it is possible to point out some changes which, I believe, are consequences of the increasing political and social demand for interpretations and solutions for important social issues, such as security, violence, poverty, inequality, population displacements, urbanization, environment, among others.

For that, there has been a significant growth in the number of researchers and post-graduate programs in sociology in Brazil. We also experienced the expansion of the labor market for sociologists, particularly in governmental agencies and NGOs as managers and evaluators of public policies. Additionally, there is a greater exposure to the media. Sociologists had been called to offer their analyses to various topics of debate. We also had sociology included in the High School curriculum, with Brazilian Government requiring that Sociology should be included as a compulsory discipline during three years of High School, in all Brazilian schools.

Nonetheless, I do believe we now have to follow certain steps in order to develop Sociology in non-central countries, such as Brazil. It is important to strengthen the dialogue with public power to inform policies of inclusion and social development that can guarantee a better standard of living for the population and enable a more active participation of the civil society. But above all we must stimulate international impact of our academic production by carrying on international comparative research, increasing the participation in international meetings, and publishing in international journals. Following this concern about internationalization, it is a fundamental task for non-central countries to develop new theories and methods to overcome the mirroring relationship that still prevails in between 'peripheral' and 'central' sociologies; it is more than clear that the analytic models developed in the early-industrialized countries do not apply to the late-industrialized or non-industrialized ones. Sociology is a discipline that has its origin in the very specific conditions: the process of urbanization and industrialization which took place at the turn of the 19th century to the 20th century in Europe, and it still carries its birthmarks. A paradigmatic example is the study of class; stratification scholars had been replicating all over the world the studies developed in Europe and the US. The inadequacy of explanatory models developed in the north to better understand the social structure of emerging economies, for example, left us without an accurate analysis of the social structure in societies that do not fit the modernization theory as developed for the central societies. Sociology in the south is still in debt of a model for sustainable social development in non-central countries.

A second set of challenges are related to the relevance and the impact of sociological studies for the society as a whole. In this sense, it is worth evaluating the impact of our field on professional formation and its interaction with other applied fields, such as technical management, administration and evaluation of social programs and policies. Also, the interaction with other fields of knowledge, such as health, urbanism, technology, nature and all other areas of the humanities. Last but not least, the impact

of sociological analysis on the economy, especially if it can have an impact on the improvement of living conditions and work for the entire population, which has direct effects on the strengthening of social inclusion, the identification of mechanisms of production and reproduction of inequality, and the contribution to the design and expansion of policies aimed at reinforcing civic participation and citizenship.

Final Remarks

The title of the Brazilian Sociological Society journal, “Sociologies in Dialogue”, published in English, inspired the theme for the ISA National Association Meeting, in 2017. It is in fact an inspiring title. The journal is an outcome of the efforts made by SBS to engage in international debate. We believe that by stimulating the acceptance of studies from various regions of the globe it is possible to promote more symmetrical geopolitics of sociological production. As Hanafi states, “Knowledge does not simply circulate: is also produced in circulation” [Hanafi, 2016]. This possibility implies creating transnational dialogues among diverse sociologies. We are aware of their limitations, such as the language, just to mention one, but we are also willing to overcome them and open a channel for a more egalitarian and productive cooperation with Global Sociology. Over the years we observed some results, Brazilian Sociology has been strengthening its ties with BRICS Sociologies, as well as, expanding and consolidating its historical relations with Latin America, Europe and the US.

I do believe that sociology can have a major role in building bridges between societies, just by its capacity to improve our understanding about others. Doing comparative analysis and circulating our work we can observe the differences and, especially, the similarities that exist among societies. Considering that, I would claim that sociology can help to show how distinctive we are in our individualities or diverse in our identities; but, above all, sociology can reveal how equal we are in our human condition, our desire to pursue goals and to shape the future.

The purpose of this article was to discuss the challenges that contemporary society imposes on sociology, both in terms of its scientific status and its vocation to analyse and to interpret transformations in social reality. In this sense, we believe it is of extreme relevance to address the processes of internationalization, research, innovation, and knowledge production. The deep transformations of societies in the twenty-first century require that sociologists evaluate and validate various dimensions of the process of knowledge production, such as research guidelines, methodological procedures, theoretical traditions, networking, and maybe even the relationship with the public sphere.

It is important to emphasize that the work of the sociologist is ultimately to treat all phenomena with suspicion. For that reason, sociology is dedicated to denaturalize common sense and to denounce that each dimension of social life is marked by relations of power and beliefs which are, until proven otherwise, the result of a system of values and norms socially shared. Facing these issues is to put sociology in its place as a global science that is socially responsible for the production of reflections that do not submit to the agenda or common-sense narratives.

The training of human resources and the production of knowledge today depend essentially on the cooperation between researchers and scientists located at

different levels of academic hierarchy. It is well-known that the intellectual production increasingly depends on interinstitutional, interregional and, most of all, international partnerships. In view of that, I would like to state that without global perspective and cooperation research in Sociology tend to be partial and incomplete; and, precisely for this reason, it will become obsolete in a short period of time.

To follow the frenetic pace of the changes in geo-economics, geo-politics, population movements, environmental balance, among many other issues that have direct impact on social life, it is fundamental to discuss the role, the place and the future of sociology. Therefore, it is important to consider the multiple options we have before us: making changes in the field and in the research spaces to build new strategies of production and work. What does innovation mean in the craft of sociology? What is our capacity to reflect on the present time and the intense dynamics of contemporary society, without letting ourselves being dragged by easy narratives or biased interpretations? How to create in fact an international atmosphere for debate when conditions seem so unfavourable to some compared to others? What is our position and what are our alternatives for securing an interchange with technological, exact and natural sciences, considering that they can, and should, engage in sociological analysis?

Our aim was certainly not to offer answers to such complex questions but to reflect on the paths and possibilities for sociology in the 21st century. Looking at the four-year period from the XVIII ISA World Congress of Sociology, in Yokohama, to the XIX ISA World Congress of Sociology, in Toronto, it is possible to argue that sociology is going global and growing stronger each day. In the last four years more national associations, especially from Arab and Latin-American countries, joined ISA and more TGs were proposed, bringing in new research themes. But as all research fields that expand, sociology faces the challenge of guaranteeing that the increase in number of professionals goes side by side with its advance in quality and consistency.

As sociology is a reflexive academic field, while it is built as an interpretation of social life and, at the same time, a science that interprets and reshapes this very same social life, there is a complementary relation that allows sociology to change along with social changes. The sociological work has shown a great ability to implement comprehensive perspectives suitable for the understanding of macro-historical phenomena, to adapt to major trends and to establish transnational dialogues in international comparative research. It does not know theoretical or methodological borders, participating in the knowledge production of other fields such as History, Anthropology, Political Science, Demography, Geography, Public Health, Environment, just to mention a few. In the same way, we can argue Sociology is not tied to a unique method of research, making use of statistics, ethnography, document analysis, focus groups, case studies, among others. It is exactly its flexibility and its ability to integrate theory and method that makes Sociology a solid field of research and allows it to keep on the move in times of change.

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SOCIOLOGY AS A SCIENCE: NEW CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY

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THE IRON BARS GET CLOSER: ANORMATIVE SOCIAL REGULATION

THE IRON BARS GET CLOSER: ANORMATIVE SOCIAL REGULATION

ПРУТЬЯ ЖЕЛЕЗНОЙ КЛЕТКИ ВСЕ БЛИЖЕ: АНОРМАТИВНОЕ СОЦИАЛЬНОЕ РЕГУЛИРОВАНИЕ

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Abstract. The ‘problem of normativity’ concerns the role that society’s value system, norms and conventions play in legislative regulation. Rapid social change was always problematic, for example the swift displacement of French Revolutionary law by the Napoleonic

Аннотация. Проблема нормативности связана с ролью, которую играет общественная система ценностей, норм и обычаев в законодательном регулировании. Стремительные социальные изменения, примером которых может быть быстрая замена Французского

Code. What validated one or the other, since both broke with previous social norms? Traditionally, both legal and social theories appealed to shared normativity to account for the 'bindingness', the sense of obligation held to inhere in the law. However, the intensification of morphogenesis had growing negative repercussions on all the normative components of the legal order: law itself, norms and rules, conventions, custom and etiquette. It is argued that as these elements weaken, 'Anormative Regulation' (or 'Bureaucratic Regulation') takes over in contemporary society, entailing no 'ought', exerting a causal force not a moral one, and operating through penalizations and prohibitions, which are punitive without entailing either a criminal record or invoking social sanction.

революционного законодательства Кодексом Наполеона, достаточно сложны. Как доказать правильность одного или другого, если оба резко отступали от прежних социальных норм? Традиционно и правовые и социальные теории обращались к коллективно разделяемой нормативности, лежащей в основе «обязательности» — обязывающего характера правовой системы. Однако интенсификация морфогенеза была сопряжена с увеличением негативных последствий для всех нормативных составляющих правового режима: самого закона, норм и правил, конвенций, обычаев и этикета. Утверждается, что, по мере того как в современном обществе эти элементы ослабляются, на смену им приходит «анормативное регулирование» («бюрократическое регулирование»), не подразумевающее долженствования, налагающее казуальное принуждение вместо морального и функционирующее через систему наказаний и запретов, не влекущих за собой ни уголовной ответственности, ни социальных санкций.

Keywords: norms, values, 'bindingness', anormativity, 'moral disconnect'

Ключевые слова: нормы, ценности, «обязательность», анормативность, «моральный разрыв»

Introduction¹

At its most general, legal normativity concerns the role that society's moral or value system, norms and conventions play in social regulation. Traditionally, both legal and social theorists had used such normativity to account for the 'bindingness' or crucial sense of obligation held to inhere in the law². Fundamentally, it was shared normativity that put the 'ought' into social action and accounted for legal conformity.

¹ This paper is abridged from my 'Anormative Social Regulation: The attempt to cope with Social Morphogenesis' (2016), in *Morphogenesis and the Crisis of Normativity*, M. S. Archer (Ed), Dordrecht, Springer.

² Since Pufendorf [Pufendorf, 1964], the obligation attaching to or the binding character of the law was the key element to be understood.

But the central question was which way round it worked? Was it shared normativity that orchestrated social change, or did social transformation engender changes in norms and values?

Radical social change accompanied by changes in the law had always been problematic in legal philosophy since it challenged the grounding of lasting legal *validity* in lasting *social normativity*. For example, French Revolutionary law, was swiftly displaced by the Napoleonic Code, and proved exercising for other independent States (when or whether to recognize either). It was yet more challenging to the philosophy of law (what validated one or the other, since both broke with previous social norms but were at variance with each other?) Conversely, if legality was granted to either, then legal validity did not seem reliant upon its grounding in the normativity particular to every nation state.

The morphogenetic approach does not treat this central problem in either/or terms, siding neither with Durkheim's conviction that changes in the 'collective conscience' follow the transformation in the division of labour³, nor with Hans Kelsen (in the bulk of his work), where legal regulation *derived* from its rooting in a foundational 'groundnorm' that underwrote its normative validity [Kelsen, 1945]. The reason for not taking sides is principled: the explanation of any social phenomenon whatsoever always comes in a SAC because it must incorporate the interplay between Structure, Culture and Agency, rather than causal primacy automatically being accorded to one of them, as was assumed by Durkheim and Kelsen in opposite ways. Given the complexities of this inter-disciplinary debate, I shall immediately spell out the three main propositions to be advanced in this paper.

To most legal philosophers the connection between Law and normativity is fundamentally *morphostatic*, working in terms of negative feedback between them. To philosophers of social science the relationship today is *morphogenetic*, with positive feedback amplifying both legal and normative changes, without assuring their compatibility.

For Sociologists, the demise of a shared normative system results in reductions in social integration, an increasing deficit in social solidarity, a growing 'macro-moral disconnect'⁴ between religious/ethical systems and members of society, all of which have negative repercussions upon the traditional normative components of the legal order: the law, norms/rules, conventions, customs and etiquette.

In consequence all five elements above are held to be giving way to the 'Anormative Regulation' of the contemporary social order or, if preferred, its 'Bureaucratic Regulation' — replete with Weber's 'iron bars' growing closer. In other words, normativity plays a much reduced role in furnishing guidelines for social action because the law and social custom diminish proportionately in relation to non-normative forms of regulative social control. Is this *necessarily* the case for any society that is undergoing intensive morphogenesis?

³ Durkheim's position was nuanced by his concern that the Third Republic in France required substantial increases in civic morals and moral education as essential normative reinforcements in order to produce a stable and just society. See the last chapter of *The Division of Labour* dealing with remedies for its pathologies.

⁴ Douglas V. Porpora coined this term in [Porpora et al., 2013].

As social change has intensified over the last three decades as a consequence of the synergy between digital science and economic financialization [Archer, 2014, 2015], novel opportunities for crime have created a novel problem for legislative regulation, namely ‘how to keep up?’ This inverts the traditional relationship between the legal order and the social order. Increasingly, the law lags behind innovative malfeasance and, since morphogenetic variety generates more variety in ways that are unpredictable, it outdistances the possibility of jurisprudence ever catching up. There are two legal alternatives. Either the law can try to ‘run faster’, but this inflates the quantity of legislation and still remains a retrospective tidying up operation⁵.

The alternative to futile legislative frenzy consists in an increasing cascade of regulations, passing downwards through a plethora of Agencies, culminating in increased bureaucratic rather than legal regulation. The next section is devoted to the growth and role of administrative regulation in late modernity (approximately after 1980), focusing upon its morphogenetic importance in relation to earlier hegemonic forms of socio-legal regulation.

Why Morphogenesis and Normativity part company

Bureaucratic regulation as anormative social regulation

This is a broad trajectory where ‘culture’ is gradually displaced from the driving seat and from steering the social order when (Durkheimian) ‘mechanical solidarity’ prevailed, diminishing further with ‘the diversity of morals’ [Ginsberg, 1962]⁶ and yet further as it confronted *fin de siècle* ‘multiculturalism’.

Although allowance must be given to the growth in international law, human rights law, and the definition of new universal legal prohibitions (for example, ‘Crimes against Humanity’), all the same these developments do not nullify the fragmenting bindingness of normativity in most parts of the life-world (locally, regionally, generationally, sexually, ethnically, linguistically etc.). This is what Doug Porpora has persuasively diagnosed as the ‘macro-moral disconnect’, where the guidelines for behaviour show a growing detachment from systems of social normativity (religious and secular alike), which are increasingly confined to the private domain [Porpora, 2001, 2013].

Within in our lifetimes, the phrase ‘rules and regulations’ was common in ordinary speech; but now the two terms have come apart. Today, ‘regulations’ — which are one form of rules — are not accompanied by normative justification and a sense of obligation has been displaced among those conforming to them, along with feelings ‘shame’ for or ‘guilt’ about their infringement. Instead, these moral responses have been replaced by considerations of escaping detection, cost-benefit analysis of the price of a fine versus one’s personal convenience (for those who can afford it) and frequent disgruntlement about these bureaucratic intrusions. This is what is meant

⁵ This has been attempted and abandoned. For example, between 1983 and 2009 the British Parliament approved over one hundred criminal justice bills and over 4,000 new criminal offences were created. In response to that trend, the Ministry of Justice established a procedure to limit the designation of new crimes (Cabinet Office 2013). In fact, the volume of Government primary legislation diminished between 1979—2009, whilst the quantity of Statutory Instruments increased [House of Lords, 2011].

⁶ An evolutionary exploration that is matched by many in legal philosophy texts on moral development [Joyce, 2007].

by social regulation having become increasingly anormative. However, is it *justified to attribute this social tendency to morphogenesis*.

On the one hand, the reason given for this proliferation of regulatory bodies in very different countries is sometimes the simple speed of change, as accentuated by ‘acceleration theory’ [Hartmut Rosa, 2003], which is straightforwardly empiricist. This is illustrated in a U.K. Cabinet Office paper⁷, significantly entitled ‘When Laws become too complex’, showing that from 1979 laws have decreased in number, though increasing in volume, whilst Statutory Instruments have more than doubled from the late 1980s to 2006. On the other hand, some stress the increased expertise required, especially in complex or highly technical sectors, where ‘their *legitimation* resides in the need for expertness and advanced technical competence’ [Casini, 2007: 21]. Here, the connection with the novel practices and techniques introduced through morphogenesis in the last three decades is more prominent.

However, it is salutary to note that within legal studies, where the growth of regulatory bodies has captured considerable attention, discussion has been restricted to an ‘in house’ debate about whether or not their increase subtracts from the powers of the state through ‘decentering’ control and results in its ‘polycentricity’, often referred to as the ‘hollowing out of the state’. This is a debate largely without a social context because, at most, references are made to the changing political philosophies of those in Office. Moreover, the concern of ‘regulatory studies’ is with the workings of regulation in terms of ‘good governance’ or the opposite, rather than with the explanation of its growth, social form or relation to normativity. Consequently, there is little meeting point between this corpus of work and my present concerns, which accounts for why the main positions sequentially adopted in ‘regulation studies’ are of little service to the sociological issues under discussion.

1. Regulation by ‘command and control’ (CAC) is the preserve of the state, using legal rules backed by criminal sanctions. ‘It is «centred» in that it assumes the state to have the capacity to command and control, to be the only commander and controller, and to be potentially effective in commanding and controlling. It is assumed to be unilateral in its approach (governments telling, others doing), based on simple cause-effect relations, and envisaging a linear progression from policy formation through to implementation.’ [Black, 2001: 106]. These substantive assumptions are rejected here and also by those advocating position (b).
2. Conversely, in the ‘decentred understanding of regulation, regulation happens in the absence of formal legal sanction — it is the product of interactions not the exercise of the formal, constitutionally recognized authority of government.’ [Rhodes, 1997]. Partly based on the manifest failures of CAC, partly on the simple recognition that regulation has many locales (polycentrism), taking place ‘in many rooms’ [Nader, Nader, 1985], and partly on Teubner’s anti-centrist systems theory [Teubner, 1993: 19—34], this popular approach also eschews any explanatory generative mechanism producing decentred regulation and settles for a list of contributory factors such as ‘complexity’, ‘fragmentation of

⁷ GOV-UK. 2013. When laws become too complex. Cabinet Office and Office of the Parliamentary Counsel, <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/publications/when-laws-become-too-complex> (downloaded 21.11.2014).

government', 'loss of steering power', 'new knowledge', 'novel networks' and so forth, whose permutations result in diverse sources of prescriptions.

3. Finally, there is the millennial hybrid that combines the above positions, by accentuating the combination of institutional centralization with decentred regulation. Hence, in the quest for enhanced steering capacity, Moran argues that the state spearheads a 'drive towards synoptic legibility: installing systems of comprehensive reporting and surveillance over numerous social spheres; the consequential pressure to standardize and to codify, which is to make explicit what had hitherto been tacit; and the creation of new institutions (notably specialized regulatory agency) to help enforce all of this' [Moran, 2004]. As his title indicates, *The British Regulatory State: High Modernism and Hyper Innovation*, Moran's preoccupations come closest to my own, but not his conclusions.

The unhelpfulness of these positions can ultimately be attributed to their empiricism. Such 'tendencies' are merely extrapolations from current data; there is no mention of generative mechanisms. All the same, it was hoped that this corpus of literature would have furnished a brief lexicon of fairly consensual and useable definitions. Yet, to Black, 'definitional chaos is almost seen as an occupational hazard by those who write about regulation' [Black, 2001: 129—144]⁸. Instead, I have resorted to self-help in the following Ideal Type, with the aim being of accentuating the most salient features of 'anormative regulation', without pretending to exhaustiveness.

- Regulations do not attempt to meet any form of 'normativity requirement', legal, conventional or personal (such as Korsgaard's 'reflective endorsement' [Korsgaard, 1996, 2009], but are the means of *avoiding* such appeals.
- Regulations exert a *causal force* not a *moral one*. They are unrelated to the approbation, approval or assent of those to whom they apply (in some of their actions), but whose agreement to any given regulation is rarely directly sought. Nevertheless, it is not one associated with a high rate of non-compliance.
- Regulations do contain 'normative operators', words such as 'ought' or 'must', is 'required'/'prohibited' or 'permitted'. However, they work — insofar as they do — through the instrumental rationality of the subjects in question, who feel no obligation but, rather, are calculative or prudential in their responses according to their means.
- Regulations have a heteronomous character, depending upon fines, penalizations and prohibitions, which are punitive without incurring either a criminal record or involving social sanction.

⁸ Compare the following three definitions:

1. To the OECD regulation is 'the full range of legal instruments by which governing institutions, at all levels of government, impose obligations or constraints on private sector behaviour. Constitutions, parliamentary laws, subordinate legislation, decrees, orders, norms, licenses, plans, codes and even some forms of administrative guidance can all be considered as 'regulation' (OECD, 1995).

2. To the UK government's Better Regulation Taskforce, regulation is 'any government measure or intervention that seeks to change the behaviour of individuals or groups, so including taxes, subsidies and other financial measures'. (Better Regulation Taskforce, undated, Principles of Better Regulation, 1. (undated)).

3. Hall, Scott and Hood [Hall, Scott, Hood, 1999] provide the broadest and vaguest definition when they simply talk of people being

3. Hall, Scott and Hood [Hall, Scott, Hood, 1999] provide the broadest and vaguest definition when they simply talk of people being regulated by culture.

- Regulations have to be actual (it would sound odd to talk of the ‘dead letter of the regulation’), but they can be displaced and replaced overnight without appealing to the ‘democratic defence of validity’.
- Regulations do not necessarily stem from authorities within the legal order. Many do (as in planning regulations), but many others originate from retailers (concerning conditions for return, reimbursement or recompense for products), train and bus services, private utilities, landlords (no pets), hotels, companies, banks, financial services, libraries and taxi drivers. The law may or may not uphold any of the above.
- Regulations do not depend upon existing social conventions. Often their avowed aim is the opposite, as in combatting discriminatory practices or policing acceptable vocabulary and behaviour. (It is not illegal to swear, conventionally many do, but we are sternly warned not to affront railway personnel or cabin crew in this way). *In fact, convention is now more frequently re-made by regulation than vice versa.*
- Regulations are basically concerned with the social co-ordination of action and practices rather than with issues of social co-operation or re-distribution. As such, they are at most binding (without entailing a sense of obligation) but never socially bonding. Hence the connection with a decline in social integration.
- Regulations differ from laws or other forms of rules in terms of what makes them social. In the latter cases, this depends upon their internal relations within complexes of roles and rules. Conversely, what makes bureaucratic regulations social is simply that people (largely) behave in conformity to them, thus producing a manifest social regularity.
- Regulations are ultimately intrusive of previously unregulated (or more loosely regulated) domains⁹.

Anormative Social Regulation Takes Over

In linking anormative bureaucratic regulation to the intensification of morphogenesis, one socio-political characteristic of regulations is crucial. Since they do not rely upon consensus among or consultation with the public affected, neither are they dependent upon the relatively slow development, typical of social conventions and of norms. *This feature recommends their suitability for ready response to the novel changes introduced through morphogenesis and its generic tendency for new variety to generate more variety.* Nevertheless, more than ready regulative capability is required to explain why they became the weapon of preference for governance over the last three decades because various negative aspects were associated above with regulatory governance.

The post-war ‘golden age’, prior to multinationalism and financialization of the economy, was the product of mutual regulation between industrial employers and their workforce, the state of one mattering to that of the other with the two sides enjoying the sponsorship of political parties alternating in government and opposition. Thus,

⁹ Such as such as EU regulation No. 730/1999 on the retail of carrots, banning the public sale of forked specimens or those with secondary roots.

Western democracies could fairly be characterized as ‘lib/lab’ [Donati, 2000, 2014]¹⁰. The regular alternation of such parties in government (or the equivalent alternation of centre-right and centre-left coalitions) gave half a loaf of bread in turn to those they represented. Hence, such mutual regulation between these distinctive political parties was a formula for protracting *morphostasis*.

It did not last because voter turn-out in general elections plummeted throughout Europe as electorates recognised the diminishing powers of national governments, given international finance capitalism, multi-national corporations and supra-national institutions such as the EU. A decade later, with the onset of the economic crisis, any residue of ‘lib/lab’ oscillation had disappeared to be replaced by a politics of ‘centrism’. Very few (an exception is [Bobbio, 1996] still maintained that ‘right’ and ‘left’ retained any meaning — unless prefixed by the term ‘ultra’. Slogans of the ‘We are the 99%’ variety indicated that the economic crisis and the response to it of ‘austerity’ had eroded the residual class basis of political support in Europe and with it the ‘lib’ versus ‘lab’ distinctions between parties. At that point, its successor, ‘centrist’ politics had no alternative to attempting to cope with the consequences of *morphogenesis* that were no respecters of national boundaries. It was this above all (though not alone) that enhanced the appeal of administrative social regulation.

Politics without Conviction: From Strategic to Tactical Government

Politics without conviction means a drastic shrinkage (*crispation*) of normativity in political life. Political parties are preoccupied with tactics; with a St Simonian ‘administration of things’ — the day to day management of austerity and the reduction of public spending with minimum backlash — not the ‘government of people’ based on a normative conception of the good society. Tactical governance, with its ‘about turns’, absorption in today’s latest ‘scandal’, and the announcement of a ‘quick fix’, behaves like the fire service attending only to emergency calls. It ejects commitment from the political domain, whether in the form of expansive political philosophies or explicitly normative organizations with a broad conspectus on the good life. Thus, religion in general is banished from the public domain [Trigg, 2008], henceforth supposed to be a depoliticized matter of private belief and practice. *If functionalists had once held that values articulated every system of social action, they have become the antithesis of today’s political aversion towards social normativity.*

Tactical governance works through bureaucratic regulation whose highest aims are manifest (meaning measurable) efficiency and effective control. Institutionally, the public domain is carved into decreasingly small pieces, each with its own Regulator, meaning that the problems occurring in any fragment can be addressed technocratically. Consequently, the pieces are never put back together and assessed for their coherence, let alone for their contribution to or obstruction of any normative definition of the good society.

Ultimately, politics without conviction generates a huge shrinkage of normativity itself within public life. What matters is that epistemically we, the people, live togeth-

¹⁰ Donati also uses the term to refer more broadly to the *lib-lab* configuration of society, one that is a compromise between the liberal (lib) side of capitalist markets (free economy) and the socialist (lab) side of the welfare entitlements and ‘equal’ opportunities funded by the state (political system).

er in overt 'political correctness'; real ontological differences are not acknowledged, addressed, assisted, or ameliorated in this semantic displacement manoeuvre. If those lower down the social hierarchy are not addressed as 'plebs', 'slags' or 'pakis', then a veneer of civility conceals the endurance of real inequalities of class, sex or ethnicity. By implication, any form of society could claim to be 'good' provided it had somehow eliminated improper speech. Thus, the role of political correctness is to mute the expression of normative differences and places a stranglehold on their potential to justify demands for greater justice. Anormative regulation inserts a solid wedge between social policy and normativity.

Social Institutions and Governance by Performance Indicators

From their emergence in Europe, the distinctive feature of the professions was the adherence of each to a specific and demanding code of ethics, departures from which were usually disciplined by a governing body of peers (usually for doctors and lawyers). This ethical regulation, symbolized by the Hippocratic Oath, approximated to a secular vow of service. It both bonded members of a profession together and provided assurance to those they served that the skills in question were being used in their interests and thus that their relationship differed from a market transaction.

Over the last quarter of a century, all of the above groups have become subject to governance by performance indicators. Schools, hospitals, universities and so forth became managed by 'objective' performance indicators with results published in League Tables, which undermined the solidarity amongst 'free professionals' and the relationality between them and those they served. *The use of performance indicators represents an extension of the logic of competition from the business world to one previously held to consist importantly in the quality of human relations.* The indicators deployed could capture measurable quantitative differences in crude empiricist terms (hospital through-put, waiting times for operations and so on) but were incapable of assessing the quality of care, of teaching or of research.

But, internally within each organization (schools, medical centres, hospitals and universities) and externally between the potential public of users, the *logic of competition* constituted an assault upon solidarity. Externally, the effects of governance by performance indicators may not be fatal but do damage the social solidarity among users. In seeking school placement for their children in establishments highly ranked on the League Tables for their measurable results, English experience shows parents moving house in order to be eligible for entry and cases of legal prosecution for some who lied about their addresses so as to place themselves in the desired catchment area. Parent is thus placed in competition with parent and their children under an obligation of gratitude for these manoeuvres. It is unnecessary to mention the transformation of our students into 'consumers', reluctant to do more than minimal reading unless this 'counts' towards their results. Corporate employers raise the non-academic stakes by the expansion of seductive internships, the appointment of 'student Ambassadors' and other forms of colonizing the campuses.

Internal and external effects coalesce. The use of Journal 'impact factors' by Heads of Department to control where colleagues publish, the appearance of Google 'hit' rates in academic references (common in Switzerland), the expectation that research grant

holders must demonstrate its 'impact' before the research is even completed, embroil all in the *situational logic of competition*. Collegiality gives way to mutual suspicion, collaboration to strategic considerations, and peer review segues into a procedure for enforcing academic correctitude. *Qui bono* from this competitive turn? The answer is hardly anyone, except those — usually not the most creative — who have re-invented themselves as academic administrators, but not the state of research and not academia as a solidary body. By working under this form of governance professionals become inoculated against the robust normativity that was once their patrimony.

Governance by Bureaucratic Regulation

It is worth noting that Canada, the U.S. and the E.U. have commissions or committees whose aim is to reduce it. In other words, bureaucratic regulation is a strange animal in the sense that some of the agencies most responsible for its proliferation, such as the E.U., at least wish to be seen to be unenthusiastic about it. What accounts for this paradox?

Certainly, bureaucratic regulation is about control and no democratic institution wants to be seen as a 'controller'. Yet, there has to be more to it because so many organizations that increasingly operate through this form of regulation make no claims about their governance being democratic: public utilities, banks, supermarkets, manufacturers, public transport, leisure facilities and hotels amongst dozens of others. I maintain that one reason for this profusion and proliferation lies in low social solidarity amongst the relevant populations (of users, consumers, clients etc.) and one consequence of its growth is to drive solidarity even lower.

It is when normative consensus is lowest in a target population that bureaucratic regulation can be applied most easily. Were there higher solidarity, entailing shared concerns amongst group members, the basis exists for potential (organized) opposition to bureaucratic fiat. Although solidarity does not necessarily imply a state of affairs even approaching normative consensus, the holding of shared concerns cannot be devoid of normativity. Some of the same things matter to those with concerns held in common and the most important of them is that these *ought* to be fostered rather than damaged. Conversely, low solidarity signals heterogeneous concerns meaning that regulation will have a mixed reception, but one too fragmented for resistance. In that case, control is simply control.

A bureaucratic regulation is usually satisfied if each and every member of the target population behaves as specified (e. g. not parking except in designated bays). What makes a regulation social is simply when a social outcome is its objective, such as avoiding a definition of overcrowding ('No more than 8 standing passengers permitted'). Nevertheless, regulations influence real social relations — specifically social solidarity — in excess of the behavioural conformity sought.

Let us quickly glance at an improbable instance, that of the (still current) E.U. regulation governing the sale of carrots. Commission Regulation (EC) No 730/1999 of 7 April 1999 states they must be «not forked, free from secondary roots». One consequence has been that horticulturalists have to dump or find some industrial outlet for their offending carrots, being paid by supermarkets for only perfectly straight specimens. Another is that the price of the latter rises. Farmers are disgruntled and so are custom-

ers. Yet, considering the price, customers may conclude that farmers growing carrots are doing very well. Meanwhile, the grower, returning home with a half a truck load of rejected forked carrots that have now lost freshness and value, curses customer perfectionism. Ironically, neither party may be fully aware of EC Regulation No 730/1999 and both, if consulted, might well be normatively opposed to it. The attitudes they do share are discounted bureaucratically and the practices imposed by regulation serve to diminish solidarity between them.

Can one generalize from this ludicrous issue? Perhaps, to the extent that when social solidarity is low, the weaker are the networks along which information flows and the less the bonds that mitigate or offset a person or group behaving in a way that is the product of regulatory control. Conversely, bureaucratic regulation enables competitive individualism to infiltrate more readily with every new decline in solidarity, thus serving to promote it. Additionally, collectivities invent informal regulations of their own. For instance, that passengers seated in rows towards the front of the plane have a right to disembark first, whether ready or not. Recognizing this practice, some airlines introduced a Priority Boarding fee!

Conclusion

This paper has tracked how sources of normativity within the legal order — laws, rules, norms, conventions and etiquette [Abrutyn, Carter, 2014] — responded to the intensification of morphogenesis over the last three decades. I have maintained that the task of normative control has passed to processes of *anormative* bureaucratic regulation. These can respond faster to novel social changes but have largely severed their links to traditional legal concerns about *legitimacy*, yet are not imbued with social concerns about *legitimation* [Turner, 2010]. Consequently, the legal and social orders are linked *instrumentally* meaning that instead of supplying normative guidelines for action, that are both constraining and enabling, social regulation is increasingly sought through regulative prohibitions and sanctions that are *anormative*.

In terms of the three main tasks that legal instruments can perform for the social order — assisting co-ordination, co-operation and redistribution — bureaucratic regulation focusses exclusively upon *co-ordination*, working causally to promote conformity rather than supplying guidelines fostering how we live together in fairness. Moral concerns cannot be obliterated but their social diffusion is discouraged as voluntary initiatives prompted by them are colonized, economic philosophy is curtailed into ‘There is no alternative’, political philosophy truncated into ‘getting by’ without vision, and human philosophy reduced to political correctness unrelated to humanistic ideals of flourishing. In consequence, all the resources most capable of fostering eudemonia, are repressed by the top-down imposition of anormative social regulation. They are fragmented into the specific remits of each regulative organization, which at most stimulates single-issue pressure groups as the form of opposition. These are hampered from coalescing because they compete for governmental recognition at election time in relation to their numerical strength.

In sum, the major top down effect is to augment the overall decline in social solidarity, since bureaucratic regulation operates through instrumental rationality and is therefore fundamentally individualistic. Thus, there is no encouragement for the

majority to become reflexive relational subjects [Donati, Archer, 2015; Archer 2007, 2012] but, rather, anormative social regulation constitutes both structural and cultural barriers against effective relationality and creative reflexivity. It follows that we should not be surprised that 'those born here' can be recruited as jihadists, that migrant groups form residential enclaves, and that the affluent retired are retreating into gated communities. These, at least have some form of social integration surpassing the absence of solidarity encountered in the developed world and a source of values sustaining normativity, albeit not ones promoting the common good.

Such are the results when the generative mechanism fueling intensive morphogenesis becomes systematically skewed towards market competition, with its intrinsic tendency to produce winners and losers, but one that increases the disproportionality between the two ('We are the 99%'). From this perspective, the potential for the same generative mechanism to diffuse 'win-win' contexts cumulating in an integrative Commons is overshadowed by the proponents of the *situational logic of competition* having made common cause with the political promoters of anormative social regulation. With it, the prospects of a eudemonic morphogenic social order appear to be paralyzed.

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SOCIOLOGY AS A SCIENCE: NEW CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY

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PREVENTING AND EXITING VIOLENCE: A DOMAIN FOR SOCIOLOGY?

PREVENTING AND EXITING VIOLENCE: A
DOMAIN FOR SOCIOLOGY?

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Abstract. Preventing and exiting violence is a central problem of social sciences. Violence-related information mainly comes from medical specialists, consultant psychiatrists, experts, lawyers, diplomatic officials, representatives of NGO and others. Today this area of knowledge needs a separate discipline operating at individual and group level (recovery of

ПРЕДОТВРАЩЕНИЕ И ПРЕКРАЩЕНИЕ
НАСИЛИЯ — СФЕРА СОЦИОЛОГИИ?

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Аннотация. Предотвращение и прекращение насилия — одна из центральных проблем социальных наук. Информация о насилии исходит в основном от врачей-специалистов, психиатров, экспертов, юристов, дипломатов, представителей общественных организаций и т.д. Сегодня настал момент сделать эту область знаний

victims or punishment for abusers), national level (building democracy or justice during the interregnum) and global level (for example, how the ISIL activities will shape the situation in the Middle East). Nonetheless, the idea of transformation of violence, crisis logic, discourse and institutional conflicts is core.

отдельным социологическим направлением, начиная с индивидуального и группового уровня (реабилитация жертв или наказание насильников) и заканчивая государственным (построение демократии и правосудие переходного периода) и геополитическим (например, что станет с ближним Востоком в связи с деятельностью ИГИЛ?). При этом ключевой здесь является идея о трансформации насилия, логики кризиса, дискурса и институциональных конфликтов.

Keywords: violence, preventing violence, new disciplines in sociology

Ключевые слова: насилие, предотвращение насилия, новые направления социологии

Violence¹ is an issue of particular significance for the humanities and social sciences. Most researchers and schools of thought have at some point explored it or dealt with it. It has been the central theme of countless theories and empirical studies in sociology and more broadly speaking for the humanities and social sciences.

Defining violence is not easy. A universalist, objective approach will, for example, propose a quantification — the number of crimes in a country, of persons killed in a war, of suicides, etc. But violence is also subjective. The definition depends on what a person, a group or a society considers as such at any given point in time. Now other people, other groups or other societies may have different perceptions which makes it difficult to generalise and encourages tendencies to relativism. This difficulty is particularly obvious with terrorism. As we already know the terrorist for some is the freedom fighter for others.

Suffice it to say that the humanities and social sciences have by no means exhausted the attempts to conceptualise violence and go further than the non-scientific definitions of daily life or found in the media. This type of endeavour demands discussion and we shall engage therein.

For example, at the beginning of the 1980s, at the time when the Red Brigades and other armed struggle organisations were operational, I had the opportunity of attending a meeting in Florence. The historian Charles Tilly, a leading exponent of the mobilisation of resources school of thought, discussed his approach to terrorism as opposed to that of Ted Robert Gurr. Gurr is a leading exponent of the current in American political sociology which considers that the participation of the actors in this type of violence is explained by their relative frustration (see for example: [Gurr, 1970; Tilly, 1978]). On another occasion, during the Congress of the International Sociological Association in

¹ My focus here will be more particularly on physical, political or social violence; I will leave aside in particular State violence, symbolic violence and also the violence associated with delinquency or crime.

Goteborg in 2010, I had a fascinating discussion about the analysis of violence with Randall Collins; we continued this discussion in an Italian sociological review². He defended an interactionist approach, in a book which has become a classic, whereas I advocated research based on the subjectivity of the actors, which exists well before the point of the intersubjective encounter in which the violence may break out. Last example: the emergence in 2016 in France of an interesting discussion concerning Jihadis which rapidly had an impact at global level. The discussion focussed on the motivation in the decision to take action. Was it primarily Islam, or was it the radicalisation resulting from situations and social processes associated in particular with a history shaped by poorly assimilated decolonisation, precarity or exclusion, discrimination, etc. Gilles Kepel focused on the radicalisation due to Islam while Olivier Roy discussed the Islamisation of social radicality; finally Farhad Khosrokhavar demonstrated that there is no one reply but a wide variety of possible situations [Khosrokhavar, 2018]. Other important discussions also posed the question of the relations between religion and political violence, for example in relation to Salafism.

On occasions, the academic conflict has become heated, even extremely so in some cases. This happened for example with the genocide in Rwanda. There was a confrontation, including in the media, in which two currents of research disagreed with one another. One school of thought went as far as accusing the other of negationism³.

Usually, researchers listen to each other, and consider where they agree and what separates them, even if some do at times disagree vociferously in public. That discussions of this sort be possible, is an indication of the existence of a field or a domain in sociology which deals with violence.

1. Two domains separate and different

In a joint article, John Gledhill and Jonathan Bright (Oxford Internet Institute) [Gledhill, Bright, 2018] demonstrate that, generally speaking, more space is devoted to the study of violence than to the study of peace. They point out that there is little academic exchange between those who study war and those who study peace; they report the existence of methodological divisions but also divisions in the regions studied or whether or not gender is an issue.

This finding is in keeping with my own observations and emphasizes the difference between research on violence, which is well developed and varied, and the research focused on exiting and preventing violence, which is much less studied. Closer consideration reveals a fragmented space in which technical, militant and institutional technical skills are mobilised. These may include medical doctors dealing with traumatism associated with the experience of terrorism, transitional justice lawyers, international consultants in 'peacekeeping', 'conflict resolution', 'nation building', etc. However, this cannot be said to be sociological research as such.

² In *Sociologica*, n°2/2012. Cf. [Collins, 2008], I clarify my approach further in [Wiewiorka, 2015a].

³ Cf. for example, the polemic between a collection of historians, in the article «Rwanda: the «Que sais-je?» — the book that re-writes history: URL: http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2017/09/25/rwanda-le-que-sais-je-qui-fait-basculer-l-histoire_5190733_3232.html#hZesgGtp02c7qXOX.99 (accessed: 16.09.2018), and Filip Reyntjens « Le difficile débat sur le Rwanda en France », *Mediapart*, 11 oct. 2017: URL: <https://blogs.mediapart.fr/fatimad/blog/111017/le-difficile-debat-sur-le-rwanda-en-france> (accessed: 16.09.2018)

If we have to start, as Gledhill and Bright do, with the image of a separation between the two registers, we observe that the second, unlike the first, is in no way reminiscent of a structured domain of research in the humanities and social sciences. It must also be admitted that exiting, or preventing, violence is not simply the reverse of violence — the two are not symmetrical — as if for example, once the causes of an episode of violence are known, one could deal with it simply and erase it, by dealing with these causes. There are specificities inherent to the prevention of, and exit from, violence which also demand consideration. To articulate the two sets of issues, we first have to constitute the exit from violence as a domain for sociological research in its own right, with its specificity. Once its autonomy has been ensured, we then have to consider how this domain can define its relation to the pre-existing domain constituted by research on violence.

Throughout the world, countless actors intervene in the reduction, prevention or ending of violence, including its effects or its impact once it has ceased. Each element of these issues is part of a very extensive arena (cf. [Wieviorka, 2015b]). At one extreme, the question is one of avoiding, minimising or ending what, in violence, affects or has affected individual persons as such, people whose physical and moral integrity has been affected. What can be done for the American Vietnam war 'vets', who witnessed, or possibly participated in killings, sometimes in barbaric ways, and cannot recover? What about child-soldiers enlisted at a very young age in a guerrilla movement in Africa which has now surrendered? At the other extreme, the question is one of confronting global issues: global terrorism, organised criminality and international drug trafficking, whole regions of the planet devastated by war, as is the case today in the Middle East.

Between the two extremes, there is no shortage of problems at town, village, local area or nation-state level, but also at community level in a locality beset by problems.

Consequently, countless skills are mobilised and, over and above the material results, the outcome is the knowledge produced by the actors. Doctors, psychiatrists, lawyers, diplomats, consultants of all sorts, militants and officials from humanitarian NGOs, soldiers, national or international politicians, etc. may draw lessons from their experience and think about their actions, thus contributing to a fund of knowledge which has the advantage of being based on experience. Occasionally there are documents prepared by authors who are capable of adopting a sociological or anthropological viewpoint, if only as a result of their training. But this in no way affects the overall image which we retain from all this production and, for example, from the reports of humanitarian organisations, international institutions or consultants. As far as they are concerned, the prevention of and exit from violence in no way constitutes in their opinion a specific domain in the humanities and social sciences. At best, they constitute a domain which is loosely structured, dominated by empirical knowledge with no recourse to theorising.

If this is the case, it is not because these questions are of little interest to citizens, political actors, public policies makers or diplomats, humanitarian organisations, or social scientists, etc.; quite the contrary. In the first instance, it is perhaps because our traditional conceptions of violence have long rendered the project of constituting a domain in sociology, or a field in sociological research devoted to violence, unnecessary.

2. The emergence of victims

The first question is therefore the evolution of the political and social status of violence.

Before extending their sphere of activity to the whole world and becoming globalised **the humanities and social sciences** were originally a Western invention; confined in the first instance to countries in Europe, then rapidly and powerfully extending to North America and, later to Latin America. In these societies, violence was considered the main threat to social order. This justified the perspective opened up by Hobbes⁴ of the resort to the State to avoid violence which he defined as a state of war «of every man against every man». The sociological tradition, amongst others is located in this perspective; we have for example Max Weber decreeing that the state has the monopoly of legitimate force or Norbert Elias considering the role of the State and, in the first instance, the Royal courts, in the decline of human aggression (cf. [Weber, 1959; Elias, 1973,1975]). Henceforth these activities fall within the jurisdiction of the State and its action which is primarily, but not uniquely, repressive. The State can hardly be questioned from this point of view, except to challenge its abuse of power or shortcomings or when the population resorts to violence to challenge a régime and justify a revolutionary action. This has been a constant issue and important schools of thought and action have thus stressed the need for revolutionary violence. Friedrich Engels, for example, highlighted the 'role of violence in history'. Some explained that a degree of violence may be necessary to ensure progress and social emancipation or asserted, with Georges Sorel, that the necessary violence of the working class would encourage the bourgeoisie to become radicalised also and would, ultimately, raise the level of civilisation. Later others considered violence essential to end colonisation. Jean Paul Sartre wrote a celebrated and quite radical preface to Franz Fanon's *Les damnés de la terre* in this sense.

Whether it be a question of asserting that the State has the legitimate monopoly of the use of violence, or of appealing to the positive and emancipatory role of violence, in both cases there was no space to make of the exit from violence an issue for research in the humanities and social sciences. These had little vocation for the analysis of the action of the State assuming its monopoly on violence; nor did they have any great interest in questioning sociologically the prevention of violence in the face of revolutionary, Marxist-Leninist, anti-imperialist or decolonising etc. ideas.

But in the 1960s in the 20th century, the viewpoint of the victims began to be perceptible in the public sphere in Western societies. The way in which whole human groups within these societies had been decimated or brutalised began to emerge as a subject for discussion. These included Indians and Black people in the United States, Jews in Europe, Armenians in Turkey, regional minorities and many others. At the same time, the voices of the men and women who denounced the violence suffered by women, children and the disabled began to be heard. In short, the voice of the victims was being taken into consideration.

This evolution developed along two distinct paths which were already perceptible in the context of the processes leading up to the Nuremberg trials (cf. [Sands, 2016]) On

⁴ «Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that conditions called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man». [Hobbes, 1651]

the one hand, there is the personal nature of the suffering endured, and in the most serious cases, offences involving human rights, whence the concept of crime against humanity forged by the legal expert, Hersch Lauterpacht. On the other, we have the collective nature where the object of the mass violence is the group to which the victims belong, which is in extreme cases subject to systematic destruction, or 'genocide' to use the term forged by the legal expert, Raphael Lemkin.

Whether it be a question of individual or collective subjectivity, or whether the violence affects individual human beings, or targets a group as a whole, this evolution has led to extraordinary changes. These have been impelled by organisations devoted to the defence of human rights, movements demanding the recognition of historic suffering affecting certain groups and possibly demanding compensation, intellectuals initiating public discussion and the elaboration of policies, for example in the form of multicultural measures or Affirmative Action.

Violence has become an issue for analysis and is not only a self-interested choice. Studying it to endeavour to reduce or prevent it or to adequately manage the impact was no longer a matter for the State alone but involved considering demands from civil society. For example, when *Médecins sans Frontières* demanded a 'right to intervene' for humanitarian reasons despite the refusal of the State concerned, it was a matter which went beyond the morals of classical politics. It could also be, as was already the case in Nuremberg, a supranational or international concern.

The legitimate monopoly of the State, sole guarantor of the control of violence, was challenged from above and from below. The interest taken in the victims and not only in the maintenance of order had had an effect. Henceforth numerous actors, whether at State level or not, work to prevent or exit violence thus reflecting the view that there should be more systematization of the knowledge enabling a better understanding of the facts and appropriate action. Whence the creation of think tanks and specialised institutes, and, as far as we are personally concerned, a platform in the FMSH which, **with the aid of several institutions**, mobilises some three hundred researchers, **moderates the IPEV⁵** panel and is preparing to launch a journal devoted to these questions⁶.

3. Loss of legitimacy and destructuration of political violence

We also observe in Western societies at least, that the past fifty years have been marked by the increasing rejection of violence which has become almost taboo.

Half a century ago, major intellectuals and numerous **researchers in the humanities and social sciences** still considered violence to be genuinely legitimate. This is not often the case today, which makes it politically easier and more desirable to constitute the exit and prevention of violence as an object of analysis. The debate is no longer a case of opposition between advocates and opponents of certain types of violence, the adhesion or rejection for example to guerrilla or revolutionary movements as it sometimes tended to be.

Finally, violence itself has considerably evolved and not only in the societies to which I give priority consideration here. The most spectacular example is political violence,

⁵ IPEV International Panel on Exiting Violence

⁶ Violence and Exiting Violence, n°1, janvier 2019.

in many ways weakened, its decomposition giving way on one hand to metapolitical violence, in particular religious, as in Islamic, Hindu or messianic Jewish nationalism and on the other, to infra-political procedures, organized delinquency and criminality. For example a guerrilla movement may become a key player in drug trafficking.

4. From the analysis of violence to its prevention and exit. Classical approaches.

The humanities and social sciences offer a wide range of approaches to violence, each with the potential to lead to coherent proposals for the exit from or prevention of violence.

The classical arguments are structured around two main types of approach. The first prioritises the idea of reaction or response: violence is here seen as individual or collective behaviour enabling an actor to confront difficulties, disruptions or crisis. This type of approach may include the concept of 'relative frustration' which I referred to above in relation to Ted Robert Gurr: the origin of violence lies in changes affecting the position of a person or a group who, as a result, feels frustrated. Researchers, in particular those in North America, who developed this approach often quote the Tocqueville of *L'Ancien regime et la Révolution*. In this case, exiting violence, or preventing it, involves preventing or minimising or rapidly ending the crisis. The focus is not on the actors of the violence as much as on the social, economic and cultural conditions which cause the crisis and their reaction.

A second type of approach focuses on the calculations of the actors, once again either individual or collective. Violence here is not reactive but instrumental; it is a resource mobilised to a specific end — in particular a political one. Thus the 'theory of mobilisation of resources' illustrated by Charles Tilly, referred to above, is very influential in political science today and focuses on the way in which a social movement, at the outset excluded by the political system, endeavours, by using violence, amongst other resources, to enter the political system, establish its presence there and to either maintain its position or to exclude others. In this case, exiting violence means ensuring that the cost for those who might consider using it would be too high.

Other approaches tend to focus on the culture and personality of the actors or perpetrators of violence. For some, a 'primary socialisation' in the family or at school may encourage tendencies to violence, forging personalities which would be receptive thereto or even shaping a whole culture. The renowned study by Theodor Adorno (et al.), published in the United States in 1950, is often quoted in support of this type of approach. Adorno suggests that an antidemocratic 'authoritarian personality', formed in childhood, enables the worst collective crimes to be committed [Adorno, 2017]. In understanding the violence of the Jihadis today, in particular the dimension of hatred of Jews, some consideration has to be given to their family background. For example, it is important to be aware, as was said to be the case for Mohammed Merah, that anti-semitism may have been rife from birth. From this perspective, the so-called 'de-radicalisation' public policies should address primary forms of socialisation, education and the family and be implemented as early as primary school.

These relatively classical approaches to violence and others which we could refer to, each have their specificity. While each sheds light which could be useful, building

on one or other to exit violence demands considerable caution. It is preferable not to get the explanation wrong. Furthermore, these approaches, while they may be useful in some ways, do also have their limits. The most obvious are related to the gratuitous, or apparently totally meaningless, nature of some acts of violence or of certain dimensions of a phenomenon of violence. Why did the jailers in the death camps, described by Primo Levi [Levi, 1989] in his last book, choose to humiliate the prisoners and treat them like animals? Was this really necessary? What explanation is there for the cruelty of the soldiers in the American army for example in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq in 2006, or during the My Lai massacre in Vietnam in March 1968? What should we make of the incomprehensible floods of words of the extreme-left terrorists in Italy at the time of the decline of their movement in the 1980s?

This brings us to the consideration of other issues, where it is the rationales of de-subjectivation and re-subjectivation which deserve our consideration.

5. The perspective of the subject and of meaning

I have suggested [Wieviorka, 2012] constructing our considerations on violence on the basis of the subjectivity of the actors. My idea is that subjectivity emerges in the course of the process of de-subjectivation and re-subjectivation. To do this, I identify various figures of the Subject of violence which I list briefly here to show the coherence of each, together with possible proposals for the exit from and prevention of violence.

— **the 'floating' subject:** here at the outset, the violence is restricted because the subject cannot become an actor in non-violent democratic interaction. For instance, young people in deprived urban areas who take part in a riot in reaction to the announcement that a death in the area had been caused by a police 'blunder' express a rage which cannot be conveyed in any other way. In this case, exiting violence involves the accession to a material space transforming the crisis, ending it and enabling these young people to express their subjectivity in action. This is a space which may be conducive to non-violent conflictuality, a point to which I shall return.

— **the non-subject** claims to act in obedience to a legitimate authority, a head of State, for example, like Adolf Eichmann explaining before his judges that if Hitler had ordered him to kill his own father, he would have done so. There would be no personal responsibility in his act, since he had to obey, nor would there be any emotion — for example, anti-Semitism — which is difficult to believe. In this case, theorised by Hannah Arendt as being due to 'the banality of evil', exiting violence involves holding the person who resorts to violence responsible for their acts, and restricting the situations in which obedience to a legitimate authority gives rise to violence. It should be noted that today, in some democracies at least, a soldier who receives a barbaric order, that of torturing for example, has the right to refuse to obey.

— **the hyper-subject** moves from the loss of meaning, which could make of the actor a 'floating subject' to the overload or recharging of meaning; this was formerly provided by the grand ideologies, in particular revolutionary and is to be found today primarily in religion, beginning with Islam. This overload enables the hyper-subject to act, to break with being passive or feeling impotent. The most important thing to ensure here is that this overload does not entirely permeate the conscience of the hyper-subject so much so that there is a risk of passage to action. Thus the present-day

Jihadi terrorist (and here I tend to agree with Gilles K epel referred to above) cannot be explained without religion, even if the terrorist is a very recent convert and does not know much about Islam. Faith gives them the strength, the *impetus* to kill and to die at the same time. Preventing or exiting violence means confronting religion if not as such, at least as a force impelling violent action. This does pose a problem: should we, as Voltaire did, combat religion in general, or one religion in particular, to avoid violence? Or should we mobilise one religion to combat another mobilised in the cause of violence? Or should we, as is the case in some ‘deradicalisation’ programmes, for example in Denmark, rely on the moderate, secularised sectors of the religion which the terrorists take advantage of?

— **the anti-subject** attributes no meaning to violence, violence is an end in itself. Cruelty, when it is not instrumental, aimed for example at terrorising an enemy, is a powerful method of denying any subjectivity to other people; the anti-subject needs this to be aware of being the actor of their own existence. When confronting violence for the sake of violence, it is essential not to allow the actor any space: the presence of witnesses, journalists, and photographers, the prohibition of alcohol or drugs which facilitate disinhibition, all play an important role. If not, only repressive action is efficient.

This typology, even if only an outline and incomplete is already a contribution to the bases for considering the prevention of and exit from violence. Each subject portrayed has its own specificities. The exit from violence (or preventing entry) depends on the type of subject; for example, the ‘floating’ subject only wishes to be able to become an actor of non-violent, negotiable conflicts whereas hyper-subjects are totally involved in a religious approach which is non-negotiable. Each figure has its own variations and its own specific sensitivity to attempts at exiting violence or to a public policy for example.

6. The applied humanities and social sciences and the sociological analysis of action

Thus, it would be possible to envisage an applied approach for the **humanities and social sciences** that would throw light on action and decision-making in matters of violence. But the listing of a set of considerations and proposals is not sufficient in itself to constitute a genuine domain in the humanities and social sciences. If we are to make progress towards achieving such an aim, it should be ensured that practical action, ultimately informed by the concrete analysis of **researchers**, becomes an object for research and discussion in its own right.

The preceding observations and remarks reveal a characteristic specific to the issues posed by the exit from and prevention of violence. Contrary to the analysis of violence, which does not require to be accompanied by action, it is difficult to separate the analysis of the exit from and prevention of violence from operational concerns, for example, from the idea of leading to recommendations. Basically, one of two things must be true here.

Either the research on the prevention of and exit from violence is in fact an **extension of the research on violence**. This extension may call for co- production or cooperation with actors in this field. However, it does not fall within the scope of an autonomous field of research. The main questions which the researcher must then consider concern the nature of the links which they may, or which they must, maintain

with the actors. Which relationships should be chosen and how can researchers ensure that these do not jeopardise their independence, their liberty and their difference vis à vis other players? This is what we have been working on up till now in this text.

The other alternative is that the issue at stake in the research is **the action and its actors**. In this case, a very different approach is involved. Here we must examine the meaning of the action, the relationships in which the actors operate and which they contribute to changing, the processes in which they appear, collectively, in the form for example of an NGO or associations, and the sources of their involvement including the personal reasons, etc. The research opportunities are numerous, whether it be private actors, either individual or collective, or actors connected with public authorities at local, national or supranational level. Who are the negotiators, the intermediaries in the meetings leading up to the Oslo Accords or the exit of the FARC from the armed struggle? How do humanitarian organisations recruit and continue to recruit their staff? What type of militants do they target and what support, what obstacles or opponents do they encounter? Is international justice not, in fact, the justice of the victorious? Is the geopolitical order which is being prepared by those who purport to be contributing to peace and the return of the rule of law in Syria or in Iraq not in fact consistent with certain interests, which go beyond what is stated?

This second set of approaches is the reverse of what we referred to as the applied **humanities and social sciences**. Applied approaches consist in finally contributing directly, perhaps with the help of some actors, to improving the knowledge available about the mechanisms and procedures of exiting from or preventing violence. However, from the point at which **their** focus is on the exit from and prevention of violence as research objects their approach is quite distinct. The claim is no longer one of doing more and better than applied sociology by systematizing knowledge and organising it in a global structured space. **This second perspective** in no way implies that analysts and actors no longer have any contact with one another. It authorises or even demands considerable collaboration; for example researchers may invite the actors to jointly reflect upon the meaning of their action, or discuss with them on the basis of findings of a study carried out on the actors. But this set of approaches makes a clear distinction in the roles. The researcher is not an actor and the actor is not a researcher.

If we accept this duality of approaches, we now have a firm foundation on which to base our conviction that the analysis of the exit from violence and its prevention, at one and the same time maintains strong links with the analysis of violence, but at the same time it also has its own dimensions and (its own) scientific autonomy.

7. The return of conflict

What can then be the specific issue at stake in a genuine **social science** of the exit from violence, integrating the two dimensions which have just been highlighted? One answer demands examination. It is based on an empirical observation. Violence is frequently, but not always, the reverse of conflict, the reverse of a conflictual relation when this relation is institutionalised and negotiable. When no conflictuality of this order is conceivable, the space for violence is much larger. When it is possible to transform the violence which is merely a threat or which is already very present into

discussions, by recognising the other as a person in their own right, the result is that the other will now become an adversary and no longer an enemy as was the case till then.

Thus, when this possibility exists, actors who may be humanitarian, political, religious, diplomatic, or other may endeavour to transform a situation of chaos, civil war or guerrilla, into a negotiation in which the protagonists will succeed in finding the conditions for a form of cohabitation which may be tense but is not murderous. For example in 2017, the FARC guerrillas in Colombia accepted to sign a peace agreement with the government by which the FARC did not purely and simply disappear but was transformed into a recognised and legitimate political force.

Similarly the Oslo Agreement between Israelis and Palestinians in 1993 aimed at transforming violent confrontation into the possibility of co-existence.

Sometimes the expression 'post-conflict' is used to refer to the horizon targeted in this type of situation. In fact, this wording is inappropriate. It would be preferable to speak of 'post-violence' or the transition from armed or violent conflict to non-violent conflict.

What applies in political matters or civil war also applies in social affairs. In a firm, which is preferable: a total absence of meetings and discussions between employers and the employed, which may unexpectedly lead to a situation of non-negotiable crisis, or even of violence, the kidnapping of managers, or arson? Or a relation with the trade unions which indeed may not always be easy? For a mayor in a deprived urban area, is it preferable to have a network of young people's associations voicing, perhaps vociferously, the demands of the young who feel excluded and subject to discrimination, or nights of rioting?

We see clearly here how research can on one hand formulate this type of question directly, and, on the other, study those on the ground who are endeavouring to provide answers, including negotiators, consultants, diplomats, social workers, trade unionists, etc.

8. But is it really possible to exit violence?

The exit from violence is not necessarily definitive, stable or total. According to Gallup International the five most dangerous countries in the world are Venezuela, South Africa, Salvador, southern Sudan and Liberia. Now, in South Africa, Salvador and Liberia political violence has disappeared; but it has been replaced by criminal violence. One can say the same of many other situations.

A society permanently exposed to certain sorts of violence develops a culture favourable to other forms. It has, for example, been observed that after years of political violence, the incidence of rape and domestic violence or homicides may be particularly high.

In the first instance, therefore, one form of violence may disappear, only to be replaced by another possibly because this violence was embedded in the previous one. Thus, to turn to the example of Columbia again, if the peace agreements ended the armed struggle waged by the guerrillas, here and there these forces have been replaced by forms of behaviour (rape, murder, extortion, all sorts of mafia-type practices, etc.) which bear witness to the total absence of any State or guarantor of order which the guerrilla had ensured in their own way. We should add that in some cases, the exit from violence is instantly replaced by violence, in others the processes overlap and yet others are more distant in time.

Violence leaves traces which may be profound and last long after it has ended. Traumatism, difficulties to project oneself into the future, a profound conviction of having experienced something irreparable, an intractable tension between the desire for peace and the desire for justice, etc.

The period of adjustment after violence for both the individual and the community, for the victims as for the guilty, may assume one of three key modes.

The first is in keeping with what Ernest Renan set out in his lecture 'Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?' in 1882 — when he explained that to function a nation must know how to forget *les violences au cours desquelles elle s'est formée*: How can we live together if we are obsessed by the past? The second mode consists in living in the past, what **Sigmund** Freud referred to as melancholy, refusing to leave the past behind and constantly brooding over this 'never-ending past' in the words of the historian, Henri Rousso.

The third option is 'mourning' — a term to be used with precaution because it might lead us to imagining that we are forgetting, whereas the issue is one of projecting ourselves into the future while not forgetting, but not being a prisoner of the suffering linked to the past. This option is never easy because the past, even if it is in some way transcended, can always resurface painfully in the memory and eclipse the present. Genuine 'mourning' implies that the sensitive questions of forgiveness, justice and peace or even reconciliation be settled. How can we accept an unjust peace, or a form of justice which does not bring with it peace? Who is in a position to propose to forgive — the guilty, their descendants or a community? Who has the right to give forgiveness: the victims, or their descendants? What can we expect from the State in this respect? How can the victims live alongside neighbours who have participated in extreme violence, as is the case in some situations in the former Yugoslavia or in the Great Lakes region in Africa?

Conclusion

These are sensitive issues, all the more so as in the approach we adopt we cannot ignore considerations of the timescale. In the short term, exiting violence means above all preventing it from happening again if it has just been intercepted; this entails an immediate, possibly pragmatic response. In the long term, however, it may be possible to envisage much more far-ranging economic, political, social or educational issues and to distance oneself from the actual violence in its material aspects.

The actual way in which an experience of violence was halted may play a determining role in the long run. Thus a statistical study carried out by the Swedish researcher, Peter Wallensteen, (who presented it in my seminar at the EHESS on 31 May 2017) consisted in comparing two modes of resolution of armed conflicts: one was based on the victory of one side over the other, the other involved the conclusion of a peace agreement through negotiation. The findings are informative: after a negotiated agreement, the percentage of return to violence within ten years was much lower than after a victory.

The exit from, or prevention of violence are complex questions which remain practical issues with a substratum of concrete aims but which cannot be settled uniquely by the expertise of specialists — consultants in 'Peace building' or in 'Conflict resolution' for example — respectable as they frequently are. These issues demand a capacity to

think in terms of different time scales, to analyse different subjectivities and to consider the reconstruction of subjects through processes of subjectivation which are always complex. In the last resort, these issues demand the acceptance of the idea that democracy, and the associated non-violent processing of differences, is the best tool for the management of divisions and tensions which, whatever one may think, are the lot of all human societies. In other words these issues call for **the social sciences** to extend their approach to violence, on one hand, and on the other, to focus on action to counter it. The analysis of action should be conducted by researchers who do not live in isolation on their own in ivory towers, but engage in discussions with the actors who construct their own analyses. In return, these analyses shed light on the action, but are distinct from it.

Conclusion (additive)

This is precisely the goal which we (Jean Pierre Dozon, Yvon Le Bot and myself) defined when we set up the International Panel on Exiting Violence, (IPEV) in January 2016. The first findings will be presented by members of this group in Beirut in June 2018. This panel comprises approximately ten working groups all of which are resolutely multidisciplinary and international; each is responsible for a specific aspect of these issues. The final report (Autumn, 2018) will summarise the conclusions and will include recommendations.

Some groups have chosen to focus on the analysis of violence itself. For example, in considering Salafism, extreme caution is required when proposing any causal relationship or one of determination between religion and violence. We must bear in mind the complexity and variety of processes associated with issues of nationalist separation and the difficulties experienced by democracies in confronting problems of this sort. Generally speaking in these instances, the collective response is to refuse elementary forms of determinism. The reflection which concerns 'radicalisation' for example shows how the analysis gains by focusing on processes of subjectivation and de-subjectivation, and its role in personal strategies, including strategies of emancipation from a family. Researchers refuse all forms of essentialism, including culturalism, whereby violence is explained by a culture and insist that there be a separation between radical ideas and radical actions which have no intrinsic link. They are also concerned not to simplify the role of the Internet and the digital world. In short, research on violence rejects simplifications or short cuts and always gains by relying on knowledge acquired at first hand on the ground.

Other groups in the panel have preferred to focus more directly on the exit from violence. The group dealing with history and memory in the wake of mass violence point to the ambivalence of commemorative initiatives and demonstrate how exiting violence may be hindered as much as facilitated by 'memorial projects' in remembrance of the past. If certain conditions are not respected, including maintaining a distance from political power, provision for meditation, democratic discussion and mutual recognition, remembrance may exacerbate or revive the tensions which led to extreme violence in the previous phase. When the question of the psychological reconstruction of the victims of major collective violence is posed, when it is a question of treating the psychic wounds and traumatism and of enabling people to live together once again,

we observe the utility of individualized arrangements which are based on people, and not uniquely on a justice oblivious to personal expectations; features such as personal accounts for example find their place in a collective, national narrative. The most successful experiences combine both top-down and bottom-up initiatives to permit the restoration of the self and also that of the social space between the living and the dead.

The analyses focussing on the theme «Justice and reconciliation» are critical of government measures of amnesty, pardon, the cancelling of legal decisions which promote oblivion in the name of peace but at the expense of justice and highlight the considerable tension which exists between the two. Finally, the research, as is demonstrated by a group dealing uniquely with this question, should more systematically integrate the 'sexospecific', 'gendered' dimensions of violence and exiting violence. Consideration should also be given to the role of women and to their specific needs in strategies of exiting violence.

A body of knowledge will thus be constructed in which the humanities and social sciences provide practical responses to very real issues ultimately in the form of recommendations. At the same time, exiting violence is constituted as a domain which is structured around that of violence but is clearly distinct from it.

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HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE USA: MEMORY, STATUS, AND TRENDS

HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE USA: MEM-
ORY, STATUS, AND TRENDS

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ВЫСШЕЕ ОБРАЗОВАНИЕ В США: ИС-
ТОРИЯ, СОВРЕМЕННОЕ ПОЛОЖЕНИЕ,
ТЕНДЕНЦИИ

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Abstract. This article examines how and why Blacks continue to be severely underrepresented in United States colleges and universities. Longitudinal analysis of Black student enrollment and degree completion at public, four-year institutions reveals the proportion of Blacks in state populations is consistently below the proportion Blacks attending state

Аннотация. Основная исследова-
тельская задача статьи состоит в том,
чтобы разобраться, как и почему ко-
личество афроамериканских студентов
в высшей школе США не соответствует
в пропорциональном отношении коли-
честву афроамериканского населения
страны. Лонгитюдный анализ статисти-
ки поступивших и окончивших четырех-

universities. The number of African American students at flagships has declined; but more Black students attend Black- Serving institutions, and Historically Black Colleges and Universities. The theory and research of the great twentieth century intellectual W. E. B. DuBois helps to frame and explain the barriers to Black access and success in U. S. higher education.

