СРАВНИТЕЛЬНЫЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ МИГРАЦИИ

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SECOND GENERATION MIGRANTS AGED 18−35 IN RUSSIA: RESEARCH PROJECT RESULTS

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ИНТЕГРАЦИЯ МИГРАНТОВ ВТОРОГО ПОКОЛЕНИЯ В ВОЗРАСТЕ 18—35 ЛЕТ В РОССИИ: РЕЗУЛЬТАТЫ ИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬСКОГО ПРОЕКТА

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Abstract. The article presents the results of a two-year research project devoted to the integration of second generation migrants in the young adult age range (18-35 years old) from the regions of Transcaucasia and Central Asia currently living in Russia. The project includes an online survey where respondents were recruited using a targeting procedure on social networking sites ($N = 12524$) and a series of interviews ($N = 401$) in 10 regions of Russia. The article contains four parts—each dealing with one of the four migrant integration dimensions—which have been delineated based on the German tradition in migrant integration studies: structural, social, cultural, and identificational integration. The authors show that second generation migrants from Transcaucasia and Central Asia do not differ from their local peers in terms of their earnings, but there are significant variations in their educational level: higher education characterizes first of all second-generation migrants from

Аннотация. В статье представлены результаты двухлетнего исследовательского проекта, посвященного интеграционным характеристикам мигрантов второго поколения в молодом взрослом возрасте (18—35 лет) из Закавказья и Средней Азии в России. Исследовательский проект включал интернет-опрос, осуществленный посредством таргетирования в социальных сетях ($N = 12524$), и серию интервью ($N = 401$) в десяти регионах России. Основываясь на немецкой традиции изучения интеграции мигрантов, авторы выделяют четыре аспекта интеграции: структурный, социальный, культурный и идентификационный,— каждому из которых посвящен раздел статьи. Авторы приходят к выводу, что в части доходов мигранты второго поколения из Закавказья и Средней Азии не отличаются от сопоставимых сверстников, в то время как в части образовательных траекторий эти группы существенно различаются, при этом высшее

Transcaucasia to a lesser extent local youth, even less so — second-generation migrants from Central Asia. Social networks of second-generation migrants are inclusive and dominated by the representatives of "other" ethnic categories; however, their marriages are mostly monoethnic. A considerable share of second-generation migrants have "liberal" attitudes and practices in the realm of gender relations, and although second-generation migrants are generally more conservative than the local youth, the gap is minor. Second-generation migrants have a strong identification with "their own" ethnic categories but that impedes neither their feeling "at home" in Russia nor their belonging in the town or region of Russia where they grew up. A comparison of integration characteristics of second-generation migrants in Russia with situations in other migrant-receiving countries shows that the Russian case is successful, comparable with Canada and Australia. However, the success is explained not with the well-reasoned migration policy as in the latter states, but with the various factors of the Soviet past including a common cultural environment as well as egalitarian urban landscapes that are of paramount importance for the comprehension of the migration system centered around Russia.

образование чаще всех получают закавказские мигранты второго поколения, затем — местные, затем — мигранты второго поколения из Средней Азии. Круги общения мигрантов второго поколения инклюзивны и в них доминируют представители «прочих» этнических категорий, жениться же они предпочитают на представителях «своей» категории, однако существует значительная группа мигрантов второго поколения, придерживающаяся «либеральных» установок и практик в части гендерных отношений, более того, хотя мигранты второго поколения в целом консервативнее местных, этот разрыв невелик. Идентификация мигрантов второго поколения со «своей» этнической категорией сильна, но это не мешает им чувствовать себя своими в России и идентифицировать себя с тем населенным пунктом и регионом, где они выросли. Если сравнивать положение российских мигрантов второго поколения с положением сопоставимых групп в прочих принимающих обществах, можно говорить, что в России интеграция этой группы мигрантов протекает успешно, наравне с такими принимающими обществами, как Канада и Австралия. Связано это, однако, в первую очередь не со взвешенной миграционной политикой, как в указанных странах, а с разнообразными факторами «советского наследия», в частности, с общим в недавнем прошлом культурным пространством, а также с эгалитарной городской средой — именно эти факторы имеют первостепенное значение для понимания миграционной системы, в центре которой находится Россия.

Research Problem

    Migrant integration is the most important skill of 21st century societies. It is known, however, that migrants who move as adults rarely completely merge into the host society. If these migrants can succeed economically, they often only master the cultural arsenal of the host society partially at best. Their children — the so-called second generation migrants — are therefore in a better position. After graduating from school in a new country, and often having been born in it, such people freely orient themselves in the cultural space of the host society. At the same time, as international experience shows, their position in the education system, in the labor market, their social ties, their values and ideas about themselves and their place in the world all significantly differ from country to country and from group to group. What is the situation with the integration of second generation migrants in Russia? Is their education level comparable to that of their local peers, or is it higher or lower? How does the level of education affect the level of income and how much — compared to locals —do second generation migrants earn when they enter the labor market? Whom do second generation migrants befriend and marry? Is it true that they form "closed communities"? Are they different from their local peers in terms of cultural patterns, or is this difference exaggerated? Is their ethnic identity blurred in comparison with their parents, and if not, how does it coexist with diverse political loyalties? There are answers to these questions for other migration societies, and these questions have become relevant for Russia, once children of migrants from the first post-Soviet wave graduated from schools[1]. This paper provides answers to these questions.

    The basis of the paper is a two-year project that included a survey of second generation migrants and comparable peers ($N = 12,524$), as well as in-depth interviews ($N = 401$) conducted in 10 regions of Russia. We define second generation migrants as people whose parents were not born in Russia and who graduated from school[2] in Russia. This is a broad definition of the term, adopted in the light of the fact that

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[1] A number of projects were devoted to the research of these children in schools, in particular [Aleksandrov, Baranova, Ivanyushina, 2012; Aleksandrov, Ivanyushina, Kazartseva, 2015]; however, the review of relevant literature is beyond the focus of this article, and there is only one project except for ours that was devoted to grown-up second generation migrants [Mukomel, 2012].

[2] In this paper, by school we generally mean primary, middle, and high school. Compulsory education in Russia implies nine grades, which can be related to middle school. After nine grades, one can get vocational education. To attend university, one must graduate from the 11th grade (high school).

second generation migrants in the narrow sense — born in the families of migrants in the host country — are a minority among all the migrant children who grew up in Russia. We could choose other terms such as "grown-up children of migrants" or "people with migration background"; however, partly in light of even less certainty or inconsistency of these terms, partly in light of the need to connect to the relevant literature, we decided to use the term "second generation migrants," which appears in the text as the abbreviation SGM. Moreover, the focus of the study is the so-called "ethnic" second generation migrants from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, or Uzbekistan: that is, those whose parents (one or both) belong to one of the "non-Russian"[3] ethnic categories and were born in the indicated countries. Other categories of second generation migrants (for example, children of migrants from Ukraine, or Russian second generation migrants from Central Asia) are beyond the focus of the study, although they took part in the survey. In addition, the study focused on the so-called "young adults" defined in the age range of 18—35 years old. These criteria, however, served primarily as a compass: for example, people with only one migrant parent or 17- or 36-year-olds could also take part in the study. Moreover, in a qualitative study, the research interest extended to parents of second generation migrants as well as local experts, such as school principals, who could provide relevant information on the integration of second generation migrants.

The key research question of the study is: "How does the integration of second generation migrants in Russia occur?" The basis for the study is a theoretical framework based on the so-called German tradition of studying integration [Esser, 2001; Heckmann, Schnapper, 2003; Esser, 2004; Heckmann, Bosswick, 2005; Varshaver, Rocheva, 2016], according to which there are four main aspects of integration: 1) structural, characterizing the position of migrants in the education system and the labor market, 2) social, describing circles of communication and marriage choices of migrants, 3) cultural, associated with changing cultural patterns, and 4) identificational, defined through the characteristics of the emotional connection of migrants with certain ethnic or national categories. The research methodology is described below, results are presented for each of the integration aspects (for each aspect a research question is presented), the results are summarized and compared with the integration characteristics of second generation migrants in other countries, and the problems associated with integration of second generation migrants are highlighted, as well as ways to address them.

Methodology

The project was implemented within the framework of the mixed methods methodology. The collection of quantitative data was carried out through the organization of a nationwide survey of young people, including both second generation migrants of different backgrounds and their local peers. The qualitative data is a series of interviews with second generation migrants from the Transcaucasian and Central Asian regions living in Moscow and the Moscow Region, the Krasnodar Region, the Tyumen Region (including the Khanty-Mansiisk autonomous district and the Yamalo-

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[3] The authors support constructivist positions, which implies consideration of ethnic categories as phenomena constantly (re)produced in the course of interaction between people.

Nenets autonomous district), and also in Rostov-on-Don, Yekaterinburg, Tver, and Irkutsk.

The survey was conducted together with Mail.Ru Group, which owns the main Russian social networking sites: Odnoklassniki (OK) and VKontakte (VK). The survey collected four data subsets which differ in sampling frames and sampling techniques. The first data subset is a random sample of users of the "Polls, Tests and Opinions" groups in Odnoklassniki and VKontakte, where the socio-demographic characteristics of the users do not differ from those among all users of the corresponding social networking sites[4]—one can thus say that a representative sample of users of these social networking sites was collected. The second subset is the result of targeting users aged 16—35 who take part in ethnically labeled groups and communities in Odnoklassniki and VKontakte (81 Armenian groups on VK, 43 Armenian groups on OK, 90 Azerbaijani groups on VK, 49 Azerbaijani groups on OK, 13 Uzbek groups on VK, 16 Uzbek groups on OK, 28 Tajik groups on VK, 18 Tajik groups on OK, 45 Kyrgyz groups on VK, 33 Kyrgyz groups on OK, 14 Georgian groups on VK, 16 Georgian groups on OK, 31 Ukrainian groups on VK, six Ukrainian groups on OK). The third subset contains users aged 18—35 whose profiles have links to their parents' profiles, which in their turn indicate as a place of birth one of the countries we are interested in: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine. Data collection for the first, second, and third subsets was carried out by Mail.Ru Group specialists: the cumulative number of respondents from these subarrays was 9,318 people. The fourth subset is the result of targeting users aged 16—35 according to groups and interests on social networking sites VKontakte, Odnoklassniki, Facebook, and Instagram. The latter two social networking sites do not allow for targeting participants of the groups; therefore, to target second generation migrants from Central Asia, Transcaucasia, and Ukraine, we used the "interests" category (for example, for targeting second generation migrants of Azerbaijani origin, the "interests" request was formulated as follows: Azerbaijan, Baku, Azeri language), whereas to target young people 16—35 years old without a migratory background, no additional filters were used. In Odnoklassniki, second generation migrants from the Transcaucasian region and Central Asia were targeted through ethnically-labeled groups (97 Kyrgyz groups, 72 Tajik groups, 42 Uzbek groups, 46 Armenian, and 35 Azerbaijani groups), and other respondents were not surveyed. In VKontakte, second generation migrants from the Transcaucasian and Central Asian regions were targeted through ethnically-labeled groups (46 Kyrgyz groups, 75 Tajik groups, 37 Uzbek groups, 100 Armenian groups, 96 Azerbaijani groups), whereas second generation migrants from Ukraine and non-migrant youth were targeted without additional filters. This subset was assembled by the efforts of the authors of the article; the number of respondents achieved this way was 3,206 people. Thus, it can be said that the final approach to the selection of respondents combines the principles of random and purposive (via groups and interests) sampling.