Keywords: Blacks, higher education, inequality, W. E. B. DuBois, IPEDS data, Flagship Universities, Black Serving Institutions (BSIs), Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs)

летние программы обучения в высших учебных заведениях показывает, что число афроамериканских студентов в элитных университетах постоянно уменьшается. В основном афроамериканские студенты обучаются в «исторически сложившихся негритянских» колледжах и университетах США. Теоретико-методологические схемы, разработанные известным интеллектуалом 20 века У.Э.Б. Дюбуа, служат основанием данной работы.

Ключевые слова: афроамериканцы, высшее образование, неравенство, У. Э. Б. Дюбуа, элитные университеты, службы содействия обучению афроамериканцев, «исторически сложившиеся негритянские» колледжи и университеты

This article¹ appropriately probes the influence of W.E.B. DuBois over my life, my scholarship and the study of Blacks in US higher education. So in this sense my paper will be a movement in 3 parts, perhaps like a European Classical Symphony — but more likely closer to an American jazz composition. I hope you will find and follow the core structure of the key points I make in the midst of the many riffs that will play backward, sideways, forward and around the major themes.

I. W.E.B. DuBois «On My Mind»: His Intellectual and Scholarly Influence Over my Life

I will reflect in this article on DuBois' profound influence over my intellectual development and trajectory as: an undergraduate and graduate student; and as a scholar, researcher, professor and policy analyst. I will also share my amazement at his prescient commentary on the current status of Blacks in US higher education. Not only did DuBois predict, «The Problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color- line, — the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea.» [DuBois, 1903: 16]. He also correctly predicted the problems of race now faced by higher education institutions in the United States.

In the first aspect, over my academic career as a student W. E. B. DuBois was my salvation, a lifeline who saved me from drowning in a sea of White, Euro- Centric scholarship (and Whiteness) that dismissed, devalued and denigrated Black people. I can't remember exactly how or when I found my way to *The Souls of Black Folks* [DuBois, 1903], but I can tell you it was a revelation! In this short, epic book DuBois spoke

¹ Revised from the 2018 W. E. B. DuBois Award Lecture for Research Focus on Black Education, Special Interest Group, American Educational Research Association, New York City, April 2018.

the richness, complexity, value, victories, defeats and contradictions of my life as a Black person in America. While the U. S. Supreme Court case, «Brown v Topeka Board of Education»², may have outlawed «separate and unequal» on the books, I grew up across the river in Kansas City, Missouri, where «Jim Crow» racial segregation kept Black people firmly on it *hooks*. DuBois recognized and reported our dignity AND degradation as a people struggling, striving and thriving under the cloud of White Supremacy. His affirmation of our «Souls» [DuBois, 1903] quickened my Spirit and placed my feet on the higher ground of activist scholarship and teaching.

The sociology program at Beloit College (Wisconsin) made no mention of DuBois, instead we studied the «Great» European thinkers in sociology — Karl Marx, Max Weber, Emile Durkheim and Sigmund Freud; spending 15 intensive, in depth weeks reading original works and commentaries on each of these scholars. Aldon Morris' recently published brilliant book, *A Scholar Denied: W.E.B. DuBois and the Birth of Modern Sociology*, [Morris, 2015] will thankfully spare future generations of Black students the frustration I felt due to the missing «Black voices.» His book provides a powerful «counter-story» that recognizes DuBois' rightful place among the discipline's founders.

Over the years after college, I sought out and read DuBois with great admiration and enthusiasm. I was enthralled with *The Philadelphia Negro* [DuBois, 1899] as a perfect example of the kind of rigorous, expansive, empirical research I aspired to conduct. I struggled to understand his sweeping historical, political economy study: *The Suppression of the Atlantic Slave Trade and Black Reconstruction* (DuBois, 1896). I plodded through his historical novel, *Quest for the Silver Fleece* [DuBois, 1911] and was impressed by its skillful incorporation of literary and social science perspectives. But most importantly, I embraced DuBois' [DuBois, 1903: 3] concept of «Double Consciousness,» describing Blacks as a unique people who embodied the contradictory identities of «African» and «American;» «Old» and «New» World; «Slave» and «Free;» these distilled the complexity of Black life in Canaan—»The Promised Land.»

My «mixed methods» dissertation used Census data, neighborhood surveys and personal interviews to study mobility aspirations among Black and white male high school students and their parents. As my research focus shifted from Black families to Black college students, I attempted to honor DuBois' insistence on the wisdom of multiple data points, recognizing that quantitative, qualitative, historical and even literary perspectives combined to help us better understand the complex story of race in America. I also learned from DuBois the necessity to share empirical research findings, «In A Different Key,» that is to match messaging to audience, to write differently for *Ebony Magazine*³ or the *American Educational Research Journal*⁴. But always in my research and writing facing the «North Star,»⁵ (i. e., the North Star led escaping slaves to freedom in Canada) with the ultimate purpose of understanding and uplifting Black communities.

² Brown vs Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) URL: <https://www.oyez.org/cases/1940—1955/347us483> (accessed: 08.10.2018).

³ *Ebony Magazine* (2018). URL: <https://www.ebony.com/> (accessed: 08.10.2018).

⁴ *American Educational Research Journal* (2018). URL: <http://journalssagepub.com/home/er> (accessed: 08.10.2018).

⁵ *North Star Newspaper* (1847). Frederick Douglass. URL: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/The-North-Star-American-newspaper> (accessed: 08.10.2018).

To this day I vividly recall a boisterous argument with the most powerful, senior professor in the University of North Carolina — Chapel Hill department of sociology. He had the temerity, audacity— the arrogance to dismiss W. E. B. DuBois, despite my determined objections. Eventually this Professor lost all decorum and screeched, «DuBois was not a sociologist, he was a journalist!!» Of course I refused to yield the point; I continued to disagree vigorously, even to the point of questioning this Professor's intellect and possibly his ancestry...I forget, you know heat of the moment and all.

Shortly after this exchange of ideas, I decided it would be best to leave Chapel Hill, so I moved to a position in sociology and the Center for African American and African Studies (CAAS)⁶ at the University of Michigan. CAAS offered a broad focus on Black culture and institutions across the African Diaspora, so it was the interdisciplinary embodiment of DuBois' scholarly perspective and world view. This rich environment assembled a veritable «Who's Who» of leading historians (e. g., Thomas Holt), psychologists (e. g., Phillip Bowman), sociologists (e.g., Aldon Morris), architects (e. g., James Sandifer), artists (e. g., Jon Lockard), Africanists (e. g., Ali Mazrui), anthropologists (e. g., Niara Sudarkasa) and creative writers (e. g., Gayl Jones) in synergistic exploration of different aspects of the African Diaspora. Added to this «Who's Who» of academics and intellectuals were amazing students who taught faculty as much — if not more— than they learned from us. The rich intellectual soup at CAAS greatly expanded my mind and horizons, rooting me even more firmly in W.E.B. DuBois, as I witness how these stellar scholars embraced his scholarship and perspectives. Professor Karida Brown has written a «love letter to W.E.B. DuBois,» acknowledging his profound impact on her development as a scholar [Brown, 2018]. In this respect I follow Dr. Brown's lead and share my own personal «love story» with the scholarship of this major figure in intellectual history.

II. Status and Trends in Black Higher Education: A Fifty Year Retrospective

It would be a decade after «Brown v Topeka Board of Education»⁷ before White campuses — operating «With All Deliberate Speed»— finally began to accept Black students in any substantial numbers [Allen, 1992]. Under pressure from the Courts and Federal enforcement agencies; AND in response to hundreds of urban uprisings, or «race riots,» that threatened the very survival of our nation; Traditionally White Colleges and Universities reluctantly opened their doors to Blacks. By 1975 the majority of Black College students attended White, Institutions, a literal sea change occurred from the 1960s when the majority of Black college students attended Historically Black Colleges and Universities. [Allen, 1992]

As DuBois predicted in 1941 the greatest national expansion in higher education was represented by public universities.

«The demand for high school and college training on the part of the mass of youth in the United States rapidly outran the facilities which private institutions supported by private endowments could furnish, and there arose the public town and city high school

⁶ Center for African American and African Studies, University of Michigan. URL: <https://lsa.umich.edu/daas> (accessed: 08.10.2018).

⁷ Brown vs Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) URL: <https://www.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/347us483> (accessed: 08.10.2018).

and the state university ... by the twenty first century the problem of higher education is going to be primarily a problem of the state.» [DuBois, 1973: 129]

Given the heightened importance of a college degree in today's society, higher education has become a critical battleground for racial equity. Forces have mobilized nationally to actively resist and subtly undercut Black progress towards equity in higher education. As DuBois expected much of the growth — and conflict — has been centered in public institutions. Public universities account for a substantial share of U.S. college graduates — this is especially true for Blacks. Therefore, it is imperative to conduct extensive empirical research on the status, trends and prospects of Blacks in U. S. higher education.

As a young assistant professor I read DuBois' impressive Atlanta University research reports. He outlined a 100 year research program to study all aspects of Black culture, life and institutions. I embraced his notion with a necessary modification that pursues this end by a different route. I resolved to graduate 100 Doctoral Students devoted to the study of Black people, who would each later graduate 100 more PhD's, with the pattern repeating and extending into the future. I have implemented this model with great pleasure and result over the 40 plus years of my career. I am proud of this multi-generational, multi- cultural legacy, an *army* of talented, accomplished academics dedicated to enriching our understanding of Blacks across the Diaspora. This is my greatest career achievement, in an academic career and life well spent. I am eternally grateful for my students, their students and their students' students.

I now briefly share findings from an empirical study of Black enrollment and degree completion in U. S. higher education over 40 years. My graduate student collaborators and I published, «*From Bakke to Fisher: African American Students in U. S. Higher Education over Forty Years*» [Allen et al., 2018] in a Russell Sage Foundation volume [Gooden, Myers, 2018] commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Kerner Commission Report on the 1960s urban riots⁸. We used Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS)⁹ to examine enrollment and completion trends for Black college students since 1975, across four-year, public universities in the 20 states with the largest numerical Black populations ([Allen et al., 2018], Table 1). In each state, we focus on: 1) the state flagship university, 2) the most prominent Traditionally White, Black-serving institution (BSI), and 3) the most prominent Historically Black College and Universities (HBCU) — if present. Readers can follow the link below to the article and data¹⁰.

Flagship Universities have designated leadership roles and emphasis in state public higher education systems. Traditionally White «Black Serving Institutions» (BSIs), with lower academic prestige have greater representation of Black students, e. g., Georgia State University and Chicago State University, are prominent in the production of Black college graduates. Finally, Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs), e. g., Morgan State University (MD) or Savannah State University (GA) that were once legally

⁸ The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968). [2016] The Kerner Report. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

⁹ Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System/ IPEDS (2018). URL: <https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/> (accessed: 08.10.2018).

¹⁰ <https://www.rsjournal.org/doi/abs/10.7758/RSF.2018.4.6.03>.

segregated by race, continue to play significant roles in Black participation in higher education ([Allen et. al., 2018], Table 2).

Importantly, our sample includes states like California, Michigan, Mississippi and Texas that were prominent in national struggles around Court cases to desegregate state higher education systems (e. g. *Adams v. Richardson* (1973)¹¹, *United States v. Fordice* (1992)¹², *Ayers v. Fordice* (1999)¹³) and Court cases that challenged the operation of Affirmative Action policies in state universities (e. g. *Bakke vs. U. C. Regents* (1978)¹⁴, *Gratz vs Bollinger* (2003)¹⁵, *Grutter vs. Bollinger* (2003)¹⁶ and *Fisher vs. University of Texas at Austin* (2013, 2016)¹⁷).

Across the 40-year period studied, the overall proportion of Black students enrolled at public flagship institutions has remained persistently low ([Allen et al., 2018: 49—55], Table 2). Black undergraduate enrollment at **flagship institutions** is significantly below the representation of Black people in the state. The most striking example, in 2015, Blacks were nearly 40 percent of total state population but only 13 per cent of undergraduate enrollment at the University of Mississippi [Allen et al., 2018: 48]. Black undergraduate enrollment at the University of California, Berkeley, University of California, Los Angeles, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, and University of Texas, Austin was 4 percent or lower in 2015. This, despite the fact that Black people were 7 percent of California's total population, 15 percent of Michigan's, and 13 percent of Texas'. Black percent undergraduate enrollment only reached double digits at five state flagship institutions nationally: University of Alabama, Louisiana State University, University of Maryland, College Park, University of Mississippi, and State University of New York-Albany (highest percent at 16.6). ([Allen et al., 2018: 49—55], Table 2)

Over the period, traditionally White, «Black Serving Institutions or **BSIs** reinforced their prominent roles in educating Black college students ([Allen et al., 2018: 49—55], Table 2). This seems to support anti-Affirmative Action arguments that Black students excluded from Flagships will simply «cascade» down to lower ranked institutions, better suited to their academic qualifications. In fact, this pattern of «displacement» represents substantial overall net losses in Black undergraduate enrollment. For example, not only was Black enrollment in California down at University of California flagships Berkeley (4 percent in 1976 to 2.1 percent in 2015) and Los Angeles (5.3 to 3 percent), it also declined at the BSI California State University, Dominguez Hills (33.8 to 12.4 percent). [Allen et al., 2018: 49]. Black undergraduate enrollment also dropped on several other BSI campuses: from 28 percent in 1976 to 16 percent in 2015 at Wayne

¹¹ *Adams vs Richardson*, 356 F. Supp. 92 (DC 1973) — Case Law, Justia. URL: <https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/356/92/1892620/> (accessed: 08.10.2018).

¹² *United States vs Fordice* (1992). United States Supreme Court 505 U.S. 717. URL: <https://www.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-1205> (accessed: 08.10.2018).

¹³ *Ayers vs Fordice*, 40 F. Supp. 2d 382 (N. D. Miss. 1999). URL: <https://www.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-1205> (accessed: 08.10.2018).

¹⁴ *Regents of the University of California vs Bakke*, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) URL: <https://www.oyez.org/cases/1979/76-811> (accessed: 08.10.2018).

¹⁵ *Gratz vs Bollinger* (2003) URL: <https://www.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-516> (accessed: 08.10.2018).

¹⁶ *Grutter vs Bollinger* (2003) URL: <https://www.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-241> (accessed: 08.10.2018).

¹⁷ *Fisher vs University of Texas at Austin* (2016) URL: <https://www.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-981> (accessed: 08.10.2018).

State University; 33 to 15 percent at City University of New York, City College and 19 to 12 percent at Temple University [Allen et al., 2018: 51, 53, 54].

Some **HBCUs** grew in Black proportion enrollment (e.g. Florida A&M University, Lincoln University of Missouri, and Central State University) since 1976, however the majority of HBCUs (11 of 14) decreased between 2.5 percent and 20 percent ([Allen et al., 2018], Table 2). This trend is distinct from the large increases for most other public institutions. The disproportionate growth between BSIs and HBCUs was striking in Georgia, Savannah State University's Black undergraduate enrollment dropped 5 percent (89 to 84 percent by 2015), compared to Georgia State University's 25 percent increase, 16 to 41 percent [Allen et al., 2018: 50].

In general, Black women outnumber Black men in undergraduate and graduate/professional degree enrollment across all institutional types. However, these gender differences are negligible at select **public flagship institutions**. For example, in 2015 at University of California flagships Berkeley and Los Angeles, Black women represented 1.1 percent and 1.8 percent compared to 0.9 percent and 1.1 percent of Black men [Allen et al., 2018: 49]. Similarly, at the University of Michigan, only 2.6 percent were Black women, and 1.8 percent were Black men [Allen et al., 2018: 51]. At the end of the day, Black enrollment on these campuses is alarmingly low — for both Black women and Black men.

Black women's percent enrollment in undergraduate and graduate/professional programs at **BSIs** increased between 1976 and 2015. For example, at the University of Southern Mississippi, undergraduate Black women increased from 7 to 21 percent, and among graduate/professionals, from 7 to 9 percent (Allen et al., 2018: 52). Contrast this with Black women's declining enrollment at City University of New York, City College, undergraduate from 17 to 9 percent, and graduate/professional from 16 to 8 percent (Allen et al., 2018: 53). Some BSIs saw increased percent enrollment for undergraduate and graduate/professional Black men, including Florida Atlantic University, from 1.5 to 7.2 percent, and 2 to 4 percent ([Allen et al., 2018], Table 2). As well, we find that Black male enrollment declined significantly at California State University-Dominguez Hills, undergraduates from 18 to 4 percent, and graduate/professionals from 9 to 3 percent [Allen et al., 2018: 49].

The enrollment of Black women varied across **HBCUs** between 1976 and 2015 ([Allen et al., 2018], Table 2). At Jackson State University, Black women undergraduates increased by from 49 to 58 percent [Allen, et al., 2018: 52]. However, at Alabama State University, Black women graduate/professionals decreased from 70 to 40 percent. Black male percent enrollment declined for undergraduates, 47 to 33 percent and for graduate/professionals 36 to 21 percent [Allen et al., 2018: 49]. The decreases for Black men at Southern A & M University, were 43 to 34 percent for undergraduates and 32 to 19 percent for graduate/professionals [Allen et al., 2018: 51].

Our analyses revealed that while Black students increasingly attended lower tier BSIs, Black enrollment at public flagship institutions remained stagnant or declined. Although Black students are mostly denied admission into the ivory gates of flagship institutions, HBCUs and BSIs offer Black students opportunities to attend and complete college. By comparison Black students have mostly lost «share» or declined in numbers at the nation's BSIs. However, HBCUs continue to «punch above their weight,» they

represent only 3 percent of the nation's colleges and universities but in any given year they graduate as much as 25 percent of all Black college BA's.

Unfortunately, our findings confirm the grim picture of inequality for the over one million Blacks in U.S. higher education conveyed by recently published studies [Harper, Simmons, 2018] (see also The Education Trust, 2018¹⁸). W.E.B. DuBois' nearly century old research and reflections on Black higher education help us to better understand the enduring obstacles to Black equality in American society and in U.S. higher education.

III. Wither Black Higher Education?: Where Do We Go From Here?

Recently Black students demanding change at Howard University, a private HBCU in Washington DC, ended their student protest and occupation of the Administration Building (Howard University Student Protest¹⁹). Many of their demands were of the most basic sort —better housing and food; ending sexual harassment and discrimination, and expanding student participation in shared governance. However, the Howard University students also made larger, *Existential* demands, calling for fundamental changes in the University AND in the society to end racism, sexism, homophobia, poverty and State violence. In this respect the Howard University Student Movement shares tactics and goals with the «Black Lives Matter»²⁰ Movement driven nationally by young Black and multi- cultural community activists and students. No doubt many of these Howard University students straddle both movements as they demand more relevant education rooted in the real world and seek solutions to the problems that plague their own lives and friends, families and communities.

These young folks remind me of myself at an earlier moment in life, before I became too complacent, too distracted, or simply too tired to speak out and act for progressive social change. I too once dreamed of a new, different world and was determined to risk life, limb and —heaven forbid even career— to realize! Our students point out the inherent contradictions DuBois recognized in 1930 when he asked, «What is the true purpose and value of higher education?» He said,

«—the whole question as to what the education of Negroes was truly aiming at... «The matter of a man's earning a living... is and must be important, but surely it can never be so important as the man himself» ... The object of education is not to make men carpenters but to make carpenters men.» [DuBois, 1973: 63—64].

The tension between «Work and Education» DuBois referred to in his Address during the 1930 Graduation at Howard University continues to plague higher education today. Economic and social inequality challenge the integrity of Colleges and Universities in multiple ways. Students stagger under the crushing burden of loan debt and are frustrated and discouraged as graduates seeking fulfilling, purposeful, economically viable employment. Sadly, as was true in 1930, «We are graduating young men and women with an intense and overwhelming appetite for wealth and no reasonable way of gratifying it, no philosophy for counteracting it.» [DuBois, 1973: 67].

¹⁸ Education Trust (2018). The State of Higher Education Equity. Washington, DC. URL: <https://edtrust.org/the-state-of-higher-education-equity/> (accessed: 09.10.2018).

¹⁹ Howard University Student Protests 2018. URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/30/us/howard-university-scandal.html> (accessed: 09.10.2018).

²⁰ «Black Lives Matter» (2018) URL: <https://blacklivesmatter.com/> (accessed: 09.10.2018).

Universities are also sagging under the economic pressures resulting from government refusal to value and support accessible, quality higher education. It is difficult to accept that society's growing resistance to investment in higher education (or for that matter K-12 education) is unrelated to the fact that the complexion of students served is increasingly non-White. Addressing similar dilemmas in 1941 at Lincoln University, an HBCU in Missouri, DuBois concludes

«The new state system of education, therefore, is faced first of all with this question of income... the present educational system is not designed to meet it. It is a system largely determined by the very economic inequality which it seeks to solve; and the power to administer the system lies all too largely in hands interested in privilege rather than in justice and in class advantage rather than in democratic control.» [DuBois, 1973: 131]

DuBois judged the situation to be «...baffling and contradictory» [DuBois, 1973: 75]. He then poses the question,

«How are we going to place the Black American on a sure foundation in the modern state? The modern state is primarily business and industry. ... The world must eat before it can think. The Negro has not found a solid foundation in that state as yet. He is mainly the unskilled laborer; the casual employee; the man hired last and fired first; the man who must subsist upon the lowest wage and consequently share an undue burden of poverty, crime, insanity and ignorance.» [DuBois, 1973: 73]

DuBois asks how will Black people navigate. «... the double and dynamic function of tuning in with a machine in action so as neither to wreck the machine nor be crushed or maimed by it.» [DuBois, 1973: 77]. He rejects the notion that resolving this inherent contradiction is impossible; in fact he says «... if it is impossible, our future economic survival is impossible.» Rather the solution lies in «...organized far- seeing effort — by outthinking and outflanking the owners of the world today who are too drunk with their own arrogance and power successfully to oppose us, if we think and learn and do.» [DuBois, 1973:77]

Speaking from beyond the grave, DuBois' voice joins those of a youth Movement that is fast gaining strength. These young people challenge higher education to revisit and revamp our approaches in order to emphasize «...training as human beings in general knowledge and experience; then technical training to guide and do a specific part of the world's work» [DuBois, 1973: 78]. DuBois admonishes, «We have lost something, brothers, wandering in strange lands. We have lost our ideals.»... We have come to a generation which seeks advance without ideals — discovery without stars. It cannot be done. Certain great landmarks and guiding facts must stand eternally before us.» [DuBois, 1973: 79].

Among the eternal values DuBois lists are the ideals of economic equity, unyielding hard work, rigorous pursuit of knowledge, sacrifice for the common good and appreciation of life's beauty and joy. It is essential that academics and universities join DuBois to recognize «Three great things are necessary for the spiritual equipment of an institution of learning: *Freedom of Spirit, Self-Knowledge* and a recognition of the *Truth.*» [DuBois, 1924: 44] Our young, Black student leaders at Howard University and Black/Multi- Racial/Multi-Cultural youth Movement leaders across the nation do us a great service when they refuse to «drink the Kool-Aid.»²¹. These young people rightly demand that we pursue Social Justice in order to rediscover and make manifest our better selves.

²¹ Jonestown Massacre (2012). URL: <http://mentalfloss.com/article/13015/jonestown-massacre-terrifying-origin-drinking-kool-aid> (accessed: 09.10.2018).

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SOCIOLOGY AS A SCIENCE: NEW CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY

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ARE SOCIOLOGISTS READY FOR 'ARTIFICIAL SOCIALITY'?
CURRENT ISSUES AND FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR STUDYING
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

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ГОТОВЫ ЛИ СОЦИОЛОГИ К АНАЛИЗУ
«ИСКУССТВЕННОЙ СОЦИАЛЬНОСТИ»?
ПРОБЛЕМЫ И ПЕРСПЕКТИВЫ
ИССЛЕДОВАНИЙ ИСКУССТВЕННОГО
ИНТЕЛЛЕКТА В СОЦИАЛЬНЫХ НАУКАХ

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Abstract. Current sociology doesn't have a settled view on what to do with a phenomenon that in the literature has been titled as "artificial intelligence" (AI). Sociological textbooks, handbooks, encyclopedias, and sociology classes' syllabi typically either don't have entries about AI at all or talk about it haphazardly with a stress on AI's social effects and without discerning the underlying logic that moves the prodigy on. This paper is an invitation to a professional conversation about what and how social sciences can/should study "artificial intelligence". It is based on a discussion of the preliminary results of an on-going three-year research project that has been launched at the ISA Congress in Toronto. The paper examines AI in relation with 'artificial sociality'. It argues that research on AI-based technologies is flourishing mainly outside established disciplinary boundaries. Thus, social sciences have to look for new theoretical and methodological frameworks to approach AI and 'artificial sociality'.

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Аннотация. В современной социологии не существует ни однозначной трактовки феномена, определяемого как «искусственный интеллект» (ИИ), ни устоявшихся подходов к его изучению. Социологические учебники, энциклопедии и учебные программы либо не упоминают искусственный интеллект, либо обсуждают его поверхностно, в связи с другими сюжетами и не рассматривая внутреннюю логику, лежащую в основании технологий ИИ и особенностей их распространения в повседневной жизни. Статья является приглашением к дискуссии о том, каким образом социальные науки могут/должны изучать искусственный интеллект в связи с развитием «искусственной социальности». В ней представлены результаты первого этапа трехлетнего исследования, который был реализован в рамках XIX конгресса Международной социологической ассоциации. По результатам анализа авторы приходят к выводу, что исследования технологий ИИ в социальных науках развиваются, преимущественно, вне привычных дисциплинарных границ. Таким образом, социальные науки стоят перед необходимостью поиска новых теоретических и методологических оснований для изучения искусственного интеллекта и «искусственной социальности».

Keywords: artificial intelligence, artificial sociality, human-machine interaction, information and communication technologies, social theory, disciplinary boundaries

Ключевые слова: искусственный интеллект, искусственная социальность, взаимодействие между человеком и машиной, информационные технологии, социальная теория, дисциплинарные границы

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Introduction

The classic definition of a human being at least since the Enlightenment has been ‘Homo Sapiens’. The term focuses on rationality / reason as a distinctive characteristic of the species. However, from the mid-XX century, the privilege of human reason has been contested by ‘artificial intelligence’ (AI)¹. Moreover, the reliance on technology in everyday life questions ‘human exceptionalism’ [Schaeffer, 2007] not only in relation to rationality but also regarding humans as social, emotional and interacting beings. One of the main trends in the development of AI is that it is becoming increasingly social. In the 1940s and 1950s the AI theme was focused on solving instrumental problems such as proving mathematical theorems, manipulating objects, translating between languages, and completing different types of practical computations. Today however, AI becomes the medium and the participant of interaction among human beings.

This paper aims to map and to evaluate social science research on the diffusion of AI technologies into the everyday life of a society. We will begin with a definition of the problem, a brief statement on the state of affairs in the field, and formulate some hypotheses concerning this state. Then we will describe the theoretical framework, the methods, and the outcomes of an empirical study conducted during the XIX ISA World Congress, Toronto, 2018 as a part of an on-going three-year research project. The paper’s final section presents basic conclusions of our research with regard to further developments in the field.

New processes and revolutionary changes in science, information technology, and robotics not only make AI a reality of everyday life but transform it into a new form of sociality. It can be referred to as **‘artificial sociality’** [Rezaev, Starikov, Tregubova,

¹ The paper does not seek to contribute to the discussion on what artificial intelligence is and in what sense it is possible. Rather, we refer to various technologies that already exist and are typically labeled as ‘AI’. As a basic definition of AI, we use a common definition that is presented in the dictionaries. The comparison of definitions from the Oxford dictionaries (URL: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/artificial_intelligence; date of access: 03.10.2018), the Encyclopedia Britannica (URL: <https://www.britannica.com/technology/artificial-intelligence>; date of access: 03.10.2018), and the Merriam-Webster dictionary (URL: <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/artificial%20intelligence>; date of access: 03.10.2018) demonstrates that «artificial intelligence» is treated in two ways: as a research on special kind of computer / machine performance and as the performance itself. Its definitive feature is performing tasks / imitation of behavior that is commonly associated with human (or animal) intelligence, such as visual perception, speech recognition, decision-making, language translation, making generalizations, and so on.

2018; Rezaev, Ivanova, 2018]². Three quite different yet related types of phenomena characterize developments that bring 'artificial sociality' to the fore. The first is human to human interactions that are mediated by machines, for instance, in social networks. The second is human to machine interactions: from programmers to technical support personnel, from users at work to children playing games. The third is computer to computer communication.

Sociality is the specific attribute of human beings characterized by the ability to enter into social interaction, which implies meaning-making, complex emotional dynamics, formation of relationships and sustained communities, and, simultaneously, the construction of the Self [Wolfe, 1993; Turner, 2002]. The social nature of AI could be conceived of in two ways: 'Strong' and 'Weak'. 'Strong' artificial sociality does not yet exist; however it would consist of the ability of AI to interact spontaneously and to be emotionally involved in interaction. 'Weak' artificial sociality is the empirical fact of the AI's participation in various social interactions, and it is currently enjoying a period of expansion.

The development of 'artificial sociality' led to the emergence of new phenomena that affect the ability of people to interact and to sustain relationships. The permeation of these phenomena into everyday life is increasingly drawing the attention of scientists, journalists, artists, entrepreneurs, and ordinary users. Since the 1980s, scholars have been discussing in what sense and how exactly AI could/should be a research problem for the social sciences [Wolfe, 1993; Schwartz, 1989; Woolgar, 1985; Bainbridge et al., 1994]. Several features could be distinguished as characteristic of the current state of affairs in AI studies in general and in research on 'artificial sociality' in particular [Rezaev, Ivanova, 2018; Rezaev, Starikov, Tregubova, 2018].

First, the views concerning AI in society have changed dramatically over the past half a century. Immediately after World War II the importance of AI seemed to be of interest only to philosophers who engaged in meta-theoretical discussions on the reality of artificial intelligence *per se*. By that time, a generation of philosophers had systematically documented and supported two contradictory conclusions: 1) AI can be and will be a reality very soon; 2) AI cannot be and will never be a reality. This situation has changed in the last quarter of the 20th century. AI has become a subfield for computer science that involves design of computer programs and of automated equipment, such as industrial robots, in ways that at least resemble human thought processes [Barr, Feigenbaum, 1982; McCorduck, 1979].

AI studies at their beginning were *anti-disciplinary* in nature: the idea and ideology of reproducing and overcoming human capabilities broke disciplinary boundaries that analytically divided human existence into separate subjects (see, for instance, interview with Terry Winograd [An Interview..., 1991], one of the pioneers of AI). Anti-disciplinary projects are not inspired by intradisciplinary debates or by difficulties in 'translating' concepts, methods or conclusions from one discipline to another. These projects emerge when the original research problems concerning truly new and evolving phenomena exist.

² The term 'artificial sociality' was coined by a German research team led by Thomas Malsch [Malsch, 1998; 2005]. Malsch considers 'artificial sociality' as a communicative network, the participants of which are not only people but also AI-based agents, with the Internet as the communicative environment. Our understanding of 'artificial sociality' is broader: it embraces all kinds of interactions where AI technologies participate as agents and / or as a medium of interaction.

Second, the majority of publications in comparative perspective are developed in engineering and computer sciences, and, to a lesser extent, in philosophy and psychology. Thus, currently, the fields of AI in general and 'artificial sociality' in particular are dominated by three major disciplines — computer science, psychology, and philosophy (see [Boden, 2016] for a brief description of research trends in the fields).

Third, for the social scientists, the computer, on the one hand, is a society's technological product, and on the other hand, is a source of technological progress and hence a source of social change. That was the case in the 20th century when debates on the post-industrial society flourished, and is still the case in the 21st century when ideas of 'digital society' and post-human evolution spread across scholarly disciplines.

Fourth, what is most striking about the sociological literature on AI is how limited it is. New notions have appeared in sociological discussions in recent years. However, these notions are restricted to quite a narrow circle of technical terms that have been introduced in our daily life, such as the 'Internet', 'networks', 'cyber', 'digital', 'social media', and 'new media'. Sociologists adopt these terms in their studies and simply combine them with the term 'society' to continue discussions under the respective rubrics of 'Internet Society', 'Network Society', 'Digital Society', 'Cyber Society', 'Social Media Society', and 'New Media Society'.

Finally, computer and software revolutions brought to the forefront a number of entirely new scholarly disciplines, which, interestingly, cannot be studied without new technologies, namely computers and software. These disciplines are digital humanities, and the studies of the Internet, cyber-culture, new media, and gaming, to name a few. These and other newcomer fields require much more attention from theoreticians in sociology and other social sciences.

Thus, the current state of scholarship on 'artificial sociality' gives quite a modest role in studying this phenomenon to the social sciences. What kind of interdisciplinary boundaries characterize the field of 'artificial sociality' in the social sciences? What are the main characteristics of research on 'artificial sociality'? And what are the directions for further developments?

To answer these questions two **hypotheses** were formulated and explored:

I. The field of studying 'artificial sociality' is multidisciplinary in the sense that scholars in sociology, psychology, communications, engineering, computer science, and other disciplines study AI and are interested in each other's work. Nonetheless, research is still done predominantly in each investigator's own intellectual tradition. Scholars from different disciplines bring various assumptions, research practices, understanding of concepts, and theoretical schemes to the field³.

II. There is no professional connectedness among social science scholars who study AI. Research topics, problems, and definitions do not reference each other, and the body of well-established findings has yet to emerge.

Methods

To test the hypotheses, we collected and analyzed expert interviews with researchers who study various phenomena of 'artificial sociality'. The study presented in this paper is

³ For instance, the very concept of 'intelligence' in 'artificial intelligence' — obviously the most fundamental notion in the field — has different meaning and interpretation for different scholars which complicates further research.

the first one of a series of comparative case studies that we are planning to conduct with experts from different research fields who are engaged in research on the influence of AI technologies on the everyday life of people. The organizational base for this study was the XIX ISA World Congress in Toronto, Canada, July 2018. The Forum is a large scholarly meeting that brings together, according to the Congress' Program⁴, about 6500 participants from different countries in more than 1000 sessions and other academic events.

In this study, we decided to focus primarily on sociologists for two reasons. First, we believe that a sociological viewpoint is highly promising for studying new characteristics of human sociality. It relates to both the macro-effects (e. g., digital divide in different societies, facilitation of transnational migration by web-based technologies, social implications of labor market transformations) and the micro-patterns (e. g., collective behavior on the Internet, changes in the emotional dimensions of interactions, the conditions for sociable robotics). Second, as indicated above, sociology has not studied AI phenomena sufficiently, if at all, so every step in this direction will be worth doing.

The scope and the trends of the interests of sociologists in studying 'artificial sociality' could be preliminarily traced in the XIX ISA Congress Program. Among numerous scholarly events of the ISA Congress, several are devoted to the issues of influence of new technologies on society. The Program detects both the interest in the new phenomena and the lack of its sociological institutionalization. The sessions described in the Program use diverse terminology and are organized by different research committees and groups; topics of some sessions seem to overlap. Session titles and descriptions mostly contain the term 'digital' and embrace both the theoretical and the methodological challenges of research⁵ as well as the specific topics focused on the elderly, youth, labor, collective action, family, etc⁶. Other sessions concerning 'artificial sociality' refer to technology/design⁷ and to social media⁸. Moreover, a quick look through the presentations demonstrated that not all of them fit well into session themes, while several presentations that discuss 'artificial sociality' phenomena are included in the sessions which do not deal with this topic specifically. Thus, sociologists' interest in 'artificial sociality' is diffused and is probably in the process of institutionalization.

⁴ URL: <https://www.isa-sociology.org/uploads/files/isa-wcs2018-program-book.pdf> (date of access: 03.10.2018).

⁵ «Digital Sociology and Sociological Theory: Intersections and Divergences», «Digital Technologies, Culture and Society», «Digitalization and Societal Innovation: One Shaping the Other», «Real Life Sociology: Understanding Society in a Digital Age», «Digital Sociology: Perspectives on Research, Methods and Concepts», «Communities and Digital Media in a Networked World».

⁶ «Conflictuality in the Digital Space: What Are the Challenges for Military Organizations?», «Studying Family Life, Digital Technologies, and Social Media: Perspectives and Methods», «Ageing and the Digital: Key Themes, Future Agendas», «Socio-Gerontechnology — Theorizing the Digital Life Worlds of Older People», «Young People and New Political Creativity in the Digital Age», «Digital Labor I — Changing World of Work and Employment Relations in the Era of 4th Industrial Revolution», «Digital Labor II — New Forms of Enterprises, of Collaborations and Work in the Digital Economy», «Organisations, Work and Society», «Digital Experiences and Narratives of Networked Activism», «Collective Action in the Digital Age», «Towards a Sociological Critique of Digital Health», «Surveillance, Power and Justice».

⁷ «The Future of Science, Technology and Innovation in a World in Turmoil», «New Principles of Designing Social Systems and Social Realities», «Aging with Technology: Barriers and Opportunities», «Mobile Communication and Leisure Practices in a Connected World», «Cyber-Criminology: Understanding the Impact of Technologies on Deviant Behaviours Online and Offline».

⁸ «Social Media and the Military», «Fake News Is the Invention of a Liar», «Globalization, New Media and the Culture of Real Virtuality: Emerging Patterns».

Many scholars have started to inquire into the diffusion of sociological views on AI and 'artificial sociality' but they still cannot manage cooperation or find common ground for the discussion.

The sample of experts for our study was recruited through the following steps. Initially, we selected 35 abstracts from the Congress Program that are directly related to the issues of 'artificial sociality'. The search for abstracts was organized using words «artificial» and «digital» in the titles of abstracts and sessions. Then, we sent 33 letters to the authors of the chosen abstracts using the e-mail address listed on the web page of the researcher (mainly on the official web pages of the universities where the authors work). E-mails couldn't be located for the authors of two abstracts. Finally, we arranged interviews with the authors of nine abstracts who agreed to participate in the project. As a result, during the XIX ISA Congress we conducted nine expert interviews with ten respondents (one of the interviews included two experts)⁹, who represent scholarly organizations from Canada, Finland, India, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russia, and the USA. Interviews lasted from 12 to 40 minutes. The interview materials are made anonymous in the analysis that follows.

Analysis

The experts have diverse research interests and organizational affiliations. How did these ten people meet at one place, the ISA Congress, and do they have anything in common? In the following analysis, we seek to address this inquiry by answering the following questions:

1. Who are these people? From what standpoint do they research the issues of 'artificial sociality'?
2. What are the main research problems? What are the main troubles with the usage of AI technologies in a society according to the experts?
3. What types of divisions (disciplinary, national, generational, conceptual, etc.) exist in their research activities?
4. How do social scientists see the difference between AI research in social sciences and humanities, and in computer science and engineering?

As the sample was designed on the basis of the ISA Congress Program, we expected to take interviews mainly with sociologists. To our surprise, only half of our respondents considered themselves sociologists, and only three of them identified themselves exclusively as sociologists without further qualifications. Going deeper into the research activities of the participants revealed an even more diverse picture. Instead of one sociological field we encountered several 'blurred' domains covering parts of different disciplines and interdisciplinary projects.

One of these domains is **policy research**: two interviews fall into this category. Policy research is guided by practical issues and difficulties that accompany the implementation of digital technologies. Typically, it is supported by governmental funds. The focus here is on the social consequences of the use of digital technologies which are unforeseen by the engineers and computer scientists who create them. The division of labor, as one of our informants put it, looks as follows:

⁹ We would like to thank Anastasia Ivanova and Valentin Starikov for their help in organizing and conducting interviews.

Because we are from the humanities, we do not do research in artificial intelligence, we do not have the laboratory requirements to meet those challenges. Our collaboration comes in when they [computer scientists and engineers] want to design or they have already designed, and then they call for a meeting and tell us: «where can we apply this?» or «what would be the challenges, if we design and apply this...» — they want a response. That is where we step in. (Int. 1)¹⁰

Practitioners in policy research have various disciplinary backgrounds (sociology, communication studies, political science, nursing, and so on). However, scholarly disciplines serve only as methodological (and also ideological) toolboxes for conducting research that is primarily directed by the practical question: do new technologies make people's lives better or worse? In regard to this question, sociological views manifest themselves in two primary ways. First, researchers consider the population of the countries under study not as a whole, but as a set of different groups (urban and rural, literate and illiterate, young and elderly, etc.). Analytic division of nations into groups with different interests, values, and behaviors is typical for classical sociological research and descends, in different versions, from Marx's, Weber's, and Durkheim's visions of society. Second, there is an underlying expectation that the implementation of new technologies will be good for the privileged groups and not so good for others, thus deepening social inequality.

Similarly, topics in policy research embrace descriptions of how different groups of people use new technologies and how they feel about it. These accounts are highly valuable from the standpoint of the social sciences as they provide a rich body of descriptive empirical data on 'artificial sociality'. Nevertheless, the transition from answering the research question about the positive or negative consequences of a particular technology, to the exploration of the ways in which people interact with it, is complicated and not so obvious. Thus, the large body of empirical findings in policy research requires way more effort in conceptualization, generalization, and comparison to be integrated into the more abstract social science disciplines.

Another domain is **disciplinary research**: three interviews fall into this category, two with sociologists and one with a historian. Specifically, by disciplinary research we mean scholarly investigation that is (mostly) governed by intra-discipline discussions and uses conceptual vocabulary and methods of one specific discipline. However, the rigidity of disciplinary boundaries is relative. One of the sociologists we interviewed works on a multi-disciplinary research team; the other one is both a sociologist and a media scholar; the historian specializes in sociological and economic history.

For all the experts in this domain the interest in AI-based technologies comes from the extension of other research topics and problems relevant to their disciplinary field. Another reason is (at least, for sociologists) «*to follow the money, which is where the money comes from for research*» (Int. 4). It is because research on new technologies is now extensively supported by various research funds. However, in contrast with policy research, disciplinary interests determine what is under investigation. For sociologists, the approach to understanding the implementation of new technologies is

¹⁰ Interviews are numbered according to the order in which they were taken. All the interviews, except for the Interview 8, were conducted in English. Interview 8 was conducted in Russian; its fragments are presented in this paper in our English translation.

now influenced by the motto «*technology is affecting sociability and social relations*» (Int. 6). In other words, what is the place of online interactions in our web of relations, in sustaining communities and trust, and how does the existence of new algorithms influences economic exchange, cultural production, and consumption. For the historian, the development of AI is to be treated through the lens of the history of rationality. Positive or negative evaluations and concerns for technological development may accompany these reflections, however, they are not at the core of the research.

Three more interviews represent the domain of **interdisciplinary research**. Unlike disciplinary research, here scholars combine visions and perspectives of different disciplines to study phenomena connected to the widespread diffusion of new digital technologies. Interdisciplinarity might manifest itself as a condition of being «in-between»:

I really like looking for a mixture of things. And I can't really code but I can talk about coding, I'm not a psychologist but know a bit of their terminology, and I'm not a sociologist, but I've read a little bit of that... I like being a bit confused and lost, not all the time, but often. (Int. 2)

It might also be considered as a combination of different perspectives:

Q.: And here, at the sociological congress, do you feel yourself comfortable, like at home? I mean...

A.: Yes, I understand. But I also go to other conferences, where there are psychologists or organizational scientists, where I also feel at home. (Int. 7)

I started off in philosophy and philosophy of logic, mathematical logic at a very early age. And I saw that is the beginnings of everything... I didn't start off majoring in AI because... [it was impossible]. But it grew out of philosophy, psychology and industrial organization. <...> I've been publishing since the late 1980s and I have been construed as a cultural theorist. (Int. 5)

Instead of disciplinary boundaries, the interviews pointed to specific interdisciplinary research fields: the study of digital technologies in education, digitalization of labor, and science and technologies studies (STS) based on AI. These fields inquire into specific phenomena using perspectives from different disciplines; however, they have boundaries both in terms of what disciplines are typically involved, and what kind of scholarly discussion is being developed. There are several examples of research problems involved in interdisciplinary research:

- «*how theories of instruction [in education] are turned into material forms, new lecture halls, or the use of certain apps or software*» (Int. 2);
- «*when we talk about technology, what should be included in the definition*» (Int. 2);
- «*to have AI invested deeply into systems, for example, that of automated vehicles, with long-term space projects, one will need the type of coordination between human beings and the systems that were projected earlier by the pioneers [of AI]*» (Int. 5);
- «*what is needed to guarantee the social welfare and economic welfare of the society in relation to new technologies, which new technologies will emerge and how they will affect the economy and work*» (Int. 7).

These problems are quite different from policy issues as they go beyond the normative questions. They also differ from the narrow disciplinary research problems as they rely on a broader conceptual vocabulary of material/digital, technology, labor, and

human-machine collaboration. Moreover, each of these interdisciplinary problems is framed in the lasting scholarly discussions: whether material and digital activities could/should be regarded as separate, and how digitalization of labor influences labor markets and unemployment, etc.

The last domain can be labeled as **transdisciplinary/anti-disciplinary research**, and only one interview falls into this category. In contrast to other domains, the research questions here address the emergence of phenomena that seem to be radically new, and thus could not be conceptualized properly by the mainstream scholarly discourse. As we noted above, from its very beginning, AI research was anti-disciplinary, then it spread into different fields and disciplines. In our interview, transhumanism is the domain of anti-disciplinary research:

So, there were people coming from different disciplines, but they were all focusing on one topic, which is self-directed evolution, how technology changes humans. ... So disciplines were somehow considered irrelevant, in the sense that we were not discussing using the same methodology, everybody was trying to extrapolate the possible development of human starting from their own perspective, but still, we could understand each other. (Int. 9).

The key here is one idea — self-directed evolution — that organizes both perceptions of diverse empirical phenomena and the applications of different disciplines. In the case of transhumanism, the study of AI and its everyday usage is one of the key issues, because the emergence of AI is regarded as the crucial step in evolution. Anti-disciplinary research always starts as marginal in relation to the established boundaries (as indeed was the case with AI research). However, the transhumanist movement is becoming more popular both in mass culture and in mainstream science: *«I think that people involved in this transhumanist movement, they develop a common vocabulary, which now is also used outside. And today, for instance, I could hear other people using these terms, even sociologists»* (Int. 9).

The range or research topics and reference points in anti-disciplinary research is diverse: the ‘anything goes’ principle promotes the elaborating of original ideas. According to the interview, research interests of the expert embrace both narratives about the future and the transformation of labor, including social robotics, and references are made to different figures, from Anthony Giddens to the chief economist of the Bank of England. Like policy research, anti-disciplinary research starts from what is happening now. Unlike policy research, however, it is focused on new phenomena *per se*, not on their consequences on the society. Anti-disciplinary research also holds optimism for negotiation of disciplinary conflicts and dissemination of its own ideas.

The four domains highlighted above are ideal types that were constructed based on the interviews. Qualitative research does not allow to make conclusions on the prominence of these types of domains among researchers involved in sociological / social science work on ‘artificial sociality’. However, we should note that disciplinary research constitutes only one of the domains, and research on new technologies exists mainly outside (or between) disciplinary boundaries.

Moving from the specific domains to general tendencies we need to raise the following question: what are the topics and structure of social knowledge on ‘artificial sociality’?

As we have observed, research topics and projects mentioned in the interviews are quite diverse, however, there are three main trends. First, scholars focus on the change, on social transformations connected to the spread of AI-based technologies. Our respondents regard these changes as significant, but their assessments vary from moderate to radical:

It's changing, it's transforming relations, yes, we can say... But we have a core of our relations that... it's still our traditional relations that we used to use to have in a village, for instance. (Int. 6)

Some of these transformations are radical. ... But what will remain is where there is work where the interaction between individuals and people is necessary, that cannot be automated very simply. (Int. 7)

These machines, the software and the hardware, become more and more sophisticated, and at the point, it will be hard to distinguish... software from a human. (Int. 9)

Second, the researchers agree in arguing against technological determinism. Implementation of new algorithms and devices is driven not only by their technical characteristics but also by people and their social relations, «*other factors like culture, religion, social stratification [that] may have an impact on technology, shape technology*» (Int. 9).

Third, despite a variety of research topics, the dominant one is the transformation of work and labor under digitalization, its social consequences, and the narratives about it. Almost all the interviews mention some aspects of labor transformations: the change in jobs, production, exchange, and consumption.

Besides research problems, many experts expressed concerns about social consequences of AI development. These issues fall into two main categories: reproduction/growth of inequality, and the loss of privacy and control. On the one hand, failure in the use of new technologies makes it necessary to protect the disadvantaged and to look into the negative side of technological change. This is how it was noted, «*some of these innovations are... the dark sides are intending because they are okay for the majority, this is for the best, people like banking on the net, and they don't take into the account the losers in some sense*» (Int. 3). On the other hand, when innovation is successful there is a risk of compromising privacy and losing control of one's personal information: «*...the property of data, how these data are managed and used: they can be used for the better, for understanding how it works, but they can also be used for bad. So I think that the use, and the property of data which is now in the hand of some corporations, it's a really big deal...*» (Int. 6).

The experts also provide reflections on the structure of sociological knowledge within the framework of studying AI-based technologies. There are two main aspects that can be identified here. One is the internal divisions in sociology and related disciplines, another is interrelations with computer science and engineering.

Above all, sociology appears to be a relatively conservative discipline that has not paid and is still not paying enough attention to new technologies. Research on 'artificial sociality' is positioned as something innovative but not yet mainstream:

...at one point, sociologists thought that it was just, you know, small beans on the side, that communication and digital media were not to reshape the entire society, and therefore... I would say a lot of that has to do with snobbism... The Internet research at the beginning was for cuckoo people. And then, when the Internet picks up, and when platform became

more important, it was already too late, because the field of communication shaped rapidly and with a really strong background into actually philosophy and not sociology. (Int. 4)

...some sociologists tend to think that looking online, or the Internet, or Facebook, is just blah-blah and that it's not serious, it's not a real work, it's leisure. (Int. 6)

My experience of talking about this subject [history of AI] to anthropologists and sociologists is quite depressing because people simply don't understand... (Int. 8)

Another division concerns the role of sociology for non-sociologists. On the one hand, sociology provides a theoretical framework for those who come from policy studies and applied research: *«I don't have any formal training in sociology; we do study a lot of sociological theories in communication, because communication is an applied field, it draws from various fields»* (Int. 1). On the other hand, for people with a background in philosophy, sociology is associated with collecting and analyzing empirical data: *«I have such reverence for people who are pure sociologists and people who have qualitative and quantitative skills that are needed for the PhD in sociology»* (Int. 5). Thus, sociology lies between applied research that lacks theory and theoretical research that lacks empirical data. This position is simultaneously promising and vulnerable because there is a question of whether sociological perspective *per se* exists beyond philosophy and applied research¹¹.

Two more observations should be made about disciplinary boundaries. First, one of the experts argued for «critical AI studies», and the statements from other interviews implicitly support this point. Critical AI studies are in contraposition to ethics: instead of reasoning about how things should happen, we need to look carefully into what is actually happening here and now, which is a job for social scientists/sociologists. Second, instead of sociology, the field of STS often stands out as a point of reference in a discussion of who does research on new technologies. However, relations of STS and sociology are ambiguous: in some interviews, they are discussed as intertwined, while in others they are considered as separate fields. These two issues, critical AI studies and STS *versus* sociology, in our opinion, deserve special attention in further research.

Among the different kinds of divisions that emerged during the interviews, geographical borders are also worth considering. As has been already mentioned, the experts hold positions in the scholarly organizations of nine countries. Several respondents referred to national and regional borders in the discussion of their research. One type of reference characterized specific features of the research topics and the organizations in a specific place: *«that's our job, we are working on that [studying public service innovation in Norway]»* (Int. 3). This type of reference was made in relation to India, Finland, Norway, Canada, and the European Union. Another type of reference related specifically to Russia and Italy implies provincialism, the indication of the narrowness or the lack of a certain type of research: *«...now it is a quite active, very lively research segment, where, unfortunately, there are very few sociologists, and in Russia, perhaps, there is none of them»* (Int. 8). Thus, spatial boundaries in social science exist at least in two forms: as regionalism and as provincialism.

¹¹ Perhaps, it is one of the reasons why sociological perspective is becoming more and more associated with left-oriented ideological issues: critique of inequality, marketization, etc. In our interviews rhetoric on inequality and loss of privacy, which we discussed above, appeared in the narratives of the participants about their research, though we did not ask them the evaluative questions directly.

The last question we would like to examine here concerns the relations of our experts with computer science and engineering. The basic divide that became apparent from the interviews was the opposition between social sciences and humanities, on the one hand, and the technical sciences, on the other. This divide emerges in composition of research groups when experts work in teams, in the conferences they attend, and in the types of research problems they are working on. However, this divide takes different forms — from distant amicability to respectful ignorance to institutional animosity. There are polar opposite views of whether productive dialogue between social and technical sciences is possible:

Yes, it takes effort and it takes time. But if both sides are prepared to listen to each other then it's also possible to have much more synergy, and much more serendipity, and much more new ideas. So, it's not easy but it can be very fruitful (Int. 7).

Humanitarians or social scientists, as a rule, have very few competences to understand what is going on in the sphere of artificial intelligence and machine learning... On the other hand, the big problem is that engineers, computer scientists, they have ambitions to talk about society and economy, they even have ambitions to offer solutions to various social problems, but they completely lack culture, neither humanitarian nor in social sciences... And how to manage this mismatch, this discrepancy, how to build the bridge — it is absolutely unclear. Our science is settled up in such a way that it is impossible to overcome this gap (Int. 8).

Judgements on this issue are highly dependent on the actual experience of interaction with technical experts. People who have to work with computer scientists and engineers on their research projects have more optimistic views of the dialogue and collaboration with them. The same situation characterizes opinions on the technical knowledge issues that are often regarded as the main obstacle for mutual understanding and cooperation. Some of our interviewees consider it too hard, some are just not interested, while others consider it worth knowing: «...it's amazing how a few people want to explore AI... the technology which is not all that difficult because we're modeling human brain, and a lot of things we're talking about in terms of machine learning, these are relatively simple concepts» (Int. 5). Therefore, the main obstacle to the dialogue is probably organizational — the lack of opportunities for joint work between social and technical scientists.

In conclusion, the diverse disciplinary backgrounds and research interests of the scholars we interviewed, and the variety of academic institutions in different countries they represented make it appear that they share nothing in common. However, their gathering at the XIX ISA Congress is not a coincidence but rather an indication of uneven and complex development of the study of 'artificial sociality' in contemporary social science.

Discussion and conclusions

The focus of our research is interdisciplinary boundaries in the studying of 'artificial sociality'. The empirical findings demonstrate that these boundaries exist in various forms and typically compose of disjointed fields and domains that are rarely overlapping. Scholars' attitudes to them also vary: from intra-disciplinary criticism to interdisciplinary rebukes, from the appreciation of other scholars' work to indifference to it, from the agreement on the division of labor to passing over established divides.

Returning to the hypotheses, we can conclude that the first one is mostly rejected, while the second one is mostly confirmed.

The first hypothesis is largely unsupported. Though disciplinary boundaries play an important role in a considerable part of the study of 'artificial sociality', disciplinary research is not the only and probably not the most popular domain. Much work is being done in interdisciplinary, anti-disciplinary, and policy studies. Differing in types of research questions, all these domains adopt and digest common concepts, methods, and findings from various disciplines. Thus, 'artificial sociality' is studied primarily between or outside well-established boundaries of sociology, anthropology, economics, history, etc.

The second hypothesis is mostly confirmed. Despite relative insignificance of disciplinary divisions, there is still no professional connection among social science scholars who study AI. New research domains do not constitute a unified field; rather, they develop their own divisions, but also construct paths to bridge the gaps between them. The variety of research topics and organizational forms demonstrates this incoherence. However, several shared orientations in the field provide common ground for further dialogue. These include the focus on social change, arguing against technological determinism, and special attention to transformations of labor.

The most important conclusion of our investigation is probably that in the social sciences, the research on AI-based technologies is flourishing mainly outside established disciplinary boundaries. We came to this conclusion even though the data was collected under the organizational framework of the ISA Congress, in other words, under an established professional body within sociology. The conclusion needs further verification in studies of wider scope. However, its plausibility could be supported by two theoretical arguments, one is more general while another concerns academic life in particular.

Primarily, our findings could be regarded as an instance of interstitial emergence of new forms of power as characterized by Michael Mann [Mann, 1986]¹². In the case of AI research, institutionalized forms of power presented by disciplinary divisions have not provided adequate organizational means to achieve research, as well as engineering goals. This led to the emergence of new organizational structures: research fields, academic journals, university departments, funding organizations, etc. This picture seems to be valid for the special case of AI research — studying 'artificial sociality': the widespread use of new technologies in the everyday life of humans also demands new organizational forms for conceptualization (ideological power) and the material basis of research (economic power).

Moreover, our results could be interpreted in terms of Randal Collins' conceptual framework of intellectual change [Collins, 1998]. This framework implies a two-level structure of the organization of scholarly attention. At the level of intellectuals' interactions, the discussion is driven by the inner dynamic of the scholarly coalitions and arguments. At the level of material and organizational structures, any change influences academic discussions indirectly by promoting coalitions and investigative tasks that have not existed yet or were marginal. In the case of AI research, new goals

¹² We would like to thank Dmitrii Zhikharevich who brought our attention to this argument.

set by the governmental and business structures caused a re-structure of disciplinary fields and pushed new coalitions of scholars that resulted, in turn, in the emergence of new academic fields.

Reflecting on these results we would like to discuss possible developments and obstacles in studying 'artificial sociality'. Primarily, is this situation promising or disadvantageous for inquiry into the new phenomena of 'artificial sociality'?

On the one hand, the situation is not so optimistic for the social sciences. Nowadays social science disciplines accumulate data and describe new phenomena, nevertheless, in our view, they are not yet able to fully grasp them at the conceptual level. How is AI designed to solve instrumental problems, communicate with another AI, and / or interact with a person? How is the process of interaction organized? How do people perceive AI? What are human emotions, and what are their analogues in the case of AI? How can engagement and synchronization with a communication partner be achieved for the machines? What are the similarities and the differences in the language performance for human perception and AI? Does the way of framing and solving problems by the human mind change because of 'artificial sociality'? What about the usage of language and non-verbal images? What emotions does a person experience, and how do they change in the process of 'learning' how to interact with a machine? How does the perception of one's own body change? These questions are approached by sociology, social psychology, anthropology, etc. in diverse empirical studies, however, they are rarely reflected on at the theoretical level. In fact, much more conceptual work is being currently done by philosophers, cultural theorists, psychologists, and even computer scientists, than by social scientists.

On the other hand, the situation for studying 'artificial sociality' is promising. Reconfiguration of well-established borders and the search for new research problems in combination with change of organizational basis are the conditions in which we expect to observe high creativity [Collins, 1998]. In fact, we could observe it in STS, Internet studies, digital humanities, and so on. Knowledge that is produced outside the established boundaries could be characterized as falling within a continuum between two ideal types: inter-disciplinary and anti-disciplinary research. Interdisciplinarity is basically directed toward problems of 'translation' and interaction between different disciplinary perspectives in relation to the study of both the well-known and new phenomena. Anti-disciplinarity is driven by the fascinating novelty of new phenomena that are to be explored or created. The thesis that we want to advance here is that 'artificial sociality' as a field of study needs to develop a novel perspective of an anti-disciplinary subject that cuts across disciplinary boundaries. It is the field that inherently has to build bridges among engineering, natural sciences, social sciences, and humanities.

However, several circumstances could become barriers to scholarly creativity. We would like to finish this paper discussing the most important of them.

First, much more collaboration is needed between computer science and social sciences. Our research demonstrated the existence of a considerable division between them, both organizationally and in discourse. We also discovered that a positive experience of collaboration between the two resolves challenges connected with finding a common language, which might seem unsolvable to the uninvolved observer. However,

the opportunities for joint research projects and even for sharing findings are rare because of how scholarly organization operates today.

Second, the divisions in interdisciplinary and policy research seem to solidify, and they could prove to be no less strict than disciplinary boundaries. Divisions as such are fruitful when they manifest themselves into a dialogue, debates, and controversies but they lead to stagnation when they imply mutual ignorance and deafness [Collins, 1998]. It also seems that AI research is losing its anti-disciplinary orientation on inquiring into radically new phenomena and is fragmented throughout separate research fields. This leaves this orientation to such groups as transhumanism, which are marginal from the standpoint of existing scholarship. The above situation is paradoxical because ‘artificial sociality’ — participation of new AI-based agents in human interactions — embraces the novel phenomena that, we believe, call for original research questions and conceptual framework.

Third, what appears to be lacking in research on ‘artificial sociality’ is the study of sociality itself. The dominant topics in the field, at least for those who have organizational connections with sociology, are related to labor transformations that are usually analyzed at the structural level. This perspective ignores both the leisure and the communication with gadgets that permeate our everyday life and interaction. We believe that the examination of social interaction is the first priority because it is a crucial phenomenon that characterizes social existence and has implications for interactions between human beings and machines. How exactly are the forms of interaction and relations among people changing? Are people (individuals, groups, or societies) getting more or less social? Are there qualitative and quantitative changes in human emotions, attachments, relationships? What is the impact of the broader context, such as state, culture, language, type of social structure, on the way ‘artificial sociality’ changes people’s everyday lives? How do technological changes interact with the social transformations of the modern societies, for instance, individualization, urbanization, changes in the family and friendships, etc.? We consider these questions no less important than new divisions of labor.

Finally, there is a deficit in theoretical frameworks. Both the review of the scholarly publications and the participant observation at the XIX ISA Congress demonstrate that the most influential theoretical resources which reflect on the interactions of non-humans in the social sciences are communication theories (both classical cybernetics and system theory of Niklas Luhmann) and actor-network theory. These approaches, in spite of vast differences between them, share one limitation: they are not able to identify specific characteristics of human interaction. In general, communication theories analyze all types of interactions as information exchanges, while actor-network theory argues for neglecting ‘human exceptionalism’. Thus, these theoretical approaches have difficulties in elaborating conceptual distinctions between human interactions, human to machine interactions, and interactions between the machines, which are all conceptualized either as exchange of signals or as heterogeneous networks.

The most promising alternative is therefore ‘sociology of human interactions’ [Rezaev, Tregubova, 2017] based on theoretical findings developed by Erving Goffman, Harold Garfinkel, Randall Collins, Jurgen Habermas, Anne Rawls, Jeffrey Alexander, and other social theorists. This conceptual framework is characterized by the inten-

tionally anthropocentric position in current theoretical debates. As social scientists need to inquire into the specific features of human interaction (emotionality, sociality, spontaneity, etc.) to study 'artificial sociality', anthropocentrism can be considered an advantage. Thus, sociology of human interactions provides theoretical foundation for considering the differences of human to human, human to machine and machine to machine interactions and, as a consequence, inquiring into the problem of distinction between human consciousness and artificial intelligence.

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DEBATING TRUMP PHENOMENON

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P. Kivisto

INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM'S COLLECTIVE NARRATIVE OF TRUMP IN BUSINESS

INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM'S
COLLECTIVE NARRATIVE OF TRUMP
IN BUSINESS

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КОЛЛЕКТИВНЫЙ НАРРАТИВ ЖУРНАЛИСТСКИХ РАССЛЕДОВАНИЙ: ТРАМП И БИЗНЕС

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Abstract. This article explores the collective journalistic narrative of Donald Trump's business career. While Trump's presentation of self as a successful businessman and celebrity was his primary rationale for his presidential candidacy, these investigative reporters paint a negative portrait¹ of his conduct. Two years

Аннотация. В статье исследуется коллективный журналистский нарратив, посвященный деловой карьере Дональда Трампа. Несмотря на то, что выдвижение Трампа в президенты подкреплялось его стремлением позиционировать себя в качестве успешного бизнесмена и известной личности,

into the Trump administration, it is mired by a remarkable series of financial and other scandals, resulting in the forced resignations of top officials and increasing criticism of others. The emerging narrative is that the administration has attracted the type of individual drawn to a culture of corruption, which is in turn seen as emanating from the business culture embraced by Trump and his family.

некоторые журналистские расследования изображают его поведение в негативном свете. За два года работы администрации Трампа она оказалась втянута в череду крупных финансовых и иных скандалов, результатом которых стали принудительные отставки представителей высшего руководства и ужесточение критики в адрес государственного аппарата. В связи с этим возникает нарратив, согласно которому администрация привлекла людей, которых притягивает культура коррупции, что, в свою очередь, связывается с деловой культурой, привычной для Трампа и его семьи.

Keywords: civil sphere, business career, corruption, journalism, narratives, Trump

Ключевые слова: гражданская сфера, деловая карьера, коррупция, журналистика, нарративы, Трамп

Democracy's advocates and authoritarians share an understanding of the vital role that independent journalism plays in a democracy, operating as it does with a professional code of ethics committed to the values of «transparency, independence, responsibility, balance, and accuracy»—values vital to a democratic civil sphere [Alexander, 2016: 2]. Realizing the significance of this code is why the former are intent on protecting the Fourth Estate, while the latter seek to undermine it. Among the functions of the press that Michael Schudson [Schudson, 2008: 12—17] identifies as fundamental are to investigate — to serve as a watchdog — and to offer analyzes in narrative form that help the public make sense of complex issues. These narratives compete with counter-narratives that are often self-serving or explicitly ideological, both seeking to advance particularistic interests at the expense of the public. Or, to frame this in terms of civil sphere theory, journalistic narratives are civil, while the others are not [Alexander, 2006; Kivisto, 2017].

This article explores the collective journalistic narrative of Donald Trump's business career that emerged during his electoral campaign and thereafter, offering a synthetic account based on the overlapping and reinforcing narratives of the individual journalists. While Trump's presentation of self as a successful businessman and celebrity was his primary rationale for his presidential candidacy, these investigative reporters — many of whom have been investigating Trump for decades — paint a negative portrait of his conduct. This includes a group of journalists who in addition to publishing numerous articles have written book-length analyses of Trump's life in business: Gwenda

Blair, Michael D'Antonio, David Cay Johnston, Michael Kranish and Marc Fisher, and Timothy L. O'Brien. The group as a whole is composed of journalists who are or have been employed by such high-profile news organizations as *The New York Times*, *The Wall Street Journal*, and *The Washington Post*. Several have been recipients of major journalistic awards, including the Pulitzer Prize, the George Polk Award, and the Loeb Award for Distinguished Journalism.

Two years into the Trump administration, it is mired by a remarkable series of financial and other scandals, resulting in the forced resignations of top officials and increasing criticism of others. For example, a recent article in *Forbes* reports that Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross may have «wrongly siphoned or outright stole» as much as \$120 million, which if proven would mean he ranks «among the biggest grifters in American history»¹. The narrative emerging is that the administration has attracted the type of individual drawn to a culture of corruption, which is in turn seen as emanating from the business culture embraced by Trump and his family. Indeed, a Google search reveals that two words describing the Trump White House that have gained currency since the 2016 election are kleptocracy and grifter. A more specific word describing a particular crime is also appearing increasingly in journalistic accounts: money laundering.

An Ethically and Legally Challenged Patrimony

To make sense of what appears to be an unprecedented level of corruption, the narrative emerging takes on credibility when turning to the past, including the deep past of the Trump family. Donald Trump represents the third generation of Trump men involved in business ventures that made them wealthy while often taking little heed of the law or of conventional business ethics — three generations of serial norm violators.

Trump's grandfather was born in 1896 in a wine-producing region of the Palatinate region of Germany, at the time under the political jurisdiction of Bavaria. When he was sixteen he departed for the United States, thereby avoiding mandatory conscription, and after registering his entry at Castle Island under the name Friedrich Trumpf, he moved in with a sister and her husband in New York City. After working for a time as a barber, he took his savings and headed to the Pacific Northwest in 1891, then a frontier attracting fortune hunters drawn to the prospect of striking it rich in the gold fields. Trump (he had changed his name by this time) had no intention of mining, but rather of servicing the needs of the miners. Beginning in Seattle, and subsequently moving to where the miners headed, he set up operations in Monte Cristo, Washington, and when gold fever headed across the border he established himself in the Yukon Territory.

In all of these locales, he set up restaurants and hotels. Gwenda Blair [Blair, 2000], a journalist who has written extensively on Trump and his forbearers has looked into the precise nature of his line of business in each of these settings and concluded that his hotels functioned as brothels, and liquor sales and gambling were the primary sources of income in his restaurants — a conclusion shared by others who have investigated his business dealings. Moreover, Blair reports on at least one instance of acquiring property illegally, staking a mining claim on a piece of property that had already been

¹ Alexander D. New Details about Wilbur Ross' Business Point to Pattern of Grifting. *Forbes*. August 7, 2018. URL: <https://www.forbes.com/sites/danalexander/2018/08/06/new-details-about-wilbur-rosss-businesses-point-to-pattern-of-grifting/> (accessed: 20.09.2018).

claimed. This occurred as the ambitious and aggressive Trump responded to rumors that a Rockefeller mining operation was about to open in the area. Trump had no intention of mining the land, which was next to the local train station, but rather planned to build a hotel. In 1900, a reporter for the *Yukon Sun* described his establishment in the following terms, «For single men the Arctic has excellent accommodations as well as the best restaurant in Bennett, but I would not advise respectable women to go there to sleep as they are liable to hear that which would be repugnant to their feelings and uttered, too, by the depraved of their own sex» [quoted in: Kranish, Fisher, 2016: 24].

That Trump made a fortune in these endeavors would become evident a few years later. That he was operating in a liminal legal place became evident even earlier, for his decision to return to New York was prompted by a crackdown by the Canadian Mounties on prostitution as well as illegal gambling and liquor sales. Trump traveled to Germany where he met and married Elizabeth Christ, a young woman from his family's neighborhood. He returned to New York with her, but when she pressed him to return to Germany, he relented. Assuming this was to be a permanent move, he took his life savings, which amounted in current dollars to over \$500,000. Unfortunately for him, local authorities informed him that because he had not discharged his obligatory military duties, he would be deported if he did not leave the country voluntarily. He pleaded with authorities to permit him and his family to remain, but the deportation order was not revoked and in June, 1905 the Trump family returned to the United States, settling in the German enclave in the South Bronx.

Shortly afterwards, his son Frederick Christ Trump, Donald Trump's father, was born. For the rest of his life Trump would work as a barber and hotel manager. Neither of these careers was a lucrative pursuit, and thus might appear as unusual occupational choices for such an acquisitive person. However, according to David Cay Johnston [Johnston, 2016: 7] barbershops «were often fronts for illegal businesses» and working as a hotel manager afforded opportunities to be financially involved in prostitution.

Whatever is the case, when Trump died in 1918, a victim of the global influenza epidemic, he left his wife with a large estate and soon thereafter with the ample capital she inherited, Elizabeth Trump opened a construction business involving her teenage son Frederick as a junior partner: E. Trump & Son. He early on assumed an active role in the business and quickly concluded that Queens and Brooklyn, with large tracts of undeveloped land that would soon no longer be isolated from the rest of the city due to the expansion of streetcar and subway lines, were likely to undergo housing booms. He was quick to take advantage of this opportunity, building his first home before he was twenty-years old.

During his quick rise as a businessman, one non-business related episode that has subsequently drawn attention given his subsequent well-documented history of racial discrimination in renting property is his arrest in 1927 for his involvement in a Ku Klux Klan march in Queens. Frederick Trump's name appears in the accounts of several newspapers from the period as one of seven men arrested. This was a protest not directed at blacks in an essentially all-white neighborhood, but rather against Catholics and immigrants. It is unclear if he was a member of the KKK or if he was wearing Klan robes (at least one contemporary newspaper account states that all seven of the arrested were «berobed marchers»). What is clear is that his home

address is listed as 175—24 Devonshire Road, Jamaica, that he was arrested for «refusing to disperse from a parade when ordered to do so,» and that the charges were later dismissed. While there is uncertainty about what to make of this event, Donald Trump's repeated assertions that his father never lived on Devonshire Road and that the whole event never happened are demonstrably false.

Fred Trump began building homes, first in Queens and then expanding his base into Brooklyn. He and his business partners swooped down to buy homes facing foreclosure during the Depression — benefitting from the economic distress that confronted many working-class homeowners. His horizon expanded during World War II when he discovered the advantages of becoming the beneficiary of federally-funded housing projects, first building housing for the U. S. Navy. His first foray into being a landlord set the stage for the rest of his career, as he squeezed profits by using low quality materials and by being a ruthless manager of his properties [Kranish, Fisher, 2016: 29; Johnston, 2016: 11]. He also had a flair for theatrical marketing, establishing a name for himself with promotional activities the likes of which his son would take to new levels decades later.

Trump jumped into the post-war housing boom, building homes quickly with the cheapest materials available, leading many city residents to dub them «Trump's dumps on stumps.» He also gamed Federal Housing Administration rules and was accused of profiteering with taxpayer money to the tune of \$4 million, for which he was called to testify before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency in 1954. While in the end he was not arrested, his pattern of pushing legality to the limits and his lack of commitment to conventional business ethics even in a business with plenty of ethically-challenged landlords became the hallmark of his success. He also engaged in a business partnership with an associate of the Genovese and Gambino organized crime families, who served both as a source of capital and as insurance that construction-related unions would not give him problems [Johnston, 2016: 12—16]. A similar complaint was lodged against him in 1966, this time by New York state authorities for inflating the costs of Trump Village [Kranish, Fisher 2016: 53].

In addition to being a landlord often despised by his residents and a businessman with ethically-challenged practices, he discriminated against blacks in his housing units. This was evident as early as 1950 to the folksinger Woody Guthrie, who lived in a Trump complex near Coney Island. Guthrie not only criticized him for charging excessive rents, but penned the following lyrics: «I suppose / Old Man Trump knows / Just how much / Racial Hate / He stirred up / In the bloodpot of human hearts / When he drew / That color line / Here at his / Eighteen hundred family project» [quoted in: Kranish, Fisher, 2016: 54].

Racial discrimination would persist throughout Fred Trump's career, and in the early 1970s, by which time Donald had joined his father's business, father and son became part of what would become one of the largest housing discrimination cases of the era: *United States of America v. Fred C. Trump, Donald Trump, and Trump Management, Inc.* They were accused of «refusing to rent and negotiate rentals with blacks, requiring different rental terms and conditions because of race, and misrepresenting that apartments were not available» [Kranish, Fisher, 2016: 57].

As an indication of the younger Trump's approach to such accusations, he hired Roy Cohn to represent the firm. Cohn has been chief counsel to Senator Joseph McCarthy

during his 1950's witch hunt for suspected Communists in government, academe, and the entertainment industry. Cohn, like his boss, was a master of character assassination, incriminating innuendo, and the fabrication of facts. His legal style can be characterized as no-holds-barred and take-no-prisoners. Both Cohn and Trump agreed to the basic proposition that if you're hit, you need to hit back harder. Thus, Cohn encouraged the Trumps to fight the case rather than settle, and in fact he filed a countersuit on their behalf contending that in a flagrant abuse of power the government had made false and misleading statements that damaged his clients' reputations. The countersuit was summarily tossed out of court and two years later the Trumps settled the case, which, as with cases from the era did not seek monetary damages, but rather sought to redress past discrimination. In his own defense, Donald Trump would subsequently claim that he was unfamiliar with the anti-discrimination provisions of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, which is either a rather remarkable admission of ignorance on the part of a large landlord with a degree in real estate from an ivy league university or an example of a type of falsehood that is difficult to disprove.

In 1976, complaints concerning the Trump Company's failure to properly maintain a housing project in Prince George's County, Maryland came to a head. Donald Trump has been overseeing the property when his father paid the site a visit and was arrested by local authorities for a host of code violations, including a failure to provide fire-prevention equipment. He was jailed until he posted bond; years later his son would assert that he hadn't known about his father's arrest. Given that father and son were business partners and this was a property the son was overseeing, it is hard to imagine how he would not have known about the arrest. Meanwhile, throughout the remainder of the decade the federal government accused the Trumps of failing to live up to the terms of their anti-discrimination lawsuit settlement.

Fred Trump was once the recipient of a Horatio Alger Award, ironic given that his inheritance prevented him from moving up the social ladder from rags to riches. The myth of the self-made man would be taken to a new level when Donald Trump set out to conquer Manhattan. Whereas his father had been content to remain a powerful landlord in the outer boroughs, catering to lower and middle class clients, his son was drawn to the prospect of getting involved in the high-end (far from the working class and the racial conflict that resulted from attempts to promote equal housing opportunities for racial minorities), and in the process establishing himself as a celebrity. The business career and the celebrity career would be from the outset intertwined. But, as *Newsweek* business writer Kurt Eichenwald² would put it, Donald Trump's «wealth is Daddy-made.»

The Confidence Man

The son's first solo efforts ended in failure, including his attempt to revitalize an apartment complex far from Manhattan — in fact in Cincinnati — owned by his father. The result when the development was sold was a net loss for his father's company. Dreaming of a career in the entertainment business, Trump invested in a Broadway play that bombed. Operating on a grander scale, his efforts to become the develop-

² Eichenwald K. Donald Trump's Many Business Failures, Explained. *Newsweek*. 8.2.2016. URL: <https://www.newsweek.com/2016/08/12/donald-trumps-business-failures-election-2016-486091.html> (accessed: 20.09.2018).

er of a convention center in Manhattan came to naught. Using his father's political connections, which the elder Trump had honed over the years, and his own audacity (at one point, he sought to have the center named after his father) and deception, he obtained hearings with power brokers that he otherwise would not have had access to. But lacking financing and a construction track record, the plan ended in failure.

His first major redevelopment project in Manhattan involved the renovation of the Commodore Hotel near Grand Central Station, made possible by aggressively pursuing tax exemptions and by his father's willingness to back his son's construction loans, which Chase Manhattan Bank approved as a favor to Fred Trump³. His relationship with business associates in the project, including the Pritzker family, owners of the Hyatt hotel chain, soured with what would become a signature of doing business with Trump: lawsuits and countersuits. And the city auditor found that Trump's accountants had short-changed the city out of millions of tax dollars [Kranish, Fisher, 2016: 73—85]. The 1970s was a period of financial crisis for the city of New York and distressed properties abounded — a situation not unlike the opportunities Fred Trump jumped on during the Depression. Trump, in characteristic bluster, claimed to have been responsible for the rejuvenation of the Grand Central neighborhood, even though by the time his project was under way numerous other projects were also in various stages of completion.

Trump's signature building came next: Trump Tower, where the Trump Organization occupies the twenty-sixth floor. In the process of erecting the 58-story structure, he revealed his lack of appreciation of historic preservation and generated a public relations debacle when he demolished the Bonwit Teller art deco building and made no effort to preserve the bronze grillwork over the entrance. Trump contracted to have concrete for the building purchased from a company owned by two mafia heavyweights, «Fat Tony» Salerno and Paul Castellano. Journalists who have analyzed the construction of the project point to the fact that Trump employed several hundred undocumented Polish workers — the so-called «Polish brigade.» According to Michael Kranish and Marc Fisher [Kranish, Fisher, 2016: 88],

The men toiled through spring and summer of 1980 with sledgehammers and blowtorches, but without hard hats, working twelve- to eighteen-hour days, seven days a week, often sleeping on Bonwit Teller's floors. They were paid less than \$5 an hour, sometimes in vodka. Many went unpaid and were threatened with deportation if they complained.

Lawsuits filed on behalf of the workers wound their way through the courts, again with the persistent prospect of lawsuits against the workers threatened by Trump and his lawyer, Roy Cohn. A settlement that found against Trump was finalized in 1999, but as is the case with most of Trump's dealings, rulings are concealed from the public, in this instance because the case was sealed by court order.

Nevertheless, this was the zenith of Trump's career as a builder. He had attracted architect Der Scutt to design it. Architecture critic Ada Louise Huxtable was impressed by the drawings, but once the building had been constructed she arrived at a very different assessment, declaring it to be «monumentally undistinguished» with an interior

³ Eichenwald K. Donald Trump's Many Business Failures, Explained. *Newsweek*. 8.2.2016. URL: <https://www.newsweek.com/2016/08/12/donald-trumps-business-failures-election-2016-486091.html> (accessed: 20.09.2018).

that reminded her of «posh ladies' powder-room décor» [quoted in: D'Antonio 2016: 147]. In its early years, it did manage to attract such high-profile celebrities as Stephen Spielberg (purchased by Universal Pictures and seldom used by the director), Michael Jackson (who rented a unit for less than a year), and Johnny Carson (who left in 1987 in a dispute with the Trump Organization). Today the Trump name has proven to be less of a draw for the sort of people Trump hoped to attract⁴. Instead has become home to associates such as Michael Cohen, Paul Manafort, and Felix Sattar, in addition to a number of known criminals — both American and foreign — and ownerships hidden behind anonymous LLCs, a common ploy used by money launderers. Christopher Steele, the author of the Trump-Russia dossier, told friends that, «It seems as if all criminal roads led to Trump Tower»⁵.

Trump's desire to populate the building with the A-list could also be seen in his desire to have famous and beautiful women by his side in public venues. Unfortunately for him, the women he would report to gossip columnists as interested in dating him — doing so by calls made by John Barron or John Miller (two fictional high-ranking officials in the Trump organization claiming to make the calls, when in fact Trump was the caller)—steered clear of his charms. Thus, the tabloids were told that stars such as Madonna, Kim Basinger, and others were interested in Donald Trump, often with the implication that they were actually dating. In fact, none of this was true.

His reports of a presumed affair with the Italian singer and model Carla Bruni continued over several years, including during extended on-air conversations on Howard Stern's satellite radio program. Bruni, who ended up marrying Nicholas Sarkozy, then the president of France, told a British newspaper after learning of these reports that in her opinion, «Trump is obviously a lunatic» [quoted in: Johnston, 2016: 145]. He also spoke about Princess Diana after her separation from Prince Charles, describing her as having the body of a model. According to British television presenter Selina Scott, he pursued Diana by sending «massive bouquets» that led her to feel that «Trump was stalking her,» which gave her «the creeps»⁶. Suffice it to say that his three wives — two Eastern European models and an actress from Dalton, Georgia — were not in the league of those Trump publicly aspired to be involved with romantically. One can assume that at some level this pains the notoriously thin-skinned Trump and leads to feelings of resentment.

During the remainder of the twentieth century, Trump not only entered into additional real estate projects, but cast a far wider net in areas where he had no prior experience, with the result being a series of economic disasters. This included first and foremost getting into the casino industry in Atlantic City. Lacking both a background in the industry and adequate financing, his first foray required him to partner with Harrah's Entertainment. Even though he would be directly competing with a casino he partially

⁴ Bernstein J. Trump Tower, A Home for Celebrities and Charlatans. *The New York Times*. August 12, 2017. URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/12/style/trump-tower-famous-residents.html> (accessed: 20.09.2018).

⁵ Kranz M. A New Report Contains Bombshell Details about Christopher Steele, the Author of the Trump-Russia Dossier. *Business Insider*. March 5, 2018. URL: <https://www.businessinsider.com/christopher-steele-new-yorker-trump-russia-dossier-revelations-2018-3> (accessed: 20.09.2018).

⁶ Newton J. Donald Trump Claimed Princess Diana 'Was Crazy' but He 'Could (and Would) Have Slept with Her' Anyway. *Daily Mail*. February 25, 2016. URL: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3464039/Donald-Trump-claimed-Princess-Diana-crazy-said-slept-without-hesitation-supermodel-beauty.html> (accessed: 20.09.2018).

owned, he purchased another one and named it Trump Castle — a move that prompted Harrah's to sell its share of the joint venture to Trump. Without the benefit of an established business partner, he financed this venture with \$ 300 million in junk bonds.

This didn't satisfy his ambition. Instead, he went on to purchase the Taj Mahal, which was billed as the largest casino in the world at the time. Misrepresenting his ability to finance the acquisition through normal channels, he was again forced to finance through junk bonds, this time for \$ 675 million, paying a 14 % interest rate. He was soon in debt to the tune of \$ 1.2 billion dollars and needed to rake in an unrealistic \$ 1.3 million a day at the renamed Trump Taj Mahal. Financially stressed, he stiffed building contractors at the Taj out of approximately \$ 60 million⁷ [Kranish, Fisher, 2016: 134—137]. His father sought to intervene, this time by illegally purchasing \$ 3.5 million in chips from Trump Castle just as his son was about to default on a loan payment. Trump senior had no intention of cashing in the chips, but instead was attempting to throw his son a lifeline — in clear violation of the New Jersey Casino Control Commission's rules. In 1991 Trump Taj Mahal filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection and half of the ownership was given to bondholders. The following year the two other casinos followed suit, the second of six bankruptcies over his career.

While Trump's fortunes sank in Atlantic City, he became involved in additional misadventures. Seeking the cachet of owning a National Football League (NFL) franchise, but without the financial means to acquire one, he instead bought the New Jersey Generals of the United States Football League (USFL), a lesser league that played its games in the spring in order not to compete directly with the NFL. Trump lobbied the USFL to switch the season to the fall to compete directly with the NFL. This was part of a gambit that Trump and Roy Cohn undertook in an attempt to merge the two leagues, or at least to take his team into the NFL. They did so by filing an anti-trust and monopoly lawsuit against the NFL. The jury ruled that in fact the NFL had a monopoly, but argued that the financial plight of the USFL was of its own devising. The USFL was awarded damages in the amount of \$ 3, a clear indication that the court had no desire to assist Trump in his plan. The conclusion of this episode was that the USFL, including Trump's team, quickly folded.

In 1988, Trump purchased the Eastern Shuttle, a no-frills airline connecting Boston, New York, and Washington, DC, from its financially troubled parent company, Eastern Airlines. He borrowed \$ 380 million for the purchase, which some analysts contend was too much. He also purchased more planes from Eastern than was necessary for the shuttle service. True to form, he renamed the airline Trump Shuttle. When the first logo design for the plane exteriors was run by him, his complaint was that his name wasn't large enough. Not knowing the industry or the customers regularly using the shuttle, he decided that what was needed was a touch of luxury. Thus, he spent \$ 1 million per plane (and the planes were only valued at \$ 4 million) on interior designs reflecting his view of elegance: faux marble walls and gold colored fixtures in the restrooms, and bird's eye maple paneling and leather seats with chrome buckles in the cabins [Kranish, Fisher, 2016: 191]. The airline immediately began to bleed money and ceased to operate in 1992, never turning a profit.

⁷ Eichenwald K. Donald Trump's Many Business Failures, Explained. *Newsweek*. 8.2.2016. URL: <https://www.newsweek.com/2016/08/12/donald-trumps-business-failures-election-2016-486091.html> (accessed: 20.09.2018).

Trump's entire business operation was hemorrhaging. One of his prize possessions, the storied Plaza Hotel, also went bankrupt when he failed to make interest payments. However, banks had been as irresponsible as Trump and if they allowed him to crash and burn, their bottom lines would have been seriously impacted. Thus, they continued in a symbiotic relationship motivated by their own self-interest, but in the process put Trump on an allowance and forced him to shed some of his major trophies, including his \$29 million yacht. In the end, regulators determined that his businesses were \$3.4 billion in debt, and that because he had personally guaranteed at least \$830 million of that debt, not only was the business organization in imminent danger of collapsing, but he may have ended up financially ruined.

Whereas the Trump family businesses over three generations, as privately held concerns, could operate in the shadows without what in their estimation was undue transparency, in this case Trump determined that going public was to his advantage. He discovered the benefits of using other people's money and allowing them to take most of the risks — the actual level of which was generally unknown to investors. The American public also learned during the Presidential debates that Trump avoided paying personal income taxes for sixteen or more years, a fact that he claimed in one debate indicated that he was smart. Even though he had proven to be a disaster as a real estate developer, casino operator, and airline owner, Trump had proven remarkably adept at projecting himself as a brash and hard charging entrepreneur.

Whereas business insiders and other critical observers, certainly in the New York area that was his base of operation, saw him as a shady and untrustworthy businessman, cynical, like-minded businesspersons and business innocents were drawn to him. His name recognition led such people to assume that Trump was one of the major real estate interests in Manhattan, an assumption that was far from the truth. However, whereas the truly major power brokers sought to operate discretely, Trump's visibility in the tabloids and on television and the radio made his a familiar name. Indeed, when he became the host of *The Apprentice* (later renamed *Celebrity Apprentice*), a reality television program, he entered a world that he had once described as inhabited by bottom-feeders. He swam near the top of that bottom for sixteen years

It was his cultivation of his name as synonymous with ostentatious wealth that became the basis for promoting his brand. No longer a real estate developer, Trump would instead seek to brand not only buildings, but a wide range of things large and small. Indeed, his willingness to put his name on such an array of items led billionaire critic Mark Cuban to suggest in recent years that Trump's frenetic branding pursuits would appear to indicate that the Trump organization suffers from serious cash flow problems. While this may well be the case, it overlooks the fact that Trump's narcissism is a driver in seeking to see his name emblazoned on as many objects as possible.

A partial list of branding initiatives includes: Trump Ice (bottled water); Trump Vodka; Trump Steaks; a travel site for glitzy travel, GoTrump.com; Trumpnet, a «corporate telephone communication services» company; *Trump* (a relaunched magazine); Trump Winery; and Trump Mortgage. He started his mortgage company in 2006, just before the housing crash, proclaiming at the time that «it's a great time to start a mortgage company»⁸. All of these

⁸ Stuart T. Donald Trump's Thirteen Biggest Business Failures. *Rolling Stone*. March 14, 2016. URL: <http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/donald-trumps-13-biggest-business-failures-20160314> (accessed: 20.09.2018).

ventures save one, Trump Winery, ended in failure. After purchasing the winery in 2011, he gave it to his son Eric, who runs it independent of the Trump Organization. It is not clear how well that business is doing. The rest of this list of business ventures was ill-advised and poorly-conceived. They were apparently not, however, fraudulent.

This is not the case with Trump University. Not unlike those late-night infomercials on making money by buying real estate with no money down, Trump University (later renamed Trump Entrepreneur Initiative after the New York Attorney General filed suit because the term university was being used illegally) promoted a get rich scheme. It differed from the infomercials in two respects. First, whereas they charged unwitting customers hundreds of dollars, Trump University used high-pressure sales techniques to bilk people out of thousands and in numerous cases tens of thousands of dollars. Second, the reason they could do so was because of the Trump name and of his explicit promise to pick the instructors who would teach the courses, which were billed as derived from his own business techniques. As became clear, Trump did little more than market the company. There was nothing original about the curriculum (indeed, large portions of material were simply pilfered from similar existing courses) and he did not choose the instructors.

Complaints proliferated across the country, leading to two class action lawsuits and a suit brought by the then New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman. Other attorneys general considered joining the lawsuit, and when that included Pam Bondi from Florida, Trump supplied her with an improper \$ 25,000 campaign contribution, for which he was penalized by the Internal Revenue Service. Trump insisted that he had done nothing wrong both with the contribution and in the operation of Trump University. In characteristic fashion, he vowed to fight the lawsuits and threatened retaliatory countersuits. He predicted that the cases would be summarily tossed out of the courts. Instead, shortly after his electoral victory, his attorneys went to court and settled the case by paying a \$ 25 million-dollar settlement. Schneiderman told reporters that the «settlement agreement is a stunning reversal by Donald Trump and a major victory for the over 6,000 victims of his fraudulent university»⁹.

Not willing to do due diligence in vetting potential business partners, Trump also licensed his name and appeared in an infomercial for Trump Institute, stating in that promotional that, «I put all of my concepts that have worked so well for me, new and old, into our seminar.» In fact, he didn't and was otherwise uninvolved in this business seminar in which people paid as much as \$ 2,000 to discover «wealth-creating secrets and practices.» Much of the content of the instructional material had been plagiarized. The actual owners of Trump Institute, Irene and Mike Milin, had a long history of running get-rich courses and an equally long history of run-ins with the law, their shady ventures at one point resulting in 33 state attorneys general signing a letter to the Federal Trade Commission accusing the duo of deceptive trade practices. A woman who attended one of the seminars of Trump Institute commented that «It was like I was in sleaze America. It was all smoke and mirrors»¹⁰.

⁹ Helderman R. Trump Agrees to \$ 25 Million Settlement in Trump University Fraud Cases. *The Washington Post*. November 18, 2016. URL: https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/source-trump-nearing-settlement-in-trump-university-fraud-cases/2016/11/18/8dc047c0-ada0-11e6-a31b-4b6397e625d0_story.html?utm_term=.c74708b58e14 (accessed: 20.09.2018).

¹⁰ Martin J. Trump Institute Offered Get-Rich Schemes with Plagiarized Lessons. *The New York Times*. June 29, 2016. URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/30/us/politics/donald-trump-institute-plagiarism.html?_r=0 (accessed: 20.09.2018).

In recent years, when Trump talks about Trump properties, he is usually talking about licensing deals in which his name is used — as with the ill-fated Trump Ocean Resort Baja Mexico and Trump Tower Tampa — and he often has a management contract, but is in reality neither the developer nor the owner of the property. In selling properties to buyers at these and other developments, it was often stated or implied that Trump was the developer and owner, but when the projects failed and buyers were informed that they had lost their investments, Trump quickly distanced himself noting what he did not want to advertise up front, which is that he had no liability in the matter since his involvement was simply that of licensing the brand.

Shortly before the presidential election, Trump Tower in Toronto was placed in receivership. This combination hotel and condominium development never managed to get off the ground from the time it opened in 2012. The actual owner was a Russian-born Canadian investor who hired another Russian with no background in real estate development or running a hotel as the chief operating officer. The development was noted for luring small-time investors, many immigrants and many with no background in investment, by contending that they could rent out their properties, quoting expected returns that were totally unrealistic. A large part of the allure for these neophyte investors was the Trump name. The vacancy rate over a four-year period ranged from 55% to over 80%, and investors lost significant amounts of money, leading to charges of fraudulent sales techniques. Once again, Trump walked away from the project asserting that he had no liability in the matter. This case is illustrative of a topic that has generated increased scrutiny over time, namely Trump's financial attachments to Russian banks and oligarchs.

Despite this portrait of a poor, unprincipled, and fraudulent businessman, Trump does have wealth, and that wealth is an essential part of his self-identity. The question of just how much he's worth has arisen throughout his career, and has proven to be difficult to answer given the intentionally opaque nature of his operations. Compounding the difficulties is the fact that he has repeatedly misrepresented his net worth, usually by inflating it dramatically, but by devaluing it when, for example, he was engaged in divorce proceedings or seeking property tax breaks. He has claimed for two decades that he's a billionaire, sometimes contending the figure is in the \$10 billion range.

Questioning Trump's net worth is perhaps the easiest way to anger him, as former *New York Times* business reporter Timothy L. O'Brien [O'Brien, 2005] discovered when in a detailed book, he contended that contrary to Trump's claims to be worth between \$5 billion and \$6 billion in 2005, he was actually worth something in the range of \$150 to \$250 million. Trump sued (one of his campaign threats was to loosen the libel laws). He was required to provide financial records including tax returns, and based on the documents the court found that O'Brien had not acted with reckless disregard for the truth. Under cross examination, Trump reported that one of the ways he assesses his net worth is based on his feelings at the moment. The case was ultimately thrown out, with Trump refusing to make public the financial records he had been forced to produce. He contended that he had won the case by forcing O'Brien to spend exorbitantly on legal bills, which was untrue. In fact, his publisher's spokesperson reported that the company paid the legal bills and knows that it spent far less than Trump paid on the case [Farhi, 2016].

O'Brien is not the only person to question whether Trump is actually a billionaire. Reinforcing suspicions is the fact that contrary to Trump's efforts to portray himself as a significant philanthropist, the evidence points to a person who has given precious little to charitable causes and institutions. Moreover, for a person who relishes seeing his name on buildings, there is no edifice bearing his name on a hospital pavilion, major museum, ivy-league campus, or for that matter anywhere that would mark a gift rather than a branding business venture. Trump has made numerous announcements of major personal donations and in one instance crashed a charity called the Association to Benefit Children, placing himself on the podium. Investigators for *The Washington Post* learned that he did not contribute a cent to the charity.

They learned further that his giving overall was remarkably low, and furthermore of the money he did contribute, around 70% went to the Trump Foundation, which has come under scrutiny for spending that violated its tax-exempt status and for raising funds in states where it had not been properly registered. In fact, an order from the State of New York forced the Foundation to cease fundraising in 2016 and shut it down in 2018.

In one egregious instance, after refusing to participate in a primary debate, Trump hosted a fundraiser for veterans, claiming that he was personally contributing \$1 million to the cause. When reporters could find no evidence to support the claim, his spokesperson Cory Lewandowski insisted that the contribution had been made, but he would not reveal details. When it became clear that Lewandowski had lied and that his failure to contribute might hurt Trump's campaign, Trump sent a check to the Marine Corps-Law Enforcement Foundation, while bristling at the reporter who wrote the story, calling him a «nasty guy»¹¹.

Trump's personality leads him to need to be perceived as a billionaire, but there is simply no accessible evidence for third parties to be able to confirm that he is as wealthy as he claims. On the contrary, there are reasonable grounds for being extremely skeptical about his boasting. Likewise, getting a handle on the scope and the net worth of the company he owns is difficult. Trump uses a complex of nearly 500 Limited Liability Companies (LLCs) designed to protect him from repeating the situation that nearly led to ruin in the 1990s when he used his own name to guarantee debt. Moreover, reporting on these LLCs is sketchy at best. A report in *The Wall Street Journal*, found for example that one such LLC, DT Connect Europe Ltd. was reported in his financial disclosure form required for his run for the presidency to have generated between \$15,001 and \$50,000 in revenue between 2015 and 2016. However, in reports filed in Scotland, where the LLC is based, that report states losses for the same time period of \$673,000¹². Evidence from an investigative report conducted by *The New York Times* found that his debt level is at least \$650 million, far more than he has publicly reported¹³.

¹¹ Fahrendthold D. A. Trump Boasts about His Philanthropy, But His Giving Falls Short of His Words. *The Washington Post*. October 29, 2016. URL: https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-boasts-of-his-philanthropy-but-his-giving-falls-short-of-his-words/2016/10/29/b3c03106-9ac7-11e6-a0ed-ab0774c1eaa5_story.html?utm_term=.f218c371fc18 (accessed: 20.09.2018).

¹² Eaglesham J., Maremont M., Schwartz L. How Donald Trump's Web of LLCs Obscures His Business Interests. *The Wall Street Journal*. December 8, 2016. URL: <http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-donald-trumps-web-of-llcs-obscures-his-business-interests-1481193002> (accessed: 20.09.2018).

¹³ Craig S. Trump's Empire: A Maze of Debts and Opaque Ties. *The New York Times*. August 20, 2016. URL: <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/21/us/politics/donald-trump-debt.html> (accessed: 20.09.2018).

Perhaps the most succinct and sober overview, not of Trump individually but of the Trump Organization to date comes from *The Economist*¹⁴ in an article seeking to «Deconstruct Donald.» Dismissing the braggadocio that has been the hallmark of Trump's presentation of his business self for his entire career, the reporters write that, «Far from being a global branding goliath, it is a small, middle-aged and largely domestic property business.» Moreover, «If Trump family members are to make a second fortune in the next four years, they will have to reinvent a mediocre firm.» The article goes on to contend that the company, with 80 % of its value tied up in commercial and residential properties (indeed, half of the company's worth is tied up in a mere five buildings) may be worth \$4 billion, with annual revenues of \$490 million. This would make it the 833rd largest firm in the country by market value and 1,925th by sales. Understanding the character of the man at the helm, they observe, «It seems likely that President Trump will inevitably blur the lines between business and politics in potentially disturbing ways — expect grubby deals and murky meetings.»

And indeed, a robust body of journalistic evidence reveals that this line has been blurred for a long time. Trump's calls to repeal the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act — with its anti-bribery and due diligence requirements — appear to be self-serving. As a particularly revealing example, Adam Davidson's¹⁵ in-depth account of his hotel project in Baku, Azerbaijan reveals «a corrupt operation engineered by oligarchs tied to Iran's Revolutionary Guard, «raising serious concerns about violations of the Act related to due diligence. Money laundering tied to Trump real estate and golf courses in the United States and abroad has become an increasingly frequent topic of journalistic inquiry¹⁶. And with the unfolding investigation of Michael Cohen, his long-time «fixer,» Davidson thinks the possibility of a narrative shift in public opinion has increased significantly in recent months¹⁷. With the Mueller investigation well underway and additional court battles ahead for Trump, combined with the impact of investigative reporting on public opinion, the opaque world of Trump businesses may become more transparent — something he clearly fears.

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DEBATING TRUMP PHENOMENON

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DONALD TRUMP: MORBID SYMPTOM OF THE INTERREGNUM TRUMP AS TROPE

DONALD TRUMP: MORBID SYMPTOM OF THE INTERREGNUM TRUMP AS TROPE

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Abstract. The election of Donald Trump raises a number of questions about how and why he was supported by the voters to gain electoral college victory. His election was not due to economic hardships but rather due to his unique ability to mobilize three primary constituents of the republican party: its billionaire elites, evangelical Christians and racist white nationalists. His appeal rested upon the

ДОНАЛД ТРАМП: БОЛЕЗНЕННЫЙ СИМПТОМ «МЕЖДУЦАРСТВИЯ» ТРАМПА КАК МЕТАФОРА

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Аннотация. Ряд вопросов возникает при анализе избрания Дональда Трампа Президентом США, в первую очередь, как и почему Трамп нашел электоральную поддержку и добился победы в Коллегии выборщиков. Его избрание было связано не столько с экономическими проблемами, сколько с его уникальной способностью мобилизовать три базовых элемента Республиканской партии:

authoritarianism of these constituencies, as well as fears of the loss of privileged identities based on race, religion and/or gender, disdain toward immigrants, fearing the “decline” of the nation and resentment toward corrupt elites.

элиту среди миллиардеров, христиан-евангелистов и белых националистов расистского толка. Обращаясь к ним, он делал упор на авторитарный характер мышления этих групп, боязнь потери привилегированного положения из-за расы, религии и/или пола, презрение к мигрантам, страх перед «закатом» нации, а также чувство враждебности к коррумпированной элите.

Keywords: Interregnum, legitimation crises, authoritarianism, reactionary populisms, racism, racial extinction, resentment, privileged identities

Ключевые слова: «междоцарствие», кризис легитимации, авторитаризм, реакционный популизм, расизм, вымирание расы, рессентимент, идентичности привилегированных групп

«The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.»

Antonio Gramsci

INTRODUCTION

How do we understand the ascent of Donald Trump as a businessman, then a reality TV personality capitalizing on his supposed «business acumen», and then, without any political experience, with a very limited understanding of politics, and what some consider severely flawed, malignant narcissistic, authoritarian, impulse ridden personality, climbed to the very pinnacle of world power as president of the United States? This is indeed a very complex question that has generated a cottage industry of critiques and analyses based upon one’s discipline, and within an academic discipline, there are again a variety of explanatory perspectives. I would like to offer a perspective informed by the early traditions of the Frankfurt school of critical theory, more recent concerns with the emotional aspects of social movements, and the growing number of empirical studies of the recent election.

The basic premise of my analysis, is that the developed countries of the world, more or less integrated in a deterritorialized, globalized world market, celebrated and regulated by neoliberal ideologies and practices, riven by a number of legitimation crises, has reached a point of exhaustion and is facing decline, transformation and renewal. The current world is dying, unsustainable for number of reasons. At this historical juncture of past and future we can easily see the one of the most blatant signs of the current interregnum its morbid symptom, has been the emergence of a variety of reactionary movements, e. g. authoritarian populisms, ethno — religious nationalisms, and virulent expressions of racism and intolerance that would halt, if not reverse the slow but steady progress toward tolerance, inclusion, equality etc. while these various forms of authoritarian populism can be seen in many parts of the world, it’s most blatant expression has been the recent history of the Republican Party in America, and the symbol, the trope of this transformation was the election of Donald J Trump as POTUS.

Perhaps one might start with growing inequality, three men now have half the wealth of the United States and five men have half the wealth of the world. Meanwhile, we note stagnant wages for the majority with the squeezing, «hollowing out», of the middle classes and the explosion of urban poverty in a «planet of slums» [Davis, 2006], rapidly expanding precariat classes including many of the college educated working in dead-end «gig» jobs [Standing, 2011], debt-financed governments as well as highly indebted individual lifestyles exist as critiques of global capital threatening the very demise of the capitalist system. Perhaps we might move on to the ecological catastrophes in the making from the pollution of air, waters and the land, industrial agriculture/aquaculture, fossil fuel based global warming with ever more devastating droughts, massive forest fires, ever more powerful hurricanes, tornadoes and tsunamis etc. If unprecedented climate change, increased global warming, and ever more polluted land air and water remain unabated, the near future may see the very end of the human species. Moreover, between advanced technologies, artificial intelligence, and digital communication, we witness an unprecedented rate of social change. Finally, given that contemporary geopolitics, we've seen unprecedented numbers of people migrating from growing poverty, ecological hardships, genocidal civil wars and insurrections-while the welcome mats of safer, more affluent countries are being removed. The emancipatory promise of the Enlightenment, that science, logic and Reason would enable human progress, personal/political and economic freedom, democracy and equality, further enabled by modern advanced technological innovations ranging first from steam powered mass production, to today when digitally based artificial intelligence directing robotic production as well as administration-has meant that the dream of the Enlightenment has instead become a nightmare. Save for the small number of wealthy elites living in unprecedented levels of splendor, most observers see that the present system is unsustainable, indeed dying, and a new vision is not yet forthcoming — especially since a sustainable society would require a far more modest standard of living involving far less fossil fuel, the consumption of much less animal protein, ending environmental devastation based on mass consumption that leaves millions of tons of almost indestructible environmental waste.

As Marx suggested, changing economic systems and changing class dynamics foster changes in cultural values as well as psychosocial changes. Thus we see number of rapidly changing aspects of contemporary cultures in which traditional values, identities and lifestyles have been discarded by many people especially younger generations. But many other segments of societies would seek to arrest, if not reverse the social and cultural changes that challenge their established identities values and lifestyles. Otherwise said, the particular world in which we live today is in a period of transition, an interregnum, but at the same time, we do not yet have a vision of an alternative to the present. The promises of neoliberal capitalism, especially the promise that the rising tide would raise all ships have proven empty, much as did the communism early 20th century. What then does the future hold or perhaps we might even ask if there is a future.

For Durkheim this is a period of an anomie, normalness, the time of transition between old and new, when the old values are no longer salience have and the new values not yet been established much as modernity replaced feudalism, dynastic rule

ended, and rational bureaucracies supplanted patrimonial organizations. Similarly, for Gramsci, the interregnum was the period between the dying of one society and birth of another, a time marked by morbid symptoms today, the symbol of this morbidity, has been clearly evident in the explosion of various right-wing political agendas, support for dictators, authoritarian populisms, and reactionary ethno-religious nationalisms that would not simply thwart social change but seek restore a «lost society» that more likely than not exists more as a social imaginary than a historical reality. The mobilizations of various authoritarian reactionary. can be seen as the morbid symptoms of transition-as attempts to stop if not reverse decline and perhaps the most blatant trope of decline has been the support for Donald Trump.

Crises of legitimacy

One of the major factors giving rise to the research and theoretical agendas of the early Frankfurt school was the rise of fascism in Germany precipitated by the economic collapse, the failure of the enfeebled Weimar government to be able to contain the crises of a global depression, and the failure to develop a cohesive value system in face of a society driven by economic political crises. In response to growing unemployment, hyperinflation and economic uncertainty, there was a great deal of fear, anxiety and anger that was often expressed in violent street confrontations between left and right parties and organizations. These conditions led to the ascent of the Nazi party, the election of Hitler as Chancellor, passage of the enabling acts, and establishment of the third Reich¹. Moreover, a crucial aspect enabling the mass embrace of fascism, was the prevalence of authoritarianism among many sectors of the German population including the more affluent segments of the working classes. Authoritarianism, rooted in psychoanalytic theory, was seen as a particular character trait disposed to submission to leaders who promised to return their obedience with his love, while at the same time authoritarians, demanded obedience and compliance from subordinates ranging from employees to wives to children. Moreover, an essential part was «authoritarian aggression», sadomasochistic impulses in which hostility was directed toward outsiders, especially typically weak and marginal Others, outsiders and nonconformists seen as «culprits» blamed for adversities and responsible for Germany's hardships and hence they became targets for aggression. Moreover, long-standing traditions of anti-Semitism based on unscrupulous merchants and parasitic bankers fueled the embrace of fascism. This anger was also directed toward the Communists, and extended to the incompetent political elites of Weimar and ultimately to the French and English «victors in World War I. In face of the various crises, there was widespread fear, anger, and uncertainty that stoked underlying authoritarianism and in turn disposed the submission to Hitler, the «powerful leader,» the combination of King Kong and the corner barber, who represented the ordinary «people» while having the extraordinary power to affect social transformations primarily the restoration of a lost world that would alleviate their suffering. Economic factors do not explain award for Trump is him Trumpism for majority of his supporters. Following the early legacies of critical theory, especially Fromm, Adorno and Horkheimer, looking at the authoritarianism of

¹ It should be noted, that the communist and socialist parties were actually more numerous than the Nazis, but they were unable to work together to defeat the Nazis who gain control of the Reichstag with 34% of the vote.

the lower middle classes, together with support from other classes including segments of the working classes, as well as the economic elites the thought that they could «control» Hitler, after the post 1929 economic crises, the charismatic appeal of Hitler, the inspiring mass spectacles of power and the use of the new mass media enabled the Nazi party to come to power².

For Habermas [Habermas, 1975] this history, itself the context of his youth, informed his notion of «legitimation crises,» as those times when the «steering mechanisms» of the society, dominant social institutions of modern societies, the economy, the polity and the cultural system seem to fail and people lose confidence. The economic system is expected to provide decent standards of living for everyone, the government is expected to enact and sustain the policies that enable the economic system to produce and deliver its goods and services, as well as provide various benefits, secure justice for all etc., and finally the cultural system is expected to provide meaning, solidarity and social integration. Given what is been said before, it is evident that contemporary societies face a number of legitimation crises. But what is essential for Habermas, is that crises at the level of the system migrate into the «life world», the realm of experience, identity and emotions. As will be seen, crises at the level of system, are often experienced as various moral or emotional shocks, and when the typifications and routines of everyday life including the bases of self-esteem and recognition are challenged, we generally see very strong emotional reactions such as anger, fear, anxiety, often shame and humiliation, depression etc.

A great deal has been said about Trump to which I can add little that has not already been said. What needs further explanation, is how and why he could mobilize so many to join his cultlike base will maintain their devotion and loyalty notwithstanding his unscrupulous business practices, his sexual promiscuity and payments of hush money to models and porn stars, the convictions of many of his associates, etc. etc. but he was able to capitalize upon their anxiety over problematic privileged now endangered status, fear of collective demise, anger at various «enemies» and intense *ressentiment* for the self-serving elites in different to the interests of the «people». How did this happen? As suggested before, the starting place is the consideration of crises of legitimacy and the impacts upon identities as well as the various emotions aroused.

It was not the economy stupid!

Perhaps the first lesson taught in a statistics class is that correlation is not causality, more specifically, following the election of Donald Trump, enabled by electoral college after his very slim victories in states like Ohio, Pennsylvania and Michigan, various pundits and talking heads proclaimed that the adverse economic consequences of globalization, especially shuttered factories, declining towns and unemployment in the industrial states mobilized a discontented, economically frustrated working-class population to vote for Donald Trump. But in the weeks months and following year or so, careful analysis of the election results showed this was not the case at all and in fact

² This is not to suggest that Trump is a Hitler who had a strong party backing, support from many sectors of big capital (ThyssenKrupp, Siemens) a clear cut cohesive if disgusting ideology and talented administrative staff-important for all charismatic leaders. Donald Trump on the other hand as a series of episodic outbursts expressed in tweets rather than an ideology, a less than stellar staff, most of whom do not stay in office very long, and increasingly, many economic elites such as the Koch brothers, have withdrawn their support for Trump.

the economically distressed members of the white working classes voted for Hillary. Indeed the average Trump voter at family income of \$ 72,000 a year, about 50 % higher than the average American,. Moreover Trump carried the majority of white male voters making over \$ 100,000 a year. Thus the attempt to explain the election on the basis of economic hardship may have made good journalism. The day after the election, but was ultimately not well sustained by the careful analyses of the vote. What then led people to vote for Trump?

As been remarkably clear that the majority of Trump voters have been likely to be white people indeed he carried every white voting group except for college-educated women and he still got approximately 48 % of them. On the one hand this is not particularly surprising since it's been particularly clear, especially after 1964 when the Democrats passed the civil rights bill which led to a massive exodus of white people from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party, especially in the South. In 1968, with Nixon's «Southern Strategy,» not so subtly appealing to white racism, the Republican Party has primarily supported various shades of racism ranging from white Southerners celebrating the Confederacy a. k. a. white privilege to Northern working-class whites fearing the losses of their white privileges. While most Republican candidates have cloaked the racist appeals in more neutral terms such as «state's rights,» or abolishing «welfare queens,» or the more pejorative notion of «takers» rather than makers, for reasons to be noted, more overtly so than other Republican candidates, Trump was very open and upfront about his racism, xenophobia, and disdain for Moslems³.

PART I: WHY TRUMP

The central argument of this essay, is that save for a small number of rich elites who stood to profit from Trump selection, economic factors as such had little role in the wider support for Trump. The journalistic explanations that globalization, financialization, economic stagnation etc. led the working classes to support Trump was not substantiated by empirical research indeed, those segments of the working classes that did feel economically distressed, were more likely to support Clinton. What factors might then explain the support for Trump? For many of his voters, the support was not simply preferences for certain policies regarding regulations, tariffs taxation or investments as such, **but intense, emotionally driven passions such as fear of change, disdain of racial, ethnic or cultural minorities, and anxieties in face of the challenges to heretofore privileged white identities.** When that privilege is typically invisible and becomes challenged, such challenges to ones very self are generally marked by intense emotional reactions. Otherwise said, Trump's support was driven more by emotions social psychological factors than economic factors. What were these factors? As will be suggested, racism, authoritarianism, and *ressentiment* may be analytically distinguished, but in practice markedly overlap. These long-standing aspects of American society, erupted in the 2016 election to embrace Trump's reactionary populism, ironically enough, a populism seemingly directed toward other elites, the «swamp,» seen as illegitimate pretenders to leadership who indeed betrayed the

³ His father, using government finance programs, built a number of apartments but subsequently faced a number of discrimination charges. As the young Donald began his real estate career, much of his work was telling minorities, especially African-Americans, there were no vacancies.

interests of the «people» by supporting tolerance, inclusion, and «political correctness» that together with changing demographics, threatened the demise of white racial privilege if not the ending of the «legitimate» domination of a «superior» race. Indeed this fear of decline has a long history, as NYT columnist Charles Blow put it, citing a good deal of social science/demographic evidence, «white extinction anxiety, white displacement anxiety, white minority anxiety... is the fear and anxiety Trump is playing to. *Politico Magazine* dubbed Trump «Pat Buchanan With Better Timing.»⁴ Similarly, as Chauncy de Vega, noting Achen and Bartels put it:

Donald Trump has *not* dramatically remade the Republican Party, nor has he caused a mass exodus by its more «sensible» voters. Trump is in fact the leader of the Republican Party; his values, policies and ideas are shared by a large majority of Republican voters. Because Republicans and the broader right-wing have spent at least five decades nurturing both dog whistle white identity politics and overt racism, as well as other culture war issues, their voters are a movement beholden to a type of political religion⁵.

As a quasi-religion, providing a meaningful, privileged collective identity for a particular community that is closely intertwined with worldviews of social or moral superiority in which are sustained by a variety of emotional gratifications, challenges and contestations to the core of one's self, one's identities elicits intense anger fear and quite often, disposes reactionary social mobilizations to defend challenged identities.

Racism: With the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 many of the heretofore racist elements of the Democratic Party, including segments of the Dixiecrats, quickly abandoned the Democratic Party to the Republican Party. The contemporary Republican Party, once the party of abolition and emancipation, was markedly transformed by the massive influx of racist bigots. As this took place, the Republican intellectuals, having read Gramsci, understood the necessity of waging a «war of position» to ultimately gain political power and part and parcel of that agenda, was to incorporate heretofore apolitical religious conservatives as well as racist elements, often overlapping groups, into the party and this would be evident in the 1968 election. Fast forward to 2008. For many such groups, the election of Barack Obama, the first African-American president, was experienced as a «moral shock» in so far as many thought of America as a «white Christian country.» This was first evident with the birth of the Tea Party shortly after the election. While they claimed to oppose government spending, especially on social programs dependent on taxation, TEA standing for «taxed enough already» their early rallies publicly proclaimed their intense racism and the disdain for Obama notwithstanding that his actual neoliberal/imperialist policies were little different from those of Bill Clinton. Within a short time, given financial and organizational support from various conservative/libertarian organizations, the Tea Party soon learned to mute and disguise their racism. Thus for example, their disdain for government provided health care insurance, was less based on any kind of cost-benefit analysis, but the feeling that such benefits, would go to lazy, undeserving minorities who did not deserve largess

⁴ <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/24/opinion/america-white-extinction.html> (accessed September 8, 2018).

⁵ DeVega, C. Pain Is the Reward: Here's What Pundits Keep Getting Wrong about Trump and His Supporters. <https://www.salon.com/2018/04/13/pain-is-the-reward-heres-what-pundits-keep-getting-wrong-about-trump-and-his-supporters/> (accessed September 7, 2018).

from the government. Many Tea Party members were quite perplexed when reporters informed them that their Medicare and Social Security payments were provided by the government but of course they claimed entitlement to these entitlements

Trump's political career began with his avid support of «birtherism,» an elaborate conspiracy theory, a hoax in which claimed that Obama was born in Kenya rather than Hawaii and was thus disqualified from running for president. Trump gained a sizable audience and following from his relentless pursuit of Obama as a Kenyan, Muslim, terrorist, communist, fascist, as well as an elitist who preferred arugula to head lettuce. And if that wasn't enough, there were suggestions that he was not qualified to get into Harvard, and even less qualified to become the editor of the *Harvard Law Review*. And finally, he had been a community organizer before becoming a law school professor. Thus he was seen as not only a «foreigner,» an outsider, but a leftist radical and intellectual a combination especially disdained by authoritarians (see below). Notwithstanding the display of his birth certificate as well as birth announcements in Hawaii in newspapers, Trump and his followers persisted in supporting that hoax for about five years-it created what would become his base

Authoritarianism: As was noted, one of the lesson contributions of the Frankfurt School to political psychology, was the salience of authoritarianism as influencing political values and behaviors. One of the central aspects of this authoritarianism was intolerance toward others, especially racial, ethnic and/or religious minorities. One of the most important indicators of this prejudice was the extent to which Hitler, building upon long-standing traditions of anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria, was able to parlay this intolerance into an «explanation» of how and why Germany had been «stabbed in the back» by traders from within and kept impoverished by unscrupulous bankers and — in both cases, the Jews were blamed for German adversities. Besides the Jews, the Communists, and indeed Slavs in general were deemed enemies and in so far as many Jews had been communists, socialists, and/or labor leaders, they were readily cast as the scapegoats for German adversities. Racism in America has served number of important, not the least of which was to provide cheap labor whether as agricultural or artisanal slaves, sharecroppers or menial workers. Further, racism, which provided poor whites with seemingly higher status and certain privileges, served to divide poor black and white populations into warring factions that would prevent their joining together in common struggle against the elites who profited from the subordinate status of both groups. Further, racism has allowed various politicians to blame their own «failed policies» on racialized Others and not only deflect responsibility for failure, but mobilize support for themselves by castigating others. In ways reminiscent of what was called the «mass psychology of fascism» [Reich, 1980] authoritarianism was more predictive of support for Trump than income or education. A great deal of evidence has shown the Trump's appeal was clearly to his blatant support for racism, xenophobia, homophobia, Islamophobia, that together with his clear embrace of intense hostility toward «enemies» and justifiable exclusion or torture of these «enemies» clearly appealed to the authoritarianism of his followers.

Smith and Hanley [Smith, Hanley, 2018] were able to include a few questions tied to authoritarianism into the American National Election Study. Authoritarianism turned out to be highly correlated with aspects of intolerance such as racial, ethnic and/or

religious prejudices or homophobia. In their analysis of the 2016 election returns, authoritarianism was highly correlated with support for Trump whose supporters voted for him **mainly because they shared his prejudices, not because they're financially stressed**. It's true, as exit polls showed, that voters without four-year college degrees were likelier than average to support Trump..[their] authoritarianism and their prejudices. Indeed, Trump supporters were less likely to be the economically distressed white working classes portrayed in the media. The fundamental point here is that while people may assume a variety of identities, occupational, political, religious or aspects of lifestyle and/or cultural preferences, any particular identity formation may be associated with various levels of authoritarianism. Thus a churchgoer may very well be an evangelical Christian or perhaps a Unitarian-but denominational preference, e. g. religious identity, very between strongly authoritarian or many cases antiauthoritarian.

It should be noted to other qualities tend to be associated with authoritarianism include conformity, anti-intellectualism and the devotion to «strong» leaders. Authoritarians generally prefer action to thought, and more often than not, their thoughts tends to disdain ideas, ambiguity or critique instead, authoritarianism is highly associated with either/or black white /thinking dogmatism and in turn tends to be impervious to change. Much like the embrace of Hitler, Trump, seemingly the successful and powerful businessman, was seen as a strong leader, a powerful hero with «extraordinary» skills who would do battle against the corrupt and illegitimate elites and thwart various interlopers and «enemies» but whose levels of discourse, expressions of violence, plebeian tastes in food and culture, and disdain of «political correctness» made him appear as one of the «ordinary people,» the «working class» billionaire.

Privileged Identities: While to be sure, racism has long served economic functions first justifying slavery, then lower wages for minorities who at the same time typically face higher costs of living. The salient issue for today is less economic as such but rather psychosocial privilege-the advantage that a particular identity, in this case whiteness, bestows upon the person. Freud claimed that people wanted to be happy by realizing the «pleasure principle» ultimately based on the gratification of otherwise repressed and/or unconscious desires. For sociological purposes however, people generally wish to feel good about themselves and who they are, this may be called positive self-regard or self-esteem, positive recognition from others, a sense of dignity etc. Thus one of the more salient aspects of the support for racism, sexism, xenophobia etc. has been the preservation of heretofore status providing, privileged identities. One of the primary problems of having a privileged identity, is that its «benefits» are often quite invisible. As many scholars have reported, most of the white working classes, are oblivious to the various benefits their whiteness has bestowed whether access to education, union membership that often translates into employment, renting or buying housing and myriad other ways etc. Most workers today «feel they are struggling to get by and such struggles limit the capacity for empathy for minorities that have a much tougher time. Indeed, many actually believe that racial and ethnic minorities gain support from the government as a result of the policies of «corrupt» elites. Thus one piece of folklore spread by right-wing can conspiracy theorists had it that when undocumented workers crossed the Rio Grande, they were met by Obama's immigration

authorities, given green cards, cash, access to Medicare and jobs if they promised to vote for Democrats. And indeed, many Trump supporters believe this, much as strongly as they had believed Obama was a Kenyan, Moslem extremist⁶.

Thus it now becomes clear, that while many of the major factors leading to the embrace of Trumpism where the impacts of globalization and modernization, **it was not so much the economic consequences of neoliberalism and/or global markets, but the extent to which globalization has fostered a great deal of migration and immigration that has resulted in demographic change**⁷. Today, immigrant populations are less likely to move into the older « ethnic enclaves» of large, cities, but are much more spread out in the suburbs, exurbs, and even rural towns where as «outsiders» they are easily noted. Moreover, at the same time, minorities are more likely to be visible in mass media.. The primary consequence of migration based demographic change, coupled with greater birthrates among various minorities, indigenous or immigrant, has led to the greater visibility of various foreign and typically less «white» populations. Thus between a growing number of Moslem healthcare providers, Hindu technicians, or Asian engineers and shopkeepers, the hegemony of heretofore white privilege has been challenged. Meanwhile, globalization and the free flow of information on the Internet, has exposed large numbers of people to much broader worldviews and perspectives than has hitherto been the case for a variety of reasons, ranging from the normalization of what had been deviant in the 1960s, the extolling of drugs and sex and rock 'n roll has become normative as well as the growing embrace of racial/ethnic inclusion, feminism and gay rights especially among youthful voters. Many younger people, have moved away from institutional often authoritarian religions and this includes many youth from evangelical backgrounds who moved away from the small towns of their parents to larger cities in search of jobs-often attending colleges and universities in the process where they are exposed to a variety of critical disciplines (social sciences, philosophy) and alternative views. In short, the heretofore privileged white, male, Christian identity, values, and lifestyles and have faced major demographic and cultural challenges and indeed, **these heretofore privileged identities, values and lifestyles are facing demise. This is the basis of political and cultural legitimization crises of today in which changing demographics and cultural change threaten the demise of certain «traditionally» privileged identities and certain corrupt, «illegitimate» elites are responsible. Such challenges and contestations of esteem granting identities evoke fear, anxiety anger and in turn reactionary leaders and politicians use these fears, anxieties and pains to manipulate certain populations into granting them support that ultimately used to advance the economic agendas of the elites and ironically indeed harms the very supporters that voted for them.** For

⁶ There is indeed an extensive social psychological literature showing how people believe «facts» if not rumors which supports their own identities and biases e.g. confirmation bias, while disregarding information inconsistent with their identities and values — disconfirmation bias. These two attitudinal factors constitute what is called «motivated reasoning» social psychological jargon to explain the people believe what they want to believe and go to great pains to keep facts, evidence and expert opinion from influencing their worldviews [Mooney, 2012].

⁷ It should be pointed out, that there were much greater rates of immigration to the United States in the late 1800s early 1900s, but most of these immigrants, not only tended to be Europeans however they were labeled, but most of these groups were concentrated in a few highly industrial cities and generally less visible to the population as a whole.

example a considerable number of Trump supporters would be adversely impacted by the ending of ACA (Obama care).

Consider only for example how many conservative governors have rejected federal government monies that would provide expanded health care services to many of the very people that support them while many such people are desperately needing better health care especially given the recent epidemics of opioid use. Insofar as many of the heretofore privileged white identities are highly authoritarian, these changes evoke levels of vitriolic hatred and intolerance, emotions which various political and/or cultural/religious leaders used to stoke the flames of anger and hatred, and such leaders, often cloaked in «populist» garb promise to avenge, punish and perhaps annihilate those corrupt and illegitimate elites seemingly to blame, and in the process restore a psychosocial *status quo ante* in order to draw support based on promises to restore a «community of memory» dwelling largely in a socially constructed imaginary of a lost «Golden age» rather than actual historical reality.

As is now quite evident, in much of the developed world, and even large segments of the developing world, these crises of political and cultural legitimacy have had a variety of emotional consequences which have prompted forces of reaction and the typical agenda of such reactionary forces has been the attempt to restore a «lost world» of the past⁸. And more often than not, this has led to the embrace of various reactionary movements and governments promising various authoritarian populisms, ethno–religious nationalisms and even neofascist mobilizations that would restore an often imaginary past and in turn create a glorious future. In such diverse countries as Russia, Turkey, Germany, or the United States, the nostalgic «yearning for yesterday» has disposed support for powerful leaders and parties that promised restoration. There are certain common patterns such as the support for the «strong leader», intolerance of democracy and the maintenance if not revival of religious nationalisms whether Russian Orthodox, evangelical Christianity in the US, or conservative Islam in Turkey that would restore a past greatness. This pattern has been most evident in the United States, where after a long period of decline following the embrace of neoliberalism, a growing right-wing coalition of billionaires, white nationalists and evangelical Christians enabled the Electoral College victory of Donald Trump a candidate supremely unqualified by virtue of personality, temperament, limited understanding of governance and indifference to facts/reality.

Otherwise said, and the heart of the present argument, is that the various authoritarian populisms, ethno-religious nationalisms and reactionary mobilizations, are basically attempts to preserve indeed restore a variety of heretofore identity-based privileges facing challenge and demise. Thus throughout modern history, we've seen various reactionary leaders and movements that would attempt to thwart social cultural change and return to that «better time». «The support for various types of authoritarian leadership is fueled by powerful emotions such that followers become impervious to any critiques or rational opposition to the policies of their «beloved» leader who would lead them to the «promised land» or at least the time of greatness.

⁸ In Marx's analysis of the coup of Louis Napoleon, he pointed out how the massive support by the French peasantry, was based on the restoration of the time when Napoleon Bonaparte gave peasants the land, but in the 40 or so years since, families grew, the land didn't, and the peasants faced hardships of mortgages and taxation.

Further fueling the anger and discontent that supports Trumpism, is the awareness of the extent to which segments of the more educated urban elites view the values and life styles and indeed racism and sexism and religiosity of the Trumpeters with disdain and condescension, if not ridicule and condescension. And surely when Hillary Clinton called these people a «basket of deplorables,» she indeed provided the perfect justification for these groups to loath the arrogance and condescension of her privilege and thus vehemently oppose her election. But this dialectic of educated elites vs less educated right, white populists has a long history (think Shay's rebellion, Whisky Rebellion, the Know Nothings and/or the KKK, etc).

Losing Our Country: One of the most common themes, clearly resulting from the various factors mentioned, has been the lamentation over the loss of one's country, America is in decline losing ground, people are feeling «left behind,» often while other groups, perhaps immigrants or minorities, are seen as making progress, and thus a major appeal of Trump was the promise of restoration, to «make America great again.» Or was it to «make America white again.» But it should be noted, that the major concern of this «decline» was not the general economic stagnation for most Americans, nor even the growing inequality, and surely not the decaying infrastructure, but the loss of what seem to be the heretofore dominant American culture of white, Christian, heteronormative superiority challenged by the growing diversity that has come from recent immigration, especially immigrants and refugees whose skin may be darker, and may perhaps embrace religions such as Islam or Hinduism. At the same time, we've seen more and more media and mass culture in which the stars, starlets, and talking heads called newscasters are no longer only white men, but increasingly include racial minorities and women. Finally, for most Americans, there has been a waning of racial and/or ethnic intolerance, and the growing embrace of various aspects of multiculturalism ranging from friendship and marriage, to taste in music, food and even mass culture. As will be noted, these trends are considered anathema, indeed the basis of «racial genocide» for certain reactionary groups. At one of the few generalizations we gain from the history of reactionary movements has been that they generally tend to restore a past that provided them with a sense of superiority but to a large extent that past exists more in their collective imaginary than actual history

Ressentiment: For Nietzsche [Nietzsche, 1994], *ressentiment* had a specific meaning that is not simply resentment, as disdaining or not liking something or someone, but an intense loathing toward the elites and the desire for revenge. *Ressentiment* is intertwined with envy a, desire to have for that which is disdained; repressed feelings and desires generate certain values that might be understood as «reaction formations.» [Scheler, 1972]. For Nietzsche, *ressentiment* the Jewish priestly class toward the Romans generated a transvaluation of ethical values. To summarize and simplify, the once powerful warrior- conquerors of Israel, had themselves become conquered by the Roman warriors who personified power, wealth and free sexuality. The now subjugated Jewish priestly class then embraced a «herd mentality» of subjugation that valued obedience, conformity, humility, poverty and asceticism-that were hence seen as «morally superior» to the wealth and power of the Romans, this provided a compensatory *ressentiment* for the now subalterns of Rome, that provided compensatory «status» of «moral superiority» rooted in revenge and envy. The rich and powerful Romans,

with their unbridled sexual indulgences might enjoy this life, but come the next world, they would burn in Hell for all eternity. Meanwhile the once humble, obedient ascetic Christians, created virtues out of necessity, extolling supplication, conformity, poverty and sexual frustration would spend eternity listening to angels playing harps. Surely an adequate compensation for lives of. Nietzsche's

... account of the conflict between the Roman warrior class and the Palestinian priestly class is reminiscent of Hegel's master/slave dialectic and prefigures Freud's use of mythological models of conflict. Scheler's phenomenological approach to resentment aims at an understanding of the condition as a whole and in its constitutive elements. Scheler was concerned with grounding an a priori axiological ethics through a phenomenological typology of the field of affectivity. An account of the heart would not be complete without an investigation of the corrosive condition of resentment... The members of the noble Jewish class, meanwhile, felt their powerful positions unjustly usurped by their conquerors, but were unable to openly retaliate. The Jewish priests did not simply resign themselves in humility to their inferior social position. **They had a deep sense of self-esteem and pride, and this fueled a simmering rage at their situation and hatred toward their conquerors**⁹.

Nietzsche's theory of resentment, a conservative if not reactionary politics of wrath and blame toward progressive politics in which the weak sought revenge indeed punishment of blameworthy elites provides powerful insights as to why major segments of the Trump coalition, fearing the demise of heretofore privileged identities, react with rage toward «establishment» elites and thus strongly identify with Trump's expressions of anger, vitriol, and disdain toward certain elites, while at the same time, he gives license for expressing aggression directed toward «marginal» racial, ethnic, religious, or gendered groups. The desire for revenge that provides compensatory self-esteem whether through the embrace of fundamentalist religion/evangelical Christianity, and/or «white nationalism,» identities and values that often overlap. Trump's disdain for establishment elites, Democratic or Republican, struck resonant chords with a vast number of American who felt they were being «left behind», their «country» and former privileged as white, and/or Christian and often male are facing a variety of challenges. What the illegitimate elites see as «good,» tolerance, inclusion charity, support for the sick, weak, or poor become seen as «bad» evil, and challenging the heretofore privileged identities. Reactionary politics, would or at least should a politics of inclusion and compassion and celebrate heretofore privileged identities based on religious morality, racial superiority racially and economic status. Following nature than the reactionary politics of Trump, authoritarian populism, can be seen as it would be «slave revolt» that would displace the weak, corrupt, seemingly «good» with the strong, the powerful and superior identities of privilege. Nietzsche strongly disdained equality and democracy, as especially evident in socialism and anarchism rooted in the spirit of revenge and hatred of the powerful that express the slave morality. characterized by *ressentiment*—hatred of the powerless seeking revenge and punishment against the powerful elites. It is an entirely negative sentiment, rejecting what is life-affirming, disdaining what is different, what is 'outside' or 'Other'. Resentment is characterized by an orientation to

⁹ Murray Morelli, Elizabeth, *Ressentiment and Rationality*. URL: <https://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Anth/AnthMore.htm> (accessed will September 7, 2018).

the outside, rather than the focus of noble morality, which is on the self. It is of course ironic that the authoritarianism of Trump supporters in fact sustains a herd mentality that disdains expressions of nonconformity and individuality.

Pseudo-populism

Populism is generally considered as a popular uprising, a political expression of «ordinary people» who constitute a morally benevolent force or are opposed to the policies and practices of certain elites that are perceived as corrupt, illegitimate, and self-serving whose policies benefit themselves and/or their class rather than the people who elect them and typically pay their taxes. Most traditional populisms have promised and sometimes delivered actual material benefits to the people who've been victimized by unscrupulous, illegitimate elites who've used their positions to enhance their own self interests. Some of the well-known populists in American history, Andrew Jackson, Huey Long, notwithstanding being racists, nevertheless provided jobs and benefits to many people. But what becomes evident today, is, in the words of observer Chauncy De Vega, is that the Republican Party has become quite psychopathic, perfecting «political sadism,» oblivious to the feelings of others (especially the pains the policies cause, they disregard for social norms and obligations, have a low frustration tolerance and propensity to express aggression, they have a limited capacity to experience guilt, while prone to lying and deception, and impulsiveness¹⁰. Republican leadership under Trump provides what historian Timothy Snyder has called «sado populism» in which the «people», and that means many of the people who supported Trump, are less likely to get benefits from government largess, in fact Republican policies are likely to hurt many of their supporters who stand to lose many of the very benefits and safety nets that they already possess — not the least of which are subsidized healthcare, food stamps, rent subsidies etc¹¹. But instead of gaining material benefits from chumps agendas,, they get to express their anger; they can openly display their racial hatreds, ethnic animosities, their antipathy toward foreigners and contempt for women seeking inequality. Collectively, these groups, and their movements toward equality and justice threaten the increasingly untenable privileged albeit conservative identities. **And above all, Trump supporters get to articulate their *ressentiment* to the corrupt and illegitimate elites who have pushed the various programs and agendas that have challenged and indeed undermined the heretofore privileged, conservative racist, sexist, Islamophobic and/or homophobic identities.**

[S]uch a voter is changing the currency of politics from achievement to suffering, from pain to gain, helping a leader of their choice establish a regime of sadopopulism. Such a voter can believe that he or she has chosen who administers their pain, and

¹⁰ DeVega, C. Pain Is the Reward: Here's What Pundits Keep Getting Wrong about Trump and His Supporters. <https://www.salon.com/2018/04/13/pain-is-the-reward-heres-what-pundits-keep-getting-wrong-about-trump-and-his-supporters/> (accessed September 10, 2018).