The survey was conducted from May to July 2018. The questionnaire in Russian was placed in the interface of the application "Surveys, Tests and Opinions" on OK and VK as well as on the SurveyMonkey website. The main blocks of the questionnaire are socio-

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[4] According to the data of the analysis provided by the partners from the Mail.Ru Group.

demographic characteristics, including position on the labor market, characteristics of parents, experience during school years, social ties, attitudes associated with identification, romantic and marital relationships, and transnational practices (for second generation migrants). In addition, second generation migrants of Armenian and Azerbaijani origin were asked questions about the Karabakh conflict and their attitudes in connection with it. The advertising of the poll in social networking sites was partly universal (Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 3) and partly ethnically oriented (Figure 4).


Figure 1 — Example of a "universal" ad

*Figure 2* — Example of a "universal" ad

Figure 3 — Example of a "universal" ad

Figure 4 — Example of an "ethnically oriented" ad

After data cleaning, the final data set includes the responses of 12,524 respondents. For the preliminary analysis, groups were constructed based on the place of birth and ethnicity of the father or both parents (open-ended question, coding), and, in some cases, the respondent's ethnicity (open-ended question, coding). By default, the birthplace and ethnicity of the father was used in our group construction.

At the first stage, 12 groups were constructed. If the respondent's father was born outside of Russia or the RSFSR[5], the respondent was classified as a second generation migrant. If the respondent's father was born in Russia or the RSFSR, then he or she was classified as a local. If the father's ethnicity was coded as "Russian (russkyi)," the respondent was also classified as "Russian (russkyi)." Furthermore, the following groups were identified at the intersection of ethnicity and place of birth: Armenian SGM (father was born in one of the countries of the Transcaucasia region and is Armenian), Azerbaijani SGM (likewise), Georgian SGM (likewise), Kyrgyz SGM (father was born in Central Asia and is Kyrgyz), Tajik SGM (likewise), Uzbek SGM (likewise), Ukrainian SGM (father was born in Ukraine and is Ukrainian), Transcaucasian Russian SGM (father was born in Transcaucasia, Russian), Central Asian Russian SGM (likewise), Ukrainian Russian SGM (likewise), local Russian (father was born in Russia, Russian), local non-Russian (father was born in Russia and is of any other nationality except Russian). At the second stage, six groups were constructed out of these 12 groups: in particular, all Transcaucasian ethnic SGMs were combined into the "Transcaucasian SGM" group, Central Asian ethnic SGMs into the Central Asia SGM group, and Russian SGMs from the South Caucasus, Central Asia, and Ukraine were united into the Russian SGMs. The remaining groups remained the same. At the final stage, due to the focus on the second generation migrants from the Transcaucasia and Central Asian regions, only Transcaucasian SGMs, Central Asian SGMs, local Russians, and local non-Russians were included in the analysis. Moreover, depending on the analysis goals, the former and the latter two groups could also be united in the groups of "second generation migrants" and "locals," or studied separately.

In-depth interviews were collected in 10 regions. 72 interviews were conducted in Moscow and the Moscow Region, 23 interviews were conducted in Tver[6], 23 interviews were conducted in Irkutsk[7], four interviews were conducted in Rostov-on-Don[8], and three interviews were conducted in Yekaterinburg[9]. The Krasnodar region[10] and the Tyumen Region (including the Khanty-Mansiisk autonomous district

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[5] RSFSR is the Russian Soviet Federated Socialistic Republic.

[6] Tver is the capital of the Tver region, which is part of the Central Federal District and considered an "economically intermediate, industrial-agrarian region" [Grigoryev et al. 2011]. The city's population is 1.2 million people.

[7] Irkutsk is the capital of the Irkutsk region, which is part of the Siberian Federal District and considered a "developed region with the processing industry as the economy's basis" [Grigoryev et al. 2011]. The city's population is 600,000 people.

[8] Rostov-on-Don is the capital of the Rostov region, which is part of the Southern Federal District and considered a "developed region with diversified economy" [Grigoryev et al. 2011]. The city's population is 1.1 million people.

[9] Yekaterinburg is the capital of the Sverdlovsk region, which is part of the Ural Federal District and considered a "developed region with diversified economy" [Grigoryev et al. 2011]. The city's population is 1.4 million people.

[10] The Krasnodar region is part of the Southern Federal District and considered an "economically intermediate, agrarian -industrial region" [Grigoryev et al. 2011]. Among the region's population of 5.6 million people, Armenians take second place after Russians (russkiye) and have lived on this territory for more than two centuries.

and the Yamal-Nenets autonomous district)[11] stand apart: there the research was conducted in a variety of locations. In the Tyumen region, 170 interviews were conducted with second generation migrants from the Transcaucasus and Central Asia, their parents, and experts in nine cities and towns (Tyumen, Surgut, Nizhnesortymsky, Pokachi, Nefteyugansk, Novy Urengoy, Salekhard, Noyabrsk, and Muravlenko). In the Krasnodar Region, 106 interviews were conducted, and the focus was on second generation migrants from Armenia and Azerbaijan in Krasnodar, Gelendzhik, Sochi, Armavir, Kurganinsk, and Gai-Kodzor. In total, 401 interviews were conducted within the project.

Informants were recruited with a variety of methods: through educational institutions (schools, secondary special, secondary professional, and higher education institutions), mosques, diaspora organizations, social networking sites (for example, ethnically labelled and local groups), dating sites, workplaces of the first generation migrants (for example, markets), and through personal contacts of researchers. At the end of the interview, each informant was asked to share contacts of other potential informants; however, no large chain of informants connected with each other that would allow for serious biases in the selection of informants for the interview was observed. In the selection of informants, we were guided by the requirements of a theoretical sample.

The interview guide included questions about the informants' family history of migration and socio-economic profile, the educational and labor market trajectory of the informant, social networks at different life stages, attitudes and practices in the sphere of romantic relations, integration trajectories of siblings, the level of knowledge of different languages and features of their usage, transnational practices, religiosity, and so on. With the consent of the informant, an interview was recorded. After an interview with a second generation migrant, the researcher filled out the informant's profile in a special spreadsheet, specifically designed for the project's goals — a casebook where one row corresponds to one informant and the columns represent the key blocks of the guide. Thus, reading the profile of an informant who was filled out in the casebook by a research colleague made it possible to quickly, though not completely, re-create the story behind it. If the interview was conducted with the parent, the columns were filled in with information about his/her children. If the interview was held with an expert, then, in addition to characterizing the position of the expert, a column with these expert statements on the locality was filled out. However, the expert thesis column was not intended exclusively for experts — the second generation migrants, like their parents, also shared their observations about the places of coming-of-age and residence, as well as the trajectories of their peers with different migration profiles. The casebook also includes data gathered through observation during or in connection with an interview.

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[11] The Tyumen region, including the Khanty-Mansiisk autonomous district (KhMAD) and the Yamal-Nenets autonomous district (YaNAD), is considered a "highly developed export-oriented region with the leading role of extracting industries" [Grigoryev et al. 2011]. The Khanty-Mansiisk autonomous district is the main oil and gas region of Russia and one of the largest oil producing regions in the world.

Research Results

STRUCTURAL INTEGRATION

Do second generation migrants and locals differ in terms of their education level? To answer this question, a subset of data was created consisting of the respondents who permanently or temporarily completed their education, which means the following: at the time of the survey, those respondents who only worked, as well as those who did not work and did not study. According to calculations, there are significant differences between the groups in terms of the highest level of educational attainment (Table 1). Transcaucasian SGMs have higher education or a PhD in 53 % of cases, which is much more common than Central Asian SGMs and locals. Central Asian SGMs, by contrast, significantly more frequently (43 % vs. 29 % for locals and 22 % for Transcaucasian SGMs) only have school education. Moreover, the response options do not allow for the separation of those who have not completed compulsory education (nine grades), but from the qualitative data, we know that such cases are not isolated, especially among Central Asian SGMs.

Table 1 — Education level of Transcaucasian and Central Asian SGMs as well as local respondents

Education level	Transcaucasian SGMs	Central Asian SGMs	Locals
School (8th, 9th, 10th, or 11th grades)	22 %	43 %	29 %
Professional, not higher	25 %	35 %	35 %
Higher education of PhD	53 %	23 %	36 %
Total	1,199	274	3,468

If a second generation migrant does not have even a basic school education, what trajectories could have led to this situation? Most likely, two factors must be present: a difficult family situation and prohibitive attitudes from the parents. Navishta (f., 21, Taj., Moscow [12]) studied in Tajikistan up to grade four, after which her family moved to Moscow for two years, during which she did not go to school. Her family returned then to Tajikistan for a year, where Navishta went to the sixth grade, after which she returned to Moscow with her mother and sister. Her father lived with another woman, not with them at that time. The mother wanted Navishta to stay at home, and besides this attitude, there was no one to babysit her sister, who did not go to kindergarten. After coming to Moscow the second time, Navishta did not go to school, meaning that her education was interrupted at the sixth grade. She now works as a hairstylist.

To what extent do second generation migrants have more or less income than comparable locals? To understand this, an analysis of means for all employed respondents was conducted [13].

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[12] Hereinafter, for each respondent, the gender, age, group by place of birth, origin of parents, as well as the informant's region of stay during the interview are indicated. If the surrounding text includes some of this information, it can be omitted from the description in the brackets. The names of the informants have been changed to keep their privacy.

[13] The analysis included those who responded "I only work" to the question of the occupation.