¹¹ As many have noted, many extremely rich corporations such as Walmart, Amazon, rely upon government programs such as food stamps and Medicare to supplement the meager wages they pay so the result is that the taxpayers, subsidize the vast wealth of such corporations-which is clearly why they fall so much money to Republican candidates likely to oppose raising minimum wages, support single-payer health care, paid parental leave etc. notwithstanding the unprecedented wealth of these corporations, and their upper echelon executives, their unbridled greed has led to vast suffering and deprivation by close to half of the population in which everyday survival is often thwarted by various hardships.

can fantasize that this leader will hurt enemies still more. ... If people who support the government expect their reward to be pain, then a democracy based upon policy competition between parties is endangered¹².

Thus to see such movements as populisms, movements in which the morally «decent» ordinary people seek actual benefits denied by incompetent, corrupt and/or illegitimate elites, is to cloak these various racist, ethnocentric, xenophobic, homophobic Islamophobic movements and tendencies in a mantle of respectability in which the «ordinary» and decent people, often God-fearing, seek to restore identities of privilege facing demographic, cultural and indeed political challenges.

PART II: THE TRUMP VOTERS

We should first note, that unlike many parliamentary democracies, the United States has a two-party system and while in practice, both parties have traditionally supported neoliberal capitalism, and American imperialism and interventionism, there are major differences between the parties based on their constituencies that constitute various often diverse constituencies that nevertheless joined together within political parties. One major difference between the parties, is that the Republican Party, tends to be overwhelmingly white whereas the Democratic Party includes a wider range racial and ethnic differences. Democrats are more likely to be urban, especially in coastal cities, a bit more educated and quite often, possessing a bit more cultural capital. But for the present purposes, the first point that needs to be noted is that one difference between the parties, **is that Republicans tend to be more tribal that is are more likely to vote for whoever is on the ticket.** Democrats, are more likely to stay home rather than vote for an unfavored candidate. And surely as we know, this was the case in 2016 as a number of Democrats, especially minorities, and especially young voters disdained Hillary Clinton and stayed home. Many of these constituencies were highly disappointed that the elites who control the Democratic Party ensured that Bernie Sanders did not get the nomination. Thus even though there are more Democrats than Republicans, Republicans, typically older, more affluent, and as was said more tribal, are simply more likely to vote than are Democrats, and likely to vote for the standard-bearer of their party regardless of who he (and so far it's always been a he) may be. But this tells us little and we need to more carefully examine the Trump coalition.

The economic elites: Although the economic elites are not just the billionaire classes, typically supported by a large number of affluent upper-middle-class executives, professionals and/or entrepreneurs who typically support the conservative economic agendas of the elites¹³. While small in numbers, with vast economic resources, millionaire and billionaire classes have a great deal of power in shaping the outcomes of elections and influencing the policies of the elected— who begin to organize for their reelection on the first day of taking office. And while it is true that in 2016, the Clinton campaign outspent the Trump campaign a good part of his victory was nevertheless

¹² DeVega, C., Pain Is the Reward: Here's What Pundits Keep Getting Wrong about Trump and His Supporters. <https://www.salon.com/2018/04/13/pain-is-the-reward-heres-what-pundits-keep-getting-wrong-about-trump-and-his-supporters/> (accessed September 9, 2018).

¹³ This is not to suggest that all upper income upper income professionals and executives support conservative agendas, viz. varies by race, ethnicity, region and particular industries etc.

based on support of various conservative if not right wing economic elites, aided by the legacy of Citizens United, that, provided a great deal of cultural and financial support. Moreover, Trump was helped by the propaganda of the many right-wing media outlets, not least of which, was Fox News. A long tradition of political analysis, perhaps beginning with James Beard's analysis of the Constitution that permanently empowered the economic elites, or the more recent work of) political policies and agendas are largely shaped by the economic elites, and the majority of such elites, tend to be in privileged economic positions/industries that support Republican candidates. As Gillens and Page [Gillens, Page, 2014] put it:

Multivariate analysis indicates that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence. **The results provide substantial support for theories of Economic-Elite Domination and for theories of Biased Pluralism**, but **not** for theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy or Majoritarian Pluralism.

Thus as has been clearly evident, the majority of economic elites tend to be conservative right-wingers who typically support Republicans, regardless of their actual qualifications, and while Trump had no qualifications for the office, he did push through boilerplate Republican issues supporting the economic elites such as a massive tax cut that increased the wealth of Republican contributors- while attempting to cut or reduce social entitlements such as healthcare, reduce if not eliminate a variety of costly regulations regarding pollution, while eliminating raises for federal workers. Thus for the economic elites, the support for Trump, running as a Republican, was primarily based on economic self-interests¹⁴. What is of course amazing Trump was able to gain their votes without alienating what is a traditionally Republican moderate constituency -but it was quite evident that economic self-interest, trumped buffoonery and the majority of white men making over hundred thousand dollars a year to support Trump. Moreover, Trump was helped by the propaganda of the many right-wing media outlets, not least of which, was Fox News.

Evangelical Christians: A major constituency in the Trump coalition, consisted of the evangelical Christians, also known as the «Christian right.» Although not clearly tied to class position as such, most come from the lower middle classes, especially the older, more likely rural or exurban people, especially in the South, who strongly embrace a variety fundamentalist beliefs perhaps beginning with creationism, the inerrancy of Scripture, the complementary relationship of men and women in so far as men are clearly «superior» to women, and what becomes extremely important in understanding American politics, the persistence a religious ideologies in shaping notions of America as a Christian country (see [Langman, Lundskow, 2017]). In 2018, 17% of the electorate were evangelical Christians and 81% of them supported Donald Trump, a thrice married man, notably highly promiscuous, proudly Friday himself as a «pussy grabber,» little schooled in religion, long involved in shady, irregular and perhaps indeed clearly

¹⁴ It should be noted however that not all economic elites are indeed Republicans, certain industries such as banking and finance, real estate, construction, energy, and defense are predominantly Republican while much of mass media/entertainment, digital media companies (Silicon Valley) are more likely to be predominantly democratic or in some cases libertarian.

fraudulent business practices, was hardly the exemplar of Christian virtues such as honesty modesty, humility, charity and compassion. How then could be embraced by the various leaders of evangelical Christianity such as Hagee, Graham, Falwell, Dobson etc.? His candidacy and election were seen as the «will of God.» Simple, ever since the 60s, the Republican Party, in need of an expanded constituency, embraced conservative Christians, and promised to maintain their values that might include prayer in the school, opposition to abortion, opposition to sex education, opposition to teaching evolution, in exchange for their votes-needed to gain electoral victories for their own agendas more closely tied to increasing the wealth of their major supporters. In other words, while most of the Republican leaders couldn't give a rat's ass about creationism, abortion or sex education, the evangelical vote became necessary to win elections determining tax policies, tariffs, business regulations etc. that in the past several decades, have led to the growth of the practically unprecedented levels of economic inequality seen today when three men have as much wealth as half of the American population, and mega corporations with offshore incorporation and banking, pay little or no taxes. As has been noted, evangelicals have been promised ending abortions what they got was unemployment, there were promised to sustain prayer in the schools but they got were business closings, they were promised gay marriages would be outlawed what they got was the acceptance of gay marriages together with massive tax cuts undermining roads, education, and infrastructure in general. As the Christian historian John Fea [Fea, 2018] argued Evangelical support for Trump was based on fear of demise, retaining if not gaining their cultural and economic power, and finally, the nostalgic yearning to return to a past time, when power was unchallenged Thus the election results showed that Donald Trump, much like most other Republican candidates, played the emotions of the Evangelical Right like a fiddle and secured their votes and loyalty that helped put him in the White House.

Alt Right and the White Nationalists: How could slavery be justified in a nation founded upon the notion that «all men were created equal and endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights.» This was simple, African slaves were not considered fully human and given their subordinate positions economically, culturally, politically, they could not be defined as «men» entitled to certain guaranteed rights. Thus these economic and political factors gave rise to racism, initially based on their economic position and exclusionary politics, but even more salient, the privileges of whiteness became an essential moment of identity within the slave states such that while the majority of white men who themselves tended to be relatively poor, nevertheless, their white skin gave them a modicum of «superior» status and «inclusion» into the dominant and superior race that was so powerful, that most were willing to give life and limb to the Confederate cause. The loss of the Civil War did little if anything to abate that racial prejudice and indeed, created the groundwork for the fear of what was earlier noted «race genocide» that is the demise of the superiority of whites whether numerically culturally or both. As a long history of racial intolerance in America must consider such diverse expressions as the KKK, or the eugenics movement. Fast forward to today.

While as has been noted, Trump supporters were not necessarily economically distressed as such, mobilizing against neoliberal globalization as such. Rather, the social and political changes of the last few decades, from the time the civil rights bill

was passed until the election of an African-American president, tendencies toward greater inclusiveness, have been perceived by many as threatening, undermining preservation of white racial identity located in a white majority nation. These changes, previously noted as leading to fears of «racial extinction» have generated a great deal of fear among the many whites regarding the future of their white superiority-fears that are well grounded in demographic and cultural change that suggest the erosion if not end of white supremacy and the various aspects of social life dependent on the «unquestioned» power and status of whiteness that provides certain groups with a variety of social and personal gratifications.. It is because increasingly evident that white people will be a minority of the population of the United States within a few decades Thus we see growing racism, intensified by the election of an African-American president, as well as anti-immigrant sentiments — especially Mexican refugees- and only a wall can stop their influx and the «threat» to white nationhood. The oppression and exclusion of inferior groups, racial, ethnic, religious or sexual minorities is based on the fear that white extremists articulate when they proclaim «they will not be replaced.»

Closely tied to the fear of demise, is of course anger not simply to various racial or ethnic minorities, but to the corrupt, liberal elites who of tolerated, if not encouraged the growing diversity-while they remain luxurious enclaves. While typically these elites tend to be Democrats dependent on minority votes, the illegitimate and corrupt elites would include Republicans like George Bush with a Colombian wife and he dared to speak Spanish or even Mitch McConnell who married a Chinese woman¹⁵. Thus today, while racism harkens back to earlier eras, we see an ultraconservative mobilization that sees itself as the «genuine» right wing, unlike various pretenders, often themselves elites, who are indifferent to the preservation of white privilege-indeed many of these elites favor liberal immigration policies that would bring in «darker» peoples to work in various high-tech/finance industries.

The alt.right whites nationalists that include elements of the KKK, various white supremacists, neo-Nazis etc. constitute the very core of the Trump base, attending the rallies for Trump, demonstrating against minorities, immigrants refugees etc. are not located within a particular class, but draw upon a number of classes especially the historically reactionary petty bourgeoisie and segments of the working classes (see below). Moreover, they are often well-funded by some of the more extremist elements among the economic elites. But that said, in general, they do tend to be less educated, more likely rural or exurban, and while found throughout the United States, they do tend to be more concentrated in the southern and western states.

The Petty Bourgeoisie: In his analysis of the French peasant farmer support for Louis Napoleon, Marx demonstrated how the petty bourgeois (lower middle classes) were typically the bearers of reactionary ideologies disparaging both communists and financial elites, and likely to support «seemingly powerful leaders.» Furthermore, the French peasant farmers, took great pride in the French armies and hailed their imperialist exploits especially in Africa and Asia. I Marx called this pattern «Bonapartism», which has served as a template for understanding later 20th century right wing if not

¹⁵ This reactionary nationalism often become so bizarre that there was a criticism of both John Terry and Milt Romney who dared speak French. Dare we be reminded that it was French arms, French money, and French military acumen that enabled the 13 colonies to win their independence!

fascist movements. But the essential point is that the petty bourgeois classes, small landowners, merchants, artisans and lower echelon state officials, tend to be highly authoritarian and provide the bulk of support for various conservative often religious political parties. Moreover, the petty bourgeois classes, well economically quite similar to the working classes, tend to have «status anxiety» in that their small businesses often artists services, are little able to withstand economic vagaries. The lower echelon state officials, typically identify with the institutions of the government for which they work, and thus typically embrace authoritarian support for power. It might also be noted that in the United States, various real estate and construction companies, including providers of building materials, tend to embrace conservative if not reactionary political agendas, disdaining any forms of government regulations, the gladly accepting government subsidies, and/or various entitlement programs, especially welfare and government provided health care. Finally, the lower middle classes, generally tend to be more religious, and members in the more conservative if not fundamentalist, religious denominations especially Southern baptism and/or more conservative Catholic churches in some it is no surprise that the white petty bourgeois classes tend to support Republican Party candidates and indeed, strongly supported Trump

It is clearly evident that none of these three constituencies can by themselves win elections and despite contradictions between free trading elites and protectionist nationalists,, hedonistic secular's and pious Christians, Trump as billionaire, Trump as «working-class» everyman, and finally Trump as God's choice to restore virtue, was able to unite these constituencies to gain his Electoral College victory. But that said, his «victory» did require the votes of workers and flippers (Obama voters who flipped to Trump).

The Working Classes: It is of course true the large number of working-class whites supported Trump and most of the research has shown that they pretty much embraced his racism, sexism, xenophobia etc. But this is hardly a new pattern and was already clear in the 1960s when in face of the civil rights movement and civil rights legislation, an antiwar movement, a counterculture, and a sexual revolution, many working-class whites began to move away from union backed Democratic to the Republicans. With civil rights legislation eroding the racial bases of employment, union membership, and ending banking practices from redlining to discrimination, the working classes began to fear the economic consequences of racial equality beginning with fears of job loss, declining values of homes in integrated neighborhoods, resentment school integration often based on busing,. This often led to protests and/or relocations to wider, more Republican suburbs. Meanwhile, many working-class families had either relatives who had been in the service are quite often currently fighting in Vietnam whose patriotism, strongly supported American imperialism. For these families, the antiwar movement, was seen as a movement of traders and/or communists, who managed to avoid fighting to defend peace, freedom, justice and the American way-little understanding that that «American way» meant that corrupt right-wing dictators would be supported against the wishes of their peoples, millions of people would die, and billions of dollars would be squandered. At the same time that the antiwar movement grew, so too did a counterculture flourish, rejecting traditional and often religiously based norms of sexual behavior, modesty and drug use in which a large segments of youth extolled «drugs and sex and

rock 'n roll» all expressions of rejecting traditional authority. Again this disposed the embrace of law and order Republicans as was clearly seen in the support for Ronald Reagan who would clampdown on the «unruly» college students. Finally, just as there was resentment toward civil rights and racial equality, there was a similar resentment toward feminism, gender equality, and women's rights, including the right to own their own sexuality and reproduction. Thus feminism in the sexual revolution further fueled the movement of working-class whites to the Republican Party and with the exception of the 2008 election, they have remained a bastion of Republican support.

Obama switchers: One of the more interesting although small constituencies of the voters were the several million voters, flippers, who had supported Obama in 2008 and/or again in 2012 and yet supported Trump in 2016. Just who were they? In an exhaustive analysis of election data, Kliman [Kliman, 2018] concluded that «With respect to several key factors—immigration, authoritarianism, and attitudes to blacks, women, and Hispanics— their responses were far closer to those of other Trump voters, and often even further to the right». He reiterated what is been said before, that support for Donald Trump was more likely based on his racism, sexism and xenophobia, Trump's support for white typically Christian typically male privilege garnered their votes rather than actual rather than a rebellion against neoliberalism, and/or a reaction to economic distress. Most of these Obama voters, had been Republicans and what needs to be explained is why they had supported Obama in 2008/2016. As Kliman put it, «a large share of Obama-Trump voters were willing to vote for Obama when race was not a salient election issue but the overwhelming issue in 2008 was the problematic survival of the American economy after having been botched up so badly by GW Bush., The Obama to Trump voters lined up behind white supremacy when the prospect of its triumphant restoration became a serious possibility. Indeed as Kliman argued, much of the working class support for Trump had already been prefigured in the support for George Wallace and his clearly racist agenda embraced by the industrial working classes of the North, long before neoliberal globalization, robotics and financialization adversely impacted American workers.

PART III: POST TRUMP AMERICA

Truly, these are the times that try men's souls at least those men and women who have souls and capacities for caring, sharing empathy and decency-hallmarks of democracy, equality and freedom. Many scholars, journalists, and indeed politically concerned people raise questions about the future of democracy and ask if Trump represents a major step on the way to and especially authoritarian, if not perhaps quasi-fascist 21st-century America. Can it happen here? Since the Trump election, there is been a renewed interest in Sinclair Lewis' 1935 novel, *It Can't Happen Here*. As the New York Times appraisal notes:

The novel's Everyman candidate, Berzelius (Buzz) Windrip, is hardly a perfect stand-in for Trump. A creature of the Great Depression and a Democrat, Windrip sweeps into office as a quasi-socialist, promising \$ 3,000 to \$ 5,000 for every «real American family.» His movement style evokes the hyper-militarization of Nazi Germany rather than the anonymous jabs of the Twitter mob...Still, there are enough points of resonance to cause palpitations in the heart of any anxious 21st-century liberal. Like Trump, Windrip

sells himself as the champion of «Forgotten Men,» determined to bring dignity and prosperity back to America's white working class. Windrip loves big, passionate rallies and rails against the «lies» of the mainstream press. His supporters embrace this message, lashing out against the «highbrow intellectuality» of editors and professors and policy elites. With Windrip's encouragement, they also take out their frustrations on blacks and Jews¹⁶.

Sociology, perhaps social science in general, is an analytic approach not a basis for prediction that is for astrologers and tarot card readers. But we can identify certain trends that seem likely. Perhaps the most notable, has been the dialectical consequence of Trump and his unique brand or should we say blend of unbridled capitalism benefiting a small elites, racist white nationalism that includes a opposition to immigrants and refugees, especially those with darker skins and especially those who may embrace other religions besides Christianity, and finally evangelical Christians who seek to maintain America as a «Christian country preserve fundamentalist beliefs, the inerrancy of Scripture, patriarchy etc. A significant segment of this group believes that these are the «last days» and sometime in the very near future, we will experience the rapture, the return of Jesus and all good things.

But history acts and strange ways, indeed, as suggested by Hegel and Marx, dialectically, and this movement of history suggest that ironically, Trump and Trumpism may have very well mobilized a variety of progressive movements that will render the Trump era an unpleasant memory. To be more specific, as was argued at the beginning of this essay, we're at a moment of transition, an interregnum as Gramsci put it, but it is increasingly clear, that Trump has catalyzed a variety of progressive social movements that can be seen as «wars of position» that would transform society not simply return society to the *status quo ante*, but lead to a more progressive, inclusive, democratic society in which to heretofore privileged identities of race, religion or ethnicity have been relegated to the dustbins of history and a newer, more egalitarian, humanistic society emergent. Is this a fantasy? Perhaps not If for example we go back to the original Gilded Age of the late 1800s and early 1900s, also a time of extreme inequality, racism, and anti-immigrant, often anti-Semitic sentiments, there were also major mobilizations of various left progressive forces, including of course feminism, pacifism, and indeed unionization socialism and communism. The result of course with the election of Roosevelt who repaid the support of the progressives by markedly change the direction of the country in a variety of beneficial ways, job programs, Social Security, rebuilding the infrastructure, support for artistic creativity, and providing a democratic alternative to the authoritarian indeed totalitarian movements of communism and fascism.

So too do many of the conditions of today portend a radically different future.. More specifically, we see today a variety of progressive trends beginning perhaps with the more tolerant and inclusive society in which racism was on the wane-one reason for the growing intensity of the waning population of racists. Similarly, evangelical Christianity, is in rapid decline especially insofar as its population is not only aging, but the conditions of its appeal, face demise-many young people who grow up in such families have abandoned the faith.

¹⁶ Reading the Classic Novel That Predicted Trump. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/17/books/review/classic-novel-that-predicted-trump-sinclair-lewis-it-cant-happen-here.html> (accessed September 9, 2018).

Perhaps the most important moment of the progressive response to Trump and Trumpism, has been the widespread and indeed enduring support for Bernie Sanders who declares himself a socialist and what is especially remarkable is that today, the majority of the young people, prefer socialism seen as a system of greater equality, of more generous social benefits, of more meaningful work that provides dignity. Bernie Sanders, remains highly popular, for many segments of the country he is an inspiration and indeed, the Bernistas represent a large and growing challenge to the centrist, neoliberal domination of the Democratic Party. As is quite evident, in the midterm elections of 2018, unprecedented numbers of women, minorities and openly LGBTQ candidates are running for office. These progressive candidates are seeking more equitable society with a more democratic, representative governance not beholden to corporate money and influence.

As has been earlier suggested, we are now in a period of transition, an interregnum, not only a time of «morbid symptoms» but a time in which we see nascent and indeed growing progressive «wars of position» that would portend a saner, more decent, democratic, inclusive egalitarian society extolling freedom and creativity. How ironic that the catalyst for myriad of progressive movements of today would be Donald Trump! As Hegel put it:

History thus corroborates the teaching of the conception that only in the maturity of reality does the ideal appear as counterpart to the real, apprehends the real world in its substance, and shapes it into an intellectual kingdom. When philosophy paints its grey in grey, one form of life has become old, and by means of grey it cannot be rejuvenated, but only known. The owl of Minerva takes its flight only when the shades of night are gathering¹⁷.

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¹⁷ Hegel, G. *The Philosophy of Right*. URL: <https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/pr/preface.htm> (accessed September 10, 2018).

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МОНИТОРИНГ МНЕНИЙ

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МОНИТОРИНГ МНЕНИЙ: СЕНТЯБРЬ — ОКТЯБРЬ 2018

Результаты ежедневных опросов «ВЦИОМ—Спутник». Метод опроса — телефонное интервью по стратифицированной двухосновной случайной выборке стационарных и мобильных номеров объемом 1200 респондентов. Выборка построена на основе полного списка телефонных номеров, задействованных на территории РФ. Данные взвешены на вероятность отбора и по социально-демографическим параметрам. Максимальный размер ошибки с вероятностью 95% не превышает 3,5%.

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8—14 октября 2018 г.

Показатель одобрения деятельности президента составляет 63,8%. В рейтинге доверия политикам верхнюю строчку по-прежнему занимает Владимир Путин (36,8%). Электоральный рейтинг партии «Единая Россия» составил 36,7% — среднее значение по данным с 8 по 14 октября.

Одобрение деятельности государственных институтов (% респондентов)

	27. VIII— 2.IX.18	3—9. IX.18	10—16. IX.18	17—23. IX.18	24—30. IX.18	1—7. X.18	8—14. X.18
Президент России	65.2	63	64	63.7	63.2	64,6	63.8
Председатель Правительства России	34.2	33.8	34.3	33.9	34.2	35	35.6
Правительство России	40.7	40.1	40.7	40.3	41.2	41.5	41.3

* По вопросу «Вы в целом одобряете или не одобряете деятельность...?» (закрытый вопрос, один ответ по каждому институту)

НЕодобрение деятельности государственных институтов (% респондентов)

	27. VIII— 2.IX.18	3—9. IX.18	10—16. IX.18	17—23. IX.18	24—30. IX.18	1—7. X.18	8—14. X.18
Президент России	25.3	26.7	26.4	26.3	26.8	26.1	26.6
Председатель Правительства России	50.3	50.1	49	50.8	49.8	48.6	48.5
Правительство России	45.3	44.9	44.2	45.5	44.5	44	44.6

*По вопросу «Вы в целом одобряете или не одобряете деятельность...?» (закрытый вопрос, один ответ по каждому институту)

Доверие политикам (% респондентов)

	27. VIII— 2.IX.18	3—9. IX.18	10—16. IX.18	17—23. IX.18	24—30. IX.18	1—7. X.18	8—14. X.18
Путин В.В.	37.5	35.9	37	37.2	36.8	37	36.8
Шойгу С.К.	15.3	14.7	14.9	16.1	15.7	15.2	15.3
Лавров С.В.	11.4	12.1	11.4	11.2	13.5	11.7	11.9

	27. VIII— 2.IX.18	3—9. IX.18	10—16. IX.18	17—23. IX.18	24—30. IX.18	1—7. X.18	8—14. X.18
Жириновский В.В.	10.3	9.8	9.5	9.5	10	9.6	9.5
Медведев Д.А.	7.6	7.3	8	7.3	6.8	7	7.9
Зюганов Г.А.	7	7.6	6.9	7.3	7.9	6.7	6.7
Грудинин П.Н.	3.4	3.4	2.8	2	2.8	2.8	2.9
Мионов С.М.	2.2	2.2	1.9	2	2	1.8	1.8
Навальный А.А.	1	0.9	1.1	1	1	1	1
Собчак К.А.	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2

*По вопросу «Все мы одним людям доверяем, другим — нет. А если говорить о политиках, кому Вы доверяете, а кому не доверили бы решение важных государственных вопросов?» (открытый вопрос, любое число ответов)

Недоверие политикам (% респондентов)

	27. VIII— 2.IX.18	3—9. IX.18	10—16. IX.18	17—23. IX.18	24—30. IX.18	1—7. X.18	8—14. X.18
Жириновский В.В.	28.8	28.2	29.3	28.6	28.7	28.2	29.3
Медведев Д.А.	26	26.5	25.5	27	26.3	24.8	25.4
Зюганов Г.А.	12.1	12.6	12.3	12.5	12.6	12.2	11.7
Собчак К.А.	3.8	3.5	2.9	2.9	2.8	3.2	2.9
Путин В.В.	5.4	5.9	5.7	5.8	6.2	5.4	6.4
Навальный А.А.	2.1	2	2.5	2.2	2.2	2.1	1.9
Мионов С.М.	2.8	3	2.8	3	2.6	2.6	2.8
Грудинин П.Н.	0.9	0.9	0.7	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6
Шойгу С.К.	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.5	0.5
Лавров С.В.	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2

*По вопросу «Все мы одним людям доверяем, другим — нет. А если говорить о политиках, кому Вы доверяете, а кому не доверили бы решение важных государственных вопросов?» (открытый вопрос, любое число ответов)

Электоральные рейтинги политических партий (% респондентов)

	27. VIII— 2.IX.18	3—9. IX.18	10—16. IX.18	17—23. IX.18	24—30. IX.18	1—7. X.18	8—14. X.18
«Единая Россия»	36.3	35.3	36.6	35.5	34.5	34.9	36.7
КПРФ	14.7	16.2	17	17.5	17.6	15.8	16.4
ЛДПР	11.3	11.2	10.8	11.2	12	12.6	11.4
«Справедливая Россия»	6.2	6.7	6.2	5.6	6.1	6.3	5.7
Непарламентские партии	8,3	7.8	8,3	8,3	8.1	8.4	8.4
Приду и испорчу бюллетень	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.7	1.4	1.5	1.6
Затрудняюсь ответить	13.5	13	11.4	11.8	12.2	11.7	11.4
Не стал бы участвовать в выборах	8,3	8.5	8.5	8.4	8.1	8,8	8.4

*По вопросу «Скажите, пожалуйста, если бы в ближайшее воскресенье состоялись выборы в Государственную Думу России, за какую из следующих партий Вы бы, скорее всего, проголосовали?» (закрытый вопрос, один ответ)

СОЦИАЛЬНЫЕ И ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКИЕ ПРОБЛЕМЫ

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СУДОСТРОЕНИЕ В РОССИИ: ПЕРСПЕКТИВЫ РАЗВИТИЯ

3 сентября 2018 г. по заказу Центра политической конъюнктуры

Россияне считают развитие российского судостроения актуальным для нашей страны (79%). Большинство наших сограждан (88%) поддерживают предложение обязать российские компании заказывать строительство судов исключительно на российских верфях. Основным ожидаемым эффектом от принятия такого решения является развитие российской экономики (87%). При этом 86% респондентов придерживаются точки зрения, что государству необходимо создать привлекательные условия для размещения заказов на российских верфях. Локализацию производства на дальневосточной судовой верфи «Звезда» россияне связывают с появлением новых рабочих мест (57%) и улучшением социально-экономической ситуации на Дальнем Востоке (31%).



Рисунок 1. По Вашему мнению, является ли в настоящее время актуальным для нашей страны создание условий для развития российского судостроения или нет? (закрытый вопрос, один ответ, % от всех опрошенных)

Таблица 1. С Вашей точки зрения, приведет или не приведет в дальнейшем локализация на российских верфях производства оборудования для судов к следующим изменениям? (закрытый вопрос, один ответ по каждой строке, % от всех опрошенных)

	Однозначно да	Скорее да	Скорее нет	Однозначно нет	Затрудняюсь ответить
Развитие смежных отраслей экономики (металлургия, приборостроение, высокие технологии и т.п.)	49	39	4	1	7
Обеспечение независимости российской судостроительной отрасли от иностранных технологий	30	34	15	6	15
Выход России в число лидеров в области мирового судостроения	33	42	10	3	12



Рисунок 2. В настоящее время обсуждается вопрос о необходимости для российских компаний заказывать строительство судов исключительно на российских верфях. Вы поддерживаете или не поддерживаете такое предложение? (закрытый вопрос, один ответ, % от всех опрошенных)

Таблица 2. **Вы согласны или не согласны со следующими утверждениями?**
(закрытый вопрос, один ответ по каждой строке, % от всех опрошенных)

	Полностью согласен	Скорее согласен	Скорее не согласен	Полностью не согласен	Затрудняюсь ответить
Размещение отечественными компаниями заказов на российских верфях будет способствовать развитию российской экономики	54	33	4	2	6
Государству необходимо создать привлекательные условия для размещения заказов на российских верфях	51	35	4	1	8
Отечественное судостроение не может конкурировать с зарубежным	13	18	30	25	15




Рисунок 3. На Ваш взгляд, какие основные эффекты следует ожидать от локализации производства на дальневосточной судовой верфи «Звезда»? (закрытый вопрос, не более трех ответов, % от всех опрошенных)

АЛКОГОЛИЗМ И КАК С НИМ БОРЬТЬСЯ

6 сентября 2018 г.

Проблема алкоголизма актуальна для многих в нашей стране (по признанию 37% опрошенных, в их близком окружении есть алкоголики). Чаще всего алкоголизм относят к категории болезней, требующих медицинского вмешательства (46%). Среди мер по борьбе с алкоголизмом наибольшей поддержкой россиян пользуется запрет на продажу спиртного гражданам, не достигшим 21 года (58%), пропаганда здорового образа жизни (54%) — с 2005 г. (39%) актуальность последней заметно выросла, а также запрет рекламы алкоголя (49% в 2018 г. — против 57% в 2009 г.).



Рисунок 4. Есть ли среди Ваших близких, знакомых алкоголики или нет? (закрытый вопрос, один ответ, % от всех опрошенных)



Рисунок 5. Как Вы относитесь к алкоголикам? (закрытый вопрос, один ответ, % от всех опрошенных)



Рисунок 6. Как Вы лично оцениваете принятые в нашей стране законодательные меры, направленные на уменьшение потребления алкоголя? (закрытый вопрос, один ответ, % от всех опрошенных)



Рисунок 7. Какие конкретно меры для борьбы с алкоголизмом Вы бы поддержали? (закрытый вопрос, любое число ответов, % от всех опрошенных)

БЕЗВРЕДНЫЙ АЛКОГОЛЬ: МИФ ИЛИ РЕАЛЬНОСТЬ?

6 сентября 2018 г.

Результаты опросов фиксируют снижение уровня потребления алкоголя в нашей стране: если в 2009 г. о том, что вовсе не пьют спиртного, сообщали 26 % россиян, то в 2018 г. — уже 40 %. Снизилась доля тех, кто считает, что все виды алкоголя в той или иной степени негативно влияют на здоровье людей — с 80 % в 2017 г. до 55 % в 2018 г.



Рисунок 8. Скажите, употребляете ли Вы алкогольные напитки, и если да, то как часто? (закрытый вопрос, один ответ, % от всех опрошенных)




Рисунок 9. За последний год Вы стали употреблять алкогольные напитки больше, меньше, или сейчас употребляете так же, как и год назад? (закрытый вопрос, один ответ, % от тех, кто употребляет алкогольные напитки)



Рисунок 10. Существует точка зрения, что есть безвредные дозы алкоголя, которые неопасны для здоровья. Согласны ли Вы с этим или нет? (закрытый вопрос, один ответ, % от всех опрошенных)



Рисунок 11. Что это за виды алкоголя? (открытый вопрос, до пяти ответов, % от тех, кто согласен с тем, что существуют неопасные для здоровья дозы алкоголя)

ПОКУПКИ, КРЕДИТЫ И ВКЛАДЫ: СБЕРЕГАТЬ ИЛИ ТРАТИТЬ?*21 сентября 2018 г.*

Более четверти граждан (29%) оценивают нынешнее время как благоприятное для крупных покупок. При этом большинство опрошенных (69%) по-прежнему не считают возможным в настоящее время рассматривать вопрос о получении крупных займов. Две трети россиян (65%) ориентированы на сберегательное поведение — они говорят о необходимости сократить повседневные расходы.



Рисунок 12. Как Вы думаете, сейчас — хорошее время или плохое время, чтобы делать крупные покупки, или нет? (закрытый вопрос, один ответ, % от всех опрошенных)



Рисунок 13. Как Вы думаете, сейчас — хорошее время или плохое время, чтобы брать кредиты, или нет? (закрытый вопрос, один ответ, % от всех опрошенных)



Рисунок 13. Как Вы считаете: сейчас лучшее время для того, чтобы делать вклады в банки, или для того чтобы забирать деньги из банков? (закрытый вопрос, один ответ, % от всех опрошенных)



Рисунок 14. Как Вы считаете: сейчас лучшее время для того, чтобы тратить, или для того, чтобы сберегать? (закрытый вопрос, один ответ, % от всех опрошенных)

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ЧТО ЧИТАЮТ РОССИЯНЕ?

8 сентября 2018 г.

Чаще всего россияне читают новости в социальных сетях (39%) и в СМИ (38%). Каждый третий опрошенный (34%) за последнюю неделю читал художественную литературу. Профессиональную и научную литературу читают 30% наших сограждан. Четверть опрошенных (25%) следят за блогами и популярными статьями в интернете.



Рисунок 1. Что из перечисленного Вы читали за последнюю неделю?
(закрытый вопрос, до пяти ответов, % от всех опрошенных)

ПРОСТОРЫ ИНТЕРНЕТА: ДЛЯ РАБОТЫ ИЛИ РАЗВЛЕЧЕНИЙ?

17 сентября 2018 г.

На сегодняшний день доля интернет-пользователей в России довольно высокая — 81% наших сограждан с той или иной периодичностью пользуются интернетом. Прежде всего наши сограждане пользуются интернетом по работе и учебе —

44 %. Большой популярностью пользуются и медиаресурсы, содержащие музыку, фильмы, книги (42%). В топ-3 наиболее распространенных видов интернет-активности также входит использование электронной почты — 37 %.



Рисунок 2. Пользуетесь ли Вы интернетом, и если да, то как часто? (закрытый вопрос, один ответ, % от всех опрошенных)



*Рисунок 3. Как часто Вы совершаете следующие действия в сети интернет?
(закрытый вопрос, один ответ, % от тех, кто пользуется интернетом, представлены ответы респондентов, кто совершает действия в интернете практически ежедневно)*

ТОП-МЕНЕДЖЕРЫ РОССИИ: ВЫСОКАЯ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬ И ЭФФЕКТИВНОЕ УПРАВЛЕНИЕ

12 сентября 2018 г.

Абсолютное большинство россиян (94 %) слышали слово «топ-менеджер». По мнению 32 % опрошенных, главными качествами, которыми должен обладать топ-менеджер, являются грамотность, образованность и компетентность. В числе прочих качеств топ-менеджеров россияне назвали коммуникабельность (15 %) и порядочность (14 %).



Рисунок 4. Вы когда-нибудь слышали такое слово «топ-менеджер»? Если да, то знаете ли Вы, кто такие топ-менеджеры, или нет? (закрытый вопрос, один ответ, % от всех опрошенных)





Рисунок 5. Топ-менеджеры — руководители высшего уровня в коммерческих организациях, которые ежедневно несут ответственность за эффективное управление этими организациями.

Как Вы считаете, какими главными качествами обладают успешные топ-менеджеры?
(открытый вопрос, до трех ответов, представлены ответы, названные не менее 1% респондентов, % от всех опрошенных)



- Любой человек может стать ТОП-менеджером, развивая в себе необходимые качества
- ТОП-менеджерами могут стать только те люди, которым изначально, с рождения присущи определенные качества
- Затрудняюсь ответить

Рисунок 6. Как Вы считаете, развивая в себе необходимые качества, любой человек может стать топ-менеджером, или топ-менеджерами могут стать только те люди, которым изначально, с рождения присущи определенные качества? (закрытый вопрос, один ответ, % от всех опрошенных)



Рисунок 7. А как чаще всего обычные управленцы становятся топ-менеджерами (руководителями высшего уровня) в нашей стране? (закрытый вопрос, один ответ, % от всех опрошенных)



Рисунок 8. Как Вы считаете, что отличает особо успешных топ-менеджеров (управленцев высшего уровня) коммерческих организаций от менее успешных? (закрытый вопрос, до восьми ответов, % от всех опрошенных)




Рисунок 9. Кого из российских топ-менеджеров (руководителей высшего уровня коммерческих организаций) Вы считаете наиболее успешными? (открытый вопрос, до трех ответов, представлены ответы, названные не менее 1% респондентов, % от всех опрошенных)

MIGRATION

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Th. Faist

IMMIGRATION INTO EUROPEAN WELFARE STATES: HOW CONFLICTS AND INEQUALITIES ARE (RE)PRODUCED

IMMIGRATION INTO EUROPEAN WELFARE STATES: HOW CONFLICTS AND INEQUALITIES ARE (RE)PRODUCED

ИММИГРАЦИЯ В ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЕ ГОСУДАРСТВА ВСЕОБЩЕГО БЛАГОСОСТОЯНИЯ: КАК (ВОС)ПРОИЗВОДЯТСЯ КОНФЛИКТЫ И НЕРАВЕНСТВА

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Abstract. Market liberalization in the EU serves as a basis for class distinctions among migrants, while restrictive immigration policies help in constructing certain immigrant culture(s) as a threat to homogeneity and welfare state solidarity.

Аннотация. Либерализация рынков Европейского Союза служит основой для классовых различий мигрантов, в то время как ограничительная иммиграционная политика способствует конструированию образа определённого

Over the past few decades, the grounds for the legitimization of inequalities have shifted. Ascriptive traits (heterogeneities) have been complemented by the alleged cultural dispositions of immigrants and the conviction that immigrants as individuals are responsible for their own fate. Such categorizations start by distinguishing legitimate refugees from non-legitimate forced migrants. Another important issue is the alleged illiberal predispositions of migrants and their unadaptability to modernity. Politics and policies seem to reward specific types of migrants and refugees, exclude the low- and non-performers in the market, and reward those who espouse liberal attitudes. In brief, it is a process of categorizing migrants into useful or dispensable.

Keywords: welfare state, market liberalization, populism, migration, inequalities

ных иммигрантских культур как угрозы однородности и солидарности государства всеобщего благосостояния. За последние несколько десятилетий основания для легитимации неравенства изменились. Аскриптивные черты (неоднородности) были дополнены предполагаемыми культурными диспозициями иммигрантов и убежденностью, что иммигранты как отдельные лица несут ответственность за свою судьбу. Дифференциации начинаются с отделения законных беженцев от нелегальных вынужденных переселенцев. Другой важный вопрос — сомнения в предрасположенности мигрантов к либеральным ценностям и в их приспособленности к жизни в современной Европе. Политика и политики, по-видимому, отдают предпочтение определенным типам мигрантов и беженцев, исключают слабых и нероботоспособных, вознаграждают тех, кто поддерживает либеральные ценности. Одним словом, это процесс разделения мигрантов на полезных и ненужных.

Ключевые слова: государство всеобщего благосостояния, либерализация рынка, популизм, миграция, неравенство

The increased perception of growing forced migration across the world, and the influx of migrants and asylum seekers into European welfare states have placed the implications of cross-border mobility on the political agenda once again. Once cross-border migrants have made it into the territory of liberal states, there is a paradox between efforts adhering to human rights on the one hand and those controlling the migrant population on the other hand. This has been called the 'liberal paradox' [e.g. Hollifield, 2004]. Reinforced border controls and the externalization of control through 'remote control' of immigration countries in emigration countries — in the case of EU member states in North and West Africa, for example, ensures that this liberal paradox is not activated, at least not to the full [Faist, 2018a].

At first sight, this insight could also apply to what I would call the 'welfare paradox', which holds that there is a tension between social rights for all citizens in national welfare states on the one hand and the deregulation of social and labour rights and

standards as part of a liberalizing global economy on the other. One may surmise that a decrease in immigration leads to fewer forced migrants competing with established non-migrants for public services and jobs. Yet the depiction of (forced) migrants as exploiting generous welfare states and competing in labour markets does not necessarily depend on high and increasing numbers of mobile border-crossers. There is no empirical evidence that migrants have competed with non-migrants with respect to economic resources over the past three decades [Faist, 2018a].

Restrictive policies in themselves, such as trying to keep migrants from reaching the shores of Europe, harden the image of migrants as potential economic competitors. Most of the opposition to asylum-seekers in Europe nowadays comes from those authoritarian political forces who openly advocate the exclusion of “others”, for example, right-wing populist parties. In a nutshell, the externalization of control has a clear effect on the liberal paradox: if migrants do not make it into the immigration countries and/or if migrants can be expelled because their fundamental human rights can be taken care of someplace else (in countries of origin and transit), the state does not need to address politically this unwanted and unwelcomed forced migrant “surplus” population. With respect to the welfare paradox, the effects turn out to be more ambiguous. More restrictive migration control will even feed the culturalization of forced migration, defining forced migrants as the “other” and as a threat. It also leads to portraying ever more categories of asylum-seekers and migrants as illegitimate refugees and undeserving recipients of social rights.

One may suppose that, however unintentionally, remote control contributes to the securitization of migration control (that is, the perception that migrants are a security threat, physically and to the welfare state), and — very important — does not necessarily assuage the feelings of threat exploited so skillfully by various political parties and movements across Europe and North America. Moreover, as events in recent years seem to suggest, in extending control afar and thus minimizing the number of migrants arriving, the externalization strategy has not helped to convince EU member states to cooperate in the distribution of the initial costs of protecting refugees. Also, instead of living up to human rights laid down in the Geneva Refugee Convention, most European states have tightened restrictions on admission and declared most forced migrants as “economic refugees”, “bogus asylum seekers” and “illegal migrants” [Faist, 2018b].

Political Efforts to Address the Liberal Paradox

European governments have engaged in strategies of migration containment, based on an enhancement of the partnership between Europe and Africa and aimed at reducing inequalities and creating enticements for migrants to stay in their countries of origin. One of the main motivations of international organizations such as the World Bank, supranational entities such as the European Union (EU), national states or (International) Non-Governmental Organizations to sponsor economic development via financial remittances of migrants is to reduce the volume of cross-border migration from the global South to the global North, for example, from Africa to Europe. Over recent years politicians across Europe have often claimed that higher levels of economic development (measured by per capita income and/or increased human development symbolized by lower infant mortality and higher rates of literacy) would eventually lead

to a decrease in international migration. What is more important, the emphasis of the EU and its Member States has been on security aspects. Their support of governments in Africa has led to securitization of migrants, meaning that routes through regions such as the Sahara have become more dangerous not only for those migrants on their way to Europe but also intra-African migrants. The Sahara, for example, has turned into a “mass graveyard” [Brachet, 2016]. This means that the routes of cross-border mobility, not only across the Mediterranean, have turned into humanitarian nightmares [cf. Cuttitta, 2017].

But even if economic development cooperation was seriously applied, there are doubts as to its consequences. The “inverted U-curve” suggests that it is not the poorest countries not the poorest segments of the population which are the most likely to move across national borders. Migration scholars, however, insist that — while this expectation may be borne out in the long run, considering demographic transitions and economic transformations — increased economic development correlates highly with increased international migration, expressed in concepts such as the “migration hump” or the “inverted U-curve” [Martin, Taylor, 1996]. As the latter term indicates, emigration is relatively low from regions with low or high levels of income whereas it is higher in those from an intermediate range. Think of countries such as Turkey or the Philippines which are sort of middle income countries when viewed globally and which have experienced relatively high rates of out-migration over the past decades. Nonetheless, seen in the long run, this is true: higher levels of economic development work to decrease emigration rates somewhat. Although creating jobs points to an important driver of migration, it is not a panacea because it does not address the underlying root causes of cross-border migration from the global South to the global North which consists of political and economic structural inequalities. It is the continued relevance of past and present colonialism and imperialism which are setting the stage for cross-border migration from the global South to the global North.

Hierarchies among Migrants: Controlling Access to Social Rights

When it comes to the European welfare states as such, there is a clear hierarchy between various types of migrants with respect to legally sanctioned access to social rights and services [Dörr, Faist, 1997; Sainsbury, 2010]. At the top tier are those migrants who are now sedentary. This is so because it usually takes a while to get full residence and employment rights for EU citizens in other member states. The second tier is composed also of EU citizens in other countries but those who could be called circular migrants. Often, the rules regulating the transfer of contributions are complex. In short, this setup favours one-time migration, not repeat migration across the borders of EU member states. In the third tier we find non-EU citizens, that is, extracomunitari who, as a rule, do not enjoy freedom of movement and have limited access to labour markets. Politically, this freedom has been rejected by critics to mean the free movement of unemployment and poverty. In the fourth and lowest tier are those who have no legal(ized) residence and or work status.

Also, language matters in the (re)production of hierarchies among these four migrant categories. The EU calls the movement of Member State citizens mobility, whereas those of third countries are deemed to constitute migration [Faist, 2013]. In a similar

way, the research literature speaks of high skilled workers of companies posting their employees abroad as expatriates and not as migrants.

Given this hierarchy of (non-)citizen access to social rights and services in the EU, it is essential to look at the underlying causes for conflicts over transnational social rights. Where social protection and migration are concerned, there is at present no prospect of harmonization of status between third-country citizens and EU citizens, because national welfare states are not prepared to relinquish control over their employment markets and social protection systems to supranational institutions.

Member states do have the ability to exercise control over individuals from third states, however. In this way, they use migration control and sometimes also naturalization policies vis-à-vis third-country nationals to regulate their respective labour markets and, hence, working conditions, wage costs and (social) citizenship.

This is easily illustrated by the example of freedom of movement for workers. Argentinians of Italian descent may adopt the citizenship of their ancestors; they then have the option of settling not only in Italy, but in any other EU member state. Survey evidence on naturalization processes in Italy finds that better opportunities for moving to other countries was the second most chosen reason for wanting to obtain Italian citizenship. In these and similar cases, other member states have no control over the mobility of workers according to citizenship. What constitutes an employee, for example, is increasingly defined and determined by the EU Commission. Member states do have the ability to exercise control over individuals from third states, however. In this way, they use migration control and sometimes also naturalization policies vis-à-vis third-country nationals to regulate their respective labour markets and, hence, working conditions, wage costs and (social) citizenship. Access to national citizenship thus becomes an indirect instrument for controlling labour markets and access to social rights.

Migration and the Rise of Populism in Europe: A Byproduct of Social Transformation

Against this economic and legal background, we have been experiencing a strong form of distrust and backlash against globalization, the political and economic elites, the EU, and we have seen the rise of populism in Europe over the last years. These developments can be perceived as constituting a threat to the stability and future of the EU, but also as an opportunity to reform the Eurozone and the European Union. As we have already seen, it is not economic issues which directly drive the perception of certain migrant categories as a threat but perceived threats to imagined cultural homogeneity and ways of life. Migration thus becomes culturalized in that migrants are also rejected because of their alleged cultural otherness. One of the most important contemporary expressions of culturalization and racialization in Europe has been right-wing xenophobic populism. After all, migrants and refugees are the most visible sign of the second modern globalization and the concomitant social transformation [cf. Beck, 1992]. Anti-immigration feelings among the dominant population's electorates have been fostered and exploited by parties mobilising tensions related to growing inequalities not only in material wealth but also power between "the elites" and "the people".

Certainly, anti-immigrant and more broadly anti-minority populism is related not only to migration but also to the loss of state legitimacy and, economically, nationalist protectionist trade and currency policies. We should not forget that right-wing pop-

ulism at first sight appear as a corrective to the current market liberalizing regimes in Europe. Yet such a view is deceiving. In reality, right-wing populists are the beneficiaries of market radical, neo-liberal policies of many member state governments [Faist, 2018a]. What is worse, right-wing populist parties such as the Front National in France, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany, the Lega Nord in Italy and the New Democrats in Sweden extend these same policies and couple them with nationalist, protectionist and xenophobic elements. There is no emergent left-wing populist alternative, except in nascent forms such as Podemos in Spain.

The Future of European Integration: New Narratives Needed

There is no counter-narrative to the right-wing populist view of the political world other than insisting on liberal values of democracies in Europe. Nowadays, no theory represents what socialism represented for the social question in the 19th and 20th Century. In contrast to the nineteenth century, alternative scenarios for the future seem to have multiplied. Socialist and communist theories — including Marxism, anarchism, syndicalism — have been complemented by, among others, postcolonial, postnational, feminist, and postmodern perspectives.

The pluralisation of theories help us to think of the (re)production of inequalities in more complex and adequate ways. In the classic version of the social question in the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries, this agent clearly was a (social) class — the proletariat, in opposition to the bourgeoisie. Nowadays, even in postmodern approaches, the concern with inequalities but also with capitalism and democracy has not disappeared. Nevertheless, in order to be useful for tackling the social question of today which has both a vertical and horizontal dimensions, one has to decouple class from the previously assumed sovereignty of allegedly objective economic interests. Yet this needs to be done without dissolving it into identity politics or reducing it into a concoction of language [Eley, Nield, 2007]. In order to defend the European project and to include a stronger social dimension, we need to avoid both a single-minded focus on identity politics and policies which usually end up in “us” vs. “them” politics and a backward-oriented politics on class to the detriment of other heterogeneities.

Migration is a crucial lens through which to explore today’s transnationalized social question. While mobilization along axes such as class continues, a seminal shift toward cultural heterogeneities and mobilization has occurred. This has not simply led to a displacement of class by status and cultural politics. After all, class politics is also built along cultural boundaries, such as working-class culture, or bourgeois culture. Nonetheless, the heterogeneities that are politicized in the contemporary period have somewhat shifted: cultural heterogeneities now stand at the forefront of debate and contention. Given the finding of this analysis that class inequalities is inextricably linked to those around culture, one should not speak of the declining significance of class but rather of the increasing significance of culture and status politics.

Conclusions: Understanding the Contemporary Conflicts around Migration

In sum, market liberalization, expressed for example in the economic integration of the EU, serves as a basis for class distinctions among migrants, or at least reinforce them, while securitization plays upon class distinctions in the effort to culturalize

them, and constructs certain immigrant culture(s) as a threat to homogeneity and welfare state solidarity. Over the past few decades, the grounds for the legitimization of inequalities have shifted. Ascriptive traits have been complemented by the alleged cultural dispositions of immigrants and the conviction that immigrants as individuals are responsible for their own fate. Such categorizations start by distinguishing legitimate refugees from non-legitimate forced migrants. Another important trope is the alleged illiberal predispositions of migrants and their unadaptability to modernity [Triadafilopoulos, Adamson, Zolberg, 2011]. Bringing together market liberalization and culturalized securitization, the current results could be read as Max Weber's Protestant Ethic reloaded (Weber 1980): politics and policies seem to reward specific types of migrants and refugees, exclude the low- and non-performers in the market, and reward those who espouse liberal attitudes. In brief, it is a process of categorizing migrants into useful or dispensable.

The future of this dynamic arrangement is highly uncertain. What can be observed is a trend toward both a de-politicized and a politicized development of heterogeneities in European public spheres. As to trends toward de-politicization, multicultural group rights, in particular, have been contentious and criticized as divisive. What we have seen is a displacement of multicultural language for a semantic of diversity or even super-diversity in market-liberal thinking and a semantic of threat in nationalist-populist rhetoric. Given this background, it is possible that market liberalization has also contributed to the decline of a rights-based approach and the rise of a resource-based approach. With specific regard to culture, we have seen a shift in policies from group rights to individual resources which can be tapped for enterprises, especially in the private sector. Incidentally, this has had implications for the transnational realm as well. For example, the World Bank has for years propagated a resource-based approach to link migration to development in casting migrants as development agents of their countries of origin through financial remittances [Faist, 2008].

While a de-politicization of cultural heterogeneities through diversity management may help to achieve partial equalities in organizations, multicultural policies are strongly linked to national projects. After all, such policies are meant to foster national integration and the social integration of immigrants as minorities into national life. Nonetheless, not only social rights but also cultural rights have been increasingly cast by international organizations as human rights which have a global reach but have to be implemented by national states to become effective. From all we know these policies are likely to remain the chief target of securitizing and xenophobic efforts. While the rhetorical criticism of multiculturalism is ever mounting and its rhetoric is pushed back by "liberal nationalism" [Levey, 2001], existing multicultural policies are not reversed to the same extent. This means that the political struggle is on-going.

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A RISE AND PROGRESSION OF MIGRATION AND ETHNICITY STUDIES IN JAPAN'S SOCIOLOGY

A RISE AND PROGRESSION OF MIGRATION AND ETHNICITY STUDIES IN JAPAN'S SOCIOLOGY

РАЗВИТИЕ МИГРАЦИОННЫХ И ЭТНИЧЕСКИХ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЙ В ЯПОНСКОЙ СОЦИОЛОГИИ

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Abstract. This paper aims to provide an overview of migration and ethnic studies in Japan's sociology and gives primary attention to some well-known sociological works. A dramatic change to the way ethnicity and related matters are understood in Japan occurred in the late-1980s due to a significant increase in the arrival of foreigners to the country. This encouraged the field of migration and ethnicity

Аннотация. В данной статье представлен обзор миграционных и этнических исследований в японской социологии. В середине 1980-х гг. в Японии произошла переоценка понятия этничности и связанных с ней категорий, что было связано с резким увеличением числа прибывающих иностранцев. Это способствовало росту исследований в области миграции и этничности, и се-

studies, and such research has flourished ever since. In what can be described as a 'new dawn' for this specific field of studies, there have recently been various examples of the ethnographic documentation of fieldwork conducted in Japan's ethnic communities. Prior to these more recent developments, the primary focus of migration and ethnicity studies was in the social lives of many Korean residents in Japan throughout their successive generations. However, the development of the study to focus upon 'newcomers' as newly arrived foreigners, has in turn brought about a sustained re-focusing upon the 'old-comers.' Now issues of migrant-intake have become public concerns, and the Japanese government's policies have recently become more open than those in previous periods.

Keywords: migration, ethnic studies, transnationalism, sociology in Japan, urban studies

годня они ведутся достаточно активно. «Новый рассвет» этого направления выражается в разнообразии этнографических полевых исследований, проводимых в этнических сообществах на территории Японии. До «рассвета» основное внимание уделялось социальной жизни корейских граждан в Японии на протяжении нескольких поколений. Но необходимость изучать «прибывших» иммигрантов вынудила переосмыслить фокус исследований давно «осевших» иностранцев. Сегодня проблемы приема мигрантов стали общественными, а политика японского правительства по этим вопросам — более открытой, чем прежде.

Ключевые слова: миграция, этнические исследования, транснационализм, социология в Японии, городские исследования

Introduction

The objective of this paper is to overview migration and ethnic studies in Japan's sociology. Of course, it will be difficult to summaries in one article to contain the diversity of approaches and views on migration and ethnic studies in Japan's sociological sciences. Thus, my intention in this paper is to review some distinguished and illustrious work of Japanese sociologists. When compared to some 'nations of immigrants' namely the United States of America, Canada, or Australia, immigration inflow to Japan is not so large in terms of numbers or proportions, but dramatic change has occurred in the mid-1980s. With this change migration studies in Japan have received new impetus.

From the late 19th century to the first quarter of the 20th century, Japan was a notable 'nation of emigrants'. The main destination was the United States of America, followed by Brazil. However, for Japan to acknowledge itself and be recognized abroad as a 'nation of immigrants' a transformation of national self-understanding had to take place, owing to various kinds of migrants-intake.

Deliberations of Ethnicity Issues

Before the mid-1980s, ethnicity and related matters of public interest — immigration, multiculturalism, and national identity — did not figure highly in the contributions

made by Japanese sociologists. But from the late 1980s, these concerns have become a major focus. By saying this, I do not suggest that ethnicity studies have only been around for 30 years, since Japan's cultural anthropology and sociology has been concerned with studies of race and ethnic community prior to that time. But with the *en masse* inflow of foreigners from the mid-1980s, many of whom have arrived from neighboring Asian countries, their presence in various inner-metropolitan areas of major cities has been a stimulus to migration and ethnicity studies, including empirical fieldwork research into the metropolitan concentration to these ethnic communities.

With the increase in foreign population since the 1980s, contemporary Japanese communities have grown diversity with respect to the socio-cultural backgrounds of residents. Such ethnically-related social change has not only fostered academic and scientific interest by sociologists, but also media coverage, and directional shifts in some local government policies. The question of whether the country is 'closed' or 'open', has long been part of political discourse. The idea of the 'closed country' can be traced back to the Edo period, when Shogunate, Iemitsu Tokugawa introduced the policy in 1633—1639, banning foreign relations with no permission for foreigners to enter and no Japanese allowed to leave the country. Of course, there were some trade-relations with China and the Netherlands [Mizukami, 2016], and thus it was actually not a totally closed country at all. But the act as a political intention was indeed effective until 1854, the year the Convention of Kanagawa, the Japan–US Treaty of Peace and Amity, was concluded.

And with that as 19th century background, we note that the debate has been still alive since the 1980s, as the 'foreigner population' has constantly increased. The issues as to how to accept or to restrict foreigners from coming into Japan has become, more and more, a public and political concern, and thus academics have also had to deal with the issues in their research and in their teaching. Some scholars have taken account of urban ethnic communities, others have focused upon national or local government policies in relation to foreign residents and their presumed place in Japanese society. Other studies have been concerned with migration and nationalism, and there are many other aspects of this significant development in Japanese social life that require careful empirical investigation.

Background Developments for the Formation of Ethnic-Communities

From the 1980s, Japan has increasingly become involved in the global migration movements and trends. The key factor for attracting migrant workers from foreign lands was Japan's so-called "Bubble Economy." It was in 1985 that an agreement was made by the Group of Five (United States of America, Britain, Germany, France, and Japan) in the face of the accumulating the United States trade deficit. This was the "Plaza Accord" signed at the New York Plaza Hotel. It changed the exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and the Japanese Yen, which was up-valued from 240 to 120 yen against the dollar. From then the Yen has been kept at that high value, and that was basic a factor to the subsequent induced migrant-inflow [Mizukami, 2009]. Changes we soon after apparent in several city centers. Tokyo, in particular, has become a center from where newly-arrived foreigners developed their ethnic businesses. And so, the establishment of ethnic communities and their settlement has become a major topic

for Japanese Sociology, though ethnicity studies had not been a chief academic focus before that time, as I have previously mentioned. These newly-arrived foreigners were designated 'newcomers,' in sociological research, in contrast with 'old-comers' who mainly consisted of Koreans, the most numerous of Japan's sub-population prior to the recent rapid increase of Chinese who now outnumber them, partly due to naturalization of Korean population.

In fact, this is part of a period in which we can say that sociological studies on nationalism, ethnicity, migration, and related issues, have flourished. This was Sociology's 'new age,' and these sub-disciplines became academic 'newcomers' to investigate the *en masse* inflow of newcomers into Japanese communities. This has also, correspondingly stimulated a previous topic of Japanese ethnicity studies, e. g., a reconsideration of the past treatment of, and prejudice toward, 'old-comers', those who are mainly of Korean background.

Some consistent patterns have been noted in the characteristics of these ethnic concentrations, in some inner areas where the newcomers from foreign lands have congregated, making use of the convenience of facilities for the single persons in taverns, public bathhouses, coin-laundries, small restaurants, and even ethnic grocery stores [Mizukami, 2008]. After the Second World War, various inner-city areas of Tokyo have revived with the emergence of black market activities arising from within the wide stretch of burnt-out ruins. Some studies have surprisingly disclosed that this development experience from the black markets is associated with the tendency of newcomers to prefer this site for their own residency.

In the mid-1950s, due to Japan's high economic growth, the sub-title of a White Paper gave expression to the emergent sentiment: 'Japan is no longer in the post-war [period].' The rapid post-war urbanization, notably with the construction of infrastructure, was supported by a domestic population movement from agrarian villages to metropolitan centers. There is a striking difference between Japan and other industrially developed countries, such as North America, and Western Europe which have also absorbed large scale foreign workers into their populations for their post-war economic growth. By contrast, Japan's major urban areas obtained the large-scale labor force in its own *domestic* population movements. Guided by the government's development policy, the influx of new settlers from northern to southern islands meant a strong gravitation to the Tokyo metropolitan area, especially from regions contiguous with its neighboring prefectures [Okuda, 1993]. "In periods of high economic growth, some inner areas of Tokyo attracted a number of single dwellers from the provinces, such as students and impoverished single workers. In addition, these areas have convenient terminal railway stations nearby, and sufficient low priced, if poor quality, accommodation" [Mizukami, 2008]. However, due to the oil crisis of 1973—1974, Japan's active domestic population movement halted, and for a time experienced stable economic growth. Following the suburban development, these newcomers from all over Japan moved to the outskirts of Tokyo, particularly when they married and formed households. With the development of suburbanization, various inner areas in Tokyo encountered problems associated with inner city decay and an aging population. But in the 1980s, a new pipeline of human movement has appeared from neighboring Asian countries [Okuda, Tajima, 1991].

Empirical Researches in Urban Sociology

Some inner areas have developed because of their attraction to young bachelors, and so convenient conditions have already existed for a new influx of single male newcomers from overseas. For example, there have been advanced shopping facilities with the availability of low-priced and dilapidated accommodation. Furthermore, the advanced businesses offer numerous jobs in service industries. They have brought about an expansion to the work-age population in what has hitherto been an older aged inner-city Tokyo [Mizukami, 2008]. In addition to these conditions, “the anonymity of the city has a positive effect for newcomers, in that their lives are not disrupted by any over concern from local residents with the newcomers from foreign lands” [Okuda, Tajima, 1991]. In particular, some areas, such as a part of the Ikebukuro district in central Tokyo, some shop-owners were from black market, building up their shops, and were not too concerned with the newly-manifested heterogeneity from foreign lands. The findings from Okuda and Tajima’s book [Okuda, Tajima, 1991]. showed that the majority of these foreigners found accommodation through their relatives and friends of the same ethnicity and, in most cases, several people lived together in a small room. This was the main complaint of the owners of houses because, according to the contract, the room was rented by one person, so the inhabitants were not allowed to live with others. On the other hand, the positive influence of these foreigners noted by the shop proprietors and house owners was the expansion of consumption and the occupation of vacant rooms. In fact, the decay in the inner-city area, the dilapidated in rental accommodation as well as the increase in the aged population, have been counteracting factors to accept the foreign newcomers. Especially, as the Ikebukuro area has been lacking a particular age group of the 20s and 30s, these ‘newcomers’ have covered this productive age group. As this kind of research was not known in Japanese sociology in the 1980s, such investigation must be seen as ground-breaking research.

And so such empirical research continues into the social life of Asian newcomers; the first research was conducted in 1988—1989, then further investigation was undertaken in 1994, clarifying the fact that the growth of diversified source countries in the region, with previous newcomers mediating between local communities and their newly arrived foreigners [Okuda, Tajima, 1995:18]. And there has been further research in 1997—1998, confirming that in the area the source countries of foreigners have further diversified [Okuda, Suzuki 2001]. After the initial research, Okuda and associates have extended the focus upon inner-city Tokyo, and intensive research was conducted in the Okubo area, in Shinjuku ward, too [Okuda, Tajima, 1993; Okuda, Suzuki, 2001]. In fact, since the late-1980s, various ethnographic studies into the communities of immigrants have been undertaken in major inner-city areas, where newly-arrived migrants tend to cluster around.

Strong and unambiguous evidence, demonstrating the popularity of the ethnic and migration studies, was found in an academic conference held in the mid-1990s. At June 1994, annual conference of *Nihon toshi shakai gakkai* (The Japanese Association for Urban Sociology), there were many presentations which chose both domestic and international ethnicity issues. Moreover, in 1995 the annual journal of the association took for its theme “The Contemporary City and Ethnicity.” Although the name of the

journal is “Annals of the Japan Association for Urban Sociology,” the Association highlighted the focus upon ethnicity in urban areas by making it the sub-title for the issue and indeed the vast majority of articles were concerned with international migration and resultant ethnic communities in urban areas. Indeed, there has been a growth in ethnographic research into ethnic communities in Japan’s urban sociology. In terms of the inner-city in the Osaka district, Tani and his group [Tani, 2002; 2015] have conducted extensive research, and have attempted to classify the various research findings and the relevant theories that arise from examination of the empirical data. “The ethnic concentration in metropolitan areas is explained in terms of a synergy between job opportunities and accessibility of settlement services not only from governments but also from the community efforts offered by compatriots of the same ethnic background” [Mizukami, 2000]. Thus, we can see some particular areas where quite visible ethnic communities exist.

The Change in Immigration Directions and the Increase in Japanese Descents

In response to the increasing foreign population, which included many undocumented migrants, the amended Immigration Act was introduced in June 1990. This aimed to rigidly restrict unskilled labor migration, while at the same time it opened the door for people of Japanese descent from Central American countries such as Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, and Argentina. In addition to the amendment, this Act instituted penal regulations for Japanese employers who hired undocumented foreign workers. Those migrants of Japanese descent could gain lawful employment even though they are unskilled laborers due to Japan’s blood-relation policy. Such policy is an exception to the rule that considers a migration applicant in terms of birth place. In other words, there is a legal contrast in accepting foreigners; Japan takes an account of Japanese descent, which is the basis on *jus sanguinis*, in contrast to the right to citizenship of individuals born in a territory, as *jus soli* [Mizukami, 2000]. With the amendment of immigration policy of 1990, many Japanese who had migrated into South and Central American countries, in the pre- and immediate post-war period, as well as their descendants, some second or third generation, began to return to Japan for their employments. An unskilled labor force of Japanese blood was officially approved, even though the majority of them were non-Japanese speakers. They too were classified as ‘newcomers.’ The amendment of the policy encouraged significant migration from South and Central America, especially Brazilians, to migrate to Japan.

In terms of emigration movements from Japan, the official Japanese labor migration from Japan to Brazil commenced at the early 20th century, and continued until August 1941. That involved almost 190,000 Japanese persons emigrating to Brazil [Nihonimin 80nenshi hensaniinkai, 1991: 140]. These migrations were constantly maintained until the outbreak of the Pacific war, and after the War, the official migration to Brazil re-commenced in 1953 until 1973 when the last migration ship was to transport Japanese laborers. Then, when we look at the statistics regarding the intake of Brazilian nationals, the number in 1988 was only 4,000. It increased the next year to about 14,000, but by 1990, the number had increased to about 56,400. Afterwards, the number has constantly increased until 2007 it has reached more than 310,000. After the 2008 financial crisis, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the number of

Brazilians has gradually decreased. These Brazilians have concentrated in particular areas. For instance, Toyota city in Aichi, Hamamatsu city in Shizuoka, and Oizumi town in Gunma prefectures have embraced large populations from Brazil. These cities have some common characteristics: they have all developed industrial towns with factories of outstanding industries. These Brazilian communities, and some other South-Central Americans, have therefore featured prominently in sociological research.

One of the outstanding works onto Japanese Brazilians is *Kao no mienai teijyuka — Nikkei Burajirujin to kokka/shijo/imin nettowaku [Invisible Residents: Japanese Brazilians vis-à-vis the State, the Market and the Immigrant Network]*, written by Kajita, Tanno, and Higuchi [Kajita, Tanno, Higuchi, 2005]. After systematizing relevant literature, including the theories and characteristics of migration, the presentation of the statistical data on Japanese Brazilians, they have described the patterns of their communities and settlement, including their changing status in Japanese labor markets. They are like a facilitating valve in the labor markets, when domestic labor force comes into the periphery area of work with low payments, they are foreclosed. According to them, migrant workers tend to settle as invisible labor force in the society. They exist, but their social existence is only recognized by the local community from their non-participation in social life. They are called 'invisible residents' [Kajita, Tanno, Higuchi, 2005: 72]. In Hirota's work, *Ethinishithi to toshi [Ethnicity and City]* [Hirota, 2003/1997], the author gathered ethnographic data on newcomers as Japanese descendants in Yokohama, Kawasaki, and Oizumi cities, clarifying characteristics of informants' lives in local communities, their socio-cultural impact onto host Japanese society. He particularly concerns with transnational perspectives. On the other hand, Miyajima and Ota [Miyajima, Ota, 2005] has focused upon 'fushugaku' which means non-school-attendees amongst foreign children in their book, *Gaikokujin no kodomo to nihon no kyoiku — Fushugaku mondai to tabunkakyosei no kadai [Foreign children and Japan's education system: Problems of non-school attendees and subjects of multicultural living together]*. There have been various problems in some foreign families, such as economic, cultural, and conventional barriers preventing some foreign children from participating properly in schools.

Global Sociology and Transnationalism

In relation to the increase in migration and ethnicity studies, Japanese sociology has established a new sociological domain that is '*Kokusai shakaigaku*.' The direct translation of this term is 'International Sociology,' but when the text book of '*Kokusai shakaigaku*' was published in 1992 [Kajita, 1992], the editor, Kajita, attached its English title as 'Transnational Relations.' However, under contemporary circumstances, this can be equivalent to 'global sociology' as the contents of the text book includes ethnicity, international migration, world cities, multicultural society, nationalism and so on. Afterwards, some text books on '*Kokusai shakaigaku*' have been published, including one of the same title, '*Kokusai shakaigaku*' [Miyajima., Sato, Ogaya, 2015]. Its English translation is now 'Transnational Sociology.' The subject of '*Kokusai shakaigaku*' has been introduced in the teaching of some universities since the 1990s. The Japan Association for Migration Policy Studies, established in 2008, is not only for academics from Universities or Research Institutes, but also includes lawyers, members from

non-government organizations and non-political organizations as well as international organizations, and has been active in its publishing and work.

In terms of sociological research, the transnational approaches have become a major means by which the settlement of migrants has been publicized. The vast majority of first generation migrants have strong ties with their homelands while living in this new environment. They persistent involvement in transnational networks. In this decade, various empirical research projects into ethnic or migrant communities in Japan have adopted a transnationalism frame of reference. In addition, some English academic books on transnationalism or ethnic studies and other relevant studies have been translated for the Japanese language publication. Examples are *Global Sociology* [Cohen, Kennedy, 2000] translated in 2003; *Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation* [Portes, Rumbaut, 2001] translated in 2014; *Transnationalism (Key Ideas)* [Vertovec, 2009] translated in 2014, and others.

Apart from the volumes of ethnic community fieldwork in Japan, there has also been some research in foreign lands by Japanese sociologists. Some empirical researches by urban sociologists are as follows: *Ekkoyoshatachi no rosanzerusu [Strangers in Los Angeles]* (Machimura 1999); *Ajiamegasithi to chiikikomyunithi no dotai — Jyakaruta no RT/ RW o chuusin nishite [An Asian Mega-City and the Dynamics of Local Community: Centre upon RT/ RW in Jakarta]*. [Yoshihara, 2005]; *The Sojourner Community: Japanese Residency in Australia* [Mizukami, 2006]. Under the progress of Japanese governments' concern regarding globalization, these studies are expected to further develop.

Concluding Remarks

The debates about the manner in which Japan receives and accepts foreigners continues. Does it start from the people's recognition of newcomers from foreign lands as migrant laborers? Was it first a tolerance of those who would be returning to their homelands after a few years or so? However, when some have extended their stay, how has that tolerance developed? Many local governments have introduced new systems and policies since the mid-1980s to take into account their foreign population. This is an aspect of Japanese society that cannot easily be ignored.

Regardless of the length of time of their residence, the research must take the process of human settlement into account. The research clearly demonstrates a variety of settlement patterns within the host Japanese community. Many did indeed return to their home country, while some have become transnational migrants who have retained a strong tie with their country of origin while living in Japan. Others have become rooted to Japanese society, marrying and developing their Japanese families. Japan has faced the shortage of local labor, owing to a rapidly ageing population and low birth rate. And this is actually related as a vital matter to the migration and 'newcomer' debate. As the Japanese government's policies have tended to become more open than previously, migration patterns and conditions of ethnicity must change, and thus, the studies will also have to change in their research frames in order to adequately explain social life.

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MIGRATION

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S. V. Ryazantsev, S. Yu. Sivoplyasova RUSSIAN WOMEN IN THE INTERNATIONAL MARRIAGE MARKET: WAYS OF MIGRATION AND ADAPTATION IN HOST SOCIETIES

RUSSIAN WOMEN IN THE INTERNATIONAL MARRIAGE MARKET: WAYS OF MIGRATION AND ADAPTATION IN HOST SOCIETIES

РОССИЙСКИЕ ЖЕНЩИНЫ НА МЕЖДУНАРОДНОМ БРАЧНОМ РЫНКЕ: ПУТИ МИГРАЦИИ И ТРАЕКТОРИИ АДАПТАЦИИ В ПРИНИМАЮЩИХ ОБЩЕСТВАХ

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Abstract. The inter-marriage market should be viewed not only as a demographic category but also as a socio-cultural phenomenon determined by international migration. After the collapse of the USSR, the scale of marriage migration from Russia began to increase sharply. Moreover, a significant share of this migration flow was women and girls. In this regard, the term “Russian wife” was formed in international practice and became kind of a brand. Women tried to find wealthy, attentive, caring companions who have no addiction to alcohol, in this regard; they were looking for husbands abroad. The increase in the scale of marriage migration stimulated the creation of a special infrastructure of the marriage market: marriage agencies, professional matchmakers, dating sites, etc. However, this led to the formation of the shadow sector of this market, which was represented by groups engaged in illegal activities related to trafficking. At the moment, Russian women can be found in many countries, but there are four priority areas of marriage migration: North American, European, Asian, and Middle East. Moving to another country, women hope for a prosperous, happy life, but they often face difficulties on the way of adaptation. Most often, such barriers

Аннотация. Брачный рынок следует рассматривать не только как демографическую категорию, но и как социально-культурное явление, обусловленное международной миграцией. После распада СССР масштабы брачной миграции из России стали резко возрастать. Значительная доля этого миграционного потока приходится на женщин и девушек. В связи с этим в международной практике возник термин «русская жена» и стал своего рода брендом. В поисках состоятельных, заботливых, не имеющих алкогольной зависимости спутников жизни, женщины обратили свой взор за границу. Рост потоков брачной миграции привел к созданию специальной инфраструктуры брачного рынка: брачные агентства, профессиональные свахи, сайты знакомств и т. д. Это, в свою очередь, вызвало формирование теневой стороны рынка, представленного группировками, занимающимися незаконной деятельностью и торговлей людьми. Сегодня русские женщины встречаются во многих странах, но есть четыре приоритетных направления брачной миграции: североамериканская, европейская, азиатская и Ближний Восток. Переезжая в другую страну, женщины надеются на благополучную, счаст-

are poor knowledge of the language, mental and cultural differences with a foreign husband. Misunderstanding often leads to a break-up in relations. However, even in the event of divorce, women are rarely return home and try to find a husband abroad again.

Keywords: marriage market, marriage migration, “Russian wives”, ways to find foreign partners, marriage agencies, direction of marriage emigration

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Theoretical background

The term “marriage market” appeared in the 1970s. This socio-demographic phenomenon is complex and multifaceted. One of the first scientists who began to deal with the problem of formation and functioning of the marriage market was Harry A. Bekker. He researched this issue from the perspective of Economics and explained the characteristics of the individual’s marriage behavior by the feasibility and benefits of marriage. The marriage market considered as the search for the best partner by a person (in terms of benefits from marriage), taking into account market restrictions [Bekker, 1974: 300].

In a similar economic context, T. Bergstrom studied the problem of the marriage market. Despite the fact that the term “marriage market” in his interpretation has a general nature (“marriage market”, in his opinion is the space of potential partners — men on the one hand and women on the other, between whom a match (i. e. marriage) must be established [Bergstrom, 1997: 46]), he concentrated on the explanation of the marriage behavior of the individual in terms of the costs of finding a partner and the benefits of creating a family.

A number of foreign publications are devoted to the study of demographic components of the marriage market. Goldman, Westoff, and Hammerslough [Goldman et al., 1984: 5] considered the age and sex structure of the marriage market. Marriage behavior of Americans is analyzed, including patterns of remarriage.

ливую жизнь, но часто сталкиваются с трудностями на пути адаптации. Чаще всего эти трудности вызваны языковыми барьерами, а также интеллектуальными и культурными различиями с выбранным спутником. Непонимание часто приводит к разрыву отношений. Однако даже в случае развода женщины редко возвращаются на родину, пытаясь снова найти мужа за границей.

Ключевые слова: брачный рынок, брачная миграция, «русские жены», поиски международного партнера, брачные агентства, траектории брачной миграции

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More recent studies [Jang, Casterline, Snyder, 2014: 1339] analyze the patterns of life strategies of American citizens in terms of competition of choice of migration and marriage.

Russian researchers often consider the socio-demographic nature of the marriage market. For example, L. Chuiko, A. Volkova, L. Darskiy, A. Vishnevsky studied in detail the demographic characteristics of the components of the marriage market, namely the number and sex-age structure of the population, the dynamics of marriage and divorce, and others. The marriage market meant a system of ratios of the numbers of different groups of the marriageable population [Chuiko, 1975; Volkova, Darskiy, 1975: 7; Vishnevsky, 1977: 56].

More recent studies of Russian scientists also maintain a socio-demographic focus. Thus, A. Sinelnikov explains the marriage behavior of men and women based on the objective demographic characteristics of potential grooms and brides and their personal aspirations (the social status of the partner, the level of his education, etc.). In this regard, the scientist offers a broad interpretation of the term “marriage market”, comprising of: the entire set of potential brides and grooms in the population, as well as the entire system of their mutual claims and requirements for future spouses¹.

Thus, the marriage market is a complex phenomenon that should be considered as an economic, socio-cultural, demographic and legal category.

The structure of the marriage market consists of unmarried men and women of marriageable age. At the same time, when citizens of one country get married, we are talking about the marriage market of a separate state. If the bride and groom are citizens of different countries, we can talk about the formation and functioning of the international marriage market. The existence of the international marriage market is due to special migration flows — international marriage migration.

The term marriage migration, as well as the marriage market, has no definite interpretation. However, unlike differentiation in the interpretation of the term “marriage market”, differences in the understanding and use of the term “marriage migration” will have significant implications for the analysis and evaluation of the scope and results of this phenomenon.

According to the first approach, marriage migration means moving to a new place of residence for the purpose of marriage and family creation, as well as moving to a migrant spouse (that is, actually family reunification). The second approach restricts the flow of marriage migrants only to those people who move to create a family and register a marriage [Iontsev, 2001: 98]. Obviously, in the first case, the migration flow will include a large population. For the purposes of this study, we will follow the second approach, and use the following definition of “international marriage migration” — the movement of people abroad for the purpose of marriage with a foreign citizen.

Marriage as a social and economical phenomenon has existed for a long time. In monarchical states of the middle ages, marriages were often concluded between representatives of the ruling dynasties of different countries. But in these cases, the marriage migration was organized, the marriage was concluded by prior agreement,

¹ Sinelnikov A. (n.d.) Marriage market. URL: <http://rybakovsky.ru/uchebnik1a2.html> (accessed: 08.08.2018). (In Russ.).

with the participation of intermediaries, and the most important criterion for choosing a spouse was the economic or geopolitical benefit [Sivoplyasova, 2018: 163].

At present (the time of freedom movement) the nature of marriage migration has changed significantly. The marriage market has become more “spontaneous” and therefore difficult to assess. The flow of migrants moving to a new place of residence for the purpose of marriage increased significantly, and the effects of marriage migration became more diverse and began to affect not only the spouses themselves, but also various spheres of society.

The present study focuses on determining the place of Russian women in the international marriage market, the analysis of marriage migration of women from Russia and the problems of their adaptation to the host society. The article considers the trends and forms of migration from the country, assesses age and sex structure, determines the role of marriage migration in the overall migration flow, identifies the main factors and directions of marriage migration of Russian women, and establishes the ways of adaptation and integration of Russian women in host societies.

Research methods and sources of information

This study is a comprehensive analysis of the migration of Russian women abroad for the purpose of marriage. The theoretical basis of the study are publications of Russian and foreign scientists on the subject, as well as statistical data from Russian and foreign sources on the number, structure and directions of migration flow. The empirical base of the study consists of the results of interviews with Russian women married to foreigners, employees of embassies and consulates of the Russian Federation, as well as publications in the media and the Internet about the fate of Russians who created families and lived abroad.

Currently in Russia there are two main sources of migration statistics. First, the Federal State Statistics Service data, which contains information about the migration for permanent residence abroad for a period of nine months or more. However, the use of these data for purposes of this study is complicated by several factors. First of all, the statistics do not include those who moved to or left the country for a shorter period. In addition, the analysis of the scale of migration is significantly complicated due to the existing rules of statistical registration of emigrants. On the one hand, persons moving abroad are not obliged to be removed from the registration at the place of residence in Russia, and, therefore, for statistics, they “continue to live in the country”, and on the other hand, according to the rules of the Federal State Statistics Service, migrants who have previously entered the country, are subject to automatic inclusion in the number of those who leave the state at the end of their legal residence, regardless of whether they actually left country or not. Finally, the third and main factor hindering the use of these statistics is the lack of accounting for marriage migration.

The second source of data on migration is the data of the Federal Migration Service, which existed until 2016 as an independent body of state power, and now is a part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia. However, these statistics have significant limitations when used for the purposes of this study: they take into account only temporary registered labor migration. Statistical data does not include information about marriage migration.

The use of foreign statistics on the extent of migration makes it possible to partially compensate for the shortcomings of domestic statistics on marriage migration from the country. Some countries (for example, the United States) issue special visas to immigrants when they come to the country for the purpose of marriage with a citizen of the state, and keep a current record of the number of such visas. Other countries (e. g. Japan) include the question of the nationality of spouses in the census form, thus the number of inter-ethnic marriages can be determined. Also, in a number of countries (for example, many European countries), the number of registered marriages of the bride and groom is recorded. It is important to note that in the first case the statistics will show the volume of marriage migration when marriage is the reason for moving to another country. In two other cases, statistical data allows to estimate the real extent of participation of Russian citizens (in particular women) in the international marriage market.

Fifty four semi-structured interviews were conducted to analyze the socio-cultural features of the international marriage market, as well as to identify the causes of migration and strategies of marriage behavior of Russian women abroad. The choice of the research method was determined by its objectives, namely the need to identify the underlying motives and opinions of the respondents on the issue under consideration.

The interviews face-to-face communication with the respondents in the form of a focused interview without structured questions but based on an interview guide. Registration of responses was carried out by recording conversation by the interviewer.

The respondents were Russian women married to foreigners and moved to another country for permanent residence, Russian-speaking women from the former republics of the Soviet Union in marriage with foreign citizens, diplomatic employees of embassies and consulates of the Russian Federation in foreign countries. The interviews were conducted in seventeen countries, including Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Vietnam, Germany, Greece, Egypt, Spain, Italy, Canada, China, Korea, USA, Turkey, Finland, France, and Japan. The choice of countries is determined by the scale and priority directions of emigration from Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, as well as the size of the Russian-speaking communities in the host countries. Interviews were conducted not only in the countries of so-called classical emigration (for example, Germany, Israel, USA), but also in new popular destinations (for example, Greece, Korea, Japan, etc.).

Interviews of Russian women emigrants in the press, blogs and social networks about personal experience of their marriage migration and the problems of adaptation and integration into the host society were also analyzed. An important source of information for the study was television programs (for example, the project "Russian wives"), which included the biography of Russian women married foreigners and lived abroad.

Thus, the research included interviews with Russian women (married emigrants and employees of diplomatic missions of the Russian Federation abroad), analysis of information from print, electronic and television sources, and processing of statistical data.

The scale and forms of migration from Russia

Following the collapse of the USSR, several factors led to Russia's actively incorporation in the international migration processes. First, the "opening" of borders un-

leashed freedom of movement. Second, the economic reforms of the early 1990s led to a significant decline in living standards, which led people to go abroad in search of a “better life”. Third, political instability and military actions in a number of former Soviet republics provoked a massive exodus of the Russian-speaking population. Thus high level of immigration as well as emigration were recorded in Russia. Total external migration turnover in the early 1990s exceeded 1.5 million border crossings per year, the share of trips ranged from 40% to 49%². The year 2016 saw a decrease in migratory movements, with about 900,000 border crossings. At the same time, the share of visits decreased to 35%³. However, it is important to note the fact that the rules of statistical accounting do not fully reflect the whole picture of migration from the country. Most likely, its real volumes are much larger.

In the modern history of Russia there are three waves of migration, each of which is characterized by similar predominant causes, forms and directions.

The first wave took place from 1991 to 1998, that is, during the period of political and economic transformation. During this period, several forms of mobilities could be observed. The first was, ethnic migration. During this period, a number of countries (for example, Germany and Israel) began implementing state programs of voluntary ethnic repatriation. Russia was inhabited by a fairly large number of ethnic Germans (whose mass migration began in the days of Catherine II) and Jews. They formed the basis of this migration flow.

The second form of mobility was labor migration. A characteristic feature of this period was the fact that the country was left mostly by highly qualified specialists. They found themselves in a difficult socio-economic situation in their homeland and tried to find better living and working conditions abroad. This phenomenon was called the “brain drain”.

Marriage migration constituted the third form of mobility. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, young girls and women began to seek life companions abroad. The reasons were the difficult economic situation in the country, low income, and therefore the attractiveness of Russian grooms, their massive social degradation. In addition, the possibility of obtaining citizenship of the country of migration in a simplified manner (this was the cause of fictitious marriages with foreigners) was very attractive.

Finally, children adopted by foreign couples comprised the fourth form of mobility. Given the large number of children left without parental care, this type of migration was assessed as positive: the burden on the state budget was reduced, and children were able to live and grow up in a family.

The second wave of migration in modern Russia is migration in the inter-crisis period from 1998 to 2008. This period is characterized by a revival of the economy, political stability and active implementation of social programs for supporting families. This led to an increase in labor migration in Russia. Unlike the previous wave which saw the arrival predominantly of, highly qualified specialists this phase led to arrival of a large number of unskilled or semi-skilled workforce, prepared to do “dirty” jobs.

² The number and migration of population 1993—2016. Moscow: Federal statistic service. URL: http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/publications/catalog/doc_1140096034906 (accessed: 16.08.2018). (In Russ.).

³ Ibid.

The second form of migration during this period was, political and economic, closely related to the movement of capital. The newly-rich classes and entrepreneurs who owned large businesses ("oligarchs"), began moving their assets abroad and settling there.

The third form of migration was a forced migration. This form of migration was typical for the Chechens, who fled from the war and found refuge in Europe. However, when there were quite a lot of ethnic Chechens in European countries, the states began to feel the negative consequences of "open doors" policy.

Marriage migration constitutes the fourth form of mobility. This form of migration has retained its popularity in the second stage of Russia's migration history. However, as well as other forms, it has undergone changes. During this period, the infrastructure of the marriage market was actively developing — marriage agencies were formed. There were professional matchmakers who provided services to search for foreign husbands, as well as mass distribution of dating sites. Among such a large number of intermediaries appeared unscrupulous entrepreneurs who covered their illegal activities under the guise of harmless firms (modeling agencies, dance schools, acting courses and more). Many young Russian girls and women often found themselves in slavery, were subjected to violence, and were forced to provide sexual services.

The fifth form of migration is that of pensioners. People older than the working age, having finished work, began to move to other countries. Independently or with the financial support of children, they purchased real estate. Taking the decision to migrate, older people were looking for a more comfortable living environment, well-developed social infrastructure, the best medical care, or favorable climate.

The third wave of emigration took place from 2008 to 2018. The structure of migration of this stage was predetermined by the global financial crisis, the complication of the foreign policy situation and the imposition of sanctions. The third period is characterized by the following forms of migration. First, it is business migration and migration of investors. Currently, entrepreneurs are becoming more mobile. The decision to organize business abroad is made not only by the owners of large capital, but also by businessmen who own much more modest assets. As in the previous stage, they move to other countries.

Secondly, it is the migration of the middle class. The spread of this form of migration indicates that international migration ceases to be "elite", moving to another country becomes available and does not require special expenses and preparation.

Third, it is educational migration. This form of migration is widespread in the modern period. At the same time, the state should foresee the negative socio-economic and demographic consequences that it has. Therefore, educational migration should be under close attention of public authorities.

Fourthly, it is the migration of highly qualified specialists. This form of migration has become widespread. People move abroad to "sell" their labor at a higher price. Thus, a special class of super-mobile specialists is formed, however, if the conditions are met, they may return to the country.

Fifthly, this is a "sanction" migration. This form of migration is vividly illustrated by the so-called "Abramovich's case", when Russian citizens, under the pressure of sanctions, are forced to move to other countries. That is, a kind of "secondary migration".

Sixth, marriage migration. The third stage is also characterized by this form of migration. However, it, according to O. Makhovskaya, “has no more” sausage”⁴ — economic, background. The main reason for the desire of Russians to marry abroad is the crisis of the domestic family model⁵. Russian women have accumulated enough knowledge about the “dangers» of interethnic marriage (the probability of getting into the system of international trafficking, cases of weaning of children, etc.), so marriage with a foreigner is most likely a deliberate step.

Thus, labor and marriage migration were stable and did not lose their popularity throughout the modern history of Russia. At the same time, if labor migration often takes the form of return migration, the marriage, as a rule, becomes permanent. That is, the country is losing people who left it to create families in other states. In this regard, there are specific socio-demographic and economic consequences for both the people and the country as a whole. Marriage migration has an important demographic impact on the country: there is not just a “direct” decline in the population of the state, but also “indirect” (the number of children born in the country is decreasing).

Features of marriage migration from Russia

Marriage migration is a very specific phenomenon. Its distinctive feature is that it is characteristic of female migration. According to experts, as well as foreign statistics, the vast majority of people who move to other countries to create families are women. They make up 98% of the migration flow.

It is difficult to estimate marriage migration from Russia. The main problem is that the statistics on migration to permanent residence collected by the Ministry of internal Affairs and developed by Rosstat do not provide a reason for “marriage”. The extent of female migration from the country can serve as an indirect source of information.

Russian women are active participants in migration. In 1997, the share of women in the total international migration turnover was 49.4%. In 2016, this share decreased slightly (to 43.3%), but continues to be at a fairly high level. At the same time, in the first half of the 2000s, this figure exceeded 50%, which means that Russian women were more mobile than men.

In the migration flow, the proportion of women is currently about 40 per cent. However, between 2000 and 2010, their share was higher than 50%, which means that women were more active than men in leaving the country. At the same time, such migration had the most negative impact on the dynamics of the country’s female population in 2006—2011, when the share of women among the departures exceeded the share of women among the arrivals, that is, Russia more actively lost the female population than accumulated it⁶.

⁴ The term “sausage” emigration comes from the popular in the 1990’s songs of the Russian band “Combination” “Two pieces of sausage” (words — A. Shishinina, music — V. Okorokov). The song was about how a man conquered the heart of a Russian woman by treating her with sausage. In this case, the sausage served as an attribute of the economic viability and well-being of the groom.

⁵ Konygina, N. (2016) Married to foreigners do not go because of money. URL: <https://iz.ru/news/272196> (accessed: 01.11.2017). (In Russ.).

⁶ The number and migration of population 1993—2016. Moscow: Federal statistic service. URL: http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/publications/catalog/doc_1140096034906 (accessed: 16.08.2018). (In Russ.).

In General, according to official statistics for the period 1993 to 2016, about 1.2 million women left the country for permanent residence abroad. At the same time, the reasons for migration were different. Taking into account the fact that other forms of migration (e. g. educational, labour, etc.) can pass into marriage migration, it is possible to estimate its scale only with the help of expert assessments. According to experts, almost every third woman who moved to another country from Russia is related to the marriage channel of migration. Thus, during this period, at least 350,000 women left to set up family abroad.

Describing the flow of marriage migration from Russia, it should be noted that young beautiful girls comprise a much higher share of those who leave the country. The average age of migrants is 28 years, as a rule, they have higher education, do not have children and often were not married before [Tyuryukanova, 1996: 91]. Thus, it is obvious that against the background of marriage migration, our country is losing its gene pool. Marriage migration becomes irreversible more often than any other form of migration.

It is interesting to note that even if life with a foreign husband does not develop, a woman usually stays abroad and continues to look for a new husband among foreigners. Women are looking for husbands not only among the citizens of the country of residence, but also subjects of other countries. Thus, within the framework of marriage migration, the flow of “secondary” migrants is quite numerous.

An important feature of marriage migration from Russia is that it is a socio-cultural phenomenon. The concept of “Russian wife” has become a kind of brand. At the same time, the word “Russian” has little to do with the ethnic characteristics of the migration flow. “Russian wives” are often called women who came from the former Soviet republics, for example, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova. This phenomenon was formed due to the fact that brides from these countries have a similar phenotype, as well as they have similar patterns of family behavior, which attracts foreign grooms.

Reasons for the high demand for Russian women and foreign men in the international marriage market

The high demand for Russian women by foreign grooms is due to the stereotypes that have emerged in some countries. First of all, Russian women are very beautiful. Slavic type of appearance is very popular abroad, especially in Asian countries. It is considered prestigious to have a Russian wife. It becomes a matter of pride for her husband and the cause of envy from neighbors.

In addition, it is believed in foreign societies that the Russian wife is better than any other takes care of her husband, caring for him, watching his appearance and health.

Wives from Russia often devote themselves entirely to home and family. They are diligent Housewives. They do all the housework well. For them, the interests of the family always come first.

Russian wives are wonderful mothers. They carefully monitor children, educate and develop them. A distinctive feature of many women who moved from Russia to foreign countries is desire to have many children and big family. This distinguishes them from many “local” brides.

Many foreign husbands note special moral and psychological qualities of Russians: they always listen to the opinion of a man, allow him to feel like the head of the family, and do not seek equality and emancipation.

And finally, Russian wives demand less “costs” and are ready to tolerate inconveniences and lack of money.

Of course, there are also opposing statements, which, unfortunately, are not groundless. But in general, the “Russian wife” is an expensive brand that implies certain qualities.

Marriage migration would not have been so widespread if foreign grooms did not attract Russian women. The reason for the high demand for foreigners on the part of Russians is quite a lot. And they do not always lie in the plane of subjective tastes. First of all, there is a belief among Russian women that a “foreign husband” has a lot of money, earns well, and, therefore, will better provide for the family. Most likely, such an opinion was formed under the impression of foreign films, which massively began to show on television since the 1990s. As a rule, such films demonstrated “beautiful life”: attractive, well-earning men tastefully furnished big house, women in expensive jewelry. All this created an image of a successful life abroad.

Another distinctive feature of foreign grooms and the reason for their high attractiveness for Russian women is a commitment to a healthy lifestyle and lack of addiction to alcohol. This factor was significant in the 1990s, when the economic crisis was accompanied by the social degradation of Russian men.

Not the last role in the formation of compelling image of foreigners playing their visual appeal. Russian women find especially beautiful Spaniards and Italians, they like tall blue-eyed Scandinavians, and generally well dressed in European style “overseas princes”. On the one hand, a well-groomed, attractive man next door is the pride of a Russian woman. On the other hand, the girls intend to “improve genes”. They hope that their joint children will also be beautiful.

Many Russian women pursue pragmatic goals when looking for a foreign husband. They believe that foreigners live in better, more comfortable conditions. And finding a foreign groom the girls hope that he will take them out of Russia. In addition, they expect that children will receive the citizenship of a foreign country and will live in another country.

Thus, the international marriage market has generated a high demand for both foreign men and Russian women, which has a kind of stimulating effect on marriage migration from Russia.

Ways to search for foreign husbands by Russian women

Certainly, marriage and the creation of a family is a personal matter for everyone. And marriage with a foreigner often is the result of a random meeting. However, many Russian women and girls are purposefully looking for a partner abroad. In this case, the ways of finding a foreign partner in the international marriage market are quite diverse.

The first pattern is *using the help of marriage agencies for a fee or free of charge*. Their mass appearance began in the 1990s in Russia and largely contributed to the increase in marriage migration from the country. Demand gave rise to supply. Currently, marriage agencies have become important agents in the Russian marriage market.

There are more than 100 marriage agencies in Moscow (were counted agencies that have websites). Some of them work in the marriage market for more than 25 years. They have an extensive database of potential brides and grooms (more than 5,000 people).

The stimulating effect of marriage migration from the country is supported by the fact that some of the marriage agencies focus exclusively on international marriages: they work only with foreign grooms and Russian brides, as well as a number of marriage agencies charge only foreigners, while for Russian girls placing profiles in the database is free.

The work of a marriage agency is a profitable business. The average cost of placing the questionnaire is about 30 thousand rubles, or about 500 dollars. In addition, marriage agencies provide all kinds of "related" services: the selection of the bride or groom, preparation of astrological forecasts, numerologist services, etc. These services are provided on a fee basis.

Many women, using the services of a marriage agency, are satisfied; they write testimonials for help in finding beloved spouse. It is interesting that the women who became one of the first clients and found a foreign husband, plan to choose a life partner for their daughters in the same way. The marriage market in Russia is highly commercialized, it is dominated by market mechanisms, and ethical and moral standards are secondary.

Irina, 25 years old, from Ukraine. *She posted a questionnaire on the website of the marriage agency from China. The Chinese, working in Tokyo in an Internet company, 36 years old, was looking for a wife in Russia or Ukraine. His first marriage was with the Chinese woman unsuccessful. "My mother advised me to look for a wife abroad. I paid the agency 10 thousand US dollars. I chose 3 girls. I wrote them. I liked Irina", he says. He invited her to Japan. He will soon be presenting to his mother.*

The second pattern is *purposeful, independent and separate search of a foreign partner or husband via the Internet*. The absence of intermediaries in this model is often very conditional, because often women and girls are trying to find a life partner through dating sites. This method of search does not require significant costs, but at the same time, is much more risky. Pages of grooms may be invalid or contain false information. Sometimes the criminal is hiding under the guise of a respectable man. Although this method of dating is one of the most popular, its effectiveness is not too great.

Svetlana, 42 years old, from Krivoy Rog, Porto Alegre (Brazil). *I met my Brazilian husband via the Internet. There is no desire to return to Russia, but I would like to keep the passport of Ukraine. No one knows how my life will turn out. Life in Ukraine is hard; I thought how I could go abroad. With a Brazilian passport I feel more comfortable: work, travel to Europe, benefits, insurance, and pensions.*

The third pattern is *acquaintance or marriage of a Russian woman in the course of another type of migration through personal acquaintance*. Women and girls often find a foreign husband while abroad for another purpose (for example, getting an education, tourist trip, work). At the same time, acquaintance and marriage with a foreigner are either unexpected or become a passing goal.

Olga, from Kirov, 25 years old, Paris (France). *Trained in Geneva. Actively I was looking for a husband in Switzerland. I returned to Russia after an internship. After 6 months I have*

moved to Moscow. Worked in the state structure. As a result I married a French citizen who worked in Moscow. Now we are living in Paris.

Natalia, 32 years old, from Moscow, Cairo (Egypt). *I went on vacation in Egypt. I met a man, an Egyptian, I fell in love. Remained in Egypt. Now in divorce. I am works as an interpreter in Cairo.*

Lyudmila, 38 years old, from Novorossiysk, Rhodes Island (Greece). *I went to work in Greece, the Rhodes Island. Got a job as a waiter in a restaurant. I married the owner of the restaurant — a Greek citizen. I am happy very much with him, I like Greece as well.*

Eugenia, 30 years old, lives in Vung Thau (Vietnam). *Works as an interpreter. I came to a joint Russian-Vietnamese company to work. I met my husband at work — he is a Vietnamese citizen. Two children were born in marriage.*

The fourth pattern is *acquaintance with a foreign groom through relatives or friends*. Many Russian women ask relatives, friends and acquaintances in other countries to help in finding a groom, due to the mass migration of Russian citizens and a large number of compatriots living abroad. This search model is one of the safest, but perhaps the longest.

Russian women who decide to marry a foreigner often use a combination of several patterns at the same time.

Olga, from Moscow, lives in Porto Alegre (Brazil). *I met my husband in Thailand. Met by the will of fate, because Brazilians are rarely in Thailand. We got married in Brazil. We live in Porto Alegre. There are 50—60 Russian — speaking people here—Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians. Of course, all speak in Russian. But almost all of them are women. Age is over 35 years. All of them moved to get married. This is a second marriage for many of them. They were looking for a husband in the Internet. They were looking for husband purposefully, as they were intended to leave Russia. There were practically no examples of “live dating”.*

Examples of interviews show that women, as a rule, do not plan to return home, but do not intend to completely lose contact with it. Often they tend to leave Russian citizenship as a kind of security guarantee.

Geography of marriage migration from Russia. The geography of the marriage migration of women is quite extensive. There are four main directions: North American (USA, Canada), European, Asian and Middle Eastern. At the same time, you can find Russian women — “Russian wives” practically in any country in the world [Ryazantsev, Sivoplyasova, 2017: 5645].

The most popular country for the migration of women in North America is the United States. This is one of the few countries that keeps a statistical record of immigrants by type of issued visas, including the so-called “visas of brides”. This makes it easier to assess the extent of marriage migration to the country. As a rule, the “bride visa” is issued for three months, during which the couple must take a decision and marry. Otherwise, the woman must leave the United States. Thus, according to the US State Department, for the period of 20 years from 1997 to 2017, Russian women were issued about 21,700 marriage visas (Fig. 1)⁷.

⁷ Report of the Visa Office 2017. U.S. Department of state — Bureau of Consular Affairs. URL <https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/visa-law0/visa-statistics/annual-reports/report-of-the-visa-office-2017.html> (accessed: 16.08.2018).




Fig. 1. The number of «bride visas» issued by US to the citizens of the Russian Federation in 1997—2017. Source: Report of the Visa Office 2017. U. S. Department of state — Bureau of Consular Affairs⁸

The maximum number of visas of brides was noted in 1999—2007. During this period, more than a one thousand Russian women annually moved to the United States for the purpose of marriage and family creation. Such high rates of migration were probably due to the difficult socio-economic situation in Russia after the financial and economic crisis 1998. Since 2008, there has been a reduction of number of issued visas, which was most likely due to the stabilization of socio-economic situation in Russia, the beginning of the implementation of an active social policy, in particular demographic and family policy aimed at supporting families with children. In the later period (2014—2017), the decline in the popularity of marriage migration to the United States may have been influenced by the introduction of sanctions, the complexity of the visa issuance procedure. Nevertheless, marriage migration to the United States retains its relative popularity among Russians today.

There are several reasons for the prevalence of marriages between American grooms and Russian brides. The first, the United States in the view of our compatriots is an economically developed and socially prosperous country where wealthy people live. The second, there is practically no language barrier. English is taught by almost everyone, starting from school, and its popularity is only increasing. Third, the mentality of Americans is relatively clear to Russians. In addition, the Russian women like to be treated with respect for their rights and freedoms by American men. There are the difficulties and barriers to a happy family life. It is necessary to note the existing differences in culture, which are most acute when the relationship does not develop.

The second popular destinations for Russian women's marriage migration are European countries, and the first three include Germany, Spain and France.

The leader is Germany among European countries in the number of migrants from Russia. According to the OECD, about 20,000 Russian people annually move to Germany,

⁸ URL <https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/visa-law0/visa-statistics/annual-reports/report-of-the-visa-office-2017.html> (accessed: 16.08.2018).

including 60% women [OECD, 2017]. Quite often, women indicate marriage as the reason for migration. Germany also issues a “bride visa”. Marriage migration from Russia to Germany has recently increased, and not the last role in the development of marriage migration is also played by the community of Russian-speaking Germans, formed as a result of active migration in the 1990s from Russia and Kazakhstan. In 2010, the Russians were issued 1,500 “bride visas” and about 2,000 visas in 2016⁹.

Another European country, where Russians most often move to create a family, is France. This country is wrapped in many myths and stereotypes. It attracts young romantic Russians as a magnet. According to the French national Institute of statistics and economic research, 4.2 million of foreigners and 6 million of migrants lived in the country in 2014. At the same time, about 51% of migrants were women. According to the National Institute of statistics and economic research, marriage migration has always occupied a significant place in the migration flow of women to France. This is largely due to the fact that the marriage with a citizen of the country makes it easier to obtain citizenship. About 5% of migrants coming to France are related to marriage migration¹⁰.

About 4,300 people from Russia move to France every year. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of migrants in this stream are women (about 70%). In total, currently about 115,000 Russians live in France. The number of women, who have acquired the citizenship of the country due to the fact that they are married to French, can serve as an indirect assessment of the marriage migration of Russian women to France (Fig. 2).




Fig. 2. The number of migrants from Russia who acquired French citizenship through marriage, person/percent.
Source: *Institute national de la statistique et des etudes economiques*¹¹e

⁹ Einreise und Aufenthalt aus familiären Gründen (Ehegatten — und Familiennachzug) (2012) Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, P. 10.

¹⁰ *Institute national de la statistique et des etudes economiques*. URL: <https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques?debut=0&idprec=2381757&theme=5> (accessed: 10.08.2018).

¹¹ URL: <https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques?debut=0&idprec=2381757&theme=5> accessed: 10.08.2018).

Figure 2 shows that the number of Russians who received French citizenship in connection with marriage with a citizen of the country has increased steadily in 2008—2015, reaching 1279 people. The migration legislation of France was amended in 2006. The right to citizenship is granted to persons who have entered into an official marriage with French and have lived in France for at least four years. Therefore, we can say that a significant increase in marriage migration began in the middle of 2000.

Currently, the share of Russians who obtain French citizenship on the basis of marriage is 5.1 % of the total number of persons receiving citizenship on this basis. At the same time, Russia is one of the four countries, migrants from which most often receive French citizenship in connection with marriage (second only to Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco).

The third attractive country for marriage migration is Spain. Every year 150,000—230,000 people come to the country. 7,000—8,400 people from them are migrants from Russia. The share of Russians in the migration flow is greater than 60 % [OECD, 2017].

Unlike many other countries, including Europe, the basis of the migration flow to Spain are not labor migrants, but people who buy real estate, creative intelligentsia, specialists, as well as Russians who married the Spaniards [Sivoplyasova, 2018: 170].

During recent history the number of marriages between Russians and Spaniards were at a fairly high level in 2000—2016 (fig. 3). During this period the maximum was reached in 2008. This year the number of registered marriages has reached 910. Currently, despite a slight decrease in the number of registered marriages between Spaniards and Russians, their number annually exceeds 600¹².




Fig. 3. Number of registered marriages between Spaniards and Russians.

Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística¹³

¹² Instituto Nacional de Estadística. URL: <http://www.ine.es/jaxiT3/Datos.htm?t=9674> (accessed: 10.08.2018).

¹³ URL: <http://www.ine.es/jaxiT3/Datos.htm?t=9674> (accessed: 10.08.2018).

Thus, marriage migration from Russia to Europe is a very common phenomenon. Such popularity of this migration direction is caused by several factors. The first, the geographical proximity of the countries. The second almost complete absence or weak language barriers, as children in Russia begin to learn the main European languages (English, German, French, and Spanish) at school. The third, long-term socio-cultural relations between Russia and European countries and similar cultural traditions, which, on the one hand, facilitates mutual understanding between people creating a new family, and on the other hand — simplifies the adaptation and integration of the Russian wife in the host society.

The third popular vector of marriage migration from Russia is the Asian direction. It is relatively new, but due to the geopolitical transformations of recent times, as well as the increasing interest of Russians in Asian culture, its attractiveness and the volume of migration will increase. In this direction, the flow of migrants to China and Korea is the most numerous.

Currently, migration to China tends to increase. The number of Russians living in this country is about 15,000 people. 1,000—1,500 of them are the Russian women who live with Chinese men [Sivoplyasova, 2017: 170].

There are several reasons for the popularity of marriage migration to China as a form of relocation. First, the demographic policy pursued in China for many years and aimed to reducing the population has led to a sharp gender imbalance in the country. 120 boys were born for 100 girls in the late 1980. Therefore, nowadays brides are “not enough” for all young people. They are forced to seek wives abroad. Secondly, the Slavic type of appearance is recognized in China as very attractive. Russian wife is considered to be very prestigious.

At the same time, marriage migration to China, unlike migration to European countries, is associated with more serious difficulties and barriers. First of all, it is a language barrier. Asian languages are more difficult to learn, so “Russian wives” often either do not know the Chinese language, or know it at an elementary level. This does not allow you to talk to husband “heart to heart”. This significantly complicates the process of adaptation of Russians in the new country. In addition, there are sharp differences in mentality and cultural traditions. Things that seemed beautiful and attractive in Russia can cause bewilderment and irritation in China.

Despite this, Chinese men are very attractive to Russian women. Our brides expect care, attention, financial solvency, lack of addiction to alcohol from the grooms. And, as examples show, expectations of girls, as a rule, are justified.

The situation with marriage migration to Korea is somewhat different. Korea is one of the countries where the share of international marriages is extremely high. Currently, it is about 10%. It was even higher — 30—40% in the 1990s. Moreover, the vast majority in this migration flow are women from Vietnam and China [Sivoplyasova, 2017: 171].

The scale of migration from Russia to Korea has a wave-like dynamics, although they are characterized by high rates. According to the OECD, the number of migrants from Russia decreased in 2003—2011 (from 9,300 to 2,600 people), and it increased to 8,300 people by 2015. At the same time, more than 40% of the total number of migrants is women [OECD, 2017]. It is obvious that not all women have moved to Korea through the marriage migration channel, but they are quite in demand in the

Korean marriage market. High demand for Russian women is primarily due to the attractiveness of their Slavic appearance. Korean men represent a model of high moral qualities and economic viability for women.

However, such international marriages often face a number of difficulties and challenges. The first, the language barrier. The Korean language is quite difficult, so not all Russian brides know it at a sufficient level. The second, differences in mentality. The third, the extremely high requests from the Russian wives.

The fourth popular destination of marriage migration from Russia is the Middle East. Turkey is the most popular country for the Russian migrants. It is extremely difficult to determine the number of Russian citizens who have moved to this eastern country. However, according to the Ambassador of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Turkey V. Ivanovsky, about 50,000 Russians lived in Turkey in 2009 [Davtyan, 2009: 6]. However, most likely, the real figure is 2—4 times higher. Moreover, the vast majority of migrants are women.

According to the site www.trt.net.tr currently, 60,000 Russians live in Antalya, 95% of which are women. At the same time, about 70% of the Russian women are women who married Turkish men. In total, according to the Embassy of the Turkish Republic in Moscow, there are about 105,000 “Russian wives” in Turkey.

After the complication of political relations between the two countries, Russian women began to actively move back to Russia, taking their children with them. However, when the contradictions were resolved, 1000—2000 “Russian wives” with children returned to Turkey to their husbands¹⁴.

Such a high level of feminization of the migration flow from Russia to Turkey is explained by the extremely high demand for Russian women from the Turks and their high attractiveness for our compatriots. At the same time, Russians often purposefully went to the country to find a husband. Other forms of migration were less frequent in marriage migration. Probably, the social phenomenon “Natasha” was formed for this reason.

Russian women do not just have an attractive Slavic appearance. Modern the Russian women hold more free views in relations with men in comparison with Turkish women, and are often ready to change belief for the sake of the Turkish beloved. In addition, they are good housewives and wonderful mothers. All this makes women and girls from Russia desirable partners for the citizens of Turkey.

However, the Turks are considered attractive young people: beautiful, well-groomed and brutal. They are ready to take responsibility for the family, independently solve complex issues, and take care of its well-being. Therefore, life in Turkey seems to our compatriots beautiful bright Eastern fairy tale.

In reality, it is quite difficult for Slavic girls to get used to and accept many national traditions of this country, to learn quite difficult Turkish and to adapt in the new country. Therefore, unfortunately, many marriages break up in 1—3 years after registration. This simultaneously entails some difficulties in determining the place of residence of the children.

¹⁴ Russian residents of Antalya are returning to Turkey (2017). URL: <http://www.trt.net.tr/russian/iz-rossiiskogo-i-turietskogo-mira/2017/04/03/russkie-zhitieli-antalii-vozvrashchautsia-v-turtsiiu-704887> (accessed: 19.08.2018). (In Russ.)

Thus, despite the high rates of marriage migration, moving to another country for permanent residence is always associated with a number of difficulties that significantly complicate the process of adaptation to the host society that often leads to a break in relations with foreign husbands.

Conclusion

Inclusion of Russia in the international marriage market occurred relatively quickly in the 1990s due to active emigration after the collapse of the USSR. The position of Russia in the international marriage market is determined by the ethno-cultural characteristics of Russian women. The phenomenon of “Russian wives” has become a national brand in the international marriage market. “Russian wife” is a collective image that includes women from Post-Soviet area, but usually only of the Slavic type of appearance. For example, a woman from Muslim regions or ethnic republics of the Northern Caucasus, North, and Siberia in the international marriage market is unlikely to be associated with the “Russian wife”. At the same time, a woman from Ukraine or Belorussia will be more often called a “Russian wife” than a “Ukrainian wife” or “Belorussian wife”.

For many Russian women, marrying a foreigner is a way of migrating abroad. Many of them are ready to go for it, despite the lack of deep feelings and love. This strategy allows you to obtain legal status in the country of migration and then citizenship, which sometimes become the goal of marriage. As a result, many marriages involving Russian women break up after they obtain citizenship of the host country.

The increase in marriage migration from Russia led to the formation and expansion of the infrastructure of marriage migration, the appearing of specialized marriage agencies, professional intermediaries working in the countries of the former USSR and Russia, the operating of many dating sites. However, in parallel with this, a shadow segment was formed, which is the involvement of young women and girls in prostitution and the entertainment industry. This refers to the spread of trafficking schemes from the countries of the former USSR under the guise of marriage emigration.

The geography of marriage migration of Russian women is very extensive and includes many countries of the world. Sometimes these countries are far enough away from Russia and very exotic. We can say that Russian women have mastered the vast geographical space and their marriage migration is sometimes very adventurous in nature and daring in areas. However, the problems of Russian marriage migrants are very similar; first of all, they are faced with a language barrier, differences in mentality, cultural characteristics, complex relationships with husband's parents. It complicates the adaptation and integration of the Russian wives in the host society. Many Russian women, despite the failure of marriages and family relationships, successfully integrate into societies, study the language and remain in host countries, but as a result of women's migration, Russia bears significant losses of the gene pool.

It is possible to formulate the following recommendations for the migration policy of Russia in relation to the marriage migration of women.

1. Russia shall sign special agreements on the regulation of international marriages in order to protect the rights of women abroad. Many agreements between Russia and host countries are aimed to protect labor rights and do not cover the protection of

women's rights, do not regulate the protection of children in international marriages, and do not provide for mechanisms to protect Russian women from violence.

2. The need for control over marriage agencies on the part of the state in order not to allow cases of trafficking. Marriage agencies operating in Russia shall be licensed by the state and report (at least for the first two or three years) on the situation of Russian women whom they have helped to find a groom or husband abroad.

3. Russian need to open especial courses for Russian woman for preparation for life in another country, primarily language and culture courses. Courses shall be open and supervised by Russian consulates and embassies abroad. This will allow having close contact with Russian women and help to support them in matters of integration. In addition, it will remove many problems from Russian diplomats who are often forced to solve the problematic issues of Russian women in international marriages.

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E. Aranda, E. Vaquera IMMIGRANT FAMILY SEPARATION, FEAR, AND THE U. S. DEPORTATION REGIME

IMMIGRANT FAMILY SEPARATION, FEAR,
AND THE U.S. DEPORTATION REGIME

РАЗДЕЛЕНИЕ СЕМЕЙ ИММИГРАНТОВ
И ЧУВСТВО СТРАХА В УСЛОВИЯХ СОВРЕ-
МЕННОГО РЕЖИМА ДЕПОРТАЦИИ В США

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Abstract. In 2018, President Trump changed a long-standing policy of keeping families who cross the United States border together; instead, he ordered that parents be detained separately from children, drawing a national outcry that led to his administration walking back the practice. Drawing on 50 in-depth interviews with undocumented young adults in the state of Florida, USA, we argue that the practice of family separation through immigration policy is not new. We illustrate how our sample's undocumented status puts them at risk for family separation under the current 'deportation regime' that creates a heightened and all-encompassing fear about the possibility of family separation.

Аннотация. Президент Трамп изменил сложившуюся годами практику совместного содержания членов семей, перешедших границу США. Его указом было предписано содержать отдельно детей и родителей. Это вызвало бурю негодования в стране и заставило администрацию отказаться от подобной практики. Опираясь на результаты 50 глубинных интервью с молодыми людьми, которые находятся в штате Флорида, США без документов, мы утверждаем, что разделение семей в практике иммиграционной политики США не является новым феноменом. Мы показываем как статус наших респондентов — молодых людей «без документов» — в условиях современного депортационного режима подвергает их риску быть разлученными с родителями и порождает всеохватывающий страх.

Keywords: family separation, immigration policy, deportation, undocumented immigrants

Ключевые слова: разделение семьи, иммиграционная политика, иммигранты без документов, депортация

In May 2018, the Attorney General of the United States, Jeff Sessions, announced that all adults who arrived at the border would be prosecuted for criminal entry, including those seeking asylum — regardless of whether they arrived with children. Because children cannot be held in criminal detention centers, this zero-tolerance policy meant children were taken from their parents when the parents were sent to jail. In the past, families had typically been kept together in family shelters or released to sponsors under the Flores Agreement¹ and the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act² until they had a court date. As a result of this «Zero-Tolerance Prosecution and Family Reunification» Policy, in a single five-week span from May 5 to June 9, 2018, over 2,300 immigrant children, including infants and toddlers, were separated from their parents by the Department of Homeland Security³. As of June 20th 2018, official reports

¹ Reno v. Flores (91—905), 507 U.S. 292 (1993). Janet Reno, Attorney General, et al. Petitioners v. Jenny Lisette Flores et al. On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, March 23, 1993.

² TVPRA (2013). H.R.898 — Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2013 113th Congress (2013—2014). <https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/898> (accessed: 13.09.2018).

³ Feinstein D. Many Republicans say they oppose family separation. But none have joined our bill. *Washington Post*. June 20, 2018. URL: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldpost/wp/2018/06/20/family-separation/?utm_term=.3a77ebd3c122 (accessed: 13.09.2018).

estimated that 2,053 separated minors remained under the care of Department of Human and Health Services funded facilities⁴.

On June 17, 2018, Laura Bush's op-ed⁵ on the cruelty of separating families referred to these 2,000 children that the Department of Homeland Security had separated from their parents and sent to mass detention centers or foster care in the prior weeks. In a quote reminiscent of one of Martin Luther King's most famous speeches, she stated: «We pride ourselves on believing that people should be seen for the content of their character, not the color of their skin. We pride ourselves on acceptance.» What she omits from her piece is the acknowledgment that this is not a new phenomenon, that unaccompanied minors have been housed in detention centers for some time, and that family separation by immigration policy had been in effect since her husband's presidency.

President George W. Bush's own 2005 «Zero Tolerance» approach to undocumented immigration was a core tenet of Operation Streamline, that imprisoned undocumented immigrants to expedite deportation. This policy sent over 200,000 immigrants to serve federal prison sentences from 2005 to 2009 alone, setting the stage for President Obama to double the number of people to be prosecuted for reentry. The policy also was key to setting the precedent that the Trump Administration expanded as officials separated asylum-seeking parents from their children.

Though the Trump Administration walked back their separation policy after great public outcry, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has long pulled families apart — whether upon arrival, shortly thereafter, or after years of living together in the U. S. The United States' escalation of mass deportations meant the separation of many families for the past two decades. The deportability [De Genova, 2002; 2010] of undocumented immigrants means that the looming threat of family separation is always on the horizon for these families. Drawing on this concept of 'deportability,' we use data from 50 in-depth interviews with undocumented young adults living in the U. S. We illustrate how their undocumented status — i. e. deportability, even under the presumed protection granted by Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (which essentially represents a deferment of deportation), permeates all aspects of their lives by incessantly bringing worry and anxiety about the threat of family separation. We argue that, although the summer of 2018 marked the beginning of physical separation of parents from children immediate to their arrival at the border, the deportation regime of the United States has been in full force for the past two decades.

Immigrant Family Separation in the 2000s

Family separation via deportation gained speed during the Bush Administration and continued into the Obama presidency. During the early to mid-2000s, immigrants interviewed by the first author [Aranda, Hughes, Sabogal, 2014] articulated the terror

⁴ Department of Homeland Security (2018). Fact Sheet: Zero-Tolerance Prosecution and Family Reunification. URL: <https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/06/23/fact-sheet-zero-tolerance-prosecution-and-family-reunification> (June 26, 2018) (accessed: 13.09.2018).

⁵ «Laura Bush: Separating children from their parents at the border 'breaks my heart'.» Washington Post, June 17 2018. URL: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/laura-bush-separating-children-from-their-parents-at-the-border-breaks-my-heart/2018/06/17/f2df517a-7287-11e8-9780-b1dd6a09b549_story.html?utm_term=.97f2ddcfac3c (accessed: 13.09.2018).

that had spread through the immigrant community as the result of ICE's raids and mass deportations. One Colombian immigrant, for example, reported that «Since 9/11 there has been persecution towards immigrants. They [the government] have utilized terrorism to justify the persecution of immigrants. They have confused the word immigrant with the word terrorist.»

Under President Obama's two terms, the threat of separation was still real and brought great distress to children and families — Obama was famously labeled «deporter in chief» by the immigrant-rights community in reference to his record of deportations. During his second presidential term, we interviewed an undocumented young adult who had an order of deportation. He shared that his U.S. citizen daughter's school called him because she had been cutting her hands with her own nails since she found out about his impending deportation. He was due to report to Immigration and Customs Enforcement that Friday, and he explained to us how he and his wife were trying to distract their daughter, but also their plan so that, at least, he would be able to say good-bye to his family. The following is an excerpt of our conversation with Pablo and his spouse:

Pablo: She is still struggling but I'm trying to keep her busy. Right now, she is at the church. Monday and Tuesday, they are doing other stuff. So.

Interviewer: What about Friday?

Spouse: Hm...

Interviewer: What's going to happen on Friday with the girls?

Spouse: When he has to go? I don't know. I don't know. I can't think about it now.

Interviewer: Are they going to go to school or come with you?

Pablo: I think it's better if she comes with us. Then, if she comes out of school and I am gone and not here, and she knows they took me, I think it's going to be worse. Because I didn't even give her a hug or kiss. When I could do it over there. When I'm getting ready to get...

Interviewer: What if you show up at the immigration office in the morning where they take off the ankle bracelet and they tell you your family can't come from here. That your family is not allowed to go to the airport?

Pablo: I don't know what's going to happen there.

Interviewer: 'Cause that is a possibility. They could say, «You are coming with us, you are going to go in our car and your family has to say good-bye here.»

Spouse: That is going to be hard.

Like Pablo and his family, many young immigrants that we interviewed have stories of parents, siblings, extended family, or close friends, being deported. The emotional toll that these separations took on young adults was grave. Cami, who arrived to the U.S. from Colombia at age 3, spoke of the loss of her mother after she was detained and eventually deported:

Cami: Back in 2007, ... we got pulled over and I had previously mentioned she had already been stopped for driving without a license before. This was another one of those times so because of that, because they saw in her record that she didn't have a driver's license and continued to drive, she ended up being arrested that day. Then taken to the local jail and there they saw that she didn't come up in the system 'cause she didn't have any status. She didn't exist. She was transferred to a detention center a few hours away from our house. Ultimately, [she] was deported 4 months later for having no status.

Interviewer: So, can you describe what that day was like for you from the moment that the police stopped you all?

Cami: Yeah it was a Tuesday morning, my mom was going to work and I was going to keep the car to go to my lacrosse practice. And I sort of immediately knew what was happening because the police officer did this crazy turn and came up behind us. I turned to my mom and I'm like... It's one of those where I don't know why he stopped us to be honest. As soon as... before the light turned green, I turned to my mom and I'm like, «Mom, I'm pretty sure we are going to get pulled over,» and she was like, «No, no we are fine». And I'm like, «I think we are». And as soon as the light turned green, the sirens and the police lights went off. And I knew it. So of course, the whole thing I knew my mom didn't have a driver's license but I didn't know fully what that could mean moving forward. So they questioned her, «Where is your insurance, your driver's license?» She couldn't produce insurance for the car and so he decided to arrest her. He asked me if I had a driver's license and I said no. [He] asked if there was someone that could pick me up and I said, «Yes, my dad,» Who thankfully even though he was undocumented, back then, he still had a valid driver's license. So I had to wait for my dad to come pick me up as my mom is driven away in the back of a police car... Honestly, that day, I remember some stuff and some of it is blurry.

Cami could not visit her mother in the detention center because she had no identification to show. She then recalled the day that her mother was deported:

Cami: We knew she was going to get deported. She... we had hired a lawyer and the immigration lawyer... my dad's boss back at the time had an immigration lawyer and took on the case. From everything that happened, we were told that the best-case scenario was for her to send a voluntary departure which is basically her signing her deportation. Because my older sister was now 21 and could petition for her, she could petition for my mom to come back. So we knew it was going to happen. We had purchased her flight back to Colombia 'cause that is what you have to do when you decide you are going to go back.

Interviewer: You got to go to the airport with her?

Cami: No. definitely not. No. so the first time around, they took her there late so she missed her flight or something. Then we had to buy another airplane ticket for her to go back to Colombia and that is when she went and she was there.

Interviewer: Did you get to talk to her before she left?

Cami: Hm... we used to talk through the phone system that the detention center had. That is how we used to communicate... I guess, I don't know if I blocked it out or I don't really remember. Honestly, I don't remember those 4 months of that whole experience. I know she was deported sometime in July from March to July, 4 months... I was really upset 'cause she didn't make it to my high school graduation. She just wasn't present. I couldn't see her. But, right when the lawyer tells you that this is the best option and someone can do the petition to come back. We had hope that that was really the case. And we weren't involved, we didn't really know that much about immigration law like that at that time. That, yeah, I think that feeling I had that I would get to see my mom within a few years whether it was 1 or 2 years.

Interviewer: How long was it until you were able to see her again?

Cami: Hm... I was finally able to see her... after 6 years. For about 12 hours.

Cami's mother did not return to the United States, but they did reunite across the border for 12 hours so they could see each other after a six-year separation. The pain this experience caused was so traumatic that Cami repressed much of her memories from that time.

Tony had also lost his mother to deportation 2 ½ years before we interviewed him. She was arrested for fighting against her abusive boyfriend. Tony was put into the foster care system and eventually received a visa to stay in the country. His mother's deportation meant not only becoming part of the foster system, but also food insecurity and semi-homelessness, part of the larger instability in his life after his mother was deported.

Others heard of the deportation of close friends or their families and feared for their own family units. Their deportability left open the chance that their own families could be separated. For example, Rose, when discussing a family she knew where the mother got deported, explained that the kids live with their dad, and then stated:

...they don't have their mom here. I don't know what I would do if my mom—[trailed off]

To me that's not fair like it shouldn't be like that... don't separate the kids from their moms just because [sic] it's just a piece of paper.

Another participant, Alex, talked about similar fears regarding his undocumented mother:

One of my, a good friend of the family, was riding his bicycle one day to work and you know, he was stopped by a police officer. He didn't know his rights I guess and I don't know how things went down or he ended up being arrested. Since he is undocumented they ended up calling the ICE and he was deported 3 months later. And, he was just riding his bike to work, man. It's... the way that it has been set up is to make you afraid. And yes, I was afraid 'cause that can happen to everybody. It could have been my mother that was riding the street with that bicycle. That fear, I try to turn it to motivation for me to achieve what I want. Which is to not live in fear. For me and my family and community and everybody else.

Alex talks about how deportability is designed to instill fear: «the way that it has been set up is to make you afraid.» This is the link between deportability and the ever-present possibility of family separation. In our data, it wasn't just young adults fearing separation from their undocumented parents. One young woman had nightmares about being handcuffed and taken away from her two-year-old daughter:

I have actually had a dream sometimes of me being handcuffed and my daughter seeing me in court being taken away and being deported. I get afraid of that because I know that my brother and my sister told me they would obviously take her in, that it's not a big deal. But I get worried about that. Once you get deported, it's a ten-year bar you know. How am I supposed to live in another country, support myself, try to fly my daughter to see me? Who is going to come in to take my daughter to me? I'm not going to see my daughter for ten years. That's some scary stuff. That worries me a lot.

These are all interviews with young adults during President Obama's second term. Toward the beginning of the 2010s, Obama directed the Department of Homeland Security to institute prosecutorial discretion in detaining and deporting immigrants [Chishti, Pierce, & Bolter, 2017]. This means that only those who were deemed a threat to public safety were the focus of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) apprehension efforts. Together with President Obama's implementation of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), which gave a deferment of deportation to young adults who met certain criteria, the fear in immigrant communities began to stabilize as the expectation that ordinary persons would be detained or deported dissipated somewhat.

Family Separation in the Age of Trump

Our most recent interviews from 2017 and 2018 for the Immigrant Youth Project — a research study on undocumented young adults living in Central Florida, USA — show how many undocumented young adults saw President Trump's election as a significant shift from previous practice under Obama's second term. President Trump's election has been seen by many as an omen. One participant, Marina, recalled staff asking her to calm crying children at the place she volunteered. When she asked why they were crying, the staff responded, «Well, Trump got inaugurated so to them, their parents automatically got deported in their heads.» Our interviews reveal that this prediction has in fact materialized, seen in our participants' reactions to President Trump's policy changes, especially the President's rescinding of DACA in September 2017. Since then, the young adults we have interviewed describe their lives as marred by the uncertainty of their futures. They fear for their families, but also for themselves. They see their lives as having «expiration dates», referring to when their DACA expires. Though the recent court decisions allowing for DACA renewals represent a glimmer of hope among a sea of uncertainty⁶, the fragility of their 'legal' status is unquestionable — dependent on court rulings that can shift with a day's notice. Under the Trump era, even those whose deportability was paused under Obama, like DACA recipients or TPS recipients, are not only losing protections but becoming a target for deportation.

Regarding the most recent family separations at the U.S.-Mexico border, asylum-seekers who arrive at this border are following the rules this country has laid out — to arrive on our soil and request asylum. The weeks of family separation they already endured will cause levels of trauma for these parents and children that will take years to undo. As Laura Bush's op-ed rightly points out, the long-term effects of internment on the Japanese in the 1940s led them to being twice as likely to suffer cardiovascular disease or die prematurely than those who were not interned — and that's only one example. Researchers and leading professional organizations have reported and denounced the long-term consequences of both internment and family separation more broadly⁷ [Dreby, 2012].

The Republican bills that were voted on during the summer of 2018 as a response to the issue of family separation in the southern border of the U.S. failed to alleviate this suffering. The more moderate one, the Border Security and Immigration Reform Act, was nothing short of a negotiation with a presidential administration that tried to leverage children in exchange for congressional support for other anti-immigrant policies it wants to enact. In exchange for keeping families together it would have eliminated the diversity visa lottery, restrict family-based migration, and allocated \$ 25 billion for a border wall. In addition, the Border Security and Immigration Reform Act prohibited

⁶ State of Texas v. United States of America (1:18-cv-00068).

⁷ American Academy of Pediatrics. AAP Statement on Protecting Immigrant Children. Fernando Stein, MD, FAAP, President, American Academy of Pediatrics. 2017, January 25. URL: <https://www.aap.org/en-us/about-the-aap/aap-press-room/Pages/AAPStatementonProtectingImmigrantChildren.aspx> (accessed: 13.09.2018); American Academy of Pediatrics (2018, June 15). AAP Statement Opposing the Border Security and Immigration Reform Act. Colleen Kraft, MD, MBA, FAAP, President, American Academy of Pediatrics. URL: <https://www.aap.org/en-us/about-the-aap/aap-press-room/Pages/AAPStatementOpposingBorderSecurityandImmigrationReformAct.aspx> (accessed: 13.09.2018); American Psychological Association. 2018, May 29. Statement of APA President regarding the traumatic effects of separating immigrant families. APA Press Release. URL: <http://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2018/05/separating-immigrant-families.aspx> (accessed: 13.09.2018).

the separation of undocumented children from their parents at the border and brought a measure of relief to dreamers by providing them with a path to citizenship. But ultimately, it upheld an immigration policy structure that criminalized immigrants and their children. This «relief» would not stop the separation of immigrant families through deportation of mothers and fathers; it would not prevent the misguided interpretation that asylum seekers that cross the border are criminals; and, it would not prevent the U.S. government from treating them as such. With no fair, comprehensive immigration legislation being proposed, our sample's deportability remains as does its ensuing consequences regarding the prospects of family separation.

Conclusion

In this paper we engage with current and past policies that comprise the U.S. deportation regime, examining how it has affected undocumented young adults and instilled in them an active fear of family separation that is directly tied to their own (and their families') deportability [De Genova, 2002]. Although much public attention was directed to immigrant family separation in the summer of 2018, the mainstream media rarely connected these effects to the deportation machine in effect for the past two decades. Our data, collected during President Obama's second term, reveals that these young adults have vivid memories of being stopped by police, having family members or close friends detained, and in some cases, having their parents deported. Thus, we argue and conclude that U.S. immigration policy for the past two decades has done nothing but separate families.

For about two centuries, the idea that the United States was a «nation of immigrants» has been celebrated both within and from outside the U.S. borders. President Trump's America shows little regard for this idea that has long defined the identity of the country. Though the United States for many years was a model to follow when it came not only to welcoming immigrants but also encouraging immigration, the country can no longer claim this distinction. Anti-immigrant discourse and xenophobia are the principles behind Trump's executive orders and his administration's severe reductions in annual caps on refugee and asylum admissions⁸; the announcements of end dates for the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) program for Nicaraguans, Hondurans, Salvadorans, and Haitians⁹; Trump administration plans to remove citizenship for immigrants found to have used fraudulent methods in the process of becoming naturalized citizens¹⁰; the proposed regulations to deny permanent residency and possibly deport persons

⁸ U. S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (2017). Fiscal year 2017 ICE enforcement and removal operations report. Washington, DC.; U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services. (2017). Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA).

⁹ U. S. Department of Homeland Security. Acting Secretary Elaine Duke announcement on Temporary Protected Status for Haiti [news release]. 2017, November 20. URL: <https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/11/20/acting-secretary-elaine-duke-announcement-temporary-protected-status-haiti> (accessed: 13.09.2018); U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Acting Secretary Elaine Duke announcement on Temporary Protected Status for Nicaragua and Honduras [news release]. 2017, November 6. URL: <https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/11/06/acting-secretary-elaine-duke-announcement-temporary-protected-status-nicaragua-and> (accessed: 13.09.2018); U. S. Department of Homeland Security. Secretary of Homeland Security Kirstjen M. Nielsen Announcement on Temporary Protected Status for El Salvador [news release]. 2018, January 8. URL: <https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/01/08/secretary-homeland-security-kirstjen-m-nielsen-announcement-temporary-protected> (accessed: 13.09.2018).