According to the analysis, there is no difference between "second generation migrants" and "local" groups (Figure 5, Figure 6). If the mean value of the monthly income for the whole dataset is 41,343 rubles, the mean for second generation migrants is 41,480 rubles, and for locals-41,283. The revealed difference of 197 rubles is not statistically significant. The analysis of three groups — locals, Transcaucasian, and Central Asian SGMs — did not show statistically significant differences between them as well (Table 2).

Figure 5 — Comparison of means: the monthly income of the locals and SGMs

Figure 6 — Comparison of means: the monthly income of the locals, Transcaucasian, and Central Asian SGMs

Table 2 — Comparison of means: the monthly income of the local respondents, Transcaucasian, and Central Asian SGMs

Group	N	Mean	Transcaucasian SGMs	Central Asian SGMs	Locals
Transcaucasian SGMs	979	42,149		3,579	865
Central Asian SGMs	225	38,570	-3,579		-2,713
Locals	2,761	41,284	-865	2,713	
Total	3,965				

However, one should determine how things would be if the groups did not differ by sex and age, and balance the groups according to these criteria through regression analysis (Table 3). According to the regression analysis, there would be no difference between the locals and all second generation migrants, as well as between the locals and Transcaucasian SGMs. At the same time, a statistically significant difference between the locals and Central Asian SGMs would appear — the latter would earn 5,500 rubles less.

Table 3 — Least Squares Regression, dependent variable — monthly income [14]

Least Squares Regression, dependent variable — monthly income		
Age	-415**	-438***
Sex (1 — male, 2 — female)	-7,934***	-8,000***
Group (1 — SGM, 2 — local)	1,295	
Transcaucasian SGM		-414
Central Asian SGM		-5,413***
Constant	62,036	65,362
R 2	0.015	0.016
N	3,965	3,965

Most likely, this difference is due to the fact that the dataset of the employed respondents has more Central Asian males than females, whereas men in all groups and in the whole data set earn more than women. The share of men among the

---

[14] *** $p < 0{,}001$
  ** $0{,}001 \leqslant p < 0{,}01$
  * $0{,}01 \leqslant p < 0{,}05$
  ' $0{,}05 \leqslant p < 0{,}1$

employed Central Asian SGMs is 63 %, 57 % among employed Transcaucasian SGMs, and among employed locals-50 %. On the whole, the monthly income of second generation working migrants in Russia is equal to the income of their local peers.

At the same time, the analysis revealed significant differences between the groups in the "capital" regions (Moscow, the Moscow region, St. Petersburg, and the Leningrad region [15]) and the "non-capital" (all other) regions (Table 4, Figure 7, Figure 8). Moreover, the incomes of SGMs and locals in these two groups of regions differ in an inversed manner. If in the metropolitan regions, locals earn more than other groups (SGMs in general and SGMs from the Transcaucasia and Central Asia), their income is statistically significantly lower in other regions. There is a peculiar hierarchy in the capital regions: the locals earn the most (59,186 rubles per month), the Transcaucasian SGMs follow them (51,494), and the Central Asian SGMs close this sequence (37,050). In the rest of Russia, Transcaucasian and Central Asian SGMs earn almost equal (39,680 and 36,322 rubles per month respectively), and the locals' income is 32,611 rubles. Most obviously, this state of affairs can be explained through differences in occupations (see Table 5). In non-capital regions, second generation migrants are more often engaged in business than locals, while in the capital regions, locals and Transcaucasian SGMs are most often engaged in business, while Central Asian SGMs are lagging behind in this indicator. As will be shown below, having a business is one of the central factors explaining differences in income. These quantitative data do not confirm the hypothesis formulated on the basis of the qualitative study, according to which, in Moscow, Transcaucasian SGMs are business owners less often and instead work as specialists with higher education. As the survey shows, in capital regions, as in all other regions, they are business owners in 21 % of the cases. At the same time, the quantitative data confirmed another hypothesis, according to which SGMs in the non-capital regions often work in family businesses: the percentage of those employed in this way among the Transcaucasian SGMs is 8 %, among Central Asian SGMs is 9 %, and locals-4 %.

Table 4 — Comparison of means: monthly income by type of region

	Locals	SGMs	Central Asian SGMs (CA SGM)	Transcaucasian SGMs (TC SGM)	Locals — SGMs	Locals — TC SGMs	Locals — CA SGMs	TC SGM — CA SGMs
Moscow, Moscow region, St. Petersburg, Leningrad region	59,186	48,581	37,050	51,494	10,605***	7,692**	22,136***	14,444**
Other regions	32,611	36,917	39,680	36,322	-4,306**	-3,711*	-7,069*	-3,358

[15] Moscow is the current capital of Russia; St. Petersburg is the former capital of Russia and bears the title of the "northern capital" of Russia. The areas surrounding these cities — the Moscow region and the Leningrad region — are closely connected with them in a variety of dimensions, including flows of work force and capital.

*Figure 7* — Comparison of means: monthly income of the groups of respondents by regions

Figure 8 — Comparison of means: monthly income of SGMs and locals by region

Table 5 — Cross-tabulation: type of employment of Transcaucasian SGMs, Central Asian SGMs, and locals in different regions

		Employees, including civil servants	Own or family business	Self-employment	Chi Sq
All Russia	Transcaucasian SGMs	73%	21%	6%	23.487**
	Central Asian SGMs	78%	18%	4%	
	Locals	80%	15%	6%	
Moscow, Moscow region, St. Petersburg, Leningrad region	Transcaucasian SGMs	72%	21%	7%	8.855`
	Central Asian SGMs	84%	14%	2%	
	Locals	71%	23%	6%	
Other regions	Transcaucasian SGMs	74%	21%	5%	50.330***
	Central Asian SGMs	73%	22%	5%	
	Locals	84%	10%	5%	

How and why does this happen? Second generation migrants who are children of businessmen "delve into" the specifics of running a business starting from their school years by helping their parents, and after graduation can earn a living by continuing this business. For example, Botir (m., 22, Uzb.), who has lived in Tyumen since he was 10 years old, now works in his father's company, which is engaged in the wholesale of fruits and vegetables, and is going to change his father "at the helm." Having worked in the enterprise of their parents or relatives, migrants of the second generation can start their own business. As did Sahib (m., 21, Azerb., Tyumen region), whose family moved from Azerbaijan when he was 11 years old. While still in middle school, he spent a lot of time at his father's store. After completing compulsory education with good marks, he decided not to continue his studies but instead spent a year at this store full time, after which he opened his own shop with the financial assistance of his father. He spoke about his thoughts at the time of the end of ninth grade: studying for five-six years to earn 30,000 rubles per month afterwards is not for him, and he did not want to lose time — he never regretted that he did not continue his studies.

Another observed situation is that a second generation migrant opens a business, while his parents have never been engaged in business. For example, the father of Sultan (m., 25, Azerb.) moved to Noyabrsk (Yamal-Nenets Autonomous District) in the Soviet times after his army service, where he worked all his life in roadworks and his wife (Sultan's mother) worked as a nursery teacher. Sultan studied in college as an electrician, then, after working for some time in his specialty, he began selling perfume "from the hood" of his car and now has a chain of stores.

Can one speak of the specific typical employment of certain groups of SGMs? Apparently, yes. Despite the general similarity in the structure of employment, important differences were also recorded (Table 6). Locals are much more likely to work in industrial production (17% versus 6% for Transcaucasian SGMs and 8% for Central Asian SGMs). Transcaucasian SGMs a little more often than the other two groups work

in health care (7 % versus 3 % for Central Asian SGMs and 4 % for locals), as well as in trade (14 %, 11 %, and 9 % respectively). Central Asian SGMs are underrepresented in education (1 % versus 5 % for Transcaucasian SGMs and locals), but are much more widely represented in public catering (21 % versus 6 % for Transcaucasian SGMs and 4 % for locals). Moreover, the analysis — disaggregated by groups — suggests that Kyrgyz SGMs are most often represented in public catering (27 % of cases), while Azerbaijani SGMs (9 %), and more specifically women, are represented among health professionals: 18 % of all employed female Azerbaijani SGMs work in medicine. Thus, we can talk about the emerging specialization of different groups of second generation migrants.

Table 6 — Distribution of respondents by employment spheres

	Transcaucasian SGMs	Central Asian SGMs	Locals	Total
Industrial production (including extractive industries)	6%	8%	**17%**	14%
Agriculture, forestry, fisheries, etc.	1%	3%	3%	2%
Construction	10%	8%	10%	10%
Service sector, household services	8%	9%	8%	8%
Catering, restaurants	6%	**21%**	4%	6%
Housing maintenance and utilities	1%	0%	2%	2%
Science, high-tech production	1%	0%	1%	1%
Education	5%	**1%**	5%	5%
Health care	**7%**	3%	4%	5%
Culture, art	2%	4%	3%	3%
Mass media	1%	0%	1%	1%
Civil service, local government	2%	2%	2%	2%
Military service	1%	2%	2%	2%
Law enforcement, security agencies, Ministry of Emergency Situations	2%	1%	2%	2%
Law courts, legal profession	3%	0%	2%	2%
Transport, warehousing facilities	4%	4%	4%	4%
IT, telecommunication, internet	4%	2%	4%	4%
Retail and wholesale trade, real estate business	**14%**	11%	9%	11%
Banking and finance	6%	5%	3%	4%
Consulting and information services	1%	0%	1%	1%

	Transcaucasian SGMs	Central Asian SGMs	Locals	Total
Sport, tourism, recreation and entertainment	4%	3%	2%	3%
Other	8%	8%	7%	8%
Don't know	3%	3%	4%	3%
	100%	100%	100%	100%

The results of the qualitative study allow us to showcase medical trajectories for Azerbaijani girls and catering trajectories for Kyrgyz SGMs. Ragif (m., 30, Azerb., Tver region) explained the popularity of the medical path for girls who grew up in Azerbaijani families the following way: "*They believe that she will complete her studies there, get married — and will her husband let her work in the sphere where there are, well, male employees? But in medicine, they believe that she goes there, gets educated as a gynecologist, the staff will be mostly [women]. This stereotype exists.*" In addition, there is a perception in the informants' families that there should be a doctor in the family, and also that medicine is a noble cause. As a result of such attitudes, medical education and the corresponding professional trajectory are quite common, and where there are many Azerbaijani SGMs, a significant part of the medical staff in some hospitals may be of Azerbaijani origin. According to Sabiga (f., 26, Azerb.) who works as a nurse in a hospital in Novy Urengoy (Yamalo-Nenets autonomous district) and whose family moved from Azerbaijan to this part of Siberia before she was born, in every department of this hospital "*for sure there is at least one female Azerbaijani,*" and this can be nurses, doctors, or hospital attendants.