¹⁰ Taxin A. (APNewsBreak: US launches bid to find citizenship. *Associated Press*. 2018, June 12. URL: <https://apnews.com/1da389a535684a5f9d0da74081c242f3> (accessed: 13.09.2018).

who employed certain public services; the denial of U.S. passports along the southern border¹¹; and the executive order resulting in the separation of children from their parents at the U.S.-Mexico border¹². History will judge the Trump administration for the harsh decisions it has taken, all in the name to reduce not just undocumented, but also legal immigration.

Among Laura Bush's suggestions articulated in her op-ed in response to family separation at the border, the one that resonates the loudest is, «If we are truly that country, then it is our obligation to reunite these detained children with their parents — and stop separating parents and children in the first place.» Ironically, this contradicts her husband's presidential legacy, continued by ensuing administrations. However, the massive national public outcry against the practice of separating families led to a walk back of this policy by the Trump administration. Nonetheless, over 400 immigrant children, as of September 2018, remained separated from their parents¹³, despite a court order for them to be reunited¹⁴. Moreover, even if families are no longer separated at the border, Trump's «deportation force» and the daily fear of family separation among the «deportable» looms.

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¹¹ Sieff K. U.S. is denying passports to Americans along the border, throwing their citizenship into question // *The Washington Post*. September 13, 2018. URL: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/us-is-denying-passports-to-americans-along-the-border-throwing-their-citizenship-into-question/2018/08/29/1d630e84-a0da-11e8-a3dd-2a1991f075d5_story.html?utm_term=.e66484042a1d (accessed: 13.09.2018).

¹² Executive Order No. 13841, 2018. *Affording Congress an Opportunity to Address Family Separation* // *Federal Register*. June 20, 2018. Vol. 83. No. 122. THE WHITE HOUSE.

¹³ Barajas J. More than 400 migrant children remain separated from their parents. Here's what we know // *PBS News Hours*. September 7, 2018. URL: <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/more-than-400-migrant-children-remain-separated-from-their-parents-heres-what-we-know/> (accessed: 13.09.2018).

¹⁴ Ms. L et al v U. S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement et al (2018), U. S. District Court, Southern District of California, No. 18—00428.

MIGRATION

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V. S. Starikov, A. A. Ivanova, M. L. Nee
**TRANSNATIONALISM ONLINE: EXPLORING MIGRATION PROCESSES
WITH LARGE DATA SETS**

TRANSNATIONALISM ONLINE: EXPLORING
MIGRATION PROCESSES WITH
LARGE DATA SETS

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ТРАНСНАЦИОНАЛИЗМ В РЕЖИМЕ
ONLINE: КАК ИССЛЕДОВАТЬ МИГРАЦИОННЫЕ
ПРОЦЕССЫ НА БОЛЬШИХ
МАССИВАХ ДАННЫХ?

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Abstract. The exponential growth of online technologies in everyday life transforms the very contours of social phenomena, processes, and institutions well known to sociologists. We discuss these transformations in two interrelated areas: transnational migration and extremism. First, the paper proposes an approach to examine «transnationalism online» as a subset of transnational migration studies. Second, it presents a critical review of how contemporary scholars study extremist activities and discourse of those who are involved in migration with a special focus on online manifestations of extremism. In a concluding part of the paper we present theoretical and methodological comments on the paths in examining the «dark side» of transnationalism online.

Keywords: transnational migration, transnational practices, extremism, online space, Internet, virtual diasporas

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Аннотация. Стремительное проникновение онлайн-технологий в повседневную жизнь общества видоизменяет привычный облик социальных явлений, процессов и институтов. Авторы статьи рассматривают данные изменения в двух взаимосвязанных исследовательских областях: транснациональной миграции и экстремистской деятельности. Статья раскрывает возможные подходы к изучению «транснационализма онлайн» как особого поля внутри исследований транснациональной миграции и предлагает критический обзор современных исследований экстремистской активности и дискурса акторов, вовлеченных в миграцию. Особое внимание уделяется проявлениям экстремизма в онлайн-среде. В заключении авторы делают выводы о теоретических и методологических перспективах исследования «обратной стороны» транснационализма онлайн через анализ транснациональных практик мигрантов в интернете.

Ключевые слова: транснациональная миграция, транснациональные практики, экстремизм, онлайн пространство, интернет, виртуальные диаспоры

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This paper seeks to achieve two interrelated goals. First, it proposes an approach to examine ‘transnationalism online’ as a subset of transnational migration studies. The basic methodological framework of this paper is to observe ‘transnationalism online’ through the lens of sociology of everyday life as well as in relation to the concept of ‘transnational practices’. Second, the paper presents a critical review of how contemporary scholars study extremist activities and discourses of those who are involved in migration processes with a special focus on online manifestations of extremism. The argument is developed to answer the following questions:

1) What is transnationalism? What conceptual frameworks are the most promising for studying transnational migration in the era of online sociality?

2) How do virtual social spaces allow to observe and to measure transnationalism? How do the Internet and online space more generally constitute, maintain, and transform transnationalism?

3) How does ‘transnationalism online’ provide or prevent migrants’ involvement into extremist activities? What steps should be made to develop research on a ‘dark side’ of ‘transnationalism online’?

Transnational approach in migration studies

There are three basic approaches to the study of migration in the current scholarly production. First, a traditional approach implies analysis of migration as human movements across borders [Jasso, Rosenzweig, 1990; Castles, Miller, 2009]. This approach has dominated the literature in the second half of the 20th century. The second approach, a post-migration studies/dynamic/situation [Martiniello, 2013], is a relatively new trend that suggests analysis of what happens to people *after* they migrate. The third approach involves integration of research perspectives of the first and second approaches with the focus on specific phenomena of *transnationalism* — simultaneous inclusion of migrants in social networks of society of origin and the host society, the constant movement of migrants between different national spaces and everyday worlds, the financial participation of migrants in the country of origin’s economy and their economic activities in the host country. In their social, economic and political circumstances, the majority of migrants who cross borders of the sovereign states and acquire formal legal status of belonging (citizenship or some informal recognition of belonging), usually maintain durable and extensive links to their home countries, families, friends, and larger social circles. Moving across the jurisdictions of nation-states, they can belong to several social spaces at the same time; for instance the receiving country diaspora and the family in the country of origin.

Transnational migration [Faist, 2013, Vertovec, 1999] is a new phenomenon in migration, growing as a result of globalization and regionalization. On the one hand, transnational migration is characterized by migrants’ special social connections: they are simultaneously ‘here and there’, connected with the host community and

the place of departure. New social spaces are crystallized in a way that embraces several local places beyond national borders. Migrants' transnationalism exists in different forms: from diffusion, to sustained organizations and communities. On the other hand, transnational migration involves not only traditional host societies such as the USA, Scandinavia, Germany, but also Eurasian societies that experience new migration flows in the recent decades. The collapse of the USSR has initiated these flows and determined a new social and economic reality in Eurasia and in the entire world.

The idea of transnationalism has weathered many storms and changed its appearance over the years. The very notion of 'transnationalism' has entered into migration studies in the early 1990s and since then it has gained a significant following among professional sociologists who explored the problems of migration [Faist, 2013]. The stream of research on transnationalism emerged with the intent to re-conceptualize migration processes by shifting the emphasis of research efforts from the analysis of dichotomy of the "country of exodus" versus the "receiving country" towards a fully acknowledged transnational perspective (see [Glick-Shiller et al., 1992] for one of the early statements). Transnationalism can be broadly conceived as "the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement" [Basch et al., 1994: 8]. Current scholarship within this field of research widely acknowledges the fact that migration is a dynamic process that encompasses different national and global geographic and cultural ties, and political networks, as well as social structural opportunities open and/or closed for migrants at home and abroad. From this point of view, people moving across countries can be described as transmigrants [Glick-Shiller et al., 1995; Faist, 2000], and their multi-territorial behaviors as 'glocal' or 'translocal' [Giulianotti, Robertson, 2007; Portes, Rumbaut, 2001]. However, there is no evidence that transnational approaches form a coherent theory or a set of theories yet. They can be more adequately described as a perspective for studying cross-border phenomena [Faist, 2010].

A brief history of the concept "transnationalism" is reconstructed by L. Remennick [Remennick, 2002]. The notion of transnationalism was coined with the purpose of a description of the flows of capital and economic resources across and beyond national borders and later adopted for the studies of migration and citizenship. In the 1990s social scientists also debated the historical novelty of transnationalism as an empirical phenomenon. Now it is commonly accepted that contemporary transnationalism, enabled by recent historical developments of cheap means of transportation and communication, is qualitatively different in its scale and impact from transnational networks that existed earlier in history. During the debates some interesting distinctions have been made, for instance between transnationalism-from-above and transnationalism-from-below: the former referring to the activities of global corporations and international organizations, the latter to grassroots transnationalism — activities of small businesses and ordinary people, cultural and economic exchanges and interactions reaching beyond national borders. Further distinctions can also be made, one such example is the distinction between formal and informal aspects of transnationalism. Several puzzles should be solved in order to study transnational migration. While the majority of migration research is based

on methodological nationalism [Wimmer, Glick-Schiller, 2003], changes of migration flows requires changes in theoretical perspective and methodology, as well as in mechanisms of the state regulation. There is not much unification resulting from globalization and regionalization processes, rather the proliferation of everyday worlds [Robertson, 1992]. Therefore transnational migrants simultaneously enter two or more everyday worlds. It seems relevant to rethink the problems of social inclusion and exclusion of migrants, as existing approaches assume homogeneity of migrants' everyday life and/or its congruence with an everyday life of the host community.

Transnationalism can be analyzed within different theoretical frameworks and empirical models. The most basic decision is whether transnationalism should be regarded as a real social phenomenon, amenable to empirical measurement, or it should be considered only as a research perspective, a lens that allows researchers to overcome the limitations of their views on social reality. This social reality would be characterized by a territorial nation-state as the main structural element and the unit of analysis, and would take into account the important processes that take place 'over' and 'outside' the boundaries of these states. In social science literature transnationalism as a phenomenon is often operationalized from the standpoint of networks. In regards to this notion, we follow the first approach, in other words, we consider transnationalism an empirical phenomenon, however, we use elements of the second approach, accepting that nation-state is not a universal unit of analysis.

The rubric of transnationalism embraces quite different empirical phenomena. On the one hand, members of 'old' and 'new' diasporas have institutionalized membership in 'commonalities' and communities, unambiguously identifying themselves as participants of transnational social structures. On the other hand, transnationalism comprises less specific situations that are experienced by almost all migrants such as visiting the homeland for holidays, being in contact with relatives in the country of origin, sending money to them, watching the country of origin's TV programming and Internet production, speaking their mother tongue abroad, and so on. Not all scholars classify these activities as transnational; some see them as deriving from social structures only. We believe, however, that the main theoretical problem lies in the following question: how do macro- and micro- level phenomena and processes interrelate with each other? On the one hand, the macro perspective of transnational migration flows is rooted in the capitalist system of relations, global and regional inequality, and the division of labor in the 21st century. On the other hand, transnationalism is produced and reproduced in everyday life of local groups and communities, in everyday interactions of migrants and host societies. Thus, we face the need to study both social relations and (relatively) independent manifestations of everyday life.

How could everyday practices of transnational migrants be framed and studied as *sui generis* reality, simultaneously independent from and interdependent on institutional social order? This task requires additional analytical tools — namely, those derived from the sociology of everyday life [Goffman, 1983; Sztompka, 2008]. Everyday life is constituted by routine interactions in social contexts; thus, analytics of human interaction is clue to the comprehension of everyday life, including its ongoing

inequalities. Three principles are crucial for the comprehension of everyday interactions. We need to 1) analyze the emotional dynamics of interactions in a variety of contexts; 2) explore what kind of social Self is constituted in social interactions; 3) distinguish between “voluntary” and “forced” social interactions: the former is practiced with goodwill and for social interaction’s sake, while humans are impelled to participate in the latter by the way of production of his/her life which could be rather traumatic (including “lonely crowds” in urban areas). Therefore, sociology of everyday life looks into the issues of social Self and identity as well as the mechanisms of emerging and reproducing social bonds, communities, and networks.

At the same time, everyday life as a reality of interpersonal/social relations could be distinguished from the approaches based on the notion of “culture” (“culture of everyday life”). A similar idea was realized by A. Papakostas in the comparative study of trust and public sphere in Greece and Sweden [Papakostas, 2012]. He treats everyday worlds as specific combinations of social relations with blurred boundaries. As social relations determine those groups, individuals and organizations being recognized as credible or not credible, everyday worlds characterized by different interactional structures get isolated from each other, not because of some intrinsic properties, but due to a particular constellation of relations. For example, migrant workers interact with each other, with the authorities (the police, the Federal migration service), and with the residents of the host society in different ways.

The basic concept for studying transnationalism based on the sociology of everyday life perspective is *transnational practices*. This concept is widely used in scholarly literature, however almost all proposed definitions are quite vague. The typical example is: “transnational ... practices are the nuts and bolts and the glue that hold the system together” [Sklair, 1991: 75]. We adopt the definition of A. M. Stepanov that is a rare exception of this tendency of ambiguity. He argues that “transnational practices are typical (routine for this type of migrant), institutionalized forms of social activity that allow migrants to participate simultaneously in the social life of the country of origin and of the host society, due to being in transnational condition” [Stepanov, 2018: 47—48]. Transnational practices shape transnational phenomena and, at the same time, are shaped by the dynamics of the reproduction of transnationalism in institutionalizing everyday life. The author further makes a distinction between three levels: a) everyday life; b) transnationalism as a formal principle of everyday life; c) practices as institutionalized forms of everyday transnationalism [Stepanov, 2018: 48—49].

Thus, at least one of the possible — and promising — ways to conceptualize transnationalism lies in a theoretical shift from the nation-states and formal institutions to everyday life and transnational practices. This shift helps to solve two important tasks. The first one is to describe and to explain how transnational phenomena exist in everyday life without reducing them to social structures or individual actions. The second one is to inquire into the necessary conditions and elements of interdependence mechanisms between macro- and micro-levels: without knowledge of contingent everyday practices we are not able to estimate their influence on and sensitivity to structural changes in labor markets, migration policies, transportation and communication networks, ideological doctrines, etc.

One of the most crucial problems in applying this framework is that transnational practices can be hardly identified *per se* as they do not evolve as discrete types of actions. In this way, social scientists should recognize the challenges for their traditional methodological approaches [Ruppert, Law, Savage, 2013: 35—40]: by focusing on transactional actors (instead of isolated individual units), by visualization as a method not only of presentation, but of analysis of new data, by continuous time instead of temporality conceived as a series of separate states, and by the analysis of whole population instead of sampling procedures employed in mainstream inferential statistics (see also: [Mackenzie, McNally, 2013]). Taking into account both the new social phenomena and the methodological challenges for studying them, we propose the framework of “transnationalism online”.

‘Transnationalism Online’

The exponential growth of information and communication technologies (ICT) along with the Internet’s penetration into everyday life challenge the necessity of face-to-face co-presence as the most important condition in which transnational interactions can occur. Such an assumption underlies much of transnationalism research but is increasingly undermined by the development of online communicative channels, transnational digital networks, Internet-based transnational identities, communities, diasporas, and fraternities/sororities of compatriots. Contemporary ICT form and organize spaces that extend beyond territorial boundaries. This multifaceted impact of the ICT is often considered in terms of an emergence of new forms of sociality, like virtual diasporas and online-migrants [Axel, 2004; Brinkerhoff, 2009; Diminescu, 2008; Swaby, 2013]. The researchers assume that “the Online” can foster the processes of identity construction since it allows to mobilize, to express solidarity and identity publicly, to exchange material goods, and to participate in transnational political, economic, social, and cultural activities [Adamson, 2012]. In this respect, “the Online” as a *sui generis* reality not only helps to maintain the existing transnational ties but also to actively participate in their formation by involving additional actors, increasing complexity of the social relations, and causing changes in the formation of identities. Thus, a new phenomenon is emerging that we call *extended digital transnationalism*, or simply *‘transnationalism online’*.

Let us turn to a very simple ethnographic illustration. One of the most admirable and highly anticipated sporting events in the summer of 2018 was the FIFA World Cup (Mundial) in the Russian Federation. It has been observed by sociologists that the World Cup is not only a global event but also a quite formal transnational phenomenon. They underline that the vast majority of sports tourists could be considered by social scientists as transnational migrants [Souvik, 2017; Agergaard, 2018]. What has appeared as absolutely novel during the 2018 FIFA World Cup was a profoundly changed structure of “digital environment” [Robins, 2000]. Since the 2014 tournament in Brazil, Internet penetration has grown from 42.3% to 54.5%. Moreover, up to 73% of the total Internet consumption belongs to mobile gadgets. In 2017 an average user spent about 3 hours a day using application environments for everyday social activities. And while the prevailing digital trend of the 2014 World Cup in Brazil was social media, the tournament in Russia has been transformed

into “the World Cup of Mobile”¹, or as we define it in this paper, the World Cup of *Online-driven sociality*.

What is more important than the extensive growth is the emergence and the expansion of new forms of human-computer-human interactions based on artificial neural networks, machine learning, independent learning, deep learning, reinforcement learning, etc. One of the most striking examples is the current ubiquity of virtual assistants. During the 2018 FIFA World Cup the use of AI-based software agents that performed services for individuals was the easiest way of communication between people who spoke different languages. By using mobile devices, tourists had a chance to maintain rather sophisticated conversations using automatic translation services or emotion recognition software. In reality, some tourists in their everyday practices could temporarily fall under the category of transnational migrants belonging both to Russia and the country they came from. At the same time, their intersubjectivities emerged and were maintained by a remote place driven by the everyday practices of those who develop and manufacture software agents. In this fashion, the use of virtual assistants do not limit transnational stance but rather extends it in one way or another. This is how transnationalism online works. To generalize this empirical evidence at a more abstract level, transnationalism theory shows its effectiveness in the studies of international migration because of its ability to take into account uncertainty and ambivalence of the migrants’ social condition, being “here and there” at the same time, while transnationalism online takes into account the fact that social interaction is carried out not only “here and there” but rather “here, there, and somewhere else”; in other words, beyond both sending and receiving countries. In the ultimate way, transnational migrants need no physical presence and co-existence at all to feel themselves a part of any other community (real or virtual), and appeal to the “third party” of transnational migration processes. As we mentioned above, the crucial role here belongs to ICT. Applying Stepanov’s scheme, ICT can be regarded as a tool of re-institutionalization in everyday transnationalism.

What are the implications for studying transnational migration from this perspective? We can identify at least two points related to the existence of extended digital transnationalism as 1) the new form of social co-existence, and 2) an analytical problem. The first point influences the very way social research is organized. The Online is a space where transnational processes can be visualized and documented in their most visible form by means of contemporary methods such as social network analysis (SNA), which allows to literally “map” transnational digital networks. The study of networked links allows to reveal transnational processes as they occur online, and also to shed light on the question of how digital interactions re-define transnational migration. At a more abstract level, these methodological issues are discussed under the rubric of “social life of methods”. The research on social life of methods is devoted to the exploration of how the proliferation of digital data archives challenges and changes traditional positivist views on social research methodology. It is an attempt to provide methodological reflection on the fact that digital data is widely and publicly available, making it possible to study whole populations and large arrays of unstructured data, which are both produced and consumed by the actors

¹ Tan J. Why Russia 2018 is poised to be the World Cup of Mobile. *Digital Market Asia*. June 21, 2018. URL: <http://www.digitalmarket.asia/russia-2018-poised-world-cup-mobile> (accessed: 09.10.2018)

themselves (like in Instagram and similar social networks) [Wyatt et al., 2013; Beer, Burrows, 2013; Gillespie, 2013]. The intuition that guides this approach was expressed by A. Abbott: “the more behaviors are conducted in electronic form, the more often and more things can be measured” [Abbott, 2000: 298].

The second implication belongs to the sphere of formulating and answering new research questions. The development of ICT raises a number of new conceptual questions related to the role of the diasporas, groups, organizations, and social formations. For example, it is an open question whether feelings of ethnic belonging and identity can be realized through transnational “imagined communities” [Anderson, 1983]. As Anderson has shown, the development of mass literature and printed newspapers facilitated by commercialization of printing technology and the emergence of “print capitalism” played a significant role in the development of modern European nationalism by allowing people in distant localities to identify with their compatriots in a unified space and time. In developing this classical insight, it is reasonable to ask whether the nature of “imagined communities” has changed with the advent of the ICT and strengthening of transnational relationships in the age of the Internet and social networks. From the methodological point of view, these conditions raise the question of suitable approaches and methods for the study of digital diasporas and global transnational communities. What are the new forms of the “local”, “national”, and “transnational”, and how is one to take into account in research this multiplicity of interactions that extend beyond borders?

In scholarly accounts, as well as in popular literature, there is a consensus on the crucial role of new information technologies in creating links among migrants, members of civil society, and politicians [Newland, 2010]. As has been demonstrated in a number of papers, these connections have significant impacts on traditional social interactions and may even facilitate the emergence of separate communities of online migrants [Brinkerhoff, 2009; Diminescu, 2008, Swaby, 2013]. Today more and more studies are focused on interrelationships between new technologies and migration processes [Brinkerhoff, 2005, 2006; Diminescu, 2008, Everett, 2009]. These studies introduced new terms, such as “transnational online communities”, “virtual/digital diasporas”, “ethnic online public spheres” [Kissau, Hunger, 2010]. Other research projects aim at studying the construction of migrants’ collective identities and political involvement. It has been shown that diasporas often use social media to create a specific public sphere for support during integration or for filling in the “social void” that occurs when moving to another country [Diminescu, 2012; Ridings, Gefen, 2004]. In regards to this notion, scholars study the importance of online networks as a kind of a “safe space” for migrants’ social interactions where they are able to discuss their identities and, in particular, to express their identities’ hybrid nature [Brinkerhoff, 2009; Swaby, 2013].

Psychological aspects of migrants’ network activities are also quite popular as a research topic among migration scholars. The studies emphasize the role of the world wide web (WWW) as an accumulator of collective memory and also as a space for re-construction of the country of origin’s image and of the migrants’ own identities that is often accompanied by trauma, shame, denial, and displacement [Bernal, 2013; Estévez, 2009]. New information technologies change the experience of migration

by forming (online) nostalgia that provides a sense of belonging and proximity to the country of origin [Estévez, 2009]. Nostalgia is understood as a longing for home, which no longer exists or has never existed [Boym, 2001]. A good illustration of that is the study of the virtual war memorial Awate.com that demonstrates how immigrants act as transnational citizens who build their own history of war, death, and mourning [Bernal, 2013]. New ICT are also being studied in connection to cross-border political mobilization [Brinkerhoff, 2009], and with conflicts and civil wars [Brinkerhoff, 2006]. An example is the research on the Tibetan Buddhist youth's use of new media to build global networks and to construct the image of the Chinese government as an enemy [Drissel, 2008]. The same tools help to produce the structures of transnational communication between the Chinese diaspora and its mainland and to create a favorable image of the "new China" [Ding, 2007]. We should conclude, therefore, that the Internet promotes formation of online spaces that have significant effects on migrants' behavior in host societies.

One of the most recent and promising concepts consolidating the new roles of the Online in establishing and maintaining social ties is an e-diaspora, or e-community². E-diaspora could be identified as a migrant collective that organizes itself and is active online and whose interactions are 'enhanced' by digital exchange [Diminescu, 2012]. E-diaspora is also a dispersed collective, a heterogeneous entity whose existence rests on the elaboration of a common direction, a direction not defined once and for all, but which is constantly renegotiated as the collective evolves. It is self-defined as it grows or diminishes not by the inclusion or the exclusion of members, but through the voluntary process of individuals joining or leaving the collective — simply by establishing hyperlinks or removing them from websites.

To provide solid theoretical grounds for studying 'transnationalism online' we propose to apply the concept of transnational practices in the framework of sociology of everyday life, as it was characterized above. E-diasporas are difficult to grasp as they are unstable 'collectives' being constantly reconstructed by the addition of every new member. Various empirical studies on transnational online communities and virtual digital diasporas identify emergent tendencies and characterize users' multiple experiences. However, they are often unable to answer the following questions: what are temporal and material limitations of interacting online? Are people who interact online acquainted beyond the Internet? Under what conditions could online communication replace face-to-face contacts both in efficiency and emotional value? How do new online practices integrate into or replace existing transnational and non-transnational practices? How does online communication change the discourse and values of people in relation to their everyday worlds and the corresponding problems?

² Those who work within this framework prefer the term 'e-diaspora' to that of 'digital diaspora' because the latter "may lend to confusion given the increasingly frequent use of the notions of 'digital native' and 'digital immigrant', in a 'generational' sense [distinguishing those born before from those born during/after the digital era]" [Diminescu, 2012]. However, in our terminology we use the terms "extended digital transnationalism" instead of "extended e-driven transnationalism" and "transnationalism online" instead of "e-transnationalism". There are two reasons. First, the use of prefix 'e-' is even more confusing as 'e'-technologies could refer to absolutely different spheres (e-governance, e-democracy, e-education, e-finance, etc.). Second, by using the terms "online" and "digital" we want to emphasize that studying transnationalism online should not limit oneself/itself to the only use of WWW and the Internet. It is important to note that the object of transnationalism online is not the 'web-connected transnational migrant', but the "digitally connected and-so-extended transnational migrant".

How do the structures of everyday connections transform: do they become more fragmented, more uniform, more controversial? Answers to these questions demand comprehension of transnational migrants' everyday lives as constantly changing (and possibly conflicting) wholes that are empirically observable as sets of interconnected transnational practices. This perspective allows for a comparative analysis of the reasons why in some cases 'transnationalism online' is effective for collective mobilization, in other cases it is widespread but does not result in actions, and in yet another it is almost absent.

There is a great number of possible questions one can raise using the framework of extended digital transnationalism. In the following section, we will try to demonstrate conceptual and methodological promises of studying extremist activities through the lens of transnationalism online.

Extremism as a 'dark side' of transnationalism online

Transnationalism has a duality in terms of its actual effects: they can be both socially desirable and unwelcome at the same time. Like other social mechanisms, for instance, trust can be either a way to reduce transactional costs or a path to open up corruption opportunities [Papakostas, 2012], transnationalism has two sides: it can both support and prevent extremist activities and ideological radicalization of migrants. Earlier studies of transnationalism emphasized predominantly positive (socially approved) aspects of these connections, namely, financial remittances, cross-border exchanges of goods and services, skill and knowledge transfer, etc. However, transnationalism also has a "dark side" given its potential to foster socially undesirable links and connections among the potential extremists and terrorists, providing the social conditions for ideological contagion and radicalization across the social networks.

The case of Russia is of special interest here as the major migration flows and diaspora activities are related to countries which are often being considered as "recruitment bases" of international terrorism. Transnational migrants from Central Asia and Caucasus who are working in Russia belong to the most vulnerable social groups in the Russian society with highly uncertain socio-economic condition, thus being the "risk group" for ideological radicalization. According to the Federal Security Service of Russia, in 2014—2016 there has been an increasing migration flow from Central Asian countries as well as Azerbaijan to the current conflict zones in the Middle East and Africa (the data is corroborated by the evidence presented by the CIA). Accordingly, the problem of extremism of the inhabitants of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is widely discussed in Russian social science. The major focus of academic attention have been young people who are typically regarded as an insular group encapsulated in intragroup networks and excluded from a wider social space. The "exclusivity" of this imaginary group is explicitly or implicitly derived from socio-psychological characteristics of its members: suggestibility, amenability, lack of experience, etc. The sources of youth's extremist moods are found either in individual actors (concrete people or organizations) or in highly abstract entities. The vivid examples of this discourse are found in such article titles as "Extremism at the Internet", "The Role of Mass Media in Resistance to Extremism," and "Justifications of Terrorism in Mass Media".

However, examination of publications from the Russian Science Citation Index (eLIBRARY.ru) database could demonstrate that current discussion in Russian scholarly literature has reached a kind of 'saturation point'. The main topics and conclusions of the vast majority of articles from 2012 to 2017 are almost identical in both the problem formulation and in the chosen methods and research units. Several basic features could be distinguished. Extremism (or religious extremism) is mainly considered in studies that are focused on Russian citizens from the North Caucasus' regions with a Muslim majority. Moreover, Moscow and St. Petersburg are the most popular research sites because they attract large migratory flows of diverse ethnic and religious composition. Finally, extremist and terrorist ideas are typically presented as attributes of group identity reproduced by virtue of media, the Internet, or some abstract "extremist ideas" as a source of group identification.

We consider conceptual isomorphism of the scholarly publications in Russia an indicator of the theoretical and methodological deadlock in the field of migration research and, in particular, in studying migrants' extremism. This situation, in our view, results from three interrelated theoretical assumptions.

First, the "dissemination of [extremist] ideas" is conceived as localized in space. As a consequence, social scientists confine themselves in administrative boundaries of cities, regions, countries, and thus are ultimately bound to make conclusions based on the "specificity" of a particular place (e.g., "the city of Nizhny Novgorod as an environment for extremist discourses" or "destructive migration processes under the conditions of Dagestan's multi-confessional composition"). However, spatial dimension does not play a crucial role in many cases: online spaces help their users to become aware of their migrant status even when this status is not formally defined (in the Russian publicist literature the term "internal emigrant" has long been in existence). Yet it should not be assumed that geographic dimension has completely lost its significance: physical space gains its importance to the extent that it shapes boundaries of socio-cultural space and continues to exert influence on institutionalization of individual experience. Any individual hypothetically has access to all the information on the Internet; however, the boundaries of his/her cultural experience are largely determined by spatial constraints: geographically and historically conditioned language abilities, possibilities of regular interactions with other actors, technical limitations, etc.

Second, the researchers are disposed to conceptual reduction of various phenomena to the notion of "target audience" of extremism (e.g., "determinants of extremist activity among youth migrants") thus falling into the 'methodological groupism' (see criticism of methodological groupism by R. Brubaker in relation to the studies of ethnicity and nationalism [Brubaker, 2002]). A group (ethnic, religious, professional and so on) exists only in a specific social context. If the researcher initially seeks to study, for example, an ethnic group, the results of the analysis will inevitably show group ethnicity as something integral and different from other ethnicities and their groups. The rejection of groupism presupposes dissimilar perspective that takes into account broader social processes: group identifications are considered shifting with actors open and creative in the construction of boundaries. In his criticism of methodological groupism, Brubaker points out the necessity of addressing the resources of situational approaches such

as ethnomethodology [Brubaker, Loveman, Stamatov, 2004] and frame analysis [Brubaker, Cooper, 2000]. It should be admitted that several scholarly papers have considered radicalization of individuals not as members of immutable groups but as actors involved in the broader social processes [Starodubrovskaya 2015a, 2015b, 2016; Vasilyeva, Mayboroda, Yasaveev, 2017]. The hypotheses formulated in these papers are fruitful for understanding the migrants' network trajectories in Russia; however, they need to be tested and re-framed for application tailoring to various social contexts of extremist discourses and activities.

Third, Russian-language scholarly publications on extremism typically contain the methodological fallacy of violating the causality element of research. This fallacy results in replacing causal explanation with causal description [Rezaev, 2015], as well as in substitution of analytical procedures by pseudo-synthesis. Instead of analyzing specific mechanisms of the transformations of values of individual and organizational actors, scholars endow some arbitrary concepts with agency to produce formulations such as "mass media as the realization of verbal extremism". These formulations allow, at best, to fix certain relationship between extremist discourse and social structures and processes that determine it. Even if this relationship exists, however, the formulation is not only theoretically feeble, but also inefficient for practical recommendations for the prevention of extremist (or considered to be extremist) ideas' dissemination. As a consequence of this conceptual weakness, political decisions for the administrative regulation of discussions in the Internet emerge (e. g., in Kazakhstan and in Russia). These decisions are implemented by blocking specific websites, which has little effect for both technical and social reasons. We believe that this failure is caused by the fact that the subject of extremist discourse is not personified and not localized. It can take concrete organizational forms, yet in general it is "dissolved" in social actions and interactions; that is why any blocking of a website should exert pressure on the real source of the extremist discourse, otherwise it will be circumvented. Nevertheless, social actions and interactions eventually take institutionalized forms that could be identified and traced on the basis of publicly accessible online data.

In accordance with these assumptions, there are no research projects involving Russian-language scholars that systematically apply theoretical and methodological tools of social and data sciences for the analysis of transnational (online) spaces. There are however several studies of mobile phones and the Internet communication of labor migrants in Russia that demonstrate their active involvement in network interactions [Rezaev, Lisitsyn, Stepanov, 2014; Varshaver, Rocheva, Ivanova, 2017]. This lack seems to be a serious omission when we compare the condition in Russian social science with the developments of its European and North American counterparts.

As it was argued above, the framework of transnationalism online is especially relevant for the study of international terrorism, since it takes into account the fact that social interaction in the field of extremist activity is carried out not only "here and there" but rather "here, there and somewhere else", i. e. beyond both sending and receiving relevant groups, communities, and countries. Terrorist organizations actively use virtual spaces for coordinating their activities and recruiting new members and agents. In so doing, they do not only rely on secure means of communication (Tor, Telegram, Onion,

etc.), but also interact online in their everyday lives, perhaps, leaving behind digital “traces”. The latter might sometimes carry indirect indicators of extremism that can be found in public segments of the Internet by looking at seemingly “neutral” open public data.

In the recent decades more and more attention is being paid to the interactions of migrants not only out of scholarly concerns, but rather because of the increasing recognition of specific security risks inherent in these interactions. Respectively, a quite large number of studies in different disciplines have been devoted to the spread of extremism and terrorism through the Internet and social networks and to ideological radicalization in a virtual space. Thus, in 2017 a special issue of *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* was dedicated to these issues (Volume 40, 2017 — Issue 1: Terrorist Online Propaganda and Radicalization), as well as a special section of *Critical Studies on Terrorism* in 2015 (Vol. 5, No. 3, December 2012: Special Section: Terrorism and Contemporary Mediascapes). There are also important discussions of ‘cyberterrorism’ and responses to it [Carlile, Macdonald, 2014; Reducing Terrorist..., 2013; Council of Europe, 2008].

One of the leading figures in this area, M. Conway [2005a, 2005b, 2006, 2007] whose research is focusing on how new media are used to organize terrorist acts, has outlined six tasks as the crucial developments in the field [Conway, 2016]. They are:

- analysis of different types of digital extremism, not only jihadi-type,
- focus on comparison across online platforms, individuals, ideologies, proximity to conflicts, gender, extremist groups, languages,
- deepening of the analysis by combining digital data analysis with interviewing and online-ethnographies,
- upgrading of the studies by utilizing the opportunities of data analysis,
- strengthening interdisciplinarity,
- more focus on gender dimension of extremism.

The brief review of the research streams demonstrates that studying the problem of extremism through the lens of transnational approach is becoming more and more popular. At the same time, there still exist obvious drawbacks and certain problems in research practice. The majority of studies of migrants’ behavior on the Internet use qualitative/ethnographic methods and are focused on individual websites. The drawbacks of this methodological trend could be illustrated by the studies of Awate.com [Bernal, 2013], Somalinet.com, TibetBoard [Brinkerhoff, 2006, 2012], as well as a small number of MySpace pages and blogs [Drissel, 2008]. These studies cannot claim a large scope or a wide external validity of research. However, one of a few projects that fills this gap in research is the Atlas of Electronic Diasporas [Diminescu, 2012]. The researchers investigated 27 diaspora groups using online cartographic methods of forming corpora and studying geography and occupations in the diasporas [Ben-David, 2012; Kumar, 2012; Mazzuchelli, 2012]. This project demonstrates an innovative approach to the analysis of diasporas as hybrids of electronic and physical spaces. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the number of websites studied for each of the 27 cases is rather small (300—500 units). Moreover, the authors intentionally include only those websites that are directly related to the migration process. Therefore, despite the fact that these (and many other) authors work on the connection between the transnational perspective, the threats of extremism, and the

new information technologies, the empirical studies do not cover the entire spatial complexity and intricacy of existing networks.

Conclusion

International social science has achieved noticeable success in studying online practices of actors involved in the migration process. At the same time, the complexity of the subject and the large body of diverse empirical findings provide grounds for the conclusion that we are still far from a satisfactory comprehension of 'dark sides' of transnationalism online, both in conceptual integrity and methodological tools.

The overall idea of this paper is to present theoretical and methodological framework of transnationalism online as potentially fruitful and promising analytical scheme. We also intend to stimulate a discussion and in some ways inspire social analysts to work on conceptualization of the new empirical and methodologically complex phenomena. Therefore we would like to formulate several proposals that could possibly be a starting point for such a discussion. These proposals are developed within the framework of sociology of everyday life as applied to the study of transnational (online) practices in order to promote the acquisition of new knowledge about the 'dark side' of transnational processes online.

1) Administrative boundaries are often redundant when formulating a research problem. The users (who are predominantly migrants, internal and external, of the first, second and third generations) are able to and do expand the space of social interactions through information and communication technologies. This space however is partly determined by physical space. That is why a transnational approach seems to be so productive in the analysis of migrants' extremist activities.

2) Scholars should avoid framing social actions and interactions in terms of preexisting social groups. In this respect it seems promising to apply the concept of "transnational practices". Practices are discrete empirically fixed types of activity that are constituent elements of migrants' everyday lives. The analysis of transnational practices helps to move from causal description to causal explanation in answering the question of why the same practices are effective/widespread in one case and ineffective/rare in other cases.

3) Practices (user's actions and interactions) are not the result of individual choice or structural conditions only. They are determined by migrants' transnational condition, institutionalized in the everyday life while partly shaping it in its own turn. Therefore, we believe that one of the most promising concepts and subjects for studying the 'dark side' of transnationalism is 'transnational (online) practices of network interactions'.

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WORK INTEGRATION SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE THROUGH STRUCTURAL AND SEMIOTIC TRANSFORMATIONS

WORK INTEGRATION SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE THROUGH STRUCTURAL AND SEMIOTIC TRANSFORMATIONS

СОЦИАЛЬНЫЕ ПРЕДПРИЯТИЯ ТРУДОВОЙ ИНТЕГРАЦИИ В ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОЙ И ВОСТОЧНОЙ ЕВРОПЕ В УСЛОВИЯХ СТРУКТУРНО-СЕМИОТИЧЕСКИХ ТРАНСФОРМАЦИЙ

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Abstract. The central question addressed is how the structural and semi-otic contexts, seen from the perspective of the cultural political economy, of the selected post-communist societies of East-Central Europe (Croatia, Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Poland) have affected the historical development and contemporary situation of social entrepreneurship focused on the integration of the disadvantaged social groups in the labour market (work integration social enterprises (WISEs)). Based on secondary data, surveys, semi-structured interviews and focus groups with the stakeholders from the transnational project INNO WISEs, we identify both the communist and post-communist transformations as mostly unfavourable for WISE, while the crucial factor contributing to their selection as a viable option after 2004 has been the external impact of the European Union-related structures and discourses.

Keywords: social entrepreneurship, disadvantaged groups, WISE, East-Central Europe, cultural political economy, social structure, social discourse

Introduction

The present paper addresses work integration social enterprises (WISEs) in the post-communist societies of East-Central Europe. Throughout Europe, WISEs are playing a vital role in facing contemporary societal and environmental challenges. While combining economic activities with specific social and governmental dimensions, they

Аннотация. Авторы исследования с позиций культурной политической экономики рассматривают влияние структурно-семиотических особенностей посткоммунистических стран Центральной и Восточной Европы (Хорватия, Чешская Республика, Словения, Польша) на историческое развитие и текущее положение социального предпринимательства, работа которого ориентирована на интеграцию социально незащищенных групп на рынке занятости (т.н. «социальные предприятия трудовой интеграции»). В исследовании использованы вторичные данные, данные опросов, полужформализованных интервью, а также фокус-групп с участием представителей международного проекта INNO WISEs. Авторы утверждают, что и коммунистические и посткоммунистические трансформации являются скорее неблагоприятными для функционирования социальных предприятий трудовой интеграции. Вместе с тем, после 2004 года немаловажным фактором, влияющим на отбор социальных предприятий трудовой интеграции, является внешнее влияние организационных структур и дискурсов, связанных с Европейским союзом.

Ключевые слова: социальное предпринимательство, незащищенные слои населения, социальные предприятия трудовой интеграции (WISE), Центральная и Восточная Европа, культурная политическая экономика, социальная структура, социальный дискурс

can encourage innovative ways of employing and integrating disadvantaged people¹ [A map of social enterprises, 2015]. With their impact on social cohesion and inclusivity, their role in mitigating social exclusion and poverty, as well as promoting innovative approaches to respond to global market needs, they have gained increased attention and support from the general public, academia, and economic actors. However, despite the common structural incentives at the EU level, resonating with adjusted legislation, business and civil initiatives, WISEs are merely a compilation of various national characteristics [A map of social enterprises, 2015]. The historical and political aspects of European regions have substantially influenced cultural, economic, and social activities [Cooney et al., 2016]. Accordingly, WISEs in East-Central Europe are lagging behind the successful performance of WISEs in Western Europe. While most of East-Central Europe was at the semi-periphery of the Western part in the 19th century [Adam et al. 2005], the consolidation of communist ideology after World War II represented a tremendous impediment to the development of social entrepreneurship. As Marković et al. emphasise [Marković et al., 2017], the emergence of the civil sector was delayed, as repressive regimes suppressed and marginalised civil society. Often, its activities were shadowed by the label of quasi-governmental agencies, severely controlled by the communist party [Bežovan, Zrinščak, 2007; Ciepielewska-Kowalik et al., 2015; Marković et al., 2017: 141]. With the process of democratisation, decentralisation, and the transformation of social welfare in the late 1980s and the 1990s, WISEs were given impetus [Ciepielewska-Kowalik et al., 2015; Marković et al., 2017]. However, one can find different levels of developmental performance even within the East-Central European region, which is due to distinctive pre-communist past, different communist regimes, i. e. Stalinism or Titoism, and transition paths.

Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to place the development of WISE in the post-communist East-Central European countries in a broader perspective of interrelated social change: occurring on the one hand on the level of social structures and on the other on the level of discourses or social semiotics. Nowadays, WISEs are the predominant form of social enterprises in East-Central Europe, and perform under the following criteria, at a minimum: a) private and autonomous enterprises operating on the market; b) disadvantaged workers have employee rights under national labour legislation; c) core mission is the integration through work of disadvantaged people; d) compliance with a minimum threshold of disadvantaged workers over total workforce [A map of social enterprises, 2015: 122]. One can find different types of WISEs differentiated on the basis of a) type of subsidies (permanent, temporary, self-financing); b) type of employment offered to disadvantaged groups; c) intensity of training of working skills; d) level of encouraging the sense of citizenship and empowerment (the extent of inclusion of disadvantaged groups into structures of enterprises); e) level of working integration and destigmatization; f) integration goals; g) type of training [ŠENT, 2014: 12—13].

This paper intends to demonstrate how a particular position of the branch of social entrepreneurship, explicitly designed to integrate deprived social groups in the labour market, has been affected by two major social transformations in East Central Europe

¹ Social enterprises and the social economy going forward (2016). URL: https://ec.europa.eu/growth/content/social-enterprises-and-social-economy-going-forward-0_en (accessed 20.09.2018).

referring to structural and semantic changes: first from (typically) semi-peripheral modernising traditional societies to the communist style modernisation and second from the communist to post-communist social order. In addition, we will observe how the very concept of WISE entered the discourses in these countries under the combined impacts of European integration, neoliberal globalisation and accelerated technological development — and how these discourses are linked to further structural transformations.

In terms of structural change, our analysis draws from a rich sociological tradition dealing with structural and functional differentiation of the increasingly complex modern social systems. While classical accounts in this topic have been already summarised and upgraded by Talcott Parsons' [Parsons, 1975] structural functionalism, significant further advances have been provided by more recent attempts by Niklas Luhmann [Luhmann, 1999] to observe the modern society as increasingly differentiated into autonomous functional subsystems, such as the economy, politics, science, religion, mass media, education, etc., which are only able to observe themselves and their environments (and respond to their observations) from their own particular perspectives.

In these terms, WISE can be understood primarily as a complex relationship between the market principles of the economic subsystem and the common (public) goods that are supposed to be provided by the political subsystem — but also combined with the principles of social solidarity and self-organisation linked to civil society. In order for WISEs to successfully merge their economic and social mission, enabling to make profit and sustain solidarity and cohesion in society, there is a need for special types of actors within the social economy, called relation subjects [Archer, Donati, 2015]. They can produce and provide common goods (trust among people, cooperation, collaboration, etc.) through emergent social relations. In that regard, WISEs can be seen as the emergent example of relational differentiation, representing the contemporary alternative to functional differentiation [Donati, 2001: 25—26].

The structures within which WISEs operate, including self-organisation within the civil society, cannot be seen as inherently inclusive, 'good' or at least neutral, but more as a place of struggles between different actors to establish and maintain certain hegemonies in classical Gramscian terms [Gramsci, 1971].

This becomes even clearer when we link social structures to discourses. (Self) observations and (self)descriptions of and by various social (sub)systems and the corresponding individual and collective agents are far from neutral: different social, economic, and political imaginaries are (re)produced through social discourses significantly affected by the unequal access of various social actors to different resources, such as power, money or influence. Based on Bob Jessop's cultural political economy, one may thus see the co-evolution of social structuration and social semiosis as determined by the on-going processes of variation in the discourses and practices, selection of particular discourses, retention of the resonant discourses, their discursive and material reinforcement, and finally the selective recruitment, inculcation, and retention of social agents on this basis [Jessop, 2009: 8—9].

By deploying the abovementioned theoretical frameworks, the present paper offers an interpretation of the exhaustive data obtained through the research conducted

within the transnational project funded by the Programme Interreg Central Europe, entitled Technologies, Competences and Social Innovation for Work Integration Social Enterprises (INNO WISEs) and a range of other secondary sources. The research methods within the project included a comparative social survey and semi-structured interviews with the WISEs representatives, as well as focus groups with a broader range of stakeholders (from WISEs, the local communities, national authorities, small and medium enterprises, experts, civil society, and the general public). In that regard, we intend to explain why WISEs have only quite recently become a relevant concept of the economic, political and social imaginaries in East Central Europe despite their deeper historical roots and what factors are most likely to shape their future structural-semiotic co-evolution.

The first major transformation: establishing the communist style modernisation

In a historical perspective, East-Central Europe is far from a homogeneous regional entity. It has consisted of various ethnic and linguistic groups and has been ruled by different political elites and powers. However, one can find numerous similarities within the region, when compared to its Western counterpart [Mucha, undated]. With the Czech lands as the only significant exception, the countries of East-Central Europe can be seen as late modernisers during their pre-communist period — when compared to the Western European core modernisers [Adam et al. 2005]. Straggling after the core, East-Central Europe was economically underdeveloped as a consequence of the prolonged transition from feudalism to capitalism, persisting agrarian economy and subsequent relative absence of indigenous upper urban classes; all these combined with the hindered struggle for constructing national identity and political sovereignty [Davies, 1996; Mucha, undated].

In structural terms, this implies the delayed growth of functional differentiation. From this perspective, the rise of the capitalist economy, which took place from the second half of the 19th century, can be seen as the growing autonomy of the economic subsystem from the traditional social bonds, typically expressed in terms of inherited social statuses, religious values and norms, traditional loyalties and solidarities, etc. In addition, the territory was severely politically dependent on foreign political forces, causing a delayed growth of autonomous political structures [Davies, 1996; Mucha, undated]. The territories of East-Central Europe mostly belonged to three major empires: Prussia/Germany, Austria (Austro-Hungary) and Russia — lacking an autonomous political organisation of their own before the First World War. The lack of their own tradition of statehood (being without their nation states despite national aspirations or obtaining them only after the First World War) clearly characterised the prevailing attitudes towards politics. It was easy to observe the state and authority with suspicion, as something foreign or even hostile.

In the social atmosphere of grounding national identity on the basis of ethnic roots and culture in opposition to the influences imposed from above, the social economy started to flourish. With the aim of mobilising the prevailing population, i. e. peasants, into a national community, especially the intelligentsia aimed to encourage specific forms of economic and social cooperation. In that regard, the critical role was played

by the Roman Catholic Church, being a protagonist in the development of charity and related social activities. Another impetus to social economy was given by the bourgeois revolutions in 1848, which established freedom of association as a classical constitutional right and legal norms regulating the foundation of associations and other forms of association of people on the basis of common interests [Borzaga et al., 2008; Spear et al., 2010: 12—14]. In Slovenia, and in other East-Central European countries, cooperatives performed on the basis of merging the principles of economic security, social freedom, and political participation [ibid.].

Activities within the social economy can be seen as the booster of the emerging third sector or civil society, but again with clear limitations:

- they mostly lagged behind the core European modernisers in terms of self-organisation abilities and freedom from political constraints and even repression;
- in many cases, especially in Poland, Slovenia, and Croatia, it was strongly dominated by the Roman Catholic hegemony in institutional and ideological terms.

The initiatives of pre-communist social entrepreneurship can be understood in this context. Although the concept as such did not exist (in Europe, it first appeared in Italy after 1990) [Defourny, Nyssens 2010], its manifestations could be observed in various territories of East-Central Europe. As has been noted, 'already in the 19th century entities that could be characterised as such enterprises operated on Polish lands in the Russian, Prussian and Austrian sector. These were, among others, agricultural societies, people's banks, cooperatives, loan societies'².

In the Austro-Hungarian Empire, as argued by Hunčová: 'co-operatives were regulated by a specific law of 1873 which was subsequently revised in 1903. Every type of co-operative was a binary, autonomous, self-governed, voluntary, mutual, self-help, open, etc. body' [Hunčová, 2004: 216]. In the Czech lands, a more advanced industrialised economy led to even more developed cooperatives as a form of social entrepreneurship in the period from 1847 (when the first cooperative was formed) to 1938 (when Czechoslovakia lost its sovereignty) [ibid.]. To a significant extent, the Czech examples were followed in the Slovenian part of Austro-Hungary, where the first cooperative was established in 1856 and the movement was strongly influenced by Janez E. Krek and his Christian-social doctrine [Kožič, 2009; Kemperle, 2017]. Until World War One, the social economy encompassed an extensive network of associations, cooperatives, charity organisations, trade unions and professional organisations and unions, while the roots of social economy organisation can be traced back to medieval history. The cooperative societies grew into a mass social movement, emerging as a defence mechanism of farmers, workers and craftsmen against the growth of capitalism³. For the Hungarian part of the monarchy that also included Croatia, in contrast, the authors do not report such a rich cooperative movement⁴ [Gabor Szabò and Alexandra Kiss, 2004].

In the pre-communist period, the emerging social entrepreneurship assumed three major functions in relation to the three subsystems, namely economy, politics/state, and civil society:

² INNO WISEs 1223 Interreg Central Europe Deliverable 1.1.4 Regional Report Poland 2018. P. 1.

³ INNO WISEs 1223 Interreg Central Europe Deliverable 1.1.4 Regional Report Slovenia 2018. P. 12—14.

⁴ Cf. INNO WISEs 1223 Interreg Central Europe Deliverable 1.1.4 Regional Report Croatia 2018.

- Towards the economy: the emerging capitalist markets and the final decay of the old order with its relative predictability generated increasing uncertainties that started to be addressed through new organisational forms in the economy, most typically the cooperatives: partly as a new response to the new challenge, partly as something legitimised by the older historical traditions⁵.
- Towards politics: due to the lack of independent statehood, cooperatives 'assumed the roles of non-existent public institutions, bolstering the national spirit and furnishing educational and social support' [Les, 2004: 186], for example in Slovenia and Poland before the First World War.
- Towards civil society: the seeds of social entrepreneurship were often linked to the Roman Catholic religion and ideology as a part of Christian social teachings, emphasising their perspective on social solidarity [Kozič, 2009]. As such the forms of social entrepreneurship also contributed to the maintenance of the hegemony of the Roman Catholic Church and its teachings.

If we link these structural conditions to discourses applying the apparatus of the cultural political economy, we can see the emerging communist discourses before the Second World War only as a *variation*, i. e., as an alternative to the established imaginaries of social entrepreneurship usually dominated by the Christian-social ideologies. While certain aspects of imaginaries were shared between the communists and the Christian-social thinkers (especially their negative views towards capitalism, i. e. the growing autonomy of the economic subsystem) and at least short-term alliances could happen among the actors/agents, they were typically positioned on the opposing sides. Learning from the Leninist/Stalinist version of the communist ideology, the East-Central European communists typically saw the highly centralised state as the principal tool for their goals (unlike, for example, their Italian counterpart Antonio Gramsci, who placed more hope in attaining the hegemony over the civil society). As such, they were reluctant towards any kind of social and economic (or even more so political) self-organisation that takes place beyond the direct control of the state.

The *selection* of the communist political, economic, and social imaginaries could only happen in East Central Europe with the total collapse of the old social orders caused by the Second World War. After that, however, the progress to the subsequent evolutionary stages that supported the selected discourse with the corresponding structures was quite swift. Through the assumed political control of the state, its institutions, including the educational and mass media subsystems, the communists took extra care to provide its *retention*. Further *reinforcement* was provided in a relatively brutal way often through direct oppression against any potential competing discourses and actors linked to them. Finally, the processes of *selective recruitment* enabled the reproduction of the dominant discourses and the maintenance of the established structures through the actors expressing loyalty to the officially supported communist ideas.

In structural terms, the key result of the communist transformation as a (selective) modernisation from above was the domination of the political subsystem over the rest of the society. The autonomy of *both* the economy and the civil society was strongly

⁵ INNO WISEs 1223 Interreg Central Europe Deliverable 1.1.4 Regional Report Poland 2018. P. 1; INNO WISEs 1223 Interreg Central Europe Deliverable 1.1.4 Regional Report Slovenia 2018. P. 12—14.

limited, since both free-market entrepreneurship and bottom-up solidarity and self-organisation were almost completely abolished. This was directly reflected at the end of autonomy of cooperatives and other forms of social entrepreneurship.

As observed for Czechoslovakia by Hunčová [Hunčová, 2004], the previous co-operative law was abolished, and cooperative ownership became socialist after 1948. That implied the loss of cooperatives' democracy (the managers were installed by the Communist Party), mutuality and self-help (under a centrally planned economy), voluntary nature (mandatory membership) and autonomy (under total politics) [Hunčová, 2004: 216]. At that time, Polish cooperatives also ceased to be autonomous players and were turned into quasi-state agencies⁶ [Les, 2004: 187]. A slightly different situation can be observed in the case of Slovenia (and Croatia). The secession from Stalinism and the introduction of the so-called 'worker's self-management' within the communist political system represented a critical structural trend inducing a period of crisis. It enabled new variations of discourses as well as their proliferation and retention [cf. Jessop 2009]. At least certain limited discussions and consultations regarding wider social issues, such as social conflict, public opinion, civil society, etc., were allowed in order to legitimise the specific type of communism. Even demonstrations against the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia were encouraged. The development of civil society thus begun even before the dissolution of Yugoslavia. As has been argued [Spear et al., 2010: 13], certain civil society organisations had been initiated in 1974, and their number increased between 1975 and 1985. At least at a declarative and superficial level, the promotion of such organisations was even more intense than in the 1990s, i. e. in the period after the immediate change of the political system [Borzaga, Galera, Nogales, 2008, in *ibid.*].

Nevertheless, the social economy was still hindered under socialism. In Yugoslavia, self-management socialism did allow certain autonomy from the direct state control, but the autonomous self-organisation in terms of social entrepreneurship was severely limited. The establishment of the communist regime substantially broke with the tradition of a strong and developed social economy. Many functions and activities of that sector were included in the public sector, while funds were nationalised or abolished. The tendencies towards collective responsibility and self-organisation observed before World War II were hindered by the patronising role of the state [Spear et al., 2010]. In some countries, work integration organisations intended for the people with disabilities still operated but in the context of communist ideology. In Croatia and Slovenia, for instance, there was a tradition of organisations employing and taking care for disabled in the communist regime, but with no direct connection to social entrepreneurship [Marković et al., 2017].

The second major transformation: from communist to post-communist social order

Of course, anti-communist, pro-Western, pro-democratic, liberal (counter)discourses were present during the communist times as *variations*. However, they were *selected* in East-Central Europe, only when this was enabled by a set of structural conditions,

⁶ INNO WISEs 1223 Interreg Central Europe Deliverable 1.1.4 Regional Report Poland 2018.

including the utter failure of the Soviet-style economic system, a variety of international factors, comparatively high educational levels of the local populations with the development of urban middle classes, etc. (It is not our purpose here to provide any exhaustive list of structural conditions.) With the shifts in political power from the 1980s to the 1990s and the corresponding major democratic and market-oriented reforms in all East Central European countries, as well as their membership in the Euro-Atlantic integrations, the *retention* of these discourses as the dominant ones has clearly gained sufficient structural support.

From their beginnings, post-communist transformations in East-Central Europe have been seen as transitions from authoritarian (and partly totalitarian) communist regimes to liberal democracies based on multi-party democracy and free market economy. From the perspective of structural change supported in the new dominant discourses, this implied support for further functional differentiation in terms of higher autonomy of various subsystems — especially of the economy and civil society from politics. The sociological theories of structural and functional differentiation were typically developed in modern Western societies to describe, analyse, and interpret the status quo, while in East-Central Europe they have gained a normative-critical orientation: free market economy and autonomous civil society were not seen so much as given facts but more as normative goals in the literature dealing with the topic [cf. Bernik, 1994; Hein, 2011; Makarovič, 1996]. To this one may also add the requirement of ‘liberating’ the political subsystem from ideological prescriptions and turning it into a Western-style comparatively free game of various interests [Golob, Makarovič, 2017].

However, neither the emerging dominant discourses, nor the corresponding structures established at the beginnings of the post-communist transitions favoured WISE or social entrepreneurship in general. While the dominant discourses at the national levels (also under the transnational, EU influence) supported autonomous self-organisation within civil society, they did not link it to entrepreneurship. The latter was supposed to belong to another autonomous sphere — that of the free market economy. Evidently, the emphasis on free market competition beyond the social concerns was most obvious in the countries that adopted shock therapy reforms [cf. Lipton, Sachs, 1990]. However, even in the countries that were more cautious while adopting the market reforms and were quite reluctant regarding deregulation, such as Slovenia [Šušteršič, 2009], it was the state and the *macro*-level neo-corporatist social dialogue that was supposed to provide sufficient social stability and solidarity [cf. Stanojević, 2012] — neither of them was seen as linked to entrepreneurship. According to Hunčová, micro-economic solutions to social problems have been ‘strange to both socialism and capitalism in the Central and Eastern European countries’ [Hunčová, 2004: 218].

Support for civil self-organisation combined with a lack of connection between the entrepreneurial and social dimension can be illustrated by the case of Poland. The country was characterised by the impressive growth of foundations and associations⁷. In contrast, the rich traditions of co-operatives were initially seen as discredited and they were rejected from the neo-liberal market perspective [Les 2008]. A similar problem could be noticed for the Czech Republic, where co-operatives were transformed

⁷ INNO WISEs 1223 Interreg Central Europe Deliverable 1.1.4 Regional Report Poland 2018. P. 1.

into private enterprises in 1992, losing their dimensions of self-help, mutuality, and collective ownership [Hunčová, 2004: 216—217]. Slovenia experienced a slightly different situation as, unlike other transition countries, did not experience a so-called ‘welfare gap’ [Črnak-Meglič, Rakar, 2009; Spear et al. 2010: 13], which encouraged the development of civil society organisations elsewhere. In Slovenia, the only significant organisational form that was close to the contemporary concept of the WISE in the 1990s was the disability companies. However, it has been argued that their social mission was weak. They were predominantly profit enterprises not including employees and other stakeholders in management⁸ [Borzaga and Galera, in Adam, 2015]. The entrepreneurship in that time was also associated with the lack of social conscience [Doherty et al., 2009; Spear et al., 2010], which have continued to influence misunderstandings of the concept.

Although certain aspects of *reinforcement* and *selective recruitment* based on the neo-liberal understanding of the free market and its distinction from any principles of social inclusion and solidarity have clearly taken place, they have been far from complete — especially when compared to the totality of these processes during the communist times. Rich variations that counter the neo-liberal imaginaries have clearly remained in the post-communist East-Central Europe — ranging from various forms of communist/socialist nostalgia to the much more innovative attempts to connect social inclusion of vulnerable groups with the principles of responsible entrepreneurship and the challenges and opportunities provided by technological development and transnational interdependence.

Although the recent growth of work integration social entrepreneurship in East-Central Europe owes some elements to the local traditions of cooperatives and other seeds of social entrepreneurship presented above, the key structural and discursive source of *variations* that have led to the current growth of WISE had been the recent transnational context of the European Union.

Contemporary challenges and opportunities: neoliberal globalisation, the European Union, accelerated technological development

Specifically, the philosophy of WISEs as a special type of social enterprises is a relatively recent development that first emerged after the mid-20th century in the old member states of the European Union with the purpose of empowering and integrating excluded people, to offer them an opportunity both to reassess the role of work in their lives and to gain control over their personal projects [Markovič et al., 2017: 142]. They are not only supposed to develop an occupation but also to acquire specific values through democratic management structures through their involvement in the governance of WISEs⁹ [Galera, Borzaga, 2009].

Although the practices of economic activities linked to the social functions and collective participation could relate well to the older East-Central European traditions of cooperatives, it has been the ‘external’ EU impact that has turned out to be crucial

⁸ INNO WISEs 1223 Interreg Central Europe Deliverable 1.1.4 Regional Report Slovenia 2018.

⁹ OECD Local Economic and Employment Development (LEED) Working Papers, 2016. OECD Publishing, Paris. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kg0nvfx2g26-en>; INNO WISEs 1223 Interreg Central Europe Deliverable D.T1.1.5., Comparative analysis, 2018.

for the establishment of WISEs in East-Central Europe. This can be mostly explained by the fact that neither of the two previous major transformations favoured the principles of social entrepreneurship. It has been argued that the development of WISEs in that region has been a consequence of the cognitive Europeanization, the dominance of new discourses, and the availability of financial funds [Marković et al., 2017]

Although unlike other countries in East-Central Europe, Poland started to evolve the legislation-institutional framework regarding WISEs already in the 1990s, it was the country's accession to the European Union in 2004 that can be seen as a major turning point for the development of WISEs and social entrepreneurship in general. In a relatively short time, legal regulations were introduced to specify important social and economic aspects of activities carried out by social economy entities. The legal framework in which social enterprises are established and operate are laid down by the National Programme of Social Economy Development and state legislation on economic activity and social economy entities. However, there are still many challenges to be overcome. It has been argued that the creation and operation of social enterprises require compliance with many complex and frequently changing state legislation provisions, which does not help the sector grow. There are no complete, systemic legal regulations related to social entrepreneurship that encourage taking up economic activity and realising valuable social objectives in this manner¹⁰. However, the regeneration of social entrepreneurship in the new political and economic reality accelerated owing to the possibility of obtaining support for undertaken actions from the European Social Fund (ESF), in particular, participation in the EQUAL Community Initiative (2005—2008)¹¹.

In Slovenia, the concept of social entrepreneurship as such was hardly used until 2009 when an EU-funded pilot programme to support the development of social enterprise was launched [European Commission 2014]. The legal basis for social entrepreneurship was established in 2011 when the *Social Entrepreneurship Act (2011)* was adopted, followed by other regulations. Despite the adoption of a legal framework for the establishment of social enterprises in accordance with the EU regulation, Slovenia has not yet overcome the initial phase of the development of the social entrepreneurship, which lags behind other EU members. This fact was, for example, confirmed by an OECD project [Spear et al. 2010] and CIRIEC [CIRIEC, 2012]. The cooperation between the institutions responsible for the development of social entrepreneurship remains insufficient [Macura, Konda 2016], which makes social entrepreneurship difficult to grow at the national as well as at the local levels.

Additionally, Slovenian WISEs consist of a large number of diverse organisations, fragmented across different sectors, and lack visibility as a homogeneous group [Podmenik, Adam, Milosevic, 2017]. The Social Entrepreneurship Act and other relevant legal documents contribute to a large range of administrative barriers that make social enterprises difficult to develop and grow¹². The Slovenian case is particularly indicative, since it demonstrates the significance of external impact to the WISE related

¹⁰ INNO WISEs 1223 Interreg Central Europe Deliverable 1.1.4 Regional Report Poland 2018. P. 10.

¹¹ INNO WISEs 1223 Interreg Central Europe Deliverable 1.1.4 Regional Report Poland 2018.

¹² INNO WISEs 1223 Interreg Central Europe Deliverable 1.1.4 Regional Report Slovenia 2018.

discourses and structures. The Social Entrepreneurship act from 2011 has directly copied a Western (typical for Italy) distinction between Type A and Type B (i. e. WISE) social enterprises, while not dealing at all with the existing disability enterprises, which have thus been omitted from the specific social entrepreneurship legislation. A more flexible solution integrating a broader variety of WISE forms and dropping the A vs B type distinction has only been adopted with the legislation changes in 2018.

In the Czech Republic, despite particular initiatives, such as the Programme Warranty 2015—2023, intended to enable social enterprises preferential access to financial resources, most pilot actions that have emerged lack clarity regarding the definition of the target groups. There is a potential risk of blurring the distinction between enterprises with social sensitiveness and real social enterprises¹³. Some research notices the mainly bottom-up origin of social enterprises and the key role played by civil society organisations. Other findings, however, suggest that approximately half of the existing social enterprises have a commercial origin. These contrasting results confirm the difficulty of capturing the variety of social enterprise types and their relative weight¹⁴. In the Czech Republic, WISEs have also been supported by socially responsible corporate policies: responsible procurement has become a new trend that is also slowly emerging in the private sector. Several large companies, banks, and public institutions have been reported to express their interest in buying goods or services from social enterprises under their corporate social responsibility policies and practices. With the help of support organisations, they look for social enterprises that can meet their needs. However, it is difficult to match demand with supply because the offer of social enterprises is limited; their capacity is restricted by the limits of their employees, and there is no intermediary at hand with up-to-date information¹⁵.

The lack of ability to apply the existing local traditions of cooperatives in the development of WISEs and social entrepreneurship, in general, has also been noted in Croatia. Again, the crucial turning point enabling the development of WISEs precisely coincided with the country's joining the EU and was defined in the Joint Memorandum on Social Inclusion of the Republic of Croatia. This framework provided the EU IPA funds, which many civil society organisations used for setting up a new generation of entities that use the model of social enterprises for work integration of disadvantaged groups. In 2015, Croatia adopted its Strategy for the Development of Social Entrepreneurship in the Republic of Croatia for the period of 2015—2020, which has finally shaped the framework for social economy actors in Croatia, including WISEs, though they are not explicitly mentioned. The document has placed additional emphasis on the integration of war-veterans and the relevance of social cooperatives as a means of cooperation in favour of vulnerable social groups¹⁶. However, it has been observed that Croatia continues to lag behind other post-socialist countries

¹³ OECD Local Economic and Employment Development (LEED) Working Papers, 2010/16, OECD Publishing, Paris. P. 9. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kg0nvfx2g26-en> (accessed: 20.09.2018). Summarised in INNO WISEs 1223 Interreg Central Europe Deliverable D.T1.1.5., Comparative analysis, 2018.

¹⁴ OECD Local Economic and Employment Development (LEED) Working Papers, 2010/16, OECD Publishing, Paris. P. 7. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kg0nvfx2g26-en> (accessed: 20.09.2018); INNO WISEs 1223 Interreg Central Europe Deliverable D.T1.1.5., Comparative analysis, 2018.

¹⁵ INNO WISEs 1223 Interreg Central Europe Deliverable D.T1.1.5., Comparative analysis, 2018.

¹⁶ INNO WISEs 1223 Interreg Central Europe Deliverable 1.1.4 Regional Report Croatia 2018.

[Marković et al., 2017]. Just as noted for the Czech Republic, confronting the economic crisis from 2008 (with the corresponding growing unemployment and even worsened conditions of the marginalised and vulnerable groups) has also been a significant factor contributing to the rise of WISEs in Croatia. WISEs have thus gained additional weight as one of the most important actors for social inclusion and integration in the work/market sector¹⁷.