The prevalence of employment of second generation migrants of Kyrgyz origin in the field of catering, apparently, is related to finding work through recently arrived peers, as well as through parents or through parents' acquaintances, who, in turn, are often employed there. For example, the following is an excerpt from an interview with Begaim (f, 21, Kyrg.) who worked for a Moscow café chain 'Chocoladnitsa,' which explains how such employment may occur:

> *I started this job after 10th grade in the summer, I had nothing to do, we didn't go home [to Kyrgyzstan], I was just relaxing and walking around. And then I got the idea: "Oh, I need to work, earn some pocket money." I went home and consulted with my mother […] and with my dad […]. And I'm like, "Oh, I'll try at McDonalds, maybe they're taking school children." I came, they told me: "Yes, of course. You are a schoolgirl, yes, we can take you, but only for the summer. But you will start with washing the floors, that is, your first work will be to wash this and that." I'm like, "Okay." I was told that they would call but they didn't. Then a friend came to my mother, they talked, it turned out that this friend was working as a cook in "Chocoladnitsa." We then lived in Medvedkovo, and she just worked in Medvedkovo in that "Chocoladnitsa." And she said: "We actually need waiters. Let your daughter work. You do not mind? Let me tell the director that there is such a girl, she knows Russian, she has Russian citizenship. She does not look Slavic, but she will work well. " Mom called me: "Here, you are offered a job, what do you think?" I was like: "Oh, good." The next day, she was just at work, told the director, this woman called me, and said, like, "Come for an*

interview." I'm like, "Oh, cool." I got all dolled up, put on all my best clothing. I came, she asked me questions [..] This is how I got this job. For six months I worked as a waiter, after six months I was offered the chance to become a supervisor.

Thus, it can be first said that Transcaucasian SGMs are better educated and Central Asian SGMs are worse educated in comparison with local peers; however, this does not have an effect at the average group level in terms of income. Income level is almost equal for the Transcaucasian and Central Asian SGMs as compared to the locals. Moreover, the regression analysis (see Table 7) allows us to say that running a business is most strongly associated with higher income at the individual level, whereas there is no relationship between education level and running a business, according to a simple correlation analysis (r = 0.013, p = 0,389). In general, the presented regression models quite clearly reveal the factors associated with income: the coefficient of determination reaches 28 %. In particular, along with running a business, the most significant are factors such as the region of residence (in metropolitan regions, the average income is about 16,000 rubles higher), the level of education (those who have only a high school education make up to 12,000 rubles less in comparison with those who graduated from a university), as well as gender (men earn, other things being equal, 9,500 rubles more than women). But the factor of being a second generation migrant is not significant: the difference between the salaries of SGMs and local youth, if controlled by the indicated and other factors, is about 1,000 rubles and not statistically significant. Moreover, there is no difference between the Transcaucasian and Central Asian SGMs in this model.

Table 7 — Least Squares Regression, dependent variable is income in the past month

Least Squares Regression, dependent variable is monthly income. Calculations include all employed respondents.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Sex (1 — male, 2 — female)	-9,374***	-9,649***	-9,518***
Age	-68	-117	-173
Place of birth of both parents	-2,776**	-3,127***	-2,911***
Education level of both parents	1,202	1,523	1,250
Region of residence	-16,229***	-16,306***	-16,069***
Education — 3 categories	4,283***	3,834***	3,837***
School grades	-3,457***	-3,290***	-3,236***
Running a business	37,908***	38,043***	38,372***
Local	1,049	4,819**	
Russian (russkyi)		-5,466**	
Transcaucasian SGMs			-1,102
Central Asian SGMs			-1,782
Constant	79,744.781	84,688.217	85,372.783
R 2	0.27	0.28	0.27
N	4,584	4,584	4,584

SOCIAL INTEGRATION

The basis of this section is the question of the extent to which second generation migrants are confined to the representatives of their ethnic category in terms of communication, with communication referring to that between coworkers, friends, and marriage and romantic partnerships. To answer these questions, both attitudes and real relationships will be analyzed.

In the survey, respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the statement "I prefer to be friends only with representatives of my ethnicity." The answers were recoded in such a way that complete disagreement with this statement corresponded to the value 0 and full agreement to value 3. The value 1 corresponded to the answer option "rather disagree," and 2 to "rather agree." The calculations for all issues related to social integration (with the exception of marriage and romantic relationships) included the SGMs from Transcaucasia and Central Asia who chose one of the main Transcaucasian and Central Asian census ethnic categories (Armenians, Georgians, Azeris, Yezidis, Kyrgyz, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Uighurs, etc.) as their ethnicity, as well as local youth for comparison.

According to the calculations, the attitudes of second generation migrants can be considered inclusive; in general, they are in the middle between the values of "completely disagree" and "rather disagree" with such a statement (the exact value is 0.56) (Table 8, Figure 9, Figure 10). At the same time, Central Asian SGMs are characterized by slightly more inclusive attitudes in comparison with the Transcaucasian SGMs. Moreover, their attitudes are more inclusive than those of the local youth; the latter have an average value on this scale of 1.06, which corresponds to the "generally disagree with the statement" option. However, this value is half a point less than the value of the SGMs. To what extent, however, are these attitudes implemented in concrete relationships?

Table 8 — Comparison of means: agreement or disagreement with the statement "I prefer to be friends only with representatives of my ethnicity" by Transcaucasian and Central Asian SGMs as well as local respondents

	N	Mean	Transcaucasian SGM	Central Asian SGM	Local
Transcaucasian SGM	2,159	.58		-.123*	.485***
Central Asian SGM	359	.45	.123*		.608***
Local	4,222	1.06	-.485***	-.608***	
SGM	2,518	.56		-0.502***	
Local	4,222	1.06	0.502***		

Figure 9 — Comparison of means: agreement or disagreement with the statement
"I prefer to be friends only with representatives of my ethnicity" by Transcaucasian and Central Asian
SGMs as well as local respondents

Figure 10 — Comparison of means: agreement or disagreement with the statement
"I prefer to be friends only with representatives of my ethnicity" by SGMs and local respondents

The table (Table 9) and the figure (Figure 11) show the approximate percentage of representatives of the same ethnic category in the respondents' various social networks. This percentage was obtained as follows: the scale values, ranging from 0 to 3, were multiplied by 33.3 %. All differences between locals and SGMs are statistically

significant. The differences between the Transcaucasian and Central Asian SGMs are significant only in relation to social networks at school, in further education, and in social networking sites, as well as in relation to neighbors. The analysis shows that, first, the local youth communicate much more with the representatives of their own ethnic category. Moreover, it should be noted that the "local" category includes both "Russians (russkiye)" and "non-Russians (nerusskiye)," and the latter often live in national republics. Thus, in aggregate among "local" respondents, the probability that a person taken at random in school or at work will be a representative of their ethnic category is higher than that among ethnic SGMs. This is largely the reason for the gap between locals and SGMs in terms of social networks.

At the same time, representatives of the same ethnic category are represented in different degrees in the SGMs' different social networks. In particular, the fewest number of the same category are among the neighbors, and most— among the best friends and friends in social networking sites. The two latter cases are the fields where second generation migrants have more opportunities to choose, which allows us to speak of so-called "inbreeding homophilia" [McPherson, Smith-Lovin, Cook, 2001]. This term refers to the phenomenon when the choice of partners in a particular activity is based on the conscious or unconscious attraction of the similar, resulting in a higher share of representatives of their category in personal networks than would be in random interactions.

Table 9 — Representatives of "their" ethnic category in the social networks of Transcaucasian SGMs, Central Asian SGMs, all SGMs, and local respondents

	Social networks at school	Social networks at work	Social networks at further education	Social networks on social networking sites	Friends	Neighbors
Transcaucasian SGMs	26%	23%	30%	43%	41%	15%
Central Asian SGMs	20%	27%	21%	40%	39%	11%
All SGMs	25%	24%	29%	43%	41%	15%
Local	75%	73%	70%	69%	76%	71%

Figure 11 — Representatives of "their" ethnic category in the social networks of Transcaucasian SGMs, Central Asian SGMs, all SGMs, and local respondents

This hypothesis can be checked another way — by conducting a correlation analysis and considering the relationship between attitudes towards friendship with representatives of "your" group and their representation in various social networks. The analysis shows that where there is less choice (neighbors), the relationship between variables is much weaker than where the respondent can choose (friends) (Table 10).

Table 10 — Correlation analysis: correlation between attitudes towards friendship with representatives of one's own group and their presence in social networks of various kinds

	I prefer to be friends only with representatives of my ethnicity
Social networks at school	.217***
Social networks at work	.196***
Social networks at further education	.210***
Social networks on social networking sites	.288***
Friends	.308***
Neighbors	.088***

However, there remains the question of to what extent the second generation migrants will definitely take advantage of a structural opportunity to be friends with representatives of a particular category. The questionnaire included a question about the presence of representatives of the respondent's ethnic category in his or her school class (Table 11). Were they necessarily friends?

Table 11 — Distribution of answers to the questions about friends during school years and classmates of their ethnic category according to the groups of respondents: Transcaucasian SGMs and Central Asian SGMs

Groups				Whether they were friends with representatives of their ethnic category at school		% of those who were not friends with representatives of their ethnic category at school if they were among classmates	Total
				Yes	No		
Transcaucasian SGMs	Were there representatives of your ethnicity among your classmates?	Yes	N	1,201	249	17%	1,450
			%	48%	10%		58%
		No	N	326	731		1057
			%	13%	29%		42%
	Total		N	1,527	980		2,507
			%	61%	39%		100.0%
Central Asian SGMs	Were there representatives of your ethnicity among your classmates?	Yes	N	148	34	19%	182
			%	33%	8%		41%
		No	N	61	197		258
			%	13%	44%		59%
	Total		N	209	231		440
			%	47%	52%		100.0%
Total	Were there representatives of your ethnicity among your classmates?	Yes	N	1,349	283	17%	1,632
			%	46%	10%		55%
		No	N	387	928		1,315
			%	13%	31%		45%
	Total		N	1,736	1,211		2,947
			%	59%	41%		100.0%

The analysis shows that even if there were representatives of their category in the class, approximately 17% of respondents (a little more for the Central Asian SGMs, a little less for the Transcaucasian SGMs) were not friends with them. According to the qualitative data, this state of affairs is common if the respondent and his/her classmate are of different gender, different social class, or different country of origin. Arriving in Moscow in the ninth grade from Uzbekistan, Urus (m., 21, Uzb.) grew up in an educated family, studied in Samarkand for eight years in a preparatory school, considered Russian as his first language and Samarkandian as his second (a so-named urban dialect formed on the basis of the Tajik language with borrowing from other languages), and became a pupil of a regular school in Moscow. Among his

classmates was a boy from a rural area of Kokand (Uzbekistan), but Urus preferred not to be friends with him, not finding anything in common. Instead, he ended up communicating with Russian female classmates who, like him, were interested in studying. Two second generation migrants of Uzbek origin — one from Uzbekistan, the second from Kyrgyzstan (m., 21, Uzb.) — studied in the same class in one of the small towns (posyolok) of the Khanty-Mansiisk autonomous district, but were never friends. On the contrary, they had conflicts, which is explained by the fact that the Uzbeks from Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan who lived in this small town had a bad attitude towards each other. A girl of Azerbaijani origin (f., 26, Azerb.), who grew up in Irkutsk and studied with an Azerbaijani boy could not be friends with him because of restrictions on girls' communication with the opposite sex:

> There was only one Azerbaijani boy except for me where I studied, and he was also from Georgia [like me]. And…well, it's not like we could be friends with the boys. […] In our childhood, I remember our neighbors were also from Georgia. And there were boys there, and they called their boys friends, and they gathered into a general group, they played tennis, watched TV, laughed, communicated well. When they were already older, something like this happened, I was walking with my uncle, and they were walking towards us. Well, I said hello. I was then 14 years old, something like that. I said hello — it was a childhood friend, why not say hello. My uncle scolded me: "Do you say hello to boys?" Then he explained to me that it is wrong, that we cannot be friends with boys, we can't even say hello them, because it will not look good. But now I understand, yes, among adults…but at that time it was really wild for me, it's a childhood friend, how can I not greet him. But then they understood it too, apparently, they were also told. When we see each other, we just pass by like we do not notice.

On the contrary, some respondents were friends at school with representatives of their category, even if they were not in the class. The mechanisms of such friendships' formation can be illustrated by the following excerpt from an interview with Bedros (m., 25, Arm., Irkutsk Region):

> Informant: I had Armenian friends from childhood, and then my social network became bigger, and many Russians (russkiye), Buryats, Azerbaijanis appeared. And since childhood, we mostly hung around in the Armenian circle. […]
>
> Researcher: And what about your social network at school?
>
> Informant: At school, my friends were Armenians, sons of my father's friends. That is, we became friends with them. Well, they are my neighbors. Here, as E. said, we saw an Armenian — we got acquainted. The same with me. But unfortunately, I had no Armenian classmates and fellow students. […] I wanted so much to have Armenians around, but they weren't at school, and they weren't at the institute. None at all. It's surprising, but that's how it was.

Thus, it can be said that second generation migrants' social networks are not at all ethnically exclusive, and in most cases, they will include representatives of other ethnic categories. At the same time, the attitude to maintain relations with representatives of "their own" category is widespread among SGMs, which will manifest itself in the ethnic identification of interlocutors in social networking sites and best friends. Along with that, the share of SGMs who claim that all their best friends are representatives of "their" category is small and amounts to about 15 %. The qualitative research also showed

that a significant proportion of such friends, as well as interlocutors in social networking sites, are family members who are only secondarily from the same ethnic category with which the respondent associates himself/herself. On the whole, it can be said that there are no closed ethnic communities of the second generation migrants, even despite the attitudes that exist among some of them concerning preferential friendship with representatives of their category. Although there are monoethnic friendship social networks, they are "unsealed" through communication in other spheres in which SGMs take part throughout their lives: at school, at work, and in areas of residence.

However, to what extent in the studied groups are there attitudes for monoethnic marriages and romantic relationships, and to what extent are these attitudes implemented? Indirectly, attitudes can be judged by the distribution of answers to the question about the "ethnicity" of the hypothetical spouse of the daughter. Here and until the end of this part, the groups are constructed based on the place of birth and ethnicity of the respondent's father.

According to calculations, there is no difference between Central Asian SGMs and local peers in this attitude. At the same time, both groups differ from Transcaucasian SGMs, among which full or partial agreement with this position is present in more than half of the cases (Table 13). If we recode the values of the variable in such a way that complete agreement with this statement becomes value 3, and complete disagreement becomes value 0, the analysis of the means (see Figure 14) also indicates a higher prevalence of this position among the SGMs from the South Caucasus. Along with that, agreement with this statement at least partially can be a cultural code and an act of identification with one's own ethnic category, and not a guide to action in life. For example, single 26-year-old Nariman who grew up in an Azerbaijani family in Tyumen (m., 26, Azerb.) would like to marry, but he then faces the following dilemma. On the one hand, he thinks that it is necessary to marry an Azerbaijani girl, and this is what all relatives expect from him, especially because he is the last man in their family line (he is the only son in his family, and the rest of his father's brothers have only daughters). But on the other hand, the experience of courting girls of Azerbaijani origin is negative, and in general, he would like someone "special." As a result, due to his age, he begins to think that it may happen that he marries a girl of another "ethnicity."

Another informant explained that the wife of the same "ethnicity" is important in order to preserve the "people": "*We have a great history, great ancestors, that's how the rabbi speaks, that he will pass this on to his student and the student should continue it, yes? I see it the same way. In the modern world, the boundaries of ethnic identity are being erased. From the point of view of Christianity, this is not bad, we are all equal, we should all be people, but let's say I, for me, the concept of a people, the cult of a people — it is sinful — but a little higher priority than religion*" (m., 29, Arm., Tver region). To what extent, however, will second generation migrants marry and date representatives of other categories?

Table 13 — Cross-tabulation: agreement or disagreement with the statement "I will marry off my daughter only to a representative of my ethnicity" according to groups: Transcaucasian SGM, Central Asian SGM, all SGM, and local respondents

| I will marry off my daughter only to a representative of my ethnicity		Transcaucasian SGMs	Central Asian SGMs	All SGMs	Local	Chi Sq
Completely agree	N	823	109	932	1,290	119.775*** when comparing three groups, 71.569*** when comparing two groups (all SGMs and locals)
	%	30.3%	19.8%	28.5%	21.5%	
Rather agree	N	670	107	777	1,395	
	%	24.7%	19.5%	23.8%	23.2%	
Rather disagree	N	760	197	957	1,928	
	%	28.0%	35.8%	29.3%	32.1%	
Completely disagree	N	465	137	602	1,391	
	%	17.1%	24.9%	18.4%	23.2%	
Total	N	2,718	550	3,268	6,004	
	%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	

Figure 14 — Comparison of means: agreement or disagreement with the statement "I will marry off my daughter only to a representative of my ethnicity" according to groups: Transcaucasian SGMs, Central Asian SGMs, all SGMs, and local respondents

According to the data, the Central Asian SGMs in terms of the spouse's ethnicity do not differ from the Transcaucasian SGMs, and the patterns associated with the romantic partner's ethnicity in these two groups are almost identical (Table 14). Moreover, the gender distribution in terms of the romantic partner's ethnic affiliation in these groups is also the same — only about a third of men have romantic partners identified with the same ethnic category as the respondents, and for women this share is just under two thirds in both groups. During the qualitative stage of the study, informants noted more than once that the idea of forbidding a girl to marry a representative of another ethnicity is adopted from childhood, with the result that girls often stop even perceiving such young people in a romantic light. One example is a girl who grew up in Azerbaijan family in Novy Urengoy (Yamalo-Nenets autonomous district) (f., 26, Azerb.): *"You know, it's already a given that they won't marry you off. It's still possible for our guys somehow, they marry Russians (russkiye)…but for us, for girls, it's already a given that it's impossible, it's forbidden, that's why we don't even look, somehow, we don't take anyone seriously. It's the same way for me. I do not perceive anyone [not Azerbaijani in a romantic way], I do not even look. Even if I socialize — with that classmate [according to the informant, he was Russian and hinted at the opportunity to date her]—this is just a classmate, a friend, that's all, there can be nothing more. I don't even think of looking at him in another way, that doesn't happen."*

Table 14 — Distribution of answers to the question about ethnicity of a spouse or romantic partner, according to the groups of respondents: Transcaucasian SGMs, Central Asian SGMs, and local

	Transcaucasian SGMs				Central Asian SGMs				Locals				
	Male	Female	All	N	Male	Female	All	N	Male	Female	All	N	Chi Sq
Spouse of the same ethnicity	48%	63%	56%	551	65%	53%	58%	127	69%	72%	71%	2697	48.638***
Romantic partner of the same ethnicity	31%	63%	48%	730	34%	61%	46%	169	68%	63%	65%	1628	75.273***

According to in-depth interviews, male second generation migrants avoid romantic relationships with girls of their ethnic category: for example, Orhan (m., 23, Azerb.), by his own confession, never considered such girls for *"frivolous relations"* as *"you will have a lot of troubles."* He said that everyone in his city knew everyone, and such news spread instantly, which could result in negative consequences.

Therefore, even though second generation migrants value personal relationships with representatives of their group, they rarely isolate themselves in such relationships, and they always communicate with someone else at school and at work. They more often marry representatives of the same category, with no gender difference, whereas

romantic relationships vary greatly between men and women, and men are more likely to date girls identified with other ethnic categories.

CULTURAL INTEGRATION

The section on cultural integration is intended to answer questions about how much second generation migrants differ from local peers in terms of cultural patterns, as well as to what extent these patterns change over time and, in principle, have the potential to change. To answer these questions, we first provide an analysis of the groups' differences in the answers to the questions about the most striking cultural norms related to gender and marriage. Second, we cover the extent to which these norms are reproduced through generations and, last, to what extent certain normative patterns are related to the time spent living in Russia.

Cultural integration is a complex non-linear process in which migrants often "navigate" between different cultural patterns, which appear as family and host society norms in the typical case of second generation migrants. The host society is not an abstraction, but manifests itself in the course of communication between the second generation migrants and their neighbors, classmates, colleagues, and so on. Considering the fact that Russia is a large and multiethnic country, the experience of interaction with the "culture of the host society" of the SGM may vary significantly depending on the context of this interaction. However, in the qualitative study, the image of "Russian culture" was reproduced in interviews, and informants could build on it for self-positioning or just state some of its patterns. Elements of this image include, for example, the fact that women in Russia do not know how to cook (f., 20, Arm., Krasnodar Region), that in Russia "there is no sense of priority towards family" (m., 30, Taj., Tyumen region), and that Russians at their leisure "go to the hookah bar and drink" (f., 20, Azerb., Tyumen region).