One can observe that in the selected countries, there is a general lack of clear definition of the WISEs in the legislation, and they often take too many legal forms. Legislation frequently provides neither proper definitions nor proper answers to the actual challenges, and as such, it can also be an administrative obstacle. There is a lack of networks or institutions with enough capacity for wider and deeper support for the development of WISEs. Especially in Slovenia, Croatia, and Poland, it has become clear that WISEs sector is still not developed very well, meaning that most WISEs are really small (typically micro) companies, with many organizational deficits. The main issue for WISEs in those countries is to ensure a budget for paying staff salaries, which means that any other cost items are usually limited. They usually have almost no budget for investments in tools, technologies, or training supporting their everyday operation. Since they are usually in the early phase of development, there is a clear need for new competences inside the organisations to enhance innovation¹⁸.

If we focus on the specific discourses and structures explicitly supporting WISE practices in East Central Europe, we may argue that the impact of the European Union has played a crucial structural and discursive role in the process of their *selection*. This has been especially noticed in the cases of Poland, Slovenia, and Croatia. In addition, extra-semiotic factors in terms of the economic crisis and its costs have been noted as playing a very significant role in the Czech Republic and Croatia. With the WISE-related concepts becoming parts of the national legislations, regulations, strategies, and organisational practices, we can argue that the selection process in terms of the cultural political economy has been successfully completed.

The *retention* phase, however, only seems to be at its beginning. WISEs have become parts of the official national strategies, but they are far from being recognised more broadly. Despite the lively policy debate and interest of policymakers and researchers, social enterprises are still rather invisible and continue to be little understood¹⁹. There is also significant concern in terms of insufficient understanding of social entrepreneurship among the general public as well as financial issues and the search for building a supportive environment for the development of social enterprises²⁰. As noted for Croatia (but can be generalised to other cases as well), even though the importance of work integration of disadvantaged groups is added to almost all official documents, WISEs very often live under the shadow of a broader concept though, in the EU, most of the social enterprises are WISEs. There is no network or institutions with sufficient

¹⁷ INNO WISEs 1223 Interreg Central Europe Deliverable 1.1.4 Regional Report Croatia 2018.

¹⁸ INNO WISEs 1223 Interreg Central Europe Deliverable D.T1.1.5., Comparative analysis, 2018. P. 40.

¹⁹ INNO WISEs 1223 Interreg Central Europe Deliverable D.T1.1.5., Comparative analysis, 2018.

²⁰ INNO WISEs 1223 Interreg Central Europe Deliverable 1.1.4 Regional Report Slovenia 2018.

capacity for wider and deeper support for WISEs development, and very few scientific studies about this topic exist²¹.

Only a broader public acknowledgement of social enterprises' ability to create social value will, in turn, build the identity of a community able to deliver social impact by engaging in different activities, increase visibility, and hence the access to private markets²². Moreover, only this could be seen as an actual *retention* of the WISE discourses and structures.

Concluding remarks — discussion

The analysis of the specific developmental paths of WISEs revealed certain influences of structural and semiotic co-evolution referring to the variation, selection and retention of discourses impeding and hindering social entrepreneurship in Poland, Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Croatia. We can observe the impact of historical elements of the pre-communist and communist periods in relation to transition outcomes, showing us a significant delay in the successful performance of WISEs. At the same time, the incentives from European integration in terms of institutional and structural frameworks and in terms of the selection and retention of certain discourses, work in favour of the development of social economy and entrepreneurship. However, there is still a long way for those countries to go in order to meet the developed European core, especially in terms of facing new technological development and related skills. In the accelerated time-space compression [Harvey 1983], WISEs are no exception in the need to adjust their visions and performance to the changed social reality underpinned with mobility, ICT expansion and new ways of social interaction. However, it has been shown that East-European countries lack proper experiences and skills on the managerial level, as well as up-to-date technologies and knowledge to use and exploit them [A map of social enterprises, 2015]. Again, the common European framework, funding, and experience-sharing can substantially improve both structural settings and the mindsets of individuals.

In the ever more connected world, inducing new risks and also opportunities, the social economy and WISEs are an important actor. They can alleviate the risks of unemployment, employment precariousness, and public discomfort with the functioning of the global economy; they also offer new ways of connection and solidarity. In that light, WISEs can be seen as a sign of the new evolutionary stage of social differentiation: upgrading the earlier modernisation related trend of functional differentiation with a new one, i. e. relational differentiation [Donati, 2011]. The latter is conceptualised as the macro-correlate to the third sector composed of social formations established through networking. Thus, they can overcome the lack of morality and solidarity brought by functional differentiation, while generating relational common goods enabling the reduction of inequality and poverty [ibid.].

Orientation towards sustainable performance is already visible in the selected countries²³. However, it has been shown that WISEs still typically lack proper work-

²¹ INNO WISEs 1223 Interreg Central Europe Deliverable 1.1.4 Regional Report Croatia 2018.

²² INNO WISEs 1223 Interreg Central Europe Deliverable D.T1.1.5., Comparative analysis, 2018.

²³ INNO WISEs 1223 Interreg Central Europe Deliverable D.T1.1.5., Comparative analysis, 2018.

flow management systems with an efficient ICT support; these processes should be adapted to the special requirements of the deprived groups employed by the WISEs. Their specific challenges call for an innovative integration between managing the workflows and managing people with their particular needs²⁴.

While the broader EU context has clearly contributed to the selection and retention of the discourses favouring WISE as a way to transcend both the neoliberal free markets and the centralised welfare state interventions, their consolidation in structural terms will clearly depend on their performance — both in terms of integrating the vulnerable social groups and in terms of surviving and even prospering under the pressures of the global market economy. The research within the InnoWISEs project has confirmed that technological developments, involving particularly the ICT related tools and the skills to adapt and apply them will be crucial in the successful production of ‘relational goods’ [Donati, 2011]. More specifically, the WISEs which are the most able to adapt the new technologies to the participation and inclusion of the vulnerable groups in the productive and governance processes of the WISEs are also more likely to achieve better results — from the economic and from the social perspective.

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²⁴ INNO WISEs 1223 Interreg Central Europe Deliverable 1.2.2 Regional Joint Strategy on tackling technological and managerial skills shortages of WISEs, 2018.

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**SUSTAINABLE TOURISM SUPRANATIONAL POLICIES
AND THE WELLBEING — GAPS AND CHALLENGES FROM THE HOSTS'
AND THE GUESTS' PERSPECTIVE**

SUSTAINABLE TOURISM SUPRANATIONAL POLICIES AND THE WELLBEING — GAPS AND CHALLENGES FROM THE HOSTS' AND THE GUESTS' PERSPECTIVE

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НАДНАЦИОНАЛЬНАЯ ПОЛИТИКА УСТОЙЧИВОГО ТУРИЗМА: ПРОБЛЕМЫ РАЗВИТИЯ С ТОЧКИ ЗРЕНИЯ ПРИНИМАЮЩИХ СТОРОН И ТУРИСТОВ

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Abstract. The year 2017 was declared by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) as the International Year of Sustainable Tourism for Development. Tourism is seen as a “driver of development and peace, promoting the harmonious co-existence of people from all countries” (Beijing Declaration 2016). A principle of sustainable tourism is to “build sustainable cities and communities”. From this perspective, tourism should support the wellbeing of all actors involved. Wellbeing of hosts should be achieved when sustainable tourism guidelines are fulfilled. Wellbeing of guests is necessary to make any destination attractive for tourism. The question posed in this paper, however, challenges that view.

The paper presents a theoretical analysis of wellbeing in relation to sustainable tourism and to hosting and guest communities. The first section talks about wellbeing conceptual backgrounds including Social Indicators, index of life quality based on values, subjective wellbeing or responsible wellbeing. The second section focuses on the analysis of wellbeing in sustainable tourism conceptual background, including the differences between the guidelines provided by WTO (2005), and the latest guidelines published by UNWTO (United Nations World Tourism Organization) and UNGA in 2015. The third section juxtaposes wellbeing conceptual background with

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Аннотация. 2017 год был объявлен Генеральной ассамблеей Организации Объединенных Наций (ГА ООН) Международным годом устойчивого туризма в интересах развития. Туризм рассматривается как «движущая сила развития и мира, способствующая гармоничному сосуществованию людей всех стран» (Пекинская декларация 2016 г.). Принцип устойчивого туризма заключается в «создании устойчивых городов и сообществ». С этой точки зрения туризм должен поддерживать благосостояние всех вовлеченных сторон. Благополучие принимающей стороны должно достигаться через соблюдение руководящих принципов устойчивого туризма. Благополучие гостей необходимо, чтобы сделать любой пункт назначения привлекательным для туристических поездок. Однако эта статья оспаривает данную точку зрения.

В тексте представлен теоретический анализ связи благосостояния с устойчивым туризмом, а также принимающей и прибывающей сторонами. В первой части рассказывается о концептуальных предпосылках благосостояния, в том числе о социальных показателях, показателях качества жизни на основе ценностей, субъективного благополучия и ответственного благополучия. Во второй части внимание уделяется анализу благосостояния в концептуальных основах устойчивого туризма, в том числе различиям между

tourism, discussing the most prominent gaps and challenges of wellbeing regarding hosting communities and tourists.

руководящими принципами, представленными ВТО (2005 г.), и последними руководящими принципами, опубликованными ЮНВТО (United Nations World Tourism Organization) и ГА ООН в 2015 г. Третья часть соотносит концепцию благосостояния с туризмом, анализирует наиболее серьезные проблемы и вызовы для благополучия принимающих сообществ и туристов.

Keywords: guests, hosts, sustainable tourism, wellbeing

Ключевые слова: мигранты-туристы, принимающая сторона, устойчивый туризм, благополучие

1. Introduction

Over the past six decades, tourism has experienced continued expansion to become one of the largest and fastest-growing economic sectors in the world. International tourist arrivals have increased from 25 million in 1950 to 278 million in 1980, 674 million in 2000, and 1,235 million in 2016. The number of domestic tourists is estimated at 5—6 billion a year [UNWTO Annual report, 2017].

Of course, the increase in the number of tourists affects economic ratios. In 2016 tourism accounted for 10% of the world's GDP, 30% of world services export, 7% of world's export, and 1 out of 10 inhabitants of our globe was employed in that sector [UNWTO Tourism Highlights, 2017]. Many new destinations have emerged in addition to the traditional ones in Europe and North America. The scale of the phenomenon is so great that tourism industry has become a common term used also outside the economic environment. In turn, social sciences compare tourism to neo-colonialism [MacCannell, 1976; Akama, 2004; Hall, Tucker, 2004]. In addition, functions and dysfunctions of tourism are also commonly discussed [Burns, Novelli, 2008; Dlużewska, 2009]. It is obvious that the impact of tourism is reflected not only in the objectively measurable economic values but also in the pressure on natural and cultural environment. Here, we are dealing with a kind of 'export of culture' which without any doubt affects social relations and the widely understood feeling of satisfaction with life, both in the sending and the receiving community. The perception of wellbeing changes even with regard to a change in the point of reference — inhabitants of tourist reception areas compare themselves with one another but also with tourists. Repeating after the Secretary General World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) Taleb Rifai «*With growth comes responsibility*». Thus, the care of supranational organizations for ensuring that tourism complies with the assumptions of sustainable development is not surprising. However, it is not only about 'fulfilling' the guidelines — the significance of tourism is definitely higher. Tourism is seen as a very important medium, a way to ensure sustainable development of many areas. Since about 2015 UNWTO has continued to advocate for tourism as a fundamental component of policies and priorities for

sustainable development *sensu largo*. As a result of such measures, in December 2015, the United Nations General Assembly declared 2017 as the International Year of Sustainable Tourism for Development.

The application documents concerning sustainable tourism often mention wellbeing. It indicates a clear influence of the guidelines of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) (2003, 2005), in which wellbeing is strictly correlated with sustainable development and with ecosystem services, both seen as inextricable elements of one global process, necessary to lead properly «*our common future*». It is normally assumed that tourism increases the wellbeing. The *Beijing Declaration* (2016) defines sustainable tourism as a «driver of development and peace» as well as emphasizes a huge role of tourism «*in promoting the harmonious co-existence of people from all countries*». In late 2015, world leaders agreed upon 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to guide our development until 2030. Tourism is committed to do its part in this common endeavor. Goal no 11 by World Committee on Tourism Ethics (WCTE) is to «*help build sustainable cities and communities*».

Wellbeing of hosts, in accordance with UNWTO (2005) or UNGA (2015), should be achieved when sustainable tourism guidelines are fulfilled. The question posed in this article, however, challenges that view. Does it really lead to wellbeing? Or maybe we are missing some important issues on the way? Wellbeing of guests is necessary to make any destination attractive for tourism. For the start, their needs and expectations will not overlap.

The article is divided into three sections. The first section talks about wellbeing conceptual backgrounds including the Social Indicators [Cummins et al., 2003], index of life quality based on values [Diener, 1995] subjective wellbeing [Diener, Suh, 1996; Ryan, Deci, 2000; Cummins, Nistico, 2002] or the responsible wellbeing one [Chambers, 1997]. The second section focuses on the analysis of wellbeing in sustainable tourism conceptual background, including the differences between the guidelines provided by World Tourism Organization (WTO) in 2005, and the latest guidelines published by United World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) and United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 2015. The third section juxtaposes wellbeing conceptual background with tourism, the most prominent gaps and challenges of wellbeing regarding hosting communities and tourists.

2. Wellbeing — conceptual background

It would be an understatement to claim that the term 'wellbeing' is reaching its peak of popularity nowadays. It is used in numerous supranational and national policies, and found its way even into mass culture, very often derived from original understanding (e. g. spa & wellness). Wellbeing appears in academic papers related to environment, economy, psychology, medical sciences and many others disciplines. It is also frequently used in relation to tourism, stating by assumption that tourism adds to the wellbeing. In consequence tourism is involved into many of social and even charity actions. Still, despite growing popularity, the term «wellbeing» is very ambiguous [Tuula, Tuuli, 2015].

The concept of wellbeing originated as early as in 1930s within the area of economic studies. It was connected with the term GNP (Gross National Product) which soon evolved into GDP (Gross Domestic Product) referring to the value of all goods

and services produced in a specific country. The reasoning was simple — the greater the GDP, the higher the wellbeing of the inhabitants of the respective country [Shea, 1976]. Without any doubt, at present GDP is only a small fragment of what contributes to the wellbeing of individuals, even when talking in economic terms only. This ratio does not provide information about the distribution of income among respective citizens (in many countries with a high GDP considerable social disparities are observed). However, it does not refer to actual costs of maintenance (what is sufficient to provide for an affluent life in one country, in another one will only cover the basic living expenses). It also does not differentiate between positive and negative expenses (from the GDP perspective buying cigarettes will increase the wellbeing).

It is obvious that countries with a high GDP can invest more in health care, education, culture and other spheres having a positive impact on the wellbeing of citizens [Lai, 2000]. However, this is neither automatic nor simple. Numerous surveys also prove that the mechanism 'more money — more happiness' (i. e. higher wellbeing) is not that obvious [Gardner, Oswald, 2007]. It is interesting that, for instance, the level of wellbeing among the inhabitants of the poor Ethiopia or Bangladesh is higher than among the citizens of many affluent developed countries [Blackmore, 2009; Copestake, 2009; Copestake, Campfield, 2009, Cummins et al., 2003; Deneulin, McGregor, 2009; Eckersley, 1998; Shea, 1976; White, 2009].

The first indicator differentiating expenses into positive and negative ones in terms of wellbeing was the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) [Halstead, 1998; Hamilton, 1998]. In turn, the Human Development Index (HDI), next to GDP, took into account the average length of life and level of education (UNDP 2003). Sen [Sen, 1985] went even further and created the famous 'concept of capabilities' in which wellbeing, apart from the above-mentioned ones, comprised political and social factors (including values). Wellbeing was to be formed by *functioning, capabilities, and agency*.

Many researchers made references to the 'concept of capabilities'. However, it is peculiar that the papers did not make reference to specific values (connected, for example, with a specific culture) and they did not even treat them as separate categories [Deneulin, McGregor, 2009: 1].

More and more often, also in the field of economic sciences, it was perceived that wellbeing was a very complex status affected by cultural, political, social and many other factors. In a straight line it led to the identification of the so-called Social Indicators (SI) [Cummins et al., 2003]. The creators of SI were guided by the idea to create a full set of indices of wellbeing. What is more, they were willing to create a universal set which could be used regardless of the fact whether the surveys were carried out in Argentina, China or the United States. Of course, this is impossible to achieve even within the same cultural, political or economic context. The selection of respective indices and, further, assigning specific weights to such indices will be arguable. How much does the level of wellbeing increase, e. g. when you have kids? Without any doubt, in the same situation some people could feel happy while others would be more or less satisfied. Still other people can feel sad and frustrated about it.

It turned out very fast that wellbeing surveys carried out in the same area provided totally different results due to a change in the indices and weights [Becker et al., 1987].

We should admit that Diener and Suh [Diener, Suh, 1996: 197] correctly indicated that the largest drawback of SI was the somehow inevitable subjectivity.

Perhaps, the most versatile set of indices closely connected with social studies and psychology is the Index of Life Quality Based on Values (QoL) created by E. Diener [Diener, 1995]. The index consists of 45 indicators that are considered universal. They were assigned to one of 7 groups (spheres) such as *Hierarchy*, *Conservatism*, *Intellectual Autonomy*, *Affective Autonomy*, *Egalitarian Commitment*, *Mastery* and *Harmony*. However, with regard to large differences in the perception of wellbeing in affluent and developing societies, Diener proposed two versions of QoL — a basic and an extended one.

Wellbeing is also given some coverage in environmental sciences. From their perspective, human wellbeing is closely linked to the good condition of natural environment — water, air etc. The mechanism is simple — the better the quality of natural environment, the higher the human wellbeing [Hall et al., 2013]. This concept more and more often tends to speak about the wellbeing of the entire globe and not only of a selected area. It analyzes, e. g. the harmful impact of fuel emissions during trans-continental flights [Pearch-Nielsen et al., 2010; Scott et al. 2008, 2010).

A. Prescott [Prescott, 2001] even writes about 'ecosystem wellbeing' defined as «a condition in which the ecosystem maintains its diversity and quality — and thus it's capacity to support people and the rest of life — and it's potential to adapt to change and provide a wide range of choices and opportunities for the future».

Prescott emphasized that it is impossible to talk about human wellbeing at the same time neglecting ecosystem wellbeing — as both of them are equally important. What is more, human wellbeing is impossible without ecosystem wellbeing.

«Ecosystem wellbeing is a requirement because the ecosystems supports life and makes possible any standards of living. Although trade-offs between the needs of people and the needs of ecosystems are unavoidable, they must be limited» [Prescott, 2001: 4].

Indeed, numerous surveys in the area of medical studies proved that good status of natural environment clearly had a positive effect on the health of individuals [Pretty et al., 2007; Rodrigues et al., 2010; Völker, Kistemann, 2011]. Studies were also carried out with reference to respective types of landscape and their impact on wellbeing [Velarde et al., 2007]. Landscapes that have the most favourable effect on wellbeing are the so-called *blue spaces* — rivers, seas, lakes [Pretty et al., 2007] and *green spaces* — forests, parks, meadows etc. (e. g. [Maas et al., 2006; Pretty et al., 2007; Völker and Kistemann, 2011]. In addition, the role of green and blue spaces was often analyzed with reference to tourism and leisure, and representatives of social studies, biology or geographical studies were involved in the surveys [Yang, 2013].

Wellbeing is also given some coverage in social studies and psychology. Two fundamental approaches to wellbeing can be distinguished within the area of humanities [Brock, 1993, Diener, Suh, 1996]. According to the first one, the components of wellbeing are determined by the so-called cultural context [Diener, Suh 1996: 189]. Happiness (wellbeing) will be perceived differently by a resident of Poland than by an Egyptian or by a British citizen. It is due to the cultural context that some behaviours seen as negative for an individual by third parties can be perceived as very positive ones by such an individual (they increase wellbeing). Someone can feel better, e. g. sacrificing something for others. In this approach a huge role is ascribed to social, cultural and religious studies.

Research carried out by the University of Bath Research Group focusing on Wellbeing in Developing Countries (WeD) provided interesting information about how wellbeing functions in different cultural contexts. The outcomes indicate that in developing countries religion, family happiness or the so-called social respect [Deneulin, McGregor, 2009, White, 2009] are more important while financial issues that are so crucial in western countries are definitely less significant.

S. White [White, 2009: 4] identified different mechanisms of wellbeing:

1. In affluent western countries — doing well means feeling good
2. In developing countries — doing good means feeling well

The second approach is the domain of psychologists. They put emphasis on the types of personality and on individual perception. In the same situation, context, or culture someone can see a glass as half full while someone else will claim it is half empty. It is important how the situation is evaluated by the analyzed individual and not how things look from a third party perspective. Thus, your wellbeing level can be high when you are «poor», ill, or unemployed — and — on the contrary — you can have good financial standing and live in good health and your wellbeing can still be low. This approach focuses on the so-called subjective wellbeing (SWB).

Researchers wonder what is the condition determining the specific level of wellbeing of an individual — is it the personality (intrinsic factors) or situations we are involved in (extrinsic factors)? Naturally, with reference to (sustainable) tourism, only the second one can be analyzed. You can influence a proper behaviour of a tourist but certainly not one's personality. Talking about *extrinsic factors*, numerous questions also arise. The most important ones refer to whether wellbeing is rather affected by our actions for the sake of other people (active approach) or by the actions of other people undertaken for our sake (passive approach). The response leads to the popular division into *hedonic* and *eudaimonic* indicators created by Waterman [Waterman, 1993]. From the perspective of the *eudaimonic* approach, good interpersonal relations and social involvement have an influence on the high level of SWB [Ryan, Deci, 2001].

Such a division is applied, among other things, in the *Multidimensional Model of Wellbeing* by Ryff and Keyes' [Ryff, Keyes, 1995]. In this model, SWB consists of: *Purpose in Life, Environmental Mastery, Self-Acceptance, Personal Growth, Autonomy, and Positive Relations with Others*. The great positive role of social involvement in the subjective wellbeing of individuals is emphasized here.

An important *eudaimonic* theory is the Self-Determination Theory (SDT) developed by Ryan and Deci [Ryan, Deci, 2000]. According to this theory, wellbeing comprises fulfilment of three most important needs such as *competence, autonomy, and relatedness*. If any of these needs is not fulfilled, ill-being appears. And ill-being may, in turn, result in pathologies of different type. Ryan and Deci [Ryan, Deci, 2000: 68] emphasize mutual relationships between extrinsic and intrinsic factors. Extrinsic factors have a strong motivating or discouraging effect on individuals (and then they already become intrinsic ones). In turn, it contributes to a distinct perception of subsequent extrinsic factors.

The Theory of Subjective Wellbeing Homeostasis developed by Cummins and Nistico [Cummins, Nistico, 2002] is also widely applied with reference to tourism. Here, comparison with others plays a very important role in the development of wellbeing of

individuals. As a result of the comparison, a person can feel better, worse, rich — because he/she has a place to live and is not hungry), or poor (because other people have villas and cars [Dłuzewska, 2016]).

Among all the wellbeing concepts, the concept of 'responsible wellbeing' by Chambers [Chambers, 1997] is the closest to the ideology of sustainable development. According to this concept, environmental activity respecting natural environment and social activity respecting people and their culture, would contribute to increasing the self-esteem of an individual and thus to increasing the level of subjective wellbeing. The better person I am, the better I feel.

Standards applicable to wellbeing with reference to the application policy of states and many national and supranational organizations such as for example the United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) or the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) were established in the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) documents from 2003 and 2005. As defined in MEA, wellbeing is a combination of five elements. These include:

1. *basic material for a good life,*
2. *health,*
3. *good social relations,*
4. *security,*
5. *freedom of choice and action.*

Of course we are talking about the wellbeing of individuals. It is clear that wellbeing is understood in very broad terms — as freedom, security, economic and social wellbeing and good health. Thus, the measurements of wellbeing interpreted as above require that many scientific disciplines such as: economy, medicine, sociology or political science and law are involved. It must be also emphasized that wellbeing interpreted as indicated above is based on measurable (objective) and subjective indicators perceived by an individual — what is a better way of measuring e. g. the quality of social relations if not based on individual statements of people participating in such relations?

Nonetheless, the components of wellbeing in the perspective of MEA are rather the scope of wishes, an indication of the direction in which one should be heading to achieve wellbeing. However, it is very difficult (based on the quoted guidelines) to measure wellbeing in practice and compare the level of wellbeing of residents in a specific area with that of residents in another one. Although the constituents of wellbeing are not inclusive of the 'natural environment status', the whole MEA document leaves no doubt that wellbeing is linked to the concept of ecosystem services and it is supposed to form part of sustainable development.

3. Sustainable tourism and wellbeing

In the publication by WTO & UNEP from 2005, out of 12 goals concerning sustainable tourism only one — *visitor fulfilment (provide a safe, satisfying and fulfilling experience for visitors, available to all)* — is dedicated to tourists. This goal is more focused on availability to tourists than on wellbeing. Furthermore, it is known that a tourist product, destination, experience which would be satisfying and fulfilling to everyone does not exist. Such common availability can lead to degradation of the natural environment and is simply a proof that mass tourism does exist.

The latest document published by UNWTO & UNGA in 2015 does not contain a single section concerning tourists, and thus this part of the article will only analyze the perspective of the host community. The wellbeing — tourists relation will be discussed in the next part of the paper.

The term 'wellbeing' is used in both documents only once. In 2005 it occurs with reference to community (the description of *community wellbeing* reads that it is about *social infrastructure, access to resources, quality of life, quality of environment, lack of corruption and human-by-human exploitation*). In turn, the publication by UNWTO & UNGA from 2015 mentions wellbeing in one section, next to health.

However, the apparently low proportion of the term 'wellbeing' as used among other guidelines does not mean that this topic is not very often brought up in both documents. It is quite the opposite. If we assume an understanding of wellbeing similar to that in scientific disciplines which explore it, one can even claim that all the goals set by WTO & UNEP (2005) and UNWTO & UNGA (2015) refer to wellbeing. However, both documents differ so they put less or more emphasis on certain issues.

The goals from 2005 were mainly underlain by the rhetoric of equilibrium. In line with the assumptions of sustainable development in the broad sense, also with reference to tourism, it was assumed that economic, environmental and social aspects are equally important. The goals were split into 3 pillars (economic, social and environmental) and into more specific categories — four per each pillar. At least in theory — an identical amount of space was devoted to every pillar. In practice equilibrium is not obvious at all. For instance, a component of 'community wellbeing' from the social pillar is *access to resources* and *quality of environment* although these refer to the *environmental* and not the *social* pillar.

The actual focus of the goals from 2005 is the environmental perspective followed by the economic one. The social perspective is the least common [Barkemeyer et al., 2014; Hall, 2009; Hall et al., 2013; Saarinen, 2006]. It is even clearer in the application policy of most supranational organizations such as for example WEF (2009a, b), WTTC (2003, 2009) or UNWTO (2002, 2007) and in scientific research in the area of sustainable tourism. Such a perspective is close to environmental concepts of wellbeing which link the (human) wellbeing with the good status of natural environment. Thus, the ecosystem wellbeing is applicable here according to Prescott (2001) who believed that environmental wellbeing was equally important to human one. It was later supported by a wider academic community (Hall, Scott, & Gössling, 2013; Tuula, & Tuuli 2015) who also advocated a joint perspective on human and environmental wellbeing.

The economic perspective is close to the concept of wellbeing evaluated according to GDP (being one of the fundamental indicators of tourism development). To some extent one could seek here for Sen's 'concept of capabilities' [Sen, 1985] in which wellbeing was composed of *functioning, capabilities, and agency*; or Social Indicators as perceived by economic studies [Cummins et al., 2003].

With reference to the social pillar, 'local control' can comprise the 'need of competence' [Ryan, Deci, 2000]. The possibility to make decisions manifested in the control of the situation without any doubt has a positive effect on the 'need of competence' in the host community. On the other hand, 'cultural richness' takes into account the culture and customs of the host community — thus, it refers to wellbeing concepts

which emphasize the importance of specific cultural and religious norms as proposed by Diener and Suh [Diener, Suh, 1996]. Therefore, Social Indicators can be sought here.

The concept of responsible wellbeing [Chambers, 1997] refers to all pillars of sustainable tourism since it is applicable both to the environment and people (host community).

In addition, recommendations from 2005 contained some impossible wishful thinking (e. g. social equity where we can read about the necessity to ensure fair and *equal* distribution of social and economic benefits of tourism).

The document by UNTWO & UNGA (2015) lists 17 goals for sustainable tourism. It does not use the division into the economic, social and environmental pillars. Components of those goals occur together and they are mentioned as if they were one thing e. g. «affordable (economic) and clean (environment) energy».

The document is under a clear influence on MEA (2003, 2005). This is reflected in goals such as «1 — no poverty» and «2 — zero hunger» corresponding to MEA's «basic material for good life», social and political factors (16 — peace, justice and strong institutions, 5 — gender equality) or «good health and wellbeing» (3). Note that *well-being* takes upon a new, not very definite meaning here (as if other elements did not contribute to wellbeing).

More space is devoted to economic goals. They are also definitely more specifically oriented and realistic than those formulated in 2005. For instance, equal and fair distribution of profit is no longer mentioned. Rather, it is «decent work and economic growth» (8) or creating adequate options for education (4 — quality education). It was even noticed that increased income does not always contribute to sustainable development understood in a broader sense. Item 12 — responsible consumption and production suggests an influence of GPI with a division into positive and negative expenditure.

Despite an apparent reduction in proportions (4/17), goals regarding the environment play a very important role here. The difference is that they were formulated in a manner ensuring broader coverage. For instance, goal 14 — «life below water» — includes all goals of the environmental pillar from 2005 with reference to water ecosystems. Similarly, goal 15 — «life on land» makes reference to 'land'. A new thing is seeing the environmental impact of tourism on a global scale, not only at the place of tourist reception (13 — climate action).

4. Gaps and challenges

The measurements of tourism impact on the wellbeing are attempted within respective disciplines that study the above-mentioned wellbeing. Surveys undertaken in selected fields maintain their own perspective and many times ignore the point of view of other disciplines. Sometimes they generate mutually excluding results. For instance, things that from the point of view of economy lead to an increase in wellbeing (such as increased GDP), from the point of view of sociology can contribute to reducing the wellbeing (e. g. deteriorated social relations). Of course, many examples of such surveys and applications for the above-mentioned concepts could be listed. However, this part of the paper discusses only those that are highly significant for analyzing the wellbeing of the host community and tourists and were not included in documents regarding sustainable tourism or seem most contentious. It is also

obvious that not all concepts refer to both groups. It is a result of the obvious fact that reasons for undertaking tourism are completely different in this case (for example, the host community will care about economic benefits which are completely insignificant for tourists). However, to start with, we will analyze the points that are common for both groups.

First, it should be emphasized that tourism significantly changes the point of reference both in the host community and among tourists. Although we live in the times of globalization and watching TV and series alone provides us with information about different (better? worse? strange?) world and different models of behaviour, the contact with 'real' people has a definitely stronger impact than what we see on the screen. In particular it refers to situations when cultural / economic/ religious differences between hosts and visitors are significant. People who have felt rich so far because they had a place to live and enough food, when looking at tourists could (and many times did) conclude that their situation is not good at all [Dłuzewska, Michniewicz-Ankiersztajn, Gonia, 2017]. As a result they might be willing to leave in order to find a better place in which they would have a status similar to that of tourists, and have their share in the tourists' assets (in a positive sense by working in tourist services and in the negative one through stealing, begging, prostitution) etc.

It is significant that they only observe the behaviour of tourists that is typical of holiday time. Such behaviour is not usual and it differs from how they live every day. Hosts cannot see tourists working long hours every day, driving their kids to school, being exhausted etc. They can only witness their behaviour in spare time: lying on the beach all day, drinking large amounts of alcohol, partying, and simply doing nothing. Or if actually doing anything — sightseeing and taking photos. Also, tourists comparing themselves with the host community can evaluate their situation differently. They could notice that they have not sufficiently appreciated their possibilities, or they could envy the locals (sun, landscape, money). Without any doubt tourism has a significant impact on social behaviour in both groups. Also, it has a certain impact on how people feel (SWB).

Thus, the Theory of Subjective Wellbeing Homeostasis (TSWH) developed by Cummins and Nistico [Cummins, Nistico, 2002], which emphasizes the high significance of the point of reference (who we compare ourselves with) in shaping the wellbeing, is very useful in wellbeing surveys. And Appadurai's Capacity to Aspire [Appadurai, 2004] is also significant here.

Secondly, tourism often takes place in the so-called developing countries. As already told, some authors even refer to neo-colonialism — a kind of 'conquest' of poorer countries by citizens of affluent ones (usually from Western societies) [MacCannell, 1976; Akama 2004, Hall, Tucker, 2004]. According to surveys carried out by WeD Group, developing countries and Western societies present different schemes of wellbeing [White, 2009]. In principle, it leads to many misunderstandings. The locals are not able to understand how it is possible that tourists feel good while behaving 'immorally', having no children, family, travelling alone etc. In turn, tourists find the often 'non-elastic' and 'old-fashioned' attitudes of the hosts weird and consider the locals backward. If we add cultural differences, a conflict is imminent. The lack of understanding leads to many dysfunctions in tourism [Dłuzewska, 2009].

Another element having an identical impact on wellbeing in both groups is the status of natural environment. Clean water, air, lack of visual pollution etc. are definitely positive both for hosts and tourists. However, it must be emphasized that subjective evaluations (SWB) can be completely different in those groups. In many developing countries visual pollution is not a problem for locals. Hence, the increase in wealth increases the amount of waste. Many times it also leads to overusing the resources [Dłuzewska, 2008] and damaging local cultural landscape for the sake of modernity: natural roofs on houses are replaced with a more practical, impermeable metal sheet, traditional housing estates are abandoned etc. [Dłuzewska, Dłuzewski, 2017]. Such behaviours were covered by the priorities for sustainable tourism published by UNWTO & UNGA (2015), specifically in priority 12 «responsible consumption and production».

In the environmental concepts of wellbeing the only 'contentious' issue is the above-mentioned «climate action» (priority 13). The global perspective emphasized by this priority, although justified from the point of view of taking care for the condition of our planet, may turn out unfavourable for certain destinations, in particular in the short run [Dłuzewska et al., 2017]. This trend comprises numerous publications concerning harmful effects of jet fuel emissions during transcontinental flights. Here, the idea of sustainable transport came into life. The most sustainable (contributing to the wellbeing of our planet and thus of humans) means of transport is railway [Peeters et al., 2009, de Bruijn et al., 2010; Dwyer et al., 2010; Pearch-Nielsen et al., 2010; Scott et al., 2008, 2010]. However, it does not take into account an obvious fact that many tourist destinations, e. g. Indonesia, cannot be reached by train — you need to fly to get there. Thus, a reduction in flights, which from the point of view of the environment increases the wellbeing and contributes to sustainable development, will be evaluated as quite the opposite from the economic perspective. Thus, as a result GDP from tourism would be reduced in destinations distant from the markets the tourists come from.

The opinions of individuals are not significant here. It does not matter whether or not they also think that e. g. reduced emissions of jet fuel, and as a consequence, reduction in the number of tourists visiting the specific destination, have an actual impact on their wellbeing or such an impact does not exist at all [Dłuzewska, 2016].

Talking about the relation between tourism and wellbeing of tourists, in the first place reference should be made to the common premonition that tourism increases the wellbeing [Tuohino et al., 2014]. Wellbeing is mostly understood as a health. The concepts wellbeing = health have attracted the interest of tourism scholars and the hospitality industry in recent years (e. g. [Bushell, Sheldon, 2009; Smith, Puczko, 2009, Tuohino et al., 2014].

Many governments use synonymously the term of medical tourism and health one [Smith, 2015]. Smith and Puczko [Smith, Puczko, 2009] were among the first to try to bridge the concepts of wellness and health tourism, and discussed diverse aspects related to wellness, e. g. spirituality, happiness, quality of life and the wellbeing.

Although reference literature often mentions negative effects of tourism, tourism dysfunctions etc. [Dłuzewska, 2009, 2017], in many circles (in particular at the level of national policies) the positive role of tourism is assumed to be an axiom [McCabe et al. 2010; McCabe, Johnson, 2013; Minnaert et al. 2009]. Such a pattern of thinking

results in the idea of financing vacation for employees and their children, charities etc [McCabe, 2009; Minnaert et al. 2006]. Some countries are convinced that tourism is a fundamental good to which we are simply entitled [Diekman, McCabe, 2011].

Surveys concerning the wellbeing of tourists are often carried out with reference to ecosystems [Völker, Kistemann, 2011; Pretty et al., 2007]. Therefore, they analyze which has a better impact — mountains, sea, lakes? A large portion of surveys is carried out in the area of medical studies. Many surveys refer to the above-mentioned blue spaces and green spaces (e. g. [Maas et al., 2006; Pretty et al., 2007, Völker, Kistemann, 2011].

Of course, ecosystems have a similar impact on all people within a specific area (i. e. identical for tourists and for the host community). However, literature neglects this issue.

On the other hand, surveys on wellness take a completely different path. Likewise in the case of social tourism, the indisputable fact is that participation in such a type of tourism increases wellbeing. Literature concerning wellness dominated wellbeing surveys, in particular in non-English-speaking countries. It will not be exaggerated to state that the term 'wellness' has departed from the original, holistic meaning of 'wellbeing'. In many cases, it is automatically associated with spas and health tourism [Dłuzewska, 2016; Georgiev, Vasileva, 2010].

5. Conclusions

The guidelines for sustainable tourism focus on the broadly understood wellbeing of the host community. This is how the care for natural environment, economic growth or level of education is perceived. However, not all goals that are important and were included in other common policies (such as for example MEA, 2005) have been included here. The largest lack of sustainable tourism indicators with reference to the host community can be the lack of social and economic measures and indices and complete neglect of the evaluation performed by the parties concerned. There is no place for subjective wellbeing here. It seems that the guidelines were created at the level of 'higher awareness' by someone who knows well what is good for others and what conditions must be satisfied to ensure that someone else feels well. To a large extent this view is supported by WeD claiming that irrespective of the political and cultural context, surveys regarding wellbeing are mainly carried out from the Western perspective. It leads to numerous misunderstandings and imposes the Western point of view [White, 2009; Copestake, Campfield, 2009].

Another big gap is not including tourists in the guidelines developed by UNWTO. It is strange because tourism is a kind of compromise. Tourism must take into account the interests of both groups at all times. But for the satisfaction of travellers, tourism — whether or not sustainable — would not exist at all. Tourists would simply avoid certain destinations. The huge significance of the satisfaction of tourists with their stay in a specific destination, hotel, or country is testified by thousands of articles regarding guest satisfaction, product quality, consumer behaviour etc. And obviously, increased satisfaction with their stay contributes to increasing the wellbeing of tourists. However, these issues are not covered by the concept of sustainable tourism. However, it is done completely separately and not in connection with considerations concerning sustainable tourism. What a pity. It would be good to talk about (sustainable) tourism which would have a positive effect on both the host community and the tourists. It

must be remembered that tourism is a kind of compromise between values, cultures, behaviours and benefits—thus, it should increase the wellbeing of both parties.

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INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES

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S. Tewari, S. Tewari SPORT PRACTICES IN BIHAR AND UTTAR PRADESH: MAKING OF “SPORTS SOCIOLOGY” IN INDIA

SPORT PRACTICES IN BIHAR AND UTTAR PRADESH: MAKING OF “SPORTS SOCIOLOGY” IN INDIA

СПОРТИВНЫЕ ПРАКТИКИ В БИХАРЕ И УТТАР-ПРАДЕШЕ: СТАНОВЛЕНИЕ СОЦИОЛОГИИ СПОРТА В ИНДИИ

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Abstract. States of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, the focus of this investigation, is a geographical term used to describe the area of the India. This research is premised on the argument that the wealth and power exposure currently associated with sports in India, coupled with its status as one of the most coalescing features of Indian culture and society, presents it as a potentially powerful tool for development. As such, the broad aim is to explore trends and debates from the emerging 'development through sport' literature, as well as those from wider development theory, in the context of sports in India. This is challenging, as sports sociological studies here have yet to make a way.

Keywords: development, sports, India, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh

Аннотация. Исследование, представленное в данной статье, охватывает два штата Индии — Бихар и Уттар-Прадеш. Мы основываемся на том, что могущество и благосостояние, связываемое сегодня со спортом в Индии, а также его непревзойденная возможность объединять индийские культуру и общество, делает его потенциально мощным инструментом развития страны. Таким образом, общей задачей для нас является анализ тенденций и дебатов в рамках темы «развитие через спорт», а также более широко — в рамках теории развития в контексте спорта в Индии. Это непростая задача, поскольку социологические исследования спорта в Индии все еще находятся на раннем этапе развития.

Ключевые слова: развитие, спорт, Индия, Бихар, Уттар-Прадеш

Objectives and Research Questions

This research is premised on the argument that the wealth and power exposure currently associated with sports in India, coupled with its status as one of the most coalescing features of Indian culture and society, presents it as a potentially powerful tool for development in India. As such, the broad aim of this analysis is to explore trends and debates from the emerging 'development through sport' literature, as well as those from wider development theory, in the context of sports in India. Within this broad aim, this study seeks to address the following three research questions:

1. How and why can sports be used for social development purposes in the states of UP and Bihar in India?
2. What role do government authorities and their commercial and social partners have in the formulation and implementation of social development initiatives in India?
3. What are the ways through social development through sports can be implemented in the states of UP and Bihar in India?

Literature Review


The topic of the research, 'sociological development through sport', has been used as a mainstay of many sports programmes in India. The objective of this research is to find out the practicality of the use of sport in sociological development, focusing on India as a demographic area. The literature review will define and introduce the concept of 'people-centred development' or the so-called 'bottom-up' approach to development, which is a central theme in many sports sociological development initiatives. It draws attention to the work of NGOs that focus its practices at the grassroots level. Examples offer analysis of different types and approaches to the use of sports in sociological development. It aims to outline major barriers for sociological development through sports, as a movement, to gain further recognition as an effective tool for development.

The other body of literature which informs this research is 'development', and more specifically the inter-sub disciplinary concept of 'development through sport'. While this concept has been gaining prominence over the past two decades [Kidd, 2008], efforts remained largely disparate until the Secretary-General convened a United Nations (UN) Inter-Agency Task Force on Sport for Development and Peace in July 2002. The subsequent publication of 'Sport for Development and Peace: Towards Achieving Millennium Development Goals' [UN]¹ provided the catalyst for a more coalescing approach to 'development through sport', and much has been written since. This review charts the progress of this literature, exploring the merit of the 'development through sport' concept as it is implemented in developing countries worldwide. While the volume of literature on the concept has expanded in recent years, its application in India is largely ignored. As such, this review will conclude by discussing the concept of 'development through sport' in the context of India, arguing that the wealth and identity currently attached to sports in India presents it as a potentially powerful tool for development in the country's disadvantaged communities. It is this argument, coupled with the dearth of current literature, which ultimately provides the motivation for this research.

Sociological Development

Initial manifestations of sociological development focused on generating economic growth, as countries with strong economies were seen as more developed than those with weak economies, and so 'to develop' was to enhance a state's economic output [Deneulin, McGregor, 2010]. Growth theory evolved into modernization theory in the 1960s with Rostow's *The Stages of Economic Growth* [Rostow, 1960], which argued that all countries must pass through five predetermined stages in the sociological development process. Thus, sociological development largely constituted top-down approaches, based on industrialization, from the 1950s through to the early 1970s [De Knop et al, 2009]. The emergence of the 'New Right' in the 1980s saw a return to a market-driven approach, referred to as neo-liberalism, and became entrenched in the policies of international sociological development agencies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

¹ www.un.org/sport/sites/www.un.org.sport/files/documents/pdfs/Backgrounders/Milestones_Sport%20for%20Development%20and%20Peace_APRIL%202009-ENG.pdf.



Pic. 1. Rostow's five-stage model of sociological development (Source:)

Such approaches to sociological development, however, have drawn a number of criticisms, most notably that they are situated in Western European history and experience, and thus represent Eurocentric sociological development thinking [Bourdieu, Passeron, 1977]. Other critiques of these approaches include, but are not limited to, their assumption that sociological development is a linear process that all nations can follow in an unconstrained manner [Coakley, 2012]; the assumption that sociological development has an endpoint which suggests that, once achieved, a country is 'developed'; their strong focus on economic growth, with little consideration for the sociological development and cultural implications; and their focus on the entire state, rather than the needs of individual communities.

Concept of sociological development and its relation with sports

Similarly to most abstract and popular sociological concepts, the sociological development concept is contested. However, the purpose of this section is not to contribute to a general conceptual discussion [Burawoy, 2009], but to find a way to apply the social-capital concept productively for the specific topic of this article. The first step is to consider the two words making up the concept. First, 'capital' is something that might give a future benefit. Capital combined with 'social' then leaves us with social relations of a special kind — containing and, potentially, generating resources — which, in the future, might have implications for actions in and postures

towards other social actors or arenas. In this context, the social relations will be those emerging from participation in voluntary sport organizations; the implications are social trust and political interests. Beyond this very basic understanding of what is implied by sociological development, some of the more consequential controversies in the conceptual debate indicate what is at stake. A first consideration is whether sociological development is an individual or a collective asset. Both possibilities are of potential sociological utility and interest, but in a context where the focus is on how individuals participating in one social arena differ — because of the social relations established within this arena — in their approach to other arenas (trust, interest), the most fruitful approach is to say that sociological development is an individual asset based in social relations. This does not imply that the instrumentalism inherent to much individualistic sociology is uncritically adopted: becoming a member of a voluntary organization might lead to certain effects later on, but the sociological development in question is not necessarily the result of intentional investments aimed at future benefits; they are, to a large extent probably the unintended consequences of instrumental, normative and/or expressive actions. A second issue is whether sociological development involves closing of social groups or opening up of new social relations (for Bourdieu, social stratification versus social mobility). Again, both approaches yield interesting analytical possibilities, but in this study it has been emphasized that the bridging effect, i. e. the question will mainly be how social relations within one context (i. e. sociological development) have implications for how members of voluntary sport organizations face specific external phenomena (whether they trust other people, whether they are interested in politics). This approach also implies a stance on a third issue. Both Coleman and Putnam are regularly accused of confusing causes and effects when it comes to analyses of sociological development, and the problem is that the concept readily takes on a tautological form: social capital (social relations) produces sociological development (trust) [Giddens, 2012]. The reason for these apparently enduring problems is that the sociological development concept often pretends to examine a rather restricted phenomenon, but actually describes a whole process. The crux of the phenomena is a (set of) social relation(s), but next, this relation depends on its consequences for passing as what it is; social relations turn out as sociological development when a manifestation of a latent resource potential is fulfilled. To meet this challenge, it has been considered that generalized trust, norms or political engagement, etc., not as sociological development, but as social phenomena that might be influenced — increase or decrease — by variations in types and amounts of sociological development.

In sketching a theoretical framework for how sociological development should be approached for sport sociological studies, I have chosen to focus on sociological development as an individual asset, as one sequence of a more extended social process and outwardly bridging rather than bonding. Furthermore, it has been emphasized that the need for breaking down what often appears as a tautological approach to manageable analytical components: sociological development (social relations) with an impending outcome (trust, political interest). Finally, I have also pointed out the necessity of identifying social mechanisms associated with these social processes. Yet,

this is still general theory at a rather abstract level, and to get closer to how members of voluntary sport organizations actually possess sociological development and how it eventually works, it has been attempted to see how different discourses more oriented to this specific issue have actually understood these processes.

Case Study: Sociological development through sports in states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh in India

While the top priority in the Sport and Recreation Policy of both the states is to 'establish a clear, integrated structure for the planning, coordination and delivery of sport and recreational opportunities at all levels' [Bourdieu, 2010], the reports concludes that the strategic objectives listed are highly elite focused but hidden in the broad-based programmes of 'sport for all'. It can be suggested that sports at the national level are tied closely to fulfil the needs at the political level such as building Indian country's reputation and economic justification [Coakley, 2001]. A research argues the phenomenon of sports in developing countries:

«They (the Indian Governments) assume that performance in international sport is a kind of conceptual measuring stick or critique of how far postcolonial cultures have or have not evolved as modern nations.» [Eitzen, Sage, 2013]

It is not surprising then, when the successes of UP and Bihar sportsmen in the international arena of sports are often referred as a 'short-cut' to international recognition and development. [Cagan, DeMause, 2008] observed that success in international sport (and the Olympics in particular) is highly visible and can offer quick returns for a relatively minimal expense. Ironically, found that in many nations, this pro-Olympic system had led to the failure of the Sport, Exercise and Physical Education (SEPE) professions to deliver on their promises to serve the masses and may argue that problems result when schools and sociological programmes are tied exclusively to pro-Olympic sports in developing countries.

Data Analysis and Results

Introduction

According to [Thompson, Pascal, 2012], for a research to be accomplished, the researcher is required to collect and examine and interpret the data. This part of the study provides results obtained from the questionnaire survey as well as presents a discussion on findings. In this, I have collected the relevant data by means of interview and survey and the analysis and presentation of the collected data has been done using tables in Microsoft excel and related Pie charts. The final discussions and recommendations are built with reference to the gathered data. The data was collected from 750 respondents spread over the two States of Uttar Pradesh (U.P.) and Bihar.

Analysis of the Questionnaire Survey

A questionnaire which in the form of semi structured questions has been employed used by the researcher to obtain the primary data. The sample size of the research contains 750 respondents, 500 from Uttar Pradesh and 250 from Bihar. Initially the questionnaire contained 50 questions. But due to the viability and complexity of the topic, only 6 questions were answered by the respondents properly.


Responses Obtained from Questionnaire

Question 1: Sports as a Part of Social Development

The first theme of the question is «sports should be a part of the government's social development programs». This is theme was set to find out the number or ratio of the people responding whether they agree or disagree for that the sports is an excellent strategy to be used in the social development in an community. The results states that 80 % of the people say that sports strategy is a good option for the social development, while rest of them say that sports strategy is not to be considered as a part of social development strategy.

Responses	No. of Respondents	Percentage
Strongly Agree	240	32 %
Agree	375	50 %
Disagree	135	18 %

Sports as a part of Social development




Interpretation: Out of 750 respondents, 32% of respondents strongly agree and 50% of respondents agreed that sports should be a part of the social development. While 18% of respondents did not agree that sports should be a part of the social development activity.

Question 2: Enhancement of general Physical fitness and social General physical fitness through Effective Sports

Another theme of question was set to find out the number or ratio of responses that general physical fitness and social skills can be improved through an effective sports strategy. The theme is «effective sports strategy helps in enhancing the social skills and general physical fitness of the people especially children». The analysis states that more than 80% of the people agree that general physical fitness and the social skills can be improved through effective sports in any social development initiative.

Responses	No. of Respondents	Percentage
Extent (Great)	225	30%
Extent (Some)	375	50%
Extent (Not Much)	150	20%

Enhancement of general Physical fitness and social General physical fitness through Effective Sports




Interpretation: Out of 750 people, 50% of respondents stated that sports helps in enhancing the general physical fitness and social skills to a great extent while 20% of respondents stated that it is not a better technique to enhance general physical fitness and social skills.

Question 3: Change in the Sports System

When the satisfaction level Sports system which the organization is following is very low or few among the people then there is a need to change the Sports system. In order to find out the responses of the people that wanted a change in the Sports system of the organization, the theme of question is set as «change in the existing Sports system». This analysis was done in the form of YES and NO answers. More than 90 % responds to Yes, as they want the existing Sports system to be changed while only few among the people out of 750 states that they do not need a change in the Sports system.

Responses	No. of Respondents	Percentage
Yes	630	84 %
No	120	16 %

Change in the Sports System



Mean	Standard Deviation
375	360.62446


Interpretation: Out of 750 people, 84 % of respondents want the existing Sports system to be changed, while only 16 % of respondents are satisfied with the existing Sports system and does not want it to be changed

Question 4: Sports provide an opportunity to Grow as an Individual

In order to boost the morale or to motivate an individual the government must give an opportunity to grow as an individual grow. Out of 750 people only few of them states that the government gives the Sports provide an opportunity to grow as an individual while others states that the government does not gives the Sports provide an opportunity to grow as an individual chance to the people to grow as an individual.

Responses	No. of Respondents	Percentage
Yes	180	24%
No	570	76%

Sports provide an opportunity to Grow as an Individual



Mean	Standard Deviation
375	275.77164


Interpretation: Out of 750 people, only 24% of respondents states that Sports provide an opportunity to grow as an individual for the individual growth, while 76% of respondents stated that the sports does not gives an opportunity to grow as an individual.

Question 5: Sociological Changes in Activity and Sports

The activities regarding the sociological changes is given much importance in both the states but still some of the people state that there is less involvement of sports in the sociological change activities of government.

Responses	No. of Respondents	Percentage
Extent (Great)	225	30%
Extent (Some)	375	50%
Extent (Not Much)	150	20%

Enhancement of general Physical fitness and social General physical fitness through Effective Sports



Mean	Standard Deviation
250	114.56439


Interpretation: Out of 750 people, 50% of respondents stated that sports involvement in the sociological change activity is upto some extent, while 20% of respondents stated that sports are not involved in such activities.

Question 6: Change in the Sports' role in social Development

Out of 750 people more than half stated that there is a need the change in the role of sports in social development while only few are the satisfied with the existing role of sports as they need it to be changed.

Responses	No. of Respondents	Percentage
Yes	630	84 %
No	120	16 %

Sports provide an opportunity to Grow as an Individual



Mean	Standard Deviation
375	360.62446

Interpretation: Out of 750 people, 84% of respondents stated that they want a change in the role of sports in social development while 16% of respondents stated that they are satisfied with the existing role of sports in social development activities and does not want a change in it.

ANOVA Test

The one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) is used to determine whether there are any significant differences between the means of two or more independent (unrelated) groups (although you tend to only see it used when there are a minimum of three, rather than two groups). A One-Way Analysis of Variance is a way to test the equality of three or more means at one time by using variances.

Assumptions

The populations from which the samples were obtained must be normally or approximately normally distributed.

The samples must be independent.

The variances of the populations must be equal.

Hypotheses

The null hypothesis will be that all population means are equal, the alternative hypothesis is that at least one mean is different. In the following, lower case letters apply to the individual samples and capital letters apply to the entire set collectively. That is, n is one of many sample sizes, but N is the total sample size.

Grand Mean

$$\bar{X}_{GM} = \frac{\sum x}{N}$$

The grand mean of a set of samples is the total of all the data values divided by the total sample size. This requires that you have all of the sample data available to you, which is usually the case, but not always. It turns out that all that is necessary to find perform a one-way analysis of variance are the number of samples, the sample means, the sample variances, and the sample sizes.

$$\bar{X}_{GM} = \frac{\sum n\bar{x}}{\sum n}$$

Another way to find the grand mean is to find the weighted average of the sample means. The weight applied is the sample size.

Total Variation

$$SS(T) = \sum (x - \bar{X}_{GM})^2$$

The total variation (not variance) is comprised the sum of the squares of the differences of each mean with the grand mean.

There is the between group variation and the within group variation. The whole idea behind the analysis of variance is to compare the ratio of between group variance to within group variance. If the variance caused by the interaction between the samples is much larger when compared to the variance that appears within each group, then it is because the means aren't the same.

Between Group Variation

$$SS(B) = \sum n (\bar{x} - \bar{X}_{GM})^2$$

The variation due to the interaction between the samples is denoted SS(B) for Sum of Squares Between groups. If the sample means are close to each other (and therefore the Grand Mean) this will be small. There are k samples involved with one data value for each sample (the sample mean), so there are k-1 degrees of freedom.

The variance due to the interaction between the samples is denoted MS(B) for Mean Square Between groups. This is the between group variation divided by its degrees of freedom. It is also denoted by s_b^2 .

Within Group Variation

$$SS(W) = \sum df \cdot s^2$$

The variation due to differences within individual samples, denoted SS(W) for Sum of Squares Within groups. Each sample is considered independently, no interaction between samples is involved. The degrees of freedom is equal to the sum of the individual degrees of freedom for each sample. Since each sample has degrees of freedom equal to one less than their sample sizes, and there are k samples, the total degrees of freedom is k less than the total sample size: $df = N - k$. The variance due to the differences within individual samples is denoted MS(W) for Mean Square Within groups. This is the within group variation divided by its degrees of freedom. It

is also denoted by s_w^2 . It is the weighted average of the variances (weighted with the degrees of freedom).

F test statistic

$$F = \frac{s_b^2}{s_w^2}$$

Recall that a F variable is the ratio of two independent chi-square variables divided by their respective degrees of freedom. Also recall that the F test statistic is the ratio of two sample variances, well, it turns out that's exactly what we have here. The F test statistic is found by dividing the between group variance by the within group variance. The degrees of freedom for the numerator are the degrees of freedom for the between group (k-1) and the degrees of freedom for the denominator are the degrees of freedom for the within group (N-k).

Data Summary Table

Group Name	N (Count)	Mean	Std. Dev.
Question 1	750	250	120.31209
Question 2	750	250	114.56439
Question 3	750	375	360.62446
Question 4	750	375	275.77164
Question 5	750	250	114.56439
Question 6	750	375	360.62446

Desired confidence level for post-hoc confidence intervals: 95

ANOVA Table

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	d.f.	Variance	F	p
Between Groups:	17578125.0000	5	3515625.0000	55.9701	0.0000
Within Groups:	282279373.2332	4494	62812.4996	—	—
Total:	299857498.2332	4499	—	—	—

Analysis of the Interviews

The interview of 6 participants was personally conducted and marked necessary points and also recorded the interview for analysis with the help of a video recorder. Major findings from the interview are as follows:

How does the political economy of the state interact with this dominant model of social development and what influences the ways development through sports can be constituted in the state. What are the partnership practices when the sport sector actors are small-scale social developers? I have compared the viability and situation of development through sports in two States and the ways each State views the project. I have examined the factors which stand out as shaping key differences in how development through sports can be constituted in practice. In this regard interviews were conducted with government officials and officials of various sports boards in UP and Bihar. Furthermore an interview with citizens from both the states was also conducted. It was observed that though there were huge differences in opinions and beliefs of officials the citizens from both the states expressed similar views and interview findings of citizens from both the states was placed under a common heading.

The interviews are divided into two three separate groups:

Interviews with government officials and officials of various sports board in Bihar

Interviews with government officials and officials of various sports board in Uttar Pradesh (UP)

Interviews with citizens of the both the states.

Interview Theme

The theme of the interviews was:

«The prospects and ways of social development through sports in the state»

Interview participants Details:

Interviews with government officials in Bihar

Name	Designation
BG1	Officer in state government
BG2	Official in a state level sports board
BG3	Official in a state level sports association
BG4	Officer in state government
BG5	Official in a state level sports board
BG6	Officer in state government
BG7	Officer in state government
BG8	Official in a state level sports association and also an entrepreneur/private investor in sports
BG9	Head of an NGO
BG10	Head of an NGO

Interviews with government officials in UP

UG1	Officer in state government
UG2	Official in a state level sports board
UG3	Official in a state level sports association and also an entrepreneur/private investor in sports
UG4	Officer in state government
UG5	Official in a state level sports board also an entrepreneur/private investor in sports
UG6	Officer in state government
UG7	Officer in state government
UG8	Official in a state level sports association also an entrepreneur/private investor in sports
UG9	Head of an NGO

Interviews with citizens in the UP and Bihar

Name	Designation
C1	A painter in UP
C2	A call center employee in UP
C3	A bank officer in UP
C4	A government teacher in UP
C5	A college going student from UP
C6	A farmer in Bihar
C7	A PWD engineer in Bihar
C8	A college student in Bihar
C9	A businessman from Bihar
C10	A housewife from Bihar

Interviews with government officials in Bihar

In my conversations with government officials in Bihar, it became evident that development through sports is a model that has awareness as being a way for social development delivery in the state. But there seemed to be debate about the value and motivations underlying these methods.

On one side there was a strong belief in the synergies and effectiveness of the public and people through these projects. Government officials indicated that development through sports were becoming more commonplace as the solution to inefficiencies in social development delivery, constrained government health budgets, and as important tools to capitalize on the benefits of sports in providing better health, social harmony and for urban regeneration. Amidst the praise for this concept, however, others revealed a quiet skepticism about the «underlying intent of development through sports for the state.

According to BG1 *«eventually market mechanisms are critical. Government policy and support are also critical. We need development through sports which create an innovative combination of structured environment in which both government and people can work together to deliver on people's aspirations.»*

Here, I examine development through sports by drawing on the cases of development through sports concept in Bihar. According to BG6, a government official in sports department *«Development through sports is a dominant ideological model for social development but is often implemented as non-political, technocratic strategies with universal understandings of sports as an entertainment and recreation tool, Sport sector actors as individuals with talent and civil society as audiences. Despite the extensive acceptance of development through sports as the structural model for social development projects, the social & economic impacts of these partnerships are yet to be understood in the state.»*

As described earlier, the development sports relationships in these projects were highly varied in the ways they were structured. This paper argues that this variation reflected the specific histories of sports, market and civil society relations within the sports in which they are implemented.

Although UP and Bihar both followed a Government-centred approach to development through sports, the sports in Bihar built in a large role for itself in the implementation process.

Interview with government employees and NGO officers in UP

According to a retired government officer in the sports ministry «encounters with the developmental sports build up a dynamic picture of 'it', both as an idealized set of values and practices (the sports as it *should* work) and also as its flawed but more commonly experienced counterpart (the sports as it *does* works».

Traditionally, local government offices are where the majority of north Indians comes into contact with the government and the location where many of the images of the government are formed.

A NGO head C9 argued that «*sports-citizen interactions were based on flows of power, money, commodities and information. State people exchanges occur across a variety of interconnected spheres. The people in north India form their understandings of the sports through watching the on Television at their homes or playing some kind of outdoor games sometimes for recreation.*»

My research indicated that the north population had developed new images of the sports through their encounters with project entrepreneurs. They interpreted these experiences against their previous and possibly negative encounters with the sports and its development projects.

A Officer from UP, UG2 argued that rather than look at the local-level or grassroots conception of the sports as its own reality, it was critical to also pay attention to the «*translocality of sports institutions*». This required conceptualizing the sports as «constituted by the local, regional, national, and transnational phenomena». According to UG5, «*These images of the sports were created and constituted by the intersection of local histories of UP and Bihar and previous encounters between the sports and citizens. Additionally, the national emphases on sports; political acceptability of economic profits of sports; and discourses of India as an emerging force in sports sphere influenced the types of images the sports tried to portray to its citizens.*» Thus, there is a growing acceptance of social development through sports even in states like UP with historical caution with respect to the private sector. The push for decentralized service delivery and good governance encourages the sports bureaucracy to imbue itself with professionalism similar to the private sector.

Discussion on Results and Findings

There are complex interactions between sports and civil society in the context of sports and the delivery of sports connected to social development services. Understanding these interactions highlighted the complexity and changing images of the sports. It revealed how the sports came to be constructed by citizens in the context of governance and economic reforms in India. The good governance agenda became a powerful symbol of the idealized representation of the modern sports based on business principles. One way the good governance agenda was operationalized in practice was through the implementation of social development. With government service delivery via projects, the government was not privatized or withdrawn as the

critics of the neoliberal governance agenda suggested, but played a critical role in managing and constructing its image to citizens. Citizens' institutional trust in and simultaneous disillusionment with government created a space for the sports to renegotiate its role and image in service delivery through these projects.

It has been clear that the government officials also face struggles in negotiating a particular idealized representation of the sports and at the same time in achieving their individual business objectives in practice. In the research in UP and Bihar, three factors stood out as shaping how development through sports is constituted and how they influence actual outcomes of development through sports projects:

- (1) Sports strategies for development through sports promotion, particularly the differences in the roles of the private and public actors;
- (2) Relative emphasis on the social development versus financial goals of the project; and
- (3) Relative power of the sports for development versus the private sector in the development projects.

Conclusion

The research work has indicated that sport is a useful tool, in various ways, to build sociological development, foster community development, and build sustainability. That is, many positive outcomes have been achieved by using sport in this manner, even if most of this is reported anecdotally and these follow new neoliberal's principles and practices. This still begs the question of directionality (sport builds sociological development, sociological development aids sport, or reciprocity exists). The case of both states also indicates an issue saliently identified by review of past studies. Past studies have discussed such government based initiatives or involvements as being top down, not clearly dealing with the issues in those localities, wasteful of human resources in the target communities, being ideologically-driven, and promoting current social inequalities (i. e., perpetuating the status quo). Such programs do not connect with the communities for which they are identified. This also provides a strong argument against older state welfare policies and programs, even though ideology is also central in this new approach.

The primary research conducted in the research work by means of interviews and questionnaire also emphasizes the points raised past studies and additionally offers two different types of sociological development through sport process. The researcher in the present research has argued that a sustainable sport-based community development initiative requires four core components: community selection (community's «readiness» and capacity to change); the need for a community catalyst(s)/ champion(s) to provide process leadership (not *de facto* hierarchical leadership); the need to build a cadre of collaborative group/community partnerships (from a wide cross section of people and organizations who share a vision and have the capacity to achieve that vision through true collaboration and true shared decision-making); and the need to promote sustainability through community development processes. These elements are variously evident in the examples provided above, but not in a holistic way. This research has argued against the traditional, status quo «sports programming» approach, where programs are dropped-into settings without proper needs assessment in the community, the use of off the shelf programs and marketing,

and delivering programs in short-term episodes without ensuring the people and other community-based resources are properly developed. That is, they often miss matters of sport sustainability and true community development.

Here we confront several issues for current and incipient sport managers. One could reasonably critique many current sport management programs and practices. Do current sport managers, or do current sport management education programs, really understand and employ community development models? Is sufficient emphasis placed on community development and the role of sport can play in that development. If sport policy and programs are imposed on communities without the elements emphasized by this research sport managers need to consider what the implications are for creating sustainable effective sporting opportunities that may result in positive sociological development outcomes. This critique indicates that sport managers and future sport managers require ongoing education to develop the knowledge and skills necessary to provide sport programs (i. e., deliver properly targeted policy) that can facilitate community development and bring about positive social change in diverse communities. Education programs for incipient sport managers should help students work to employ a community development perspective and develop and deliver sustainable sport interventions, based on the real needs of the communities and on sustainable community development models.

While there is currently little direct evidence that sport contributes to sociological development through fostering social inclusion and community development, sport does have substantial social value. This is particularly so in India, as sport particularly cricket is widely recognized as a core component of the social and cultural fabric of Indian communities.

It provides an excellent «hook «for engaging people who may be suffering from disadvantage and providing a supportive environment to encourage and assist those individuals in their social development, learning, and connection through related programs and services.

These approaches are at the heart of the neoliberals agenda to improve individual freedom and opportunity. Sport and Recreation practitioners are passionate about the impacts their programs have on individuals and their social development. While this is largely anecdotal, new evaluation tools are attempting to capture meaningful data to contribute to the evidence base for this claim.

Long-term viability or sustainability in delivering social outcomes is central to the success of these developments through sport programs. Modern society demands more flexibility and choice and this should also be true of how communities and individuals access range of opportunities. A one size fits all approach will not meet all community needs. The challenge for the traditional sport sector in UP is to move beyond current sport delivery practices to provide a range of products including low cost locally developed grass roots opportunities and extended public/private/third sector linking sociological development programs. There is a danger however, in relying on this predominantly volunteer based sector to deliver social outcomes.

In Bihar on the other hand, the opportunity exists for NGOs, with government support, to establish long-term viable programs that use sport to engage with communities to deliver social outcomes. Partnerships between the traditional sport sector and NGOs could be forged to support participation in sport across the

continuum from outreach to mainstream participation. Suffice to say, this could potentially open the way.

For the development of a «third way» in Bihar where community-based organizations provide local grass-root sports participation opportunities for their communities, with strong linkages, collaborations, shared decision-making capacities, and partnerships with community groups and organizations, including mainstream sport. Donnelly (2007) provides the following summation:

All sport and recreation provision should be based on long term, established funding; should be continually monitored and evaluated in light of ongoing research, and should, for the most part, be offered for the purposes of social opportunity and social development.

From the above literature and examples, we note the following criteria to effectively use sport in social development and as a vehicle to contribute to development of sociological development/social inclusion within disadvantaged communities. First, programs should be designed with regard to the local assets (e. g., infrastructure, people, revenues, networks) available in the target communities. Second, sport-based social inclusion programs should be local area based and address and respond to individual community needs utilizing a social development approach. Third, monitoring and evaluation should form an integral component of the program from conception to implementation and should contribute to the evidence base. Finally, development of «third way» sports programs should be explored by all sectors with a view to mainstream or long-term funding ensuring sustainability.

A broad array of positive community networks and relationships can be developed through engagement with sport. This engagement can create opportunities that can foster social inclusion and community development, which in turn, can assist in building high levels of positive sociological development. Importantly, future research, specifically in the arena of Sports Sociology and education programs should seek to develop the tangible means by which to facilitate these processes.

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A PROPOS PUBLICATIONS

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THIRTY YEARS OF CHANGE IN THE PUBLICATION PROCESS

THIRTY YEARS OF CHANGE IN THE PUBLICATION PROCESS

ОБ ИЗМЕНЕНИЯХ В ПУБЛИКАЦИОННОМ ПРОЦЕССЕ ЗА ПОСЛЕДНИЕ 30 ЛЕТ

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Abstract. This essay considers changes in the publication process in sociology journals over the last thirty years. Decisions of accept or conditional accept on the first submission have almost disappeared, and the use of revise and resubmit decisions has expanded to cover a wide range of papers. Other important changes have been an increase in the typical number of reviewers and a less

Аннотация. В эссе рассматриваются изменения, происшедшие за последние тридцать лет в организации публикаций материалов в социологических журналах. Решение о принятии или условном принятии первоначального варианта рукописи к публикации практически исчезли из практики работы редакционных коллегий. На данный момент широкое распространение получил алгоритм, при

active role for editors. The changes have resulted in an improvement of the quality of published papers, but have also had some negative consequences. One is a slowdown in the process. Another is a dominance of one kind of publication — the full-scale research paper — and a decline of other types, including comments, research notes, and essays. The paper concludes by discussing some changes that might encourage a wider variety of publication types and facilitate commentary and debate on published papers.

Keywords: publication process, publication practices, publication, sociological journals

котором автору предлагается внести изменения в текст и повторно отправить его на рецензирование. Кроме того, увеличилось стандартное число рецензентов при одновременном снижении значимости работы редактора. Данные изменения привели к улучшению качества публикуемых статей, однако мы можем наблюдать и некоторые негативные последствия. Во-первых, замедляется процесс принятия рукописей к печати. Во-вторых, в журналах доминирует один тип публикаций — полномасштабные, законченные исследования — в то время как другие жанры научной работы: комментарии, исследовательские заметки и эссе — представлены в гораздо меньшей степени. В заключение обсуждаются некоторые изменения, которые могут способствовать расширению разнообразия типов публикаций, а также облегчить комментирование и обсуждение опубликованных работ.

Ключевые слова: публикационный процесс, публикационные практики, публикация, социологические журналы

In its general outlines, the publication process is the same as it was when I received my Ph. D. in 1987: the only obvious change is that it is conducted online rather than through the mail. An author sends a paper to a journal and the journal sends a blinded copy of the paper to several reviewers. Reviewers are usually asked to provide two kinds of comments: the first are responses to fixed-choice questions about the quality of the paper in various respects, while the second is general commentary. After consulting the reviews, the editor makes a decision. The author is informed of the decision and provided with the general commentary, but not with the responses to the fixed-choice questions. If the paper is rejected, the author can send it to another journal, either without change or in a revised form, and the process begins again. The new journal will not have access to the reviews from the first journal, and normally will not know that the paper has previously been rejected. Virtually all journals have rules against simultaneous submission to other journals, and they seem to be respected: I have never heard of anyone submitting the same paper to more than one journal at a time.

However, on closer examination there are some important changes. The first involves the possible outcomes on a first submission. In principle, a paper can be accepted, accepted conditional on some clearly defined revisions, rejected with an invitation to submit a revised version, or simply rejected. By the late 1980s, the first two outcomes had essentially disappeared for first submissions to the top journals: realistically, the only two possibilities were revise and resubmit and reject. However, outright or conditional acceptance on a first submission still sometimes occurred for journals a step or two below the top rank — in fact, my first publication [Weakliem, 1986] was accepted outright. Over time, more and more journals have effectively abandoned outright or conditional acceptance on initial submission: even a paper that receives very strong reviews will be given a decision of revise and resubmit.

A second change involves the meaning of the revise and resubmit decision. Thirty years ago, a revise and resubmit meant that the paper had a better than even chance of being accepted, even at the top journals — at least, that was what I was told, and my own experience seemed to bear it out. A second revise and resubmit was unusual, and in most cases was almost a conditional acceptance: it meant that the editor thought the revised paper had a few specific problems that needed to be corrected. Today, multiple rounds of revise and resubmit are common, and papers are often rejected on the second or even third resubmission. Although there are no formal distinctions among types of revise and resubmit, authors and editors know that the decision can mean many different things: that the paper is likely to be accepted after following the reviewers' suggestions on a few points, that the paper has a chance after extensive revision or additional analyses, or that the paper is a long shot. It is possible that other variants of the revise and resubmit are emerging. A few years ago, I was told that my paper was rejected but that I could submit a revised version as a new submission when the new editor took over. On inquiring what this meant, I was told that paper would be sent to an entirely new group of reviewers. The incoming editor would know the names of the reviewers from the first round so that they would not be chosen to review the new submission, but had not read their reviews and would not consult them when making a decision on the revised paper. I have since heard of a friend who had a similar experience with a different journal.

A third change is an increase in the number of reviews on each round. Thirty years ago, two or sometimes three was standard, even at the top journals. Now it is not uncommon to have five or more reviews. Sometimes this happens because the initial reviewers disagree and the editor seeks additional opinions. However, sometimes journals simply ask for and receive a large number of reviews. The increased number of reviews is probably one of the causes of the increase in revise and resubmit decisions. The more reviewers there are, the more likely that one of them will disagree with the others: someone might see a flaw in a paper that the others praise, or potential in a paper that others see as weak or uninteresting. In such case, a revise and resubmit seems like a safe choice from the point of view of the journal.

A fourth change is that editors take a less active role. When I began my career, editors often gave their own assessment of the paper in the decision letter. If the decision was revise and resubmit, the editor would provide reasonably clear guidance: for example, pointing to some of the issues raised by the reviewers as important and

others as secondary, and sometimes even saying that they disagreed with one of the reviewers. If the decision was to reject despite one or more reviews that seemed favorable, the editor would give some explanation for the decision, and sometimes suggest directions for revision or other journals to which the paper might be submitted. Even if the reviews were clearly negative, the editor might mention the points that seemed most compelling. Whether you agreed or disagreed, at least you knew what the editor thought. Today, many journals use a standard letter that simply refers to the reviews. If the decision is revise and resubmit, the author is told to consider the reviews when revising the paper; if the decision is to reject, the author is told that the reviews provide the reasons. Sometimes reviewers point in very different directions when suggesting a revision, and sometimes papers are rejected when the reviews appear to be favorable, but many journals use a standard form letter even in these situations.

The fifth change is a consequence of the first four: the publication process is a lot slower than it used to be. This is partly because of longer wait times for decisions, but mostly because of an increase in the use of revise and resubmit decisions, especially multiple rounds of revise and resubmit.

From a reader's point of view, there are obvious differences: articles today are longer and contain more references. The expansion seems to be particularly great in the introductory sections: most papers devote a good deal of space to discussion of theory and hypotheses before beginning their empirical analysis.

The changes described above continue trends that began decades earlier. That is, the differences between the 1980s and the 1950s are similar to the differences between the present and the 1980s. Similar changes have occurred in many, although not all, disciplines: Ellison [Ellison, 2002a; 2002b] provides a detailed description of economics and some comparative data.

Explaining the changes

One plausible reason for the change in the publication process is change in technology. As photocopies became cheaper, it became reasonable to ask authors to send in more copies, which made it possible to have more reviewers, and the shift to electronic copies removed all constraints. More reviewers meant more suggested revisions. The development of statistical software made it easier for authors to run additional analyses, and the development of word processing programs made it easier to revise the text. As a result, reviewers felt free to ask for more revisions, and authors were able to provide them.

However, although technological changes gave journals the opportunity to obtain more reviews and ask for more revisions, it is still necessary to explain why they took advantage of this opportunity. One possible reason is an increase in the number of submissions. Although the number of professors of sociology has not increased much since the 1980s, the pressure to publish has grown, so the top journals receive more submissions than they used to. However, on reflection it is not clear that an increase in the number of submissions makes the task of selecting the best papers more difficult. The editor of a journal that does not receive many high quality submissions needs to look for promise in papers and work with authors to improve them. In contrast, a journal that receives many high quality submissions can easily reject most of them as not up

to its standards. It does not need to make distinctions among the rejected papers, so it could have an initial screening based on one or two reviews and give additional attention only to papers with strong reviews at the initial stage.

Sociology journals may have followed the course that they did because sociologists have a relatively egalitarian ethos. In particular, there is growing concern about fair treatment for women, ethnic minorities, and authors at lower-ranked institutions. In sociology, almost all journals have blind reviews, so reviewers' judgment cannot be directly influenced by the characteristics of the authors. This fact means that editors can defend against charges of bias by following reviewers closely rather than emphasizing their own judgment. Obtaining additional reviews also helps to defend against criticism — authors may regard it as unfair if their paper is rejected on the basis of one review, but are more likely to accept the decision if several reviews make similar points. The egalitarian ethos also means that many reviewers are interested in helping authors to improve their papers, rather than in merely weeding out ones that are not strong enough, so they give detailed reviews and suggestions rather than summary judgments. Reviews of this kind make a revise and resubmit decision more appealing: if the paper is already good, it could become better, and even if the current version is not very good, there may be potential.

Positive and negative consequences of the changes

As a result of the changes in the editorial process, papers have a higher standard of craftsmanship. They are more likely to control for additional variables, contain various kinds of robustness checks, discuss alternative interpretations of the findings, and connect the research to a wider range of literature. Almost all of the papers published in the leading journals today are serious attempts to analyze a question of theoretical or practical interest. Although it is hard to be sure, there is probably less favoritism than their used to be. Connections with the editor have become less important, and the reviewers are a larger and more diverse group than ever before. These are important forms of progress. My discussion will devote more space to the negative consequences of the changes, but that is simply because they are less obvious.

One of the negative consequences has already been mentioned — the publication process takes longer than it used to. This is merely an annoyance for senior scholars, but can be a serious problem for untenured faculty. Going through several rounds of revision for a top journal may take years. If the paper is eventually rejected, the author has nothing to show for it — in fact, the expenditure of time and effort means that the author who almost made it is worse off than someone whose paper was rejected on the first round. Of course, the revisions may make the paper stronger and therefore more likely to be accepted at another journal, but this is not always the case. A paper may become less readable and less focused because it adds so much material to respond to the reviewers' concerns. That is, it may be better from the point of view of those reviewers, but less appealing to a new reader.

The slowdown of publication also has negative consequences for the discipline. The leading journals rarely contain articles on recent events, even very important ones. For example, many sociologists have thought about the 2016 American presidential election, and have offered views on it, but journals have not published much research. It is possible that some will appear in the next few years as papers make their way

through the publication process, but the slow pace of publication is an incentive to avoid research on current events — by the time your work is published, people may have lost interest. As a result, disciplines and journals that have faster publication times have more impact on public discussion. For example, a paper on the 2016 election by Diana Mutz [Mutz, 2018] published earlier this year has received a good deal of attention. The paper was published in the *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*: it was received in October 2017, accepted in March 2018, and appeared in April. It is hard to imagine such rapid publication for a prominent journal in sociology or in Mutz's own discipline of political science.

Another consequence is that published articles now take more time and effort to read, even for professional sociologists. This is partly simply because they are longer, and partly because they include more material that is not essential to the main argument, but was included in order to meet questions raised by the reviewers. I used to read new issues of the *American Sociological Review* and *American Journal of Sociology* regularly — not cover to cover, but I usually found at least one article that I read almost immediately. Now I glance at the titles and put the issue aside. If I see an article that sounds interesting, I usually decide that I don't have time to read it right now, but will try to get to it later. Of course, this means that in many cases I never get to it. There are many reasons for this change, but one is that it has become harder to read an article quickly: you have to be willing and able to make a serious commitment of time.

A final issue is that journals have come to be dominated by one type of article — the full-scale research paper. At one time, leading journals also contained research notes, short comments on previously published papers, and essays offering ideas or observations supported by a few examples (the essays and research notes were not necessarily in different sections: they are my characterization of the nature of articles). Today, research notes have almost disappeared. Comments on published papers still sometimes appear, but they undergo the same review process as original papers. As a result, comments must offer extensive analysis and discussion in order to have a chance of being published. A published comment today usually means a comprehensive effort to refute the original paper: there is no place for a brief observation, even a valid and important one. Essays appear only if they are invited papers.

The dominance of the research paper might be regarded as a mark of improved quality. When journals receive rigorous analyses of theoretically important questions, they no longer need atheoretical data analyses or half-baked ideas to fill their pages. I once observed to the editor of a major journal that essays were no longer published in the leading journals — he agreed, but did not understand why I saw this as something to be regretted. I will address this issue in the next section.

What should be done?

Research papers are valuable, but they require well-developed theory and abundant high-quality data, and there are many topics of sociological interest where one or both of these are lacking. The dominance of the research paper means that these topics get less attention than they should.

Sociology does not have a generally accepted set of principles that can be applied to new questions and used to generate hypotheses. In practice, «deriving a hypothesis

from theory» means connecting it with the writings of people who are regarded as theorists. This is not a bad thing — a discipline needs an intellectual tradition to provide a framework. Moreover, it is not all that restrictive: Marx, Weber, and Durkheim are the premier theorists (at least to most sociologists of my generation) but many others are regarded as having some stature. With a little effort, it is often possible to present a piece of empirical research as a test of theoretically informed hypotheses. However, it is not clear that this is the best use of an author's time or the journal's space. As a reviewer, I often find myself saying that the data analysis is interesting but that the hypotheses seem contrived.

More importantly, the insistence that research be grounded in «theory» can lead to neglect of important issues. Collins [Collins, 1984: 347] says that: «statistical sociology has been used. . . for the most part within the context of parochial social problems issues (for example, did American blacks make more progress in the 1960s than in the 1950s?).» From a contemporary perspective, it seems like the circumstances under which ethnic inequality declines more or less rapidly should be an extremely important question for sociological theory. However, it was not a question that received much attention from Marx, Weber, and Durkheim. Their primary interest was with the leading social problem of their time and place: the effect of industrialization.

One solution is to revive the research note: a paper that does not contain extensive discussion of theory, but launches into the analysis after a brief introduction. I am not suggesting that sociology can progress by simply accumulating a large heap of facts. Rather, theorists (or anyone who wants to contribute to the development of theory) should pay attention to these empirical studies and try to develop explanations that account for their findings. An example from economics is the paper by A. W. Phillips [Phillips, 1958] on «The Relation between Unemployment and Money Wage Rates.» The theoretical background was just a few sentences, with no references, and the entire paper contained only a handful of references to the scholarly literature. Nevertheless, it immediately attracted the attention of other economists, and economic theorists have been offering explanations, critiques, and refinements of the «Phillips Curve» ever since.

The essay also has an important role to play when theory or data are lacking. An essay is an attempt to propose an idea and make a case for it by referring to some examples, but not to conduct tests or provide a systematic review of the literature. When a new issue arises, ideas are likely to be more abundant than evidence. Even if it is not possible to test these ideas, it is useful to put them in circulation. It is unlikely that essays will return to the leading journals, since it is harder to get consensus on whether an idea is interesting or thought-provoking than on the soundness of analysis or the quality of data. However, the discipline would benefit from the development of new outlets for essays.

Finally, there should be more opportunities to comment on published articles. No published article is the last word on its topic: some readers will have questions or objections, while others will have ideas about how the research could be extended. Almost none of this discussion is reflected in journals. With the development of the internet, comments can go online rather than having to take up printed space. Most newspapers and magazines allow comments on their articles, and many of them receive a large number of comments, but simply adding an online comment section probably would

not have much effect on sociology journals. The online journal *Sociological Science* allows comments, but out of the last 100 articles published, only eight have received any comments, and none have received more than four. Of course, one reason for this is that most scholarly articles have few readers, but many of the *Sociological Science* articles have thousands of page views. Another is that most readers come to the article later, rather than when it first appears. After a year or two has passed, a comment is unlikely to spark debate, and may never even be seen by the author, so even a reader who has something to say might not bother. Finally, published comments usually involve an attempt to refute the original paper. As a result, readers may think that authors will take offense at online comments, and authors may tend to respond in a defensive manner if they receive comments. Thus, creating a culture of commentary and debate on published papers will take a positive effort. Journals in statistics have a tradition of including a number of brief comments on selected papers in the same issue as the original. The comments are not necessarily criticisms: they often involve questions, suggestions, and possible connections with other areas of research. They usually make interesting reading, and occasionally a comment becomes well-known in its own right. Sociology journals could adopt this practice. Of course, doing so would raise a question of how to select the commentators. A place to start would be to offer the reviewers of the paper a chance to provide a brief commentary. When I was a Deputy Editor of the *American Sociological Review*, I found the dialogue among the reviewers and the authors was not only interesting, but also helpful in understanding papers and the discipline more generally. Ordinary readers see none of this dialogue. Including commentary would also be a way to give reviewers some recognition for their work. Given the demands on space in the journals, the commentary might appear only online, rather than in print, and starting with a number of invited comments could encourage readers to join in the discussion.

The preceding proposals all involve major changes, so I will conclude with a few simple suggestions. First, editors should try to give clear direction in revise and resubmit decisions, particularly when the reviews point in different directions. Second, they should try to minimize multiple revise and resubmit decisions. Finally, three reviewers (which might be two outside reviewers and an editor or deputy editor) is enough for most papers.

In reviewing the changes in publication practices, I was struck by two points. First, the development of the internet merely continued the direction of earlier technological innovations such as photocopying. Sociology has not taken advantage of the possibilities for interaction created by the internet: in some ways, there is less interaction than they used to be. Second, the changes are the result of a gradual evolution, not a plan. As sociologists, we know that gradual evolution does not necessarily mean all-around improvement. In many ways, sociology journals are better than ever, but we have also lost some things of value.

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T. Dwyer

HANDBOOK ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF YOUTH IN BRICS COUNTRIES: GENERAL EDITOR'S ANNOTATIONS

HANDBOOK ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF
YOUTH IN BRICS COUNTRIES: GENERAL
EDITOR'S ANNOTATIONS

НАСТОЛЬНАЯ КНИГА ПО СОЦИОЛОГИИ
МОЛОДЕЖИ В СТРАНАХ БРИКС: КОМ-
МЕНТАРИИ ГЛАВНОГО РЕДАКТОРА

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Abstract. The paper highlights two key subjects of the new Handbook on the sociology of youth in BRICS countries. The first pays attention to mechanisms and structural contexts of youth social mobilization in the BRICS countries. The second deals with the effects of information technologies on social interactions between young people. The author argues

Аннотация. В заметках главного редактора настольной книги по социологии молодежи в странах БРИКС выделяются две ключевые темы. Первая — это механизмы и структурный контекст социальной мобилизации молодежи в странах БРИКС. Вторая — это влияние информационных технологий на формы социальных взаимодействий

that comparative analysis presented in the handbook demonstrates that development of South Africa, Brazil, China, Russia, and India does not follow strictly the path anticipated in the framework of modernization theory.

Keywords: sociology of youth, comparative analysis, BRICS countries, social movements, Internet and society

в молодёжной среде. Автор утверждает, что материалы сравнительных исследований, представленных в книге, свидетельствуют, что пути развития Южной Африки, Бразилии, Китая, России и Индии не укладываются в русло современной теории модернизации.

Ключевые слова: социология молодёжи, сравнительный анализ, страны БРИКС, социальные движения, интернет и общество

Introduction

The construction of the BRICS — a grouping made up of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — involves massive sense-making efforts which bring together politicians, intellectuals, diplomats, journalists, business people and others. The aim of the *Handbook on the Sociology of Youth in BRICS Countries*¹ is to make a contribution to these efforts by furthering mutual understanding among sociologists in these five countries and also more widely.

The BRICS are usually portrayed as large, regionally powerful, culturally diverse, regionally populous, developing economies, however, such a portrayal is imprecise, but what unites them is that there is very little mutual knowledge and until recently dialogue. Sociologists are fortunate that their founding fathers left a theoretical and empirical legacy that permits limited understandings to be built across national boundaries by a resort to common conceptual language. However, the empirical support for much of sociology's dominant concerns as a discipline is largely based upon 10% of the world's population — those living where sociology is most developed, i. e. in the developed or industrialized world where modernization theory is a central reference.

The publication of the second of two sociology handbooks by World Scientific continues to demonstrate that the development of these countries does not follow the paths laid out in modernization theory. Both handbooks reveal that certain social dynamics are common to some of the BRICS countries, and that these may not be considered of interest to social scientists in Western countries. For example, at the BRICS Academic Forum held in 2014 in Rio de Janeiro, the well-known South Africa sociologist Eddie Webster observed that all of the BRICS had enormous problems. Effectively, the shared problems associated with being 'emerging' and in some cases 'transitional' countries lead some BRICS observers to identify similar sets of social problems: rural exodus, disorganized urbanization, discrimination, extreme poverty, corruption, bad business climates and complex increases in inequalities. The fact they these countries share problems has the potential to bring them closer together. However, positive changes are seen in life expectancies and living conditions, access

¹ Handbook on the Sociology of Youth in BRICS Countries. Dwyer, T., Gorshkov, M. K., Modi, I., Li Chunling & Mapadimeng, M.S. (eds). Singapore, World Scientific, 2018.

to health and education, access to information technologies and results of innovation, such shared developments do not mean that these countries share the same vision of development, and much less a Western view [Dwyer, 2017: 101]

This book shows it is possible to arrive at a sociological comprehension of the development of a BRIC partner without having had to spend years of intense and specialized study on its civilization². This is the second edited handbook to be published by World Scientific, the first was the 'Handbook of Social Stratification in the BRIC countries' in 2013 (in Mandarin in 2011). In this new handbook, authors from each of the BRICS nations have contributed chapters to nine sections which treat the following themes: History of Concepts and Theoretical and Methodological Assumptions into Research on Youth; Demographic Characteristics of Youth; Identity and Generation; Consumption and Leisure; Family, Marriage and Sexuality; The State and Political Values; Education and Employment; Internet Participation and Communication; Conclusion. With over 1,100 pages the handbook starts by republishing LI Peilin's 2013 introduction to the *Handbook on Social Stratification in the BRIC Countries* where he writes: «analyzing social structural changes, especially changes in the social stratification structures of the BRIC countries, is a special sociological perspective in the study and analysis of social issues. [That can]...help us achieve a better understanding of the economic growth and social development of the emerging economic powers. This very special perspective... unveil[s] the mystery... [of] how these emerging powers with such dramatic differences in history, geography, culture, language, religion, etc. could have shared a common will and taken joint actions in certain circumstances. In any event, it is the profound social structural changes in these countries that determine their own future and, to a large extent, will shape the socio-economic landscape of the future world.» [Peilin et al., 2013: XXIV—XXV]

Sociologists have discovered what Brazilian diplomats have classified as 'surprising',³ the fact that there exist many more points in common than had been imagined at the beginning of the BRICS dialogue, common viewpoints that could simply could not have been perceived because of historical lack reading and of dialogue. Shared interests and problems are revealed, in addition comparative sociological research has discovered shared perceptions and values⁴. In the next part of this review I shall examine some crucial points in the book.

The handbook

In the past dramatic shifts in power and of resistance, became visible through state-perpetrated or anti-state-oriented violence in some of the countries. Readers see the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa, droves of young Brazilian, black males been killed by crime, and that both war and revolution and its aftermath took large tolls on Russian and Chinese youth. Over the last half century cultural revolution, military

² Roulleau-Berger, Laurence, GUO Yuhua, LI Peilin & LIU Shiding (eds) 2008. *La Nouvelle Sociologie Chinoise*, Paris, CNRS Éditions [Roulleau-Berger et al., 2008], demonstrated that it is possible to analyze contemporary China in purely sociological terms, by analogy, this led us to understand that other civilizations could also be reserched in a similar manner.

³ Seminar, «BRICS Co-operation: Assessment and Next Steps» Funag, Palácio Itamaraty, Brasília, 1 August 2017.

⁴ [Inglehart, 1997: 263]; see Figure 8.11, Economic development goes with diminishing support for state ownership, in [Covic, 2017]; [Dwyer et alii, 2016]] (In Mandarin 2016. BIAN GE SHI JIE ZHONG DE DA XUE SHENG — ZHONG GUO, BA XI BI JIAO YAN JIU, Beijing, Social Sciences Academic Press).

rule, poverty, hunger and famine have affected the education, development, horizons and life chances of youth to different degrees in these different countries. Today, war, famine or revolution are happily no longer the dominant types of violence in the BRICS, in Brazil and South Africa interpersonal violence kills beyond levels considered to represent civil war, in Bharat India we discover the victimization of women on one hand and the actions of Maoist guerrilla movements on the other. In other words instability and a fragile social fabric can have great impact in undermining youths' life chances... in the West such factors are often marginalized as 'deviance' whereas in the BRICS they may be seen as total social facts that at the same time as they marked the past, threaten to undermine the future.

The sometimes assumed universality of certain widely accepted Western concepts are relativized in the book, to give just two examples: Erikson's moratorium and the idea of school-to-work transition do not work very well in the BRICS, and this is very clear in the Brazilian texts. However, other ideas seem to work well in cross-cultural settings, to give two examples: theory of generations and of age-class stratification. The handbook also shows the appearance of new phenomena, sometimes they arrive with great force. Some may have already been previously detected in the West, but much of what goes on in the BRICS seems to be relatively unknown outside in Western sociology: Hukou system, cybercrime, censorship, forced marriages, caste system, one child policy, youth violence, Aids' impact on youth etc. This book discusses over 40% of the world's youth and in so doing makes a decisive step towards undermining the pretensions of developing a Western-based unified theoretical systems based on approximately 10%. The handbook therefore throws down the gauntlet, of theory development.

As we can see, the handbook is highly suggestive. Time and space coordinates accompany each indexed item thereby facilitating comparative analyses. At the time of going to press I have been dabbling with understanding a further path it alights, one so important in the history of Western sociology, perhaps providing fertile seeds for theory construction.

Youth, Agency and Social Action

The Handbook mentions and analyzes examples and varieties of social movements developed by youth: The Brazilian movements for direct elections in the mid-eighties and for President Fernando Collor de Mello's impeachment in the early nineties are examples. In Russia in 2011 and 2012 there were protests against the possibilities of election frauds. However, survey results analyzed in the handbook indicates low levels of political activism among young people. They have become oriented towards personal success. Indian social movements opposed to corruption and sexual violence have made headlines in the international press over recent times. Anand Kumar's chapter reveals an extraordinary and complex variety of struggles going on in all parts and segments of India. In *China Chic*, top fashion designer Vivienne Tam writes uniformity gave way to individuation as people put their own markings on their Mao Suits during the Cultural Revolution. Much more recently, youth-led mobilizations followed extraordinary events such as the Sichuan earthquake of 2008, and the Wenzhou high-speed train disaster of 2011. In South Africa the youth movement played a strong role in the anti-apartheid struggle and subsequent social construction. In contrast, in contempo-

rary China open political protest no longer appears to be a focus of youth's exercises of agency, but rather entrepreneurial and scientific activity. Indeed, the differences between China's and India's political paths should not be over-estimated, both have deeply sedimented and millinerian cultures which may be capable of accommodating the forces of modernity.

Such movements are lodged in each society's internal and historical dynamics, which condition possibilities and horizons. Sociology has come to associate its practices with democratic political systems, the fact that all of the BRICS except for India have been run over much of the last seven decades by non-democratic political systems, and today the marks of past authoritarianism affect not only scientific production but the political and social realities. Also I think the handbook provides a warning to all Western sociology students, that they take notions such as Millennials, Generation X etc for granted as representing all of humanity, they are making a big mistake. Maybe a 'BRICS perspective' can undermine several other widely held views, this would help theory to advance.

Everywhere in the handbook structural, political and cognitive barriers to the exercise of agency can be seen: this is identified as a lack of an appropriate political culture in Brazil, the party's monopoly of political power in China and effectively single party rule in democratic South Africa. Structural barriers are both cognitive and access-related, entry into politics is uneven. Furthermore, other opportunities — be they economic, leisure or educational — are also unevenly spread for youth, and as such limit life chances. Chapters often broach such structural constraints, and show that the life-chances of have been being significantly raised whenever there has been fast economic growth, social collapse is associated with the opposite, however even with growth others are left behind, or even worse, fall behind.

Intergenerational dependency in Brazil, Russia and China is a result of a decline in the birth rate, combined with increasing life expectancy. This leads to young people being required to sacrifice themselves in order to permit their elders to have a more comfortable retired life than they themselves will be able to have. Remarkably this state of affairs does not meet with more than isolated criticisms. In China a vigorous blog movement discusses the huge emotional problems generated by such dependence. The fiscal capacities of State spending on public pension systems in both Russia and Brazil have been the challenged, in Russia protests led President Putin to backtrack and in Brazil, President Temer was unable to pass pension reform. In China the one child family policy is already being revived reducing that future demands on a benevolent government to fulfill care obligations to the old.

The Handbook on Social Stratification shows that subsequent to the reform and opening up in China, the fall of Communism in Russia the Independence of India and the end of the Military regime in Brazil spaces for the exercise of agency opened up, especially in the economic sphere. However, where this overflowed into the political system the results were varied.

Agency and information technologies

Even if the authors do not use the vocabulary of 'agency', the handbook shows that the use of the internet seems to be the place where agency is most easily observed

in the five countries — particularly in the eighth section ‘internet participation and communication’.

The rise of enterprise associated with new technologies appears to be a general phenomenon in all five countries. Some of the most important contemporary capitalists in the ITC sector are from BRICS countries and there are many spin-off enterprises and users. Youth turns to political action particularly in Brazil and South Africa whereas in China spoofing aims to subvert official values without directly challenging the political system. We also discover social actors who attempt to use the power of the ITCs to undermine the system of political power: in Brazil hackers use ITCs to fight corruption!

However, the positive news on the economic front gives birth to a negative side product — cybercrime. This appears to grow in the shade offered by the opening up of new and unregulated opportunities. McAfee reports that the world’s four leading cybercrime countries are United States, China, Brazil and Russia. In other words cybercrime is an authentic BRICS problem.

But, at a more general level, we see that defamation, poison-pens and terrorism organize themselves through the internet, however, such activities are not normally associated in Sociology with the concept of ‘agency’ which is mainly presented in a bright light, indeed adapting Michel Wieviorka we might call these «counter-agency actors.’

Methodology and limitations of the approach taken

At the Bandung conference (1955) Nehru had identified the principles of **equality between nations** and **respect for sovereignty** as the bases for cooperation, said differently, no country has a right to carry on as though it were a superior to another, nor to involve itself in their internal affairs. Recently an article has presented an ‘ideal type’ based on a reconstructed post-facto representation of what was done in the two handbooks. Beyond the first two principles a motivation to work together was added in. The central axis of the project involves the acquisition and transmission of knowledge on other societies and social systems, in other words, this is a win — win situation for all involved.

Once the themes of the sections were decided upon the presidents of the principal sociological societies of each country were free to choose their national editor and these, in turn, to choose authors. While India and Brazil were invited late on in the process to write the first handbook, for the second we envisaged that it would come to be read by an international public, and this would give authors visibility they would not normally obtain. National editors were responsible for supervising the production of the chapters without undue interference from the chief editor. Authors were encouraged to express themselves within the limits of their own intellectual traditions, without being required to sterilize their chapters to make them acceptable according to the criteria established by the many blind refereed journals. Our books were works of freedom, which open up spaces for developing dialogue, for teaching, in the future.

Indeed this second book is just a further step by which BRICS sociologists are beginning to get to know their partner societies better and to understand the bases of each others’ sociological practices. For the BRICS to work there is so much work to be done in a short time, and dialogue is extremely fragile and complex. The book’s

greatest strength its innovative nature — which comes from it having been published and able to promote dialogue. However, the conditions under which it was published contain the seeds of its greatest weakness — heterogeneity!

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KARL MARX'S 200TH ANNIVERSARY

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KARL MARX IN TIME OF VICTORIOUS CAPITALISM: A REVIEW OF NEW AND NOTEWORTHY RESEARCH

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CAPITALISM: A REVIEW OF NEW AND
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КАРЛ МАРКС В ЭПОХУ ПОБЕДИВШЕГО
КАПИТАЛИЗМА: ОБЗОР НОВЕЙШИХ
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Abstract. This paper is an extended review of selected conferences and other academic events devoted to Marx's 200th anniversary held in 2018. The authors review a collection of the papers presented during these events and reflect on the current position of Marxist and Marxiological scholarship on contemporary campuses in the time of «academic capitalism».

Keywords: marxism, Marx, critical sociology, academic capitalism, comparative capitalism.

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Аннотация. Представлен обзор материалов конференций и научных журналов, посвящённых двухсотлетию со дня рождения Карла Маркса. Авторы анализируют статьи и презентации, которые имеют непосредственное отношение к переосмыслению наследия Маркса в социологии. Статья завершается комментариями о положении марксистских и марксологических исследований в эпоху «академического капитализма».

Ключевые слова: марксизм, Карл Маркс, критическая социология, академический капитализм, сравнительный капитализм

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Capitalism exists in 2018. It can be said that it is a time of victorious capitalism or rather capitalisms. There is a plethora of adjectives different authors have used to characterize the varieties of capitalism. You will see in the literature papers about organized/disorganized capitalism [Lash, Urry, 1987], turbo capitalism [Luttwak, 1998], conscious capitalism [Mackey, Sisodia, 2014], natural capitalism [Hawken, Lovins, Lovins, 1999]. Sociologists also discuss the specifics of academic capitalism [Jessop, 2018b].

The year also 2018 marks the 200th birthday of Karl Marx — a perfect time to reconsider the fate and the prospects of capitalism and the modes of its critique. What Marx left behind is an open system of thought or rather a collection of scattered blocks of theory that allow for creative reconstruction. This means that there are multiple ways of «making sense of Marx», to put it in Jon Elster's words — to construct consistent and compelling readings of Marx.

This paper is not intended as a standard piece of the conference report genre; rather, it is a selective review essay focusing on several particularly interesting results of the sociologists' reflections on Marx's 200th anniversary. In order to avoid the pitfall of being somewhat arbitrary this paper borrows the definition of what is 'interesting' from Murray Davis' famous 1971 paper, in which he argued that «interesting theories are those which *deny* certain assumptions of their audience» [Davis, 1971: 309]. Furthermore, instead of theories, this paper is concerned with professional events and publications devoted to Marx's jubilee that resonated across the sociological community. Specifically, questions that arose during this anniversary year include:

What happened to the Marxian critical project during the last 200 years? Does it still have a future? Has Marx become an indisputable classic, and, by the same token, no longer relevant for sociology's present concerns? Is capitalism still an «unsurpassable horizon of our times», to adopt Jean-Paul Sartre's words (notably, said in relation to Marxism) or just a controversial political term with limited heuristic value? Can the Marxian synthesis of speculative philosophy and political economy add value to the scientific study of the social reality, and what is 'value' anyway?

Many of these questions have been addressed by sociologists in this landmark year, at professional meetings and conferences, as well as in published papers and journals' special issues.

One of the major conferences on Marx in 2018 has undoubtedly been the one organized by *The Marx Collegium*, featuring prominent speakers such as Immanuel Wallerstein, Saskia Sassen, Etienne Balibar, Bob Jessop, Silvia Federici, Bertell Ollman, Leo Panitch, Terell Carver, George Comninel, Marcello Musto and the late Moishe Postone.¹ The other major initiative related to Marx's anniversary is the *Marx200* project funded by Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, presenting an extensive archive of digital documents, exhibits, interviews and scholarly presentations, as well as information on the events, such as conferences, summer and autumn schools, and public lectures.² While these two initiatives are perhaps unmatched in their scale and scope, they naturally encompass a wide variety of publics and scholarly disciplines. The concern of this paper, by contrast, is specifically the sociological resonance of Marx's anniversary.

Luckily, a sociological approach to the themes of Marx's 200th anniversary has not escaped the attention of some of the discipline's professional bodies. Thus, the 8.1 issue of *The Global Dialogue*, the official journal of International Sociological Association, devoted a special section to the reflections of sociologists on the fate of Marx and Marxism within the discipline. On the contrary, the American Sociological Association and International Institute of Sociology remained silent.³

The Global Dialogue offers a range of reflections on Marxism's uneven career in sociology, its relationships to feminism, theory of the state, the analysis of law and much else besides, taking stock of the 200 year long survival race between the Marxian critique and its object — capitalism, or bourgeois mode of production. In their short one-page editorial, the editors, Brigitte Aulenbacher and Klaus Doerre [2018], concede approvingly that there is «a rich body of research on Marx worldwide», despite of the fact that Marxian theory remains contested [Aulenbacher, Doerre, 2018: 31]. The invited symposium, entitled 'Marx and Sociology Today', was aimed at providing an appreciation of this diversity and mapping the terms of the contestation.⁴

G. M. Tamás gives a short overview of Marxism's relationships with sociology as a discipline, emphasizing from the outset that the latter «is posterior to» the former

¹ The conference reports are available in several languages from the collegium's website: URL: <http://www.marxcollegium.org/speakers.html> (date of assess: 29.09.2018).

² URL: <https://marx200.org/en/mediathek> (date of assess: 29.09.2018).

³ As for the former, the most recent material mentioning Karl Marx on the ASA website is from January 2017: URL: <http://www.asanet.org/news-events/asa-news/what-relation-between-theory-and-practice-and-did-marx-discuss-engineering-society> (date of assess: 29.09.2018).

⁴ It is impossible to do justice to all the contributions presented within the limits of this paper, so the below review is inevitably selective. Interested readers may refer to the issue itself for more details.

[Tamás, 2018: 32]. Despite the fact that most Marxists would agree with the core premise of a sociological study of capitalism which Tamás traces back to Weber and Mauss, there is a «quarrel» between Marxism and bourgeois sociology, whose project was «in part directed against» Marx's legacy [Ibid.]. From the point of view of the history of philosophy, Marx made a step «forward from Hegel, but also back to Kant» [Ibid.: 33], thus restoring the «duality of the empirical and the transcendental». Furthermore, Marx's critique of sociology's celebrated «facts qua things» (pace Durkheim) as reified abstractions suspects active essences behind static appearances, claiming that the former are «not things, but human subjective activities» [Ibid.]. Hence inequality is not identical to exploitation — to regard the latter a «political problem» capable of gradual improvement is, for a Marxist, absurd [Ibid.]. Moreover, Marx also questions the notion of class struggle as a driving force of history — instead, classes are historical, not trans-historical, and as such exist only in capitalism. If classes are epiphenomenal of value and capital, then class cultures, organizations and lifestyles, like much of the rest of the objects of sociological study, are little more than «second-order epiphenomena». Thus, «usually, sociological questions cannot be answered by Marxian theory, and vice versa» [Ibid.].

In his contribution, Erik O. Wright focuses on the prediction that capitalism is unsustainable as a social order, showing that this proposition «embodies the interplay of deterministic claims about the inevitable demise of capitalism with nondeterministic claims about the future beyond capitalism» [Wright, 2018: 34]. While doubtful about the strength and longevity of capitalism, Wright believes that the nondeterministic element creates a space for collective agency, while the deterministic ones give reasons for optimism. Hence the continuing relevance of Marxism for the social movements, even though «we now live in a world very different from the one in which Marx formulated his theoretical ideas» [Ibid.: 35]. Wright concedes, however, that the «laws of motion» are no longer feasible as an analytical framework in the XXI century. Making a detour from the hardline Marxist worldview, he refers to such 'bourgeois' notions as equality, freedom, democracy and humanity, considered necessary for «human flourishing» which, according to Wright, capitalism fails to produce, thus «obstructing» their «fullest possible realization». For Wright, a desirable post-capitalist future would be based on an economic system where investment and production decisions fall out of control of the capitalist class and are instead governed by means of a radical democracy. This prospect advocates Marxism as not simply a critique of capitalism, but an «emancipatory social science» in charge of analyzing the conditions under which radical economic democracy would be not just imaginable or desirable, but achievable and sustainable. Wright's last thesis pertains to the importance of the «class struggles of transformation» that go beyond mere resistance. This claim speaks directly to his own project of analyzing «real utopias» [Wright, 2010]. Global capital has no «outside»; hence its transformation can only be achieved from the «inside» and only with the help of popular mobilizations [Wright, 2018: 35].

Moving away from purely economic perspective of Marxism, Alexandra Scheele and Stephanie Wöhl [2018] examine how feminism confronts Marxism in the XXI century. Criticizing the current Marx renaissance's blindness towards feminist questions, the contributors try to bring forth the crucial issue of capitalism's entanglement

with patriarchy, noting that «feminist analyses were never genuinely part of left-wing discussions about Marx» [Scheele, Wöhl, 2018: 36]. Whereas Marx «at least mentioned» the gendered dimensions of capitalist reproduction and exploitation, the sexual division of labor, and patriarchal foundations of capitalist accumulation, these issues are remarkably absent from contemporary renewal of the Marxist debate [Ibid.] The authors call attention to the fact that gendered division of labor cannot be taken for granted, since such a naturalization obscures its constitutive role for the functioning of the global capitalist system, as well as the crucial position of reproductive labor within the global production and care chains [Ibid.: 37]. In this respect, Scheele's and Wöhl's contribution speaks not only to the feminist accounts, but also to Marxist feminism emerging from within the tradition and stressing the gendered dimensions of such fundamental processes as «primitive accumulation». The work of the Operaist feminist thinker Silvia Federici [Federici 2004] would be a case in point. The authors' second major point concerns the necessity of engaging with the insights offered by feminist and the postcolonial perspective to recognize the limitation of the Marxian revolutionary subject as a male, white, and Western [Scheele, Wöhl, 2018: 37]. The contribution concludes with a critique of the current androcentric bias in both academia and Marxism at large.

Bob Jessop's contribution concerns the issue of the Marxist analysis of the modern state [Jessop, 2018a]. Starting with the well-known observation that neither Marx nor Engels provided a comprehensive theory of the state and nationalism, as well as the concrete mechanisms of the state's famous «withering away», Jessop asserts that there is still much to be gained from the scattered accounts of these issues that Marx and Engels *did* develop. Jessop suggests that at least three main accounts of the state are discernible in Marx's work [Ibid.: 38]. First, there is the notion of the state as the «central committee of the bourgeoisie», implying complete continuity between the class organizations of the capitalists and the state, and asserting the latter's complete heteronomy. However, this idea is dismissed by Jessop as merely «propagandist» and intended for strategic purposes. The second reading, more informed by historical evidence, posits the state as a *potentially autonomous* entity, and sees the autonomy as a contingent outcome of the class struggle. Such an understanding remains widely accepted in today's historical sociology. The third reading is rooted in Marx's early criticism of Hegel's philosophy of right and the later account of the experience of the Paris Commune. In this account the state reappears as the alienated structure separating the rulers and the ruled; on the other hand, by virtue of its impersonal domination, the state also functions as the condition of possibility of the separation of the political and the economic, and thus political from economic exploitation — the insight famously taken on board by the Political Marxists [Wood, 1981]. Marx also pointed out the inherent contradiction of democratic constitutions — between the formal equality of political rights and the social and economic power of the bourgeoisie that allows it to dominate «subaltern» classes. In the end, Marx does leave some space for the state's autonomy — the crucial issue in the sociology of the state, from the 1970s Marxists «state derivation» debates to the more recent historical sociology of the state [Evans, Rueschmeyer, Skocpol, 1985] — by virtue of the institutional separation of the political and the economic, and the relative autonomy of political struggle from the

immediate economic conditions. Jessop's conclusion is that Marxian analysis of the state, precisely because of its incomplete character, is a promising yet challenging field for further theoretical elaboration.

Guilherme Leite Gonçalves [2018] addresses another problematic part of Marxian theory—the analysis of law. Beginning with the observation that «much of what we know about the Marxist notion of law» is rooted in Pashukanis' «commodity-form theory of law» [Pashukanis, 1978], Gonçalves argues that this theory explains why domination assumes abstract character, how the appropriation of the producer's labor is made invisible, and how exchange between equals sustains inequality; however, it cannot explain why capitalism reduce itself to this cycle [Gonçalves, 2018: 40]. Drawing on the arguments of Rosa Luxemburg, further developed by David Harvey and Klaus Doerre, that capital's global reach and expansion are driven by the necessity to realize value by colonizing some Other, external spaces, not yet commodified, Gonçalves suggests that primitive accumulation is a permanent feature of capitalism—it simply never stops [Bonefeld, 2011; Doerre, 2012]. He then relates the notion of *Landnahme*, proposed by Doerre as a general description of capital's *modus operandi*, to law. The theory of the legal form by Pashukanis has limited heuristic value as far as *Landnahme* is concerned: in this process «law works as explicit legal violence and an express prescription of inequality» [Gonçalves, 2018: 40—41]. Hence the theory views the role of the state as central in the process of «land grabbing», as the agency that violently destroys the institutions of common property and replaces them with private property relations. First, it engages in the process of «legal othering», the discursive characterization of the non-capitalist 'Other' as deviant and inferior by means of the human rights doctrine. Then the state imposes privatization. Finally, the law simply takes the form of Marxian 'bloody legislation' whereby the criminal law is mobilized to discipline the workforce—in the present context, enforcing precarious and flexible work relations and criminalizing poverty. Gonçalves concludes that the law works differently depending on whether it is being enacted in the cycle of exchange of equivalents or the expansion cycle (*Landnahme*), fluctuating between explicit legal violence in the latter case, and fetishist legal form in the former.

Lastly, the three concluding contributions address the issue of Marxism's prevalence in different parts of the world, namely India, South Africa, and the Global South more generally. Satish Deshpande provides a comprehensive map of Marxism's reception in India, where, contrary to the Anglo-American West, political Marxism has loomed larger than academic [Deshpande, 2018: 42]. India stands out as the first country in which a democratically elected communist government assumed power. This event occurred in 1957 when the Communist Party of India won the elections in the state of Kerala and became the major agent of spreading Marxist ideas. Academically, Marxism in India has been more influential in history, economics and political science rather than sociology, with some notable exceptions. The country's contribution to theoretical Marxism has been primarily in the transition debate and Subaltern Studies [Ibid.: 43].

Michelle Williams [2018], writing from South Africa, argues that Marx remains relevant despite the recent rise of postmodernism. Yet the biggest challenge for the local Marxist scholars is to engage productively with the issues of race and racism after apartheid. Most of the Marxist analyses of race have tended to see it as an instrument

of division of the working class, thus taking the latter's identity for granted. Hence, more nuanced historical accounts sensitive to historical contingency are needed.

Finally, Raju Das and David Fasenfest [2018] look at Marxism from the point of view of the Global South, arguing that Marx's theory remains pertinent to that region, if engaged with carefully—avoiding both Eurocentrism as well as world-regional exceptionalism. Going against much of postcolonial thought, Das and Fasenfest suggest that Marx's analysis focused on Europe as the site where capitalism, as a system, took root, rather than conveyed any sense that European experiences were somehow privileged or unique [Das, Fasenfest, 2018: 46]. Therefore, his «basically global and internationalist» approach remains salient, as long as both the North and South are class societies where «the majority of free and unfree workers perform surplus labor» [Ibid.].

Many of these topics surrounding Marxism's global reach also resonated at the 2018 Hamburg conference entitled «The Dynamics of Capitalism: Inquiries to Marx on the Occasion of his 200th Birthday», jointly organized by Hamburg Institute of Social Research and the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, May 3—5, 2018. Contrary to the ISA's reflections, this conference was less concerned with how Marxism travelled in sociology and instead focused on the topic that preoccupied Marx himself—the capitalist dynamics. Again, it is impossible to do justice to the richness of the presentations; fortunately, they are available online for those interested.⁵

The opening presentation was given by Thomas Piketty who presented some of the findings of his recent research pertaining to the changing patterns of political conflict and rising inequality.⁶ Starting with the question as to why rising inequality does not lead to rising demands for redistribution, Piketty examined the changing voter composition in France, Britain, and the US for the period of 1948—2017 using the data from post-electoral surveys. He found that in the 1950s and 1960s, the vote for the left (labor, social-democrat, socialist) parties used to be associated with lower education and lower income, and hence can be interpreted as a class-based vote intended to press for redistributive policies. Over the 1970s and 1980s, however, the left vote has become associated with higher education and income levels, so that in the 1990s and 2000s, Piketty claims, a new «multiple-elite party system» emerged. This new political system is divided into the highly educated left-wing «Brahmin», and wealthy or high income right-wing «Merchant» voters, or intellectual elite vs. business elite. Piketty's main conclusion is that ongoing evolutions are complex and political strategies will matter in shaping the course of future events. New class alliances and cleavages might emerge, including a renewed class-based political conflict.

Wolfgang Streeck focused specifically on Marx, and his social theory as a theory of history, noting a reemergence of the sense of directionality of historical process after the neoliberal revolution of the late 1970s⁷ (see also [Streeck, 2010]). Delving into Marxian theory of value, as well as the accounts of the struggle around the working day, Streeck argued that over the course of its history, capitalism emancipates itself from the conditions of its emergence. This process is best captured in the chapters of *Das Kapital*

⁵ URL: <http://www.mpiifg.de/projects/marx200/livestreams.asp> (date of assess: 29.09.2018).

⁶ URL: <http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/Piketty2018.pdf> (date of assess: 29.09.2018).

⁷ URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9oYebm07Wa0> (date of assess: 29.09.2018).

devoted to the «formation of the modern working class» that in many ways parallel the concluding chapters of Weber's *Protestant Ethic*, where the metaphor of the iron cage emerges. Perhaps the most interesting part of Streeck's presentation was in his historical observations. Similar to today, in the 1960s and the 1970s the speculation on the possible shape of a post-capitalist future loomed large in the social science discourse, along with the idea of emancipation *from work*, as evidenced by the attention paid to such evocative texts as Keynes' *The Economics Possibilities of Our Grandchildren*.⁸ The implication of Streeck's argument is that, with the advent of neoliberal orthodoxy that revitalized work-discipline and the concern with economic subsistence, Marx's analysis of the «driving forces» of history has become relevant anew.

Jens Beckert addressed the topic of value in Marx and in the new economic sociology⁹. His argument is that parts of the Marxian agenda remain relevant in so far as it focuses on the difference between value and market prices, therefore offering a way to examine the dynamics of capitalism, rather than static equilibrium conditions. However, the divergence between values and prices and hence the sources of capitalist dynamics need not be addressed in exclusively Marxian terms. Beckert suggests an economic-sociological interpretation of the theory of investment expectations as a means to account for these issues, as well as alternative readings of the Marxian theory of value, as suggested by pragmatist interpretations [Deutschmann, 2011].

Axel Honneth represented the discipline of philosophy in the conference dominated by economic sociologists¹⁰. Pointing out from the outset that Marx never abandoned the notion of civil society he borrowed from Hegel, Honneth insisted that for Hegel, and a fortiori for Marx, this concept meant simply the market or the economy, the realm of private exchanges among self-interested individuals—contrary to the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment. Over the course of his studies, Marx fluctuated between offering a structural theory of capitalist dynamics and a critical anthropology of bourgeois subjectivity. This hesitation is best exemplified by the *Grundrisse*, where, according to Honneth, Marx tried to combine the two. The *Grundrisse* also make clear that any notion of 'epistemological rupture' is absurd—Marx never abandoned his project of the critique of alienation, although he did struggle with making theory and data fit as well as with his famous «method of presentation» vs. «method of inquiry» problem. Honneth concluded with the argument that this contradiction—or double purpose—of the Marxian project persists, but can be used productively as a source of alternative conceptualizations of «capitalism»: as an economic system or as a «form of life», that is, culture.

Other presentations were no less salient, ranging from sophisticated analyses of the new roles assumed by technology—Marx's cherished «productive forces»—to the rise of the «artificially intelligent classes» (Marion Fourcade)¹¹ or the «technoscience rent» (Kean Birch)¹². There were also two presentations that addressed the topic of money,

⁸ Keynes J. M. (1930) *The Economic Possibilities of Our Grandchildren*. URL: <http://www.econ.yale.edu/smith/econ116a/keynes1.pdf> (date of assess: 29.09.2018).

⁹ URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SibSNPH603M> (date of assess: 29.09.2018).

¹⁰ URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BB6epE9YVz0> (date of assess: 29.09.2018).

¹¹ URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OUNYGdKaw8A> (date of assess: 29.09.2018).

¹² URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W_iddHJ1IDM (date of assess: 29.09.2018). See also URL: https://www.academia.edu/33175493/Technoscience_rent_Towards_a_theory_of_rentiership (date of assess: 29.09.2018).

financialization and economic abstractions more generally (Greta Krippner and Aaron Sahr)¹³. New ways of conceptualizing the modes of production, a category notoriously prone to confusion, were offered (David Elder-Vass)¹⁴ along with the reflections on the history of ideas, for example, «the never-ending story» of capitalism's imminent collapse (Friedrich Lenger)¹⁵.

As evidenced by this unjustifiably short overview, some of the ever present tensions of Marxism reemerged throughout the papers presented in *The Global Dialogue*, as well as in the presentations of the Hamburg conference. The issues of incompatibility of the Marxian analysis of the value-form with the standards of mainstream empirical social science [Postone, 1993], the challenge of developing an adequate theory of the state and the law, as well as accounting for the non-European and gendered dimensions of capital and capitalism remain as salient as always. Furthermore, if, as many of the authors suggest, political practice cannot be used as a criterion — if not for verification, then for vindication — of the central claims of Marxism, perhaps the scholars who consider themselves as belonging to this tradition should come up with some other criteria for distinguishing between «good» and «bad» Marxist scholarship. With this it is also important to consider how possible criteria would be compatible with the established epistemologies of the mainstream social sciences? Finally, there is the concern of what remains of Marxism as a unified research program — can it bring any value to the feminist or postcolonial studies, or historical sociology of the state, or economic sociology of value and markets, so that the exchange will be reciprocal, rather than one-sidedly oriented at correcting the blind spots of Marxism? Or rather, as Immanuel Wallerstein [Wallerstein, 1998] and Randall Collins [Collins, 1994] suggest, can Marxism now be regarded as a fundamental basis of any sociological inquiry, thereby paradoxically becoming increasingly distant from the specific concerns of the practicing researchers? If «we are all now Marxists» by virtue of doing sociology, what would be distinctive of a *Marxist sociology*? Should we blame the «academization of Marxism» ongoing since the 1960s [Ollman, 1982] especially in the current times of «academic capitalism»? These questions seem to remain on the agenda, and the sociologists' current engagement with Marx are but a compelling indication of their continuing salience.

We would like to conclude this essay by offering a speculation about what Marx could possibly bring to the global, international and comparative sociology of the XXI century. William Sewell has aptly characterized contemporary comparative historical sociology as predominantly «left Weberian» [Sewell, 1996]. Weberian analysis proceeds with the assumption of multiple divergent trajectories, following the basic logic of the case-based comparative research. Hence what we now have is an endless debate about varieties of capitalism, or varieties of transitions to capitalism. There is nothing wrong with this research program; however, its heuristic potential may be limited by the very assumption it is based on — the assumption of difference. Yet what a renewed attention to Marx can bring is precisely a certain re-focusing of our theorizing on what

¹³ URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v4GXJBUvUc4> (date of assess: 29.09.2018).

¹⁴ URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OUNYGdKaw8A> (date of assess: 29.09.2018).

¹⁵ URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d8usobQUqBo> (date of assess: 29.09.2018).

might be called, following Wolfgang Streeck, the «commonalities of capitalism» [Streeck, 2010], with a focus on categorical core that remains beyond the institutional and technological forms capitalist societies nowadays assume. The reviewed papers and presentations covered in this article demonstrate both the demand for such a vision and serve as promising attempts to elaborate some conceptual tools for it.

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A SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINE GROWS WHEN IT REMEMBERS ITS GREAT FIGURES

A SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINE GROWS WHEN IT REMEMBERS ITS GREAT FIGURES

НАУКА РАЗВИВАЕТСЯ, КОГДА ХРАНИТ ПАМЯТЬ О СВОИХ ГЕРОЯХ

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A scientific discipline grows when is able to develop new knowledge, new questions and hypotheses, new methods and theoretical paradigms. But it also grows when it remembers its great figures like Neil Smelser and critically assesses their legacy. Neil Smelser had a long and very fruitful career, about six decades and a half of intense intellectual work. He was a kind of wunderkind; when he was twenty two years old he went to Oxford with a Rhodes scholarship and he was asked by Talcott Parsons, his Harvard mentor and the most influential sociologist at that time, to assist him in preparing the Marshall lectures. Neil was much more than a research assistant. He

updated Parsons' economic knowledge with John Maynard Keynes general theory and brought very innovative ideas, first of all the scheme of the double interchanges, that allowed Parsons' AGIL model to be applied to social systems, a substantial contribution to the joint book "Economy and Society. An integration of economic and social theory". I know this book very well, it was the way through which I met Neil. In 1966 I was preparing the Italian edition of "Economy and Society"-with a long introduction where I defined my own theoretical position when I won a Harkness fellowship for Ph.D. for studying in the United States and I chose the University of California at Berkeley. In the late 60's, Berkeley was a very special place for all what was happening inside and around campus; there was a great sociological school with figures like Bellah, Bendix, Goffman, Lipset, Lowenthal, Selznick, and Smelser. When I met him, he had already published among other works the book on the British industrial revolution, the one on collective behavior, "Sociology of economic life". Being one of the most eminent representatives of functionalism (at the time the hegemonic paradigm in social science), a kind of heir apparent to Parsons, I thought to find a very self-assured, arrogant man, a sort of primadonna. On the contrary, he was a gentle and generous person, very open, always respecting other's ideas, I had different political views at that time and we used to have very open and interesting conversations. Neil had not only a very brilliant mind, but also a wide and deep culture, extending across the boundaries of sociology, economics, psychology, psychoanalysis, history. He was also a great educator, a mentor for a generation of students. Many among us remember his social theory class, which was really a model of how to teach. He always believed in the close link between research and teaching. Teaching helps the growth of brilliant minds and it is a way to test hypotheses and generate new knowledge. Neil Smelser was the author of major scientific works; he was very productive in the first ten-fifteen years of his career; in from the late 1970s and '80s he made a partial reappraisal of his early functionalist paradigm; in the last decade of the twentieth he was again very productive, with important new contributions to psychoanalysis and the method of behavioral sciences and additions and revisions of his key topics, like the sociology of collective behavior. Neil also reflected upon his own experience as advisor to academic governance in higher education. A sort of completion of his intellectual career was his famous speech as elected president of the American Sociological Association on "the rational and ambivalent". Finally, in the new century and in the last years of his life, he continued to work, going back and forth his lifetime interests in research, but also addressing new and much debated topics as for instance terrorism. There is another component of his personality which must be stressed: his role of spokesman for the social sciences, a sort of ambassador, with various and different stakeholders, including government agencies, international organizations, the general public, the media. Neil Smelser consistently defended science, good social science. And to this purpose he also played a major role in international organizations. In 1978 I started with him the research group on "Economy and society" which is now RC-02; Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Arnold Sales and Harry Makler had a similar proposal, so we joined efforts and started one of the most successful research committees of the ISA. In 1990 he became ISA vice-president and chair of the program committee, which is not so common because many first class scholars think they cannot 'loose time' in this kind

of organizational responsibilities. Another quality I have always appreciated was Neil's constant attempt to bridge disciplinary divides. He was against the over-fragmentation of social sciences and tried to build bridges between sociology and economics, sociology and psychology, sociology and history. The complexity of knowledge nowadays fosters specialization, it is inescapable, and we must counteract this trend through the development of interdisciplinary dialogue and cooperation. I think that Neil would have appreciated what I've done in the last five years as president of the International Social Science Council, in particular the merger between ISSC and ICSU (the council which represents international organization of the natural sciences) in the new International Science Council with the objective of creating a single, powerful global voice for science. This is my personal tribute to him.

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P. Sztompka

NEIL J. SMELSER: SNIPPETS OF PERSONAL MEMORY

NEIL J. SMELSER: SNIPPETS OF PERSONAL MEMORY

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НЕЙЛ СМЕЛЗЕР: КАРТИНКИ ИЗ ЛИЧНЫХ ВОСПОМИНАНИЙ

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It is a great gift of fate when the academic master turns into a friend. This has been my experience with Neil J. Smelser. Just three examples of his immense generosity and trust for the sociologist from a far away country, Poland.

When in 1972 I first came to the UC Berkeley as a Fulbright post-doctoral fellow, the first thing was to enroll at Neil's class on classical sociological theories. We were sitting together with Jeff Alexander, Eric Olin Wright, Luca Perone and others listening to Neil's masterful lectures on classical masters of sociology. After classes we gathered at informal "Theory Club" and discussed what he has just said. When after Comte and Spencer it came to Karl Marx, Neil approached me and asked if

I could deliver the lecture in his place. He assumed, quite correctly, that coming from Eastern Europe I had been well acquainted with Marx's work. Indeed at that time I was much interested in the work of Marx as an XIX-century author of original socio-economic theory and humanistic image of a human person, rather than the creator of a communist movement of which I had enough of a first-hand bad experience. I gave the lecture in this spirit with Neil sitting in the audience. Incredible feeling, perhaps the most difficult exam I have ever passed, which became a most memorable event in my long teaching career. An immense gift of trust for a completely unknown postdoctoral student from far away country. But there were other gestures of support. When at the end of my fellowship I completed the manuscript of my first English-language book on structural-functionalism, it was Neil who recommended it to Stanley Holwith, then the editor at Academic Press, N.Y., and the book "System and Function" came out a year later, introducing me to the American sociological community and initiating my international career.

When more than twenty years later I came as a fellow to the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University where Neil was a Director, it happened that my mother got terminally ill and I had to break my stay and return to Poland. Neil expressed his sympathy and friendly encouragement once again. Some months later, a bit contrary to the CASBS standard policy, he reinvited me to complete my fellowship and the result was a book coauthored by Alexander, Eyerman, Giesen, Smelser and myself on "Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity" (CUP at Berkeley 2005).

Again some twenty years passed and in 2014 at the age of seventy I was retiring from the Jagiellonian University at Krakow. The idea of the Faculty instead of the traditional Festschrift was to invite some of my foreign colleagues and collaborators to deliver a series of visiting lectures ("oral publications" on their current work) for our students. Some of my colleagues came, one month Jeff Alexander, then another month Anthony Giddens. And one day at the Krakow airport at Balice I was greeting Neil Smelser, already well over eighty, who came from the plane on a wheelchair, after a long flight from California. He had medical problems with his legs. And he took all this huge trip from California via Frankfurt, and all discomfort of a long flight, just for the sake of his student of nineteen-seventies. And to the delight of my students he delivered impressive lectures on the tradition of universities and contemporary dilemmas of their structure and functioning.

Of course I have had many more opportunities to meet and collaborate with Neil, for example within the framework of International Sociological Association (ISA) where he was a Vice-President, and in 2002 I followed his tenure elected as a President. But those three occasions I have described evoke strongest emotions of gratitude and show best what kind of unusual person Neil Smelser was. All who had known him, and all readers of his important work, will miss him for a long time.

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WE CAN AND SHOULD RETURN TO HIS WRITINGS WITH PROFIT

WE CAN AND SHOULD RETURN TO HIS
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МЫ МОЖЕМ И ДОЛЖНЫ ВОЗВРА-
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I am going to speak from the point of view of many of Neil Smelser's students, especially the students of the latter part of his career. It is great to remember Neil here in Toronto for reasons I will get to later. But it has also been great for me personally, because I had an opportunity to go back through my files and hear his voice again through those files. So, I intersperse my reflections here with a little bit of his voice. From our first casual conversation to our last professional chat, Neil was a stalwart and kind presence in my life over thirty years. He was a lovely man and I'll miss him, as many of you here will, and certainly many of his students of my generation.

At that first meeting, I was saying something about the beginnings of my dissertation design, some rigorously linked set of hypotheses. He kindly mentioned that it might be

a mistake to make the design so tight at such an early stage of the research, because unexpected things might happen. So, obviously I had to ask him to be on my dissertation committee. And at our last meeting, we had a lovely chat in a hotel lobby: professional gossip, his latest writing— very characteristically, his essay called “Sources of Unity and Disunity in Sociology” — and his grandchildren (I was very impressed by a game he had invented for them). When we had to part, I said “But we haven’t even talked about health issues”, and he answered warmly: “Well, we’ve covered the important things”.

So, thirty years of support and friendship leave a lot of memories. Amazingly, there’s not one upsetting memory among them. That’s quite remarkable, I think. As a dissertation advisor, Neil may not have realized how much it meant to find his long letters of careful reflections in my mail so promptly after I’d given him something to read. He was balanced, undogmatic, open, interested, and supportive. Never unduly directive, he didn’t create “Smelser students,” but helped us become scholars in ourselves. Yet years later I would be surprised to realize that Neil had pioneered the scholarship generating some new idea of mine. And that was the least of it. I also remember the years of advice about navigating my career, and, when he plunged into his active retirement, I always enjoyed hearing the latest enthusiastic accounts of his next book, his keen travels, and the grandchildren who delighted him.

To me, Neil seemed amazingly unpretentious. If it had been left to him, I would not have known what a significant figure he is in twentieth century sociology. Yet, looking back at all he did, he must have been a professional virtuoso. Occasionally, he might mention some obligation to travel— on the program committee here at ISA, or to Berlin to give the Georg Simmel Lectures, or to a National Academy of Sciences meeting. Or he might mention an acquaintance from his long tenure with the Guggenheim Foundation or the Social Science Research Council, or Directorship of the Center for Advanced Studies in Behavioral Sciences. Or he might mention a project he was particularly engaged in— like a national report on terrorism, or a plan for the University of California in the coming century. And it’s very fitting to be remembering Neil in Toronto: the Toronto meeting of his ASA presidency was a high point for both of us. (Also fittingly, when he was introduced as President of ASA, he was called “Bridge-builder par excellence.”) Yet all this was a tiny fraction of all he contributed to the academy, mostly behind the scenes.

He was similarly unpretentious about his scholarship. But ultimately, that is what we should remember most. He is gone, but we can and should still return to his writings with profit. The fact that he treated his retirement as a happy opportunity to write more books reminds us how important scholarship was to him. Here is Neil’s voice, writing at the time of his retirement: “I think it will be more like a third career than a retirement”.

And so it was. Overall, his contributions covered a vast terrain, because he was always pleased to think about a new problem, or rethink an earlier position. We all have our particular interests, but Neil wrote a lot that any sociologist can profit from, whatever their interests. I still find his early *Comparative Methods in the Social Sciences* useful for my students. Among his later works, I remember his particular delight in *The Odyssey Experience*, describing a pervasive and influential social process broadly applicable to many arenas of contemporary life.

I also think — and I emphasize this — every sociologist should read his article “The rational and the ambivalent in the social sciences”, his presidential address for ASA, which was the culmination of a series of more obscure but important articles over the years offering a sustained critique of rational choice.

And every student should read his short book «Problematics of Sociology: The Georg Simmel Lectures» for really lucid and balanced map of the field, of the sort that only Neil could provide. Neil’s wise reflections on the scope and inherent tensions of our discipline, and the forces that shape it, are explored in more depth in one of his very last books, *Getting Sociology Right: A Half-Century of Reflections*. That includes the wonderful essay “Sociology as Science, Humanism and Art” – another required reading.

So I am grateful to remember Neil’s support and friendship through the years, and even more, for the distinctive voice he offered to sociology. And I ask you all to look more at this voice. Thank you.