For this analysis, however, objective differences from cultural patterns that are common among the diverse non-migrant population of Russia are more important. In this regard, we decided to compare both the two groups — locals and SGMs — and four groups — the Transcaucasian and Central Asian SGMs, local Russians and local non-Russians — despite the fact that the latter group is also extremely heterogeneous and includes those who indicated that their father, for example, is a Pole, Avar, Jew, or Tatar. At the same time, our sample (for the category "local") mirrors the ethnic composition of Russia in general terms: in the data set, "Russians (russkiye)" are followed by Tatars, Ukrainians, Bashkirs, and Chuvashs, and although the ethnic composition of the "local non-Russians" is quite diverse — as in Russia as a whole — representatives of the Caucasian and Volga ethnic categories prevail. Based on all this, the question of the similarity of cultural patterns should be formulated somewhat more precisely: to what extent do SGMs differ from local peers, both as a whole and separately from Russians and non-Russians?

Regarding gender norms, it can be argued that the only significant difference is between "local Russians" and other groups, including both Central Asian and Transcaucasian second generation migrants, while the latter two groups do not differ from "local non-Russians" on most issues (Table 15, Figure 15, Figure 17). These three groups are more conservative and more often agree that if a husband earns less than

his wife, it is a shameful issue for him, and also less often agree that it is important for a woman to fulfill her potential in a profession. The only statement in the distribution of reactions for which there is a gap between the "ethnic" groups is the statement: "if there is enough money in the family, a woman does not need to work." Central Asian SGMs agree with the above significantly more often than other groups, whereas the existing difference between Transcaucasian SGMs and local non-Russians, on the one hand, and local Russians, on the other hand, is smaller than the difference of each of these groups from Central Asian SGMs. At the same time, it should be noted that although local Russians are less conservative in comparison with other groups, it's quite difficult to call the mean value for this group "liberal." For example, local Russians almost equally agree and disagree with the statement that the husband should make all decisions in the family. The analysis of differences between the SGMs and the local peers in general suggests that the second generation migrants are slightly more conservative than the locals, but this gap is not large (Figure 16, Figure 18).

Table 15 — Mean values of answers to the questions on gender and marriage practices of Transcaucasian SGMs, Central Asian SGMs, all SGMs, local Russians, local non-Russians, and all local respondents

	If there is enough money in the family, a woman does not need to work*	It is important for a woman to fulfill her potential in a profession	If a husband earns less than a wife, it is a shameful issue for him	The husband should make all decisions in the family	Vignette — A wife is to come back to work once a child grows up**	We never kissed before the wedding	The decision about our wedding was made by our parents	At our wedding, there were relatives whom I had never seen before	We got acquainted on the Internet (social networking sites, dating sites, etc.)
Transcaucasian SGMs	1.59	2.11	1.23	1.68	.45	.20	.10	.25	.33
Central Asian SGMs	1.81	2.15	1.27	1.65	.50	.18	.17	.31	.31
Local Russians	1.48	2.01	1.04	1.42	.35	.08	.10	.15	.29
Local non-Russians	1.59	2.07	1.30	1.67	.42	.17	.19	.29	.39
All SGMs	1.63	2.12	1.24	1.67	.46	.20	.11	.26	.32
All locals	1.50	2.02	1.09	1.47	.37	.10	.12	.18	.31

* For the first four questions, the scale of means varies from 0 (complete disagreement with the statement) to 3 (complete agreement with the statement), while the scale for question 2 (fulfilling potential in a profession) is inverted. The scale for the remaining five questions is from 0 (disagreement with the statement) to 1 (agreement with the statement).

** The full text of the vignette is the following:
Imagine the situation. Your friends got married, they had a baby. They debate whether the wife should leave work and, until the children grow up, only take care of the home and the children, or whether she can go back to work after maternity leave. What do you think they should do? 1. The wife should leave work and, until the children grow up, she should only take care of the house and the children. 2. The wife should go to work after maternity leave.

Figure 15 — Gender attitudes of Transcaucasian SGMs, Central Asian SGMs, local Russians, and local non-Russians


*Figure 16* — Gender attitudes of SGMs and local respondents

Figure 17 — Marriage practices of Transcaucasian SGMs, Central Asian SGMs, local Russians, and local non-Russians


Figure 18 — Marriage practices of SGMs and local respondents

A number of questions about marriage were addressed only to married respondents. Their analysis reveals the same trend: namely, the SGMs are more conservative and local Russians differ from other groups in most issues. On the other hand, local non-Russians are more likely to resemble SGMs from Transcaucasia and Central Asia than local Russians. At the same time, there are a number of trends that may hide new cultural patterns emerging in the course of cultural integration. For instance, 15—20 % of "non-Russian" respondents (SGM and local) and about 8 % of local Russians did not kiss before their wedding. However, Transcaucasian SGMs are not different from local Russians in terms of who made decisions about the wedding — the newlyweds or their parents (10 % for both groups), and these percentages are less than the values for Central Asian SGMs (16 %) and local non-Russian (19 %). Central Asian SGMs are also more similar to local non-Russians than to Transcaucasian SGMs in whether relatives whom they did not know were at their wedding. An indirect indicator of conservatism (however, not only of conservatism), moreover, can be the prevalence of online dating practices — conservative environments invite such acquaintances. According to this criterion, the SGMs differ neither from local Russians nor from local non-Russians, but the differences between these two groups, on the contrary, are significant, and local non-Russians have higher values by this criterion than local Russians.

What is behind these answers? How does online dating occur, how do marriages without any intimate contact between the bride and the groom before the wedding among second generation migrants happen? The attitude according to which all intimate contacts, including kisses, should occur only after the wedding, is connected with the need for the absolute chastity of the girl, since the girl's reputation directly affects the reputation of her fiancé. During a group discussion, young people of Azerbaijani origin who grew up in Moscow discussed why they are still not married — although they are over 25 years old, and by this age their parents had been married for some years and had several children — and explained their unwed status by describing the very high risk of meeting an Azerbaijani girl and proposing to her, but then finding out that she went to the movies with someone and they had kissed. Paikar (m., 23, Arm., Krasnodar region) spoke about his cousins' jokes when they ask each other "difficult questions": "*You kiss her, but are you sure that she has not been kissed? And if I give you a million [rubles], will you marry a non-virgin woman?*" Within the framework of this conservative model, a girl should not take the initiative and show that she likes a man. Moreover, in conservative families, girls are in principle limited in their ability to meet and communicate with the opposite sex, and social networking sites in this sense become a space of freedom, albeit a relatively limited one. During the interviews with two girls who grew up in Azerbaijani families in the Tyumen region, as well as during a group discussion with girls of Armenian descent in Sochi, discussions took place on how to get acquainted with a boy so as to comply with all propriety norms, but at the same time have the opportunity to communicate with him without strict supervision by the older generation. Some admitted that social networking sites are one of the few options, while others rejected this option; however, in return, they could suggest nothing, except, perhaps, the intervention of supernatural forces. At the same time, making acquaintances in social networking sites also implies a certain set of rules. According to an informant who grew up in the Khanty-Mansiisk autonomous district

in a Talysh family (f., 16, Azerb., Tyumen region), if you like someone, you can't send him a friend request on social networking sites, and you can't quickly approve his friend request; you need to wait until he puts a certain number of "likes," then you "like" him in response — and only after that you can add each other as a friend. Thus, social networking sites are a space where behavior is also regulated, but there is room for dating and communication in a situation when other methods of dating are not available or are severely limited.

To what extent does an intergenerational value shift occur? To answer this question, two variables were created on the basis of the variables describing the gender attitudes of both parents and children — considered separately — each of which had three positions: conservative, neutral, and liberal. Next, the cross-tabulation of parents and respondents was carried out and a new variable was created, evaluating the intergenerational dynamics by "steps" (Table 16). In particular, if the respondent was brought up in a conservative family and now he professes liberal views, his gradation is considered as "made two 'liberal' steps." By analogy, other gradations were created.

Table 16 — Cross-tabulation of answers of respondents' parents and respondents themselves to gender related questions

Parents and respondent according to the gender-related questions			Respondent according to the gender-related questions			Total
			Conservative	Neutral	Liberal	
Respondent's parents according to the gender-related questions	Conservative	N	447	696	351	1,494
		%	13.5%	21.0%	10.6%	45.0%
	Neutral	N	288	550	445	1,283
		%	8.7%	16.6%	13.4%	38.7%
	Liberal	N	61	194	287	542
		%	1.8%	5.8%	8.6%	16.3%
Total		N	796	1,440	1,083	3,319
		%	24.0%	43.4%	32.6%	100.0%

The majority of second generation migrants from the Transcaucasia and Central Asia grew up in conservative families (45 %). What does this conservatism mean? One of the most prominent examples of a conservative family is Lily's family (f., 19, Arm., Moscow):

Informant: I have two brothers. One brother is 23 years old, and the second is four.

Researcher: There are no girls?

Informant: No

Researcher: Is that why you are paid so much attention?

Informant: Yes. From both my brother and my father.

Researcher: Who is tougher?

Informant: Tougher? My father is stricter, my brother is tougher. Let me explain the difference. My father can calmly say, "No, you will not go there." I will not argue, this is normal. But my brother nags at me about everything. Suppose, I put on some kind of dress. When we go for a walk, he will nag me about this dress. And the father will immediately say "take it off," calmly.

Researcher: You do not have tight dresses, do you?

Informant: I have one.

Researcher: How do you choose clothes, with your mother?

Informant: No, on my own. I don't allow myself to wear what I know will look vulgar, what my father won't like, what my brother won't like, what I won't be able to wear dancing in a restaurant, for example. And for casual clothes, the main thing is that it should not be revealing.

Researcher: Any crop tops, sleeveless vests?

Informant: It shouldn't show anything. [If there are] sleeves — no problem. A knee-length skirt. The shorts can be above the knee. Surprisingly, my father allows me to wear shorts, even short ones.

Researcher: You need to take a chance!

Informant: But now I feel uncomfortable, I've grown up.

Researcher: But when you were about fourteen?

Informant: Yes, bathing suits — I don't really swim, so I don't wear them. Suppose we went swimming at the lake in the village, then I would wear a crop top, shorts are also necessary. There were guys that stare, and that is very bad. I don't go to the pool here. I don't know how to swim. I have a bathing suit, but I don't wear it, there is nowhere to wear it.

Researcher: That is, if there is a party in the pool with girls, only then?

Informant: Party?

Researcher: Well, sort of, something like a sauna, swimming pool?

Informant: I can't go there either. Recently, there was my friend's birthday, her whole family was there, in a restaurant. A hundred people were there. There were all our friends, boys, girls. My father just barely let me go. There were tears, scenes, but he did let me go. Everything went well.

Second generation migrants themselves, however, adhere to conservative views less often than their parents — only in 24 % of cases, whereas neutral and liberal gender positions in these issues are more common among them (Table 17). The most frequent step is a step from the family's conservative position to a personal neutral position (21 % of cases), and the transition from the liberal position of parents to a personal neutral position is least likely to occur. In approximately 40 % of cases, an approximate status

quo is preserved. However, who is more likely, socialized in a conservative family, to not adhere to conservative positions: Central Asian or Transcaucasian SGMs? According to calculations, Transcaucasian SGMs born in conservative families remain conservative only in 29 % of cases, and Central Asians in 34 %. Moreover, Transcaucasian SGMs from such families more often take up explicit liberal positions, in 24 % of cases versus 17 % of Central Asian SGMs. Such transitions in which children are more "liberal" than parents are, however, accompanied by conflicts: *For them [parents], the life plan is set up — to graduate from university, to marry (and only someone of my ethnicity), which I, of course, will not do, give birth to kids as soon as possible, and that's it, but I don't want to do that until I'm 35, let's say. And we often have arguments. I have my own plans for life and goals*" (m., 20, Azerb., Tyumen region). It is important to note, however, that conflicts over norms also occur when parents and children agree on part of the questions. For example, Rosa (f., 25, Azerb., Tyumen region) constantly conflicts with her parents about her appearance: she dyes her hair red and shaves her temples, argues with her parents about the possibility of making decisions independently, and scares them with being an atheist. However, she will postpone sexual relations until her wedding, although she told her parents that she would not allow them to check the sheet for blood after the wedding night. In addition, as can be seen from table 16, there are situations, although few, when parents adhere to more liberal views than their children: for example, in a family of Armenians who moved to Moscow, a daughter who grew up in Russia believes that her mother does not dress in the proper way for a modest Armenian woman, and sometimes asks her to put on less-revealing clothes (f., 23, Arm., Moscow).

Table 17 — Gender attitudes of respondents according to the groups of SGMs:
Transcaucasian SGMs and Central Asian SGMs

Children of conservative parents according to the gender-related questions		Respondent according to the gender-related questions		
		Conservative	Neutral	Liberal
Transcaucasian SGMs	N	383	606	319
	%	29.3 %	46.3 %	24.4 %
Central Asian SGMs	N	64	65	32
	%	34.4 %	48.4 %	17.2 %

It is important to note that there are significant gender differences in the dynamics of positions related to gender issues (Table 18). Men are much more likely to remain in their parents' positions, or take steps towards a more conservative position. On the contrary, in more than 50 % of cases (versus 32 % in men), women turn out to hold more liberal views than their parents.

Table 18 — Intergenerational dynamics in the gender-related questions according to sex

Intergenerational dynamics in the gender-related questions		Male	Female	Total
Made two conservative steps	N	30	31	61
	%	2.3%	1.5%	1.8%
Made one conservative step	N	278	204	482
	%	21.5%	10.1%	14.5%
Remained in the same position	N	572	712	1,284
	%	44.1%	35.2%	38.7%
Made one liberal step	N	364	777	1,141
	%	28.1%	38.4%	34.4%
Made two liberal steps	N	52	299	351
	%	4.0%	14.8%	10.6%
Total	N	1,296	2,023	3,319
	%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Therefore, it is possible to infer that a conservative position, which characterizes the SGMs' parents, is not always reproduced in the children's generation, and the value changes occur through the generation.

However, to what extent do gender attitudes differ depending on whether a migrant was born in Russia or not and, if not, on the age when he/she migrated, i.e. from migration generation in the narrow sense of the term's definition? According to established terminology, the second generation migrants in the narrow sense refer to those who were born in the country where the parents moved, 1.75 are those who moved to the host country before school, 1.5 are those who found themselves in the host society between the ages of 7—13, and 1.25 are those who came after the age of 13, but before the legal age [Rumbaut, 1997]. Cross-sectional analysis is a rough way to measure the dynamics of attitudes over time, but it allows one to make a reasonable assumption about the phenomenon (Table 19). According to the analysis, there are no differences between the gender attitudes of the 2, 1.75 and 1.5 generations, while at the same time, respondents from the 1.25 generation differ from all other respondents and share more conservative positions. Thus, it can be assumed that value shift is more likely to occur if the migration occurred before the subject is 14 years old. Qualitative data allows us to illustrate such a transition within one family. In Dinara's family (f., 23, Taj., Tyumen Region), there are two more sisters in addition to her: one of them is two years younger, the other is nine years younger. In Russia, Dinara went to the seventh grade, and her middle sister to the fifth grade. The informant notes the difference between herself and her sister: her sister more easily puts on shorts and revealing clothing, and married a Chuvash whom she met at work rather than a Tajik.

Table 19 — Cross-tabulation: respondents' gender attitudes according to the migration generations

Respondent's gender attitudes		Migration generation				Chi Sq
		2	1.75	1.5	1.25	
Conservative	N	469	187	115	20	9.462
	%	24.1%	23.8%	22.7%	27.8%	
Neutral	N	842	339	217	40	
	%	43.3%	43.1%	42.9%	55.6%	
Liberal	N	633	261	174	12	
	%	32.6%	33.2%	34.4%	16.7%	
Total	N	1,944	787	506	72	
	%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	

In general, it can be said that second generation migrants do differ somewhat in terms of gender and marriage norms from local peers. However, local youth, including the "Russians," (russkiye) are far from being "liberals," and the gap between the SGMs and the locals is generally small. Furthermore, some of the patterns of SGMs from the South Caucasus are more similar to those of the local Russians (russkiye) than to those of Central Asian SGMs. In turn, the latter are identical in some aspects in their position to local non-Russians, who in some questions demonstrate the most conservative positions. At the same time, SGMs in many cases have already made a big step towards more liberal attitudes in comparison with their parents, and it can be said that an intergenerational value transition is taking place. This transition relates less to the so-called generation 1.25, that is, people who came to Russia between the ages of 14 to 18 years old.

IDENTIFICATIONAL INTEGRATION

The key question of this section is the identification of second generation migrants with Russia and their "loyalty" to the country. It can be said that second generation migrants are usually transnational; that is, are associated with both Russia and the parents' country of origin due to different practices, and this raises the question of the exclusivity or inclusivity of their national and ethnic identities. In light of this, it is important to understand the extent to which transnational behavior or strong ethnic identity "hinders" the emotional connection of the SGM with Russia. It should be noted that a qualitative study allows us to speak about the variation of this feature. A good indicator is the support of a particular national sports team at major competitions. Some informants were asked about which countries they support at the Olympics, and the answers varied. In particular, Bagrat (m., 22, Arm.), who was born and grew up in Moscow in a family of Azerbaijani Armenians, supports primarily Armenia, and only then Russia. Vusala (f., 22, Azerb., Khanty-Mansiisk autonomous district) cheers first of all for Russia, and "by residual principle" for Azerbaijan. To what extent are dual loyalties characteristic for SGMs and how exclusive are they?

The respondents were asked which country they belong to, with the answer options "to Russia," "to my parents' country of origin," "to both countries," "to neither of the countries" (see Table 20). An analysis of the distributions showed that the absolute majority of the "votes" (about 80 %) were equally divided between the first and second answers, 10 % belong to only the parents' country of origin, and about 8 % feel themselves marginalized and belong neither to Russia, nor to the parents' country of origin. These figures characterize SGMs both from the South Caucasus and from Central Asia, and there is no difference between these groups.

Table 20 — Cross-tabulation: responses to the question "Which country do you belong to more?" according to the following groups of SGMs: Transcaucasian SGMs and Central Asian SGMs

Belongs to		Group		Total
		Transcaucasian SGM	Central Asian SGM	
Russia	N	1,222	264	1,486
	%	41.9%	42.1%	41.9%
The parents'/parent's country of origin	N	310	64	374
	%	10.6%	10.2%	10.6%
Both countries	N	1,167	242	1,409
	%	4.,0%	38.6%	39.8%
To neither of the countries	N	217	57	274
	%	7.4%	9.1%	7.7%
Total	N	2,916	627	3,543
	%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

In addition to this question, the respondents were offered several other questions about identification. In particular, they were asked to agree or disagree with the statements "There is a lot from both Russian (russkaya) culture and the culture of the country where my parents were born in me," "I will never be considered a native in Russia," and also "It's important for me that I am [the respondent's answer to an open question about his or her ethnicity] by ethnicity" (Figure 19).

An analysis of the response distributions to these questions showed that respondents generally agree that they have absorbed two cultures, but they feel that they are not considered "natives" in Russia. This feeling mainly concerns the SGMs from Central Asia. The degree of identification with the category that they indicated as their "ethnicity" is also high, and higher among the Transcaucasian SGMs. Thus, it can be said that the majority of the SGMs consider Russia to be their country. The case of Babken (m., 20, Arm., Moscow) is quite characteristic of SGMs whom we interviewed: he does not particularly reflect on this on an ongoing basis. However, when the interviewer asked him to answer the corresponding question, he answered

unequivocally: "*My Motherland turns out to be Russia, as I was born here.*" The case of Varsik (f., 23, Arm., Moscow) is also characteristic in the same manner: she speaks of having two homelands at the same time:


Figure 19 — Answers to the questions on identification according to the following groups of SGMs: Transcaucasian SGMs and Central Asian SGMs

Researcher: Where is your homeland?

Informant: I have two, I think. Because I am very grateful to Russia for this entire opportunity, that my [parents] moved here, and were able to raise us, to give us everything, everything that my sister and I wanted. Well, how can I call my homeland Russia, as it were, yes, if I am Armenian. Thus, I'm an insider here and there. Or, a stranger here and there.

However, to what extent is there a negative correlation between transnational behavior and ethnic identification on the one hand, and identification with Russia on the other?

As can be judged from the table (Table 21), transnational behavior is largely common among SGMs. At school, a third of the respondents visited their parents' country of origin every summer, and a little more than a third went there more than once. While the children of non-migrants went to a village or to a recreational camp, second generation migrants often went to visit their relatives in Transcaucasia or Central Asia. For example, Dildar's family (f., 18, Azerb., Tyumen Oblast) spent each summer in a village near Ganja, and Intizora (f., 23, Uzb., Moscow) was sent to relatives to Andijan, while their parents remained in Russia. In addition, it often happened that SGMs spent a longer time in the country of origin. For example, Pulat (m., 21, Uzb, Omsk Region) was born and went to school in Russia, but then lived in Kyrgyzstan from the fourth to the seventh grade after his parents' divorce, after which he returned to Russia. In addition, over the past five years, 31 % of the surveyed SGMs went to their country of origin at least three times, and this number is in general less than the frequency of their trips during their school years. This finding is consistent with the results of the qualitative

data analysis, which showed that the intensity of trips to their parents' country of origin decreases after school graduation, but also indicates the overall intensity of transnational behavior.

Table 21 — Cross-tabulation: Answers to the questions "Did you go to the country of your parents' (or one of your parent's) origin during your school years?" and "How many times in the last five years have you been in your parents'/one parent's country of origin?" according to the answers to the question "Do you belong in Russia?"

	Did you go to the country of your parents' (or one of your parent's) origin during your school years?	Do you belong in Russia?		Total	Chi Sq	How many times in the last five years have you been in your parents'/ one parent's country of origin?"	Do you belong in Russia?		Total	Chi Sq
		No	Yes				No	Yes		
N	Yes, every summer	255	931	1,186		More than 5 times	103	287	390	
%		39%	32%	33%	20.662***		16%	10%	11%	47.126***
N	Yes, several times	232	1,014	1,246		3—5 times	151	569	720	
%		36%	35%	35%			23%	20%	20%	
N	Yes, once	71	363	434		Once or twice	270	1,142	1,412	
%		11%	12%	12%			42%	39%	40%	
N	No	90	587	677		Not once	124	897	1,021	
%		14%	20%	19%			19%	31%	29%	
N	Total	648	2,895	3,543		Total	648	2,895	3,543	
%		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%			100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	

According to the data (see Table 22), there is correlation between transnational behavior and a feeling of belonging in Russia: a significant part of those who feel that they belong in Russia have not traveled to their parents' countries of origin during their school years or in the last five years. These figures are higher than among those who feel they do not belong in Russia. At the same time, if we return to the ratios, it is clear that among those who feel they belong in Russia, 67 % of respondents intensively exhibited transnational behavior, and among those who have been at least once in their country of origin over the past five years, this share is 69 %. Thus, it can be said that if there is a correlation between transnationalism and a feeling of belonging in Russia, it is weak, and it is quite possible to travel to a country of origin and belong in Russia, which is what the overwhelming majority of respondents do. For example,

Nevara (f., 22, Taj.) grew up in Moscow in a family of migrants from Tajikistan, and it was believed that they would soon return to their country of origin. Nevara regularly visited Khujand, her parents' hometown. Arriving there, however, she felt like a stranger, and in Moscow, on the contrary, she felt an insider. Another example of the absence of a contradiction between Russian identity and transnationalism is Odinahon (f., 17, Kyrg, Moscow), who every year travels with his family to Jalal-Abad, while still considering Russia to be her homeland.

The situation is similar with the correlation between the power of ethnic identification and belonging to Russia. There is a weak correlation between these variables ($r = 0.058$, $p = 0.001$), but the cross-tabulation shows that among those who belong to Russia, 53 % value their ethnicity as well versus 62 % among those who did not "get along" with Russia well (see table 22). Thus, strong ethnic identity and a sense of being at home in Russia are quite compatible.

> *Researcher: And how do you identify, Armenian?*
> *Informant: I am completely Armenian, Armenian, but Russian [rossiyanin]. That is, I am an Armenian in my head, I am just very friendly towards all peoples, both Russians [russkiye] and all, all, but my upbringing turned out to be more Armenian.*

(m., 21, Arm., Moscow)

Table 22 — Cross-tabulation: agreement or disagreement with the statement "It is important for me that I am … by ethnicity" according to the responses to the question "Do you belong to Russia?"

It is important for me that I am … by ethnicity		Do you belong to Russia?		Total	Chi Sq
		No	Yes		
Completely agree	N	350	1,327	1677	
	%	62.8 %	53.4 %	55,1 %	
Rather agree	N	130	755	885	
	%	23.3 %	30.4 %	29.1 %	
Rather disagree	N	59	306	365	16.840***
	%	10.6 %	12.3 %	12.0 %	
Completely disagree	N	18	98	116	
	%	3.2 %	3.9 %	3.8 %	
Total	N	557	2,486	3,043	
	%	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %	

Moreover, at least for some SGMs, identity is an object for reflection, which can result in quite complex lexical structures. An open question in the survey revealed such identities: "Armenian with a Russian heart," "Armenian-Ukrainian," "Armenian son of the Russian people," "Black Russian (Azerbaijani)," "Kyrgyz by blood, Russian by soul," and so on. Among other identities, in addition, the category "Muslim" is widespread.

Thus, it can be argued that in most cases, SGMs feel that they belong to Russia, but their parents' country of origin, as well as their own ethnicity, also mean a lot to

them. In general, these loyalties do not conflict either in the SGMs' perceptions, nor in their attitudes and behavior.

Conclusion

Summing up, we can say that ethnic second generation migrants from Transcaucasia and Central Asia are on average more successful than local peers in terms of education; at the same time, if the Transcaucasian SGMs are more educated than the local peers, then Central Asian SGMs "lose" by this criterion to everyone else, including local youth. However, these differences do not affect the level of income — it is the same for the whole country, but there are differences if we look at the capital and non-capital regions separately. In the second generation migrant social networks, as a rule, there are representatives of their own ethnic category; however, closed groups of this kind in this environment are rarely formed, and mostly second generation migrants communicate with representatives of other ethnic categories. Migrants of the second generation marry representatives of their own category more often than representatives of other categories, but romantic relationships with the latter occur more often. However, there are significant differences by gender: men date representatives of other categories twice as often as women do. Gender attitudes of second generation migrants are, in general, more conservative than those of the local peers, but the difference is not very large, not least because Russia, in general, is a fairly conservative country. At the same time, second generation migrants are significantly more "liberal" in these matters than their parents. Identificational characteristics of second generation migrants are inclusive: most often they feel that they belong to both Russia and their specific region in the country, as well as to their parents' country of origin. Their identification with their ethnic category is also important for them. All these identities coexist successfully in the heads of second generation migrants and do not conflict.

In general, we can thus talk about successful integration. Moreover, as the study of cases of second generation migrants' integration in different countries shows, the Russian situation is one of the most successful in the world. The integration trajectories of second generation migrants are closely connected with the characteristics of their parents' human capital and with the characteristics of the spatial distribution of migrants in the host country. In Russia, both factors favor the integration of SGMs: first, migrant families live dispersedly, and there is no reason to talk about monoethnic areas with compact migrant settlements. Secondly, despite the fact that the point system for selecting migrants does not work in Russia, as in Canada and Australia, most parents of SGMs have at least secondary education and often run their own business, the size of which, however, can vary greatly. Third, due to the fact that all parents of SGMs from Transcaucasia and Central Asia in Russia grew up in the USSR, they are well acquainted with the institutions of the host society, which have changed only slightly due to the institutional path dependence effect in the 30 years that have passed since the collapse of the USSR. This means that this older generation is fluent or good at the Russian language, and besides, in terms of some values and attitudes (for example, values of higher education), these migrants are often only slightly different from local peers.

If one evaluates specific aspects of integration, the situation of the SGMs in Russia is also one of the most prosperous in terms of structural integration. In Belgium

and in France, for example, the indicators of SGMs in terms of education and the situation on the labor market are much worse than for locals. The Russian situation is comparable to the situation in Canada and Australia, countries with the so-called point immigration system. In terms of social integration, Russia is slightly different from other countries: the social networks of the SGMs in Russia are multiethnic, and the same situation can be observed, for example, in Germany and Sweden. In contrast to Germany, however, the SGMs almost without exception are native Russian speakers or are fluent in Russian (cultural integration) in the Russian case. In addition, unlike the main immigration societies, the analysis did not reveal any strong differences between the SGMs and local peers in terms of gender norms in Russia. SGM integration in Russia, moreover, is generally not a problem: this situation is similar to that of North American countries and differs from Germany, where SGMs primarily associate themselves with their parents' country of origin, whereas the association with the host country is weak.

It can be argued, therefore, that second generation migrants in Russia do not experience significant integration problems and, in comparison with international cases, are in the better position. At the same time, although the situation is generally favorable, there are a number of recurring problems whose solutions will contribute to a better integration of second generation migrants. In particular, there are cases when second generation migrants do not obtain Russian citizenship even while living in Russia and studying at Russian schools. As a result, they are faced with the inability to continue free education in the country after high school graduation. Moreover, upon reaching the age of consent, they are legally vulnerable, and in particular can be deported. The solution to this problem can be the inclusion of the category "having received basic general education in Russia" among the categories of persons entitled to receive Russian citizenship under the simplified procedure. The second problem is the lack of a comprehensive solution for learning Russian as a foreign language by migrant children in schools. The low skill level of the Russian language contributes to reducing the expected socio-economic profile of second generation migrants; moreover, this language deficiency makes them outcasts in the classroom. In solving this problem, the schools are left on their own and the scaling up of already developed practices in the country can be a significant help. The third problem is that girls from conservative families often are subjected to domestic violence — both physical and emotional — and can develop associated psychological problems. Creating a system of psychological assistance for such girls and the inclusion of a cultural component in the training of psychologists, as well as expanding the network of shelters for women in distress, can help resolve situations associated with patriarchal pressure in families. The fourth problem is the conflict potential of "cultural" events in schools and universities, in which SGMs represent their parents' countries of origin. The mass brawl of Armenians and Azerbaijanis at the "Moscow Made Us Friends" event at RUDN University in 2007 is a typical example of this problem. Its solution is a change in the scenario of a typical event, in which competition should be replaced by cooperation, and the ethnic essence should be changed to a family one [16].

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[16] For more information on what principles should be laid in such kind of events, see Varshaver, Rocheva, Ivanova, 2015; Varshaver, Rocheva, Ivanova, 2017; Varshaver, Rocheva, Ivanova, 2017.

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